THOMAS POWNALL

M.P., F.R.S.

GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY

AUTHOR OF

THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS

WITH A SUPPLEMENT COMPARING

THE COLONIES OF

KINGS GEORGE III. & EDWARD VII.

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THOMAS POWNALL

The Honorable Govr Thomas Pownall M.P.
OBIIT 1805.

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WITH A SUPPLEMENT COMPARING

THE COLONIES OF KINGS GEORGE III AND EDWARD VII

By CHARLES A. W. POWNALL

1722 1805

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PREFACE

This book has been written with two objects in view.

First, to revive the memory of a distant kinsman, who did his best to serve England. Thomas Pownall was a lieutenant of Pitt, he shared that great statesman's views. He was able to reinforce them with knowledge, gained on the spot, of the then existing conditions of the North American Colonies, and the men, such as Franklin, who were the leaders of opinion there.

In the years after his return from those colonies, both from his place in Parliament and in his writings, he advocated those measures of conciliation which Pitt regarded as the only means of preventing a rupture. If they had been adopted the Stars and Stripes need never have replaced the Union Jack. Circumstances change from generation to generation; the nature of mankind and the problems it has to face remain much the same at all times.

Secondly, the attempt is made to deduce, from the failure of an oligarchy to deal with its "Overseas Men" of the eighteenth century, some parallels and lessons which may perhaps help to prevent the democracy of to-day from committing similar errors in the present and the future.

History repeats itself. It has done so, as regards England, in the remarkable similarity between her

relations with the North American colonies in the middle of the eighteenth century and with those which she now has: Canada, Australasia, the Cape. In the old days her colonies desired to remain under the flag if they could get reasonable treatment. That was the mind of Franklin and Washington; it was the mind of Mr. Deakin, of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, of Mr. Moor, Dr. Jameson and their colleagues at the Imperial Conference of 1907. The latter ask for favourable and preferential terms, as the former did a century and a half ago. So, too, do the parts played by Thomas Pownall in the Parliaments of King George III. and by the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain in those of King Edward VII. correspond. Imperially-minded Englishmen, they both became well acquainted with colonial ideas. Widely separated in time, closely allied in thought, the one did long ago, the other has been doing lately, his best for the unity of the Empire. A deaf ear was turned to Pownall's warnings. Events justified them. Is a deaf ear to be turned to the warnings of Mr. Chamberlain?

It was selfishness and ignorance of the outside world, on the part of the home-staying English, which lost the American colonies in the time of George III. in whose own person those defects were most prominent. The same selfishness and the same ignorance exist to-day. If unchecked in the treatment of the present colonies they may cause even greater loss to us and our descendants than they did to our forefathers.

CHARLES A. W. POWNALL.

The Athenæum, Pall Mall, S.W.
October 11, 1908.

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ERRATA

Page 18, line 34, *for* Rooseveldt *read* Roosevelt.
„ 67, „ 20, *for* Osborn *read* Osborne.
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CHAPTER I

PERSONAL

Thomas Pownall, whose name is practically unknown to the present generation, was distinguished in the reign of George III. as a Colonial Governor, a man of affairs with a seat in Parliament; in his later life as an antiquary, and throughout his career as a writer on political questions. His book on the *Administration of the Colonies*, which first appeared in 1764 when the destiny of the Colonies in North America hung in the balance, passed through several editions in the next ten years, and on that work his claim to remembrance has, till now, chiefly rested. Chapter XII. of this book endeavours to prove that he was also the long-sought author of the famous *Letters of Junius*.

He was born in 1722, the younger brother of John Pownall, Esq., who had a good estate at Saltfleetby on the Lincolnshire coast, but though he took his turn as High Sheriff for the county he did not reside there, his life being spent in Government offices in London. In 1745 he was gazetted Secretary to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations,[1] and he held that position for many years, till in 1768 he became Under-Secretary of State for the American Department, and eventually one of the Commissioners of the Board of Customs and a member of Parliament, representing St. Germans in Cornwall for a short time from 1774. John Pownall was a Deputy-Lieutenant for Lincoln, and in the Commission of the Peace for that county, and also for Middlesex, Kent and Surrey. An obituary notice of him in the *Gentleman's Magazine* says that "his character, for

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1745, p. 389.

abilities, attention, integrity and knowledge of business is so universally known, and hath been so, both by Government and by all persons who have had business to transact with him, or occasion to apply to the offices where he served, that all praise on that head is superfluous."[1] He, Thomas the subject of this memoir, and two other brothers, Richard and Edward, who were in the Guards,[2] were the sons of William Pownall, Esq., of Saltfleetby, by his wife Sarah the daughter of John Burniston, Deputy-Governor of Bombay. William Pownall died in 1735, and to his memory his eldest son erected a monument, first in St. Martin's, afterwards removed to St. Margaret's Church at Lincoln, on which he is described as "Armiger ex Stirpe antiqua in Agro Cestriae." That statement is traced to its origin at the end of this book, for to know from whom a man descends is helpful to the understanding of what kind of man he himself was.

Though some of his forefathers appear in the Lincolnshire pedigrees of the Harleian Society,[3] their connection with that county was comparatively recent, for, as the Lincoln monument states, they originally came from Cheshire.

Those interested in genealogical matters will find in the appendix some pages giving another instance of the well-known fact that the status of families varies through their generations in curves of good and ill fortune, sometimes rising, then falling, then perhaps rising again. It is sufficient to say here that Thomas Pownall, beginning life in the reign of George I., when an old Cheshire descent was claimed for him, did so as one of a family which had taken no share in public affairs since a very remote period.

Having ranked for some generations, when at Witton and Barnton, among the yeomen of Cheshire, it had been quite apart from the Court with its influences and ambitions, which made the fortunes of some houses, especially in the reign of Henry VIII., but destroyed those of many others. In the Middle Ages the heads of the "taller poppies" were always cut off, sooner or later, as they rose above the crowd. But he came of pure

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1795, p. 621.
[2] *Ibid.*, 1759, p. 94; 1763, p. 258; 1769, p. 168.
[3] Vol. lii. p. 796.

English blood, of men connected with the land of England since that was first brought under cultivation; some of it they had always owned, more or less in quantity, as their fortunes changed from time to time. His branch then owned a good deal. In consequence of marriages with several consecutive heiresses they were wealthy people. Moreover, with the continuous ownership, which involves having subordinates, had come the instinct of the owner and master for giving orders and ruling which is in large measure a hereditary gift.

That part of his inheritance was most valuable to one destined to be a Colonial Governor of the eighteenth century, when the man on the spot, separated by a distance very great in time from the central authority and its resources, had to rely on his own strength in such a crisis as might arise at any moment, and did actually exist in Massachusetts when Pownall took charge of the province. His being able to rise to the occasion was partly due to the fact that his forefathers had lived—men in the habit of command, employers and not employed—the old quiet life of the English country-side in the days when the son succeeded the father in the owning or the tilling of the same acres. To that life there were but few counter attractions in the shape of professions or foreign appointments. Commerce was small, manufacturing industries began later with that discovery of the power of steam which has revolutionised human existence; the land was everything.

Though Thomas Pownall's lot was to depart from it and to go overseas, almost the first of his name to do so, he was himself brought up in that old order of things.

His father died when he was a child. He was educated at Lincoln, the county town, and proceeded to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he took his degree in 1743. He then went up to London, where the elder brother's position as Secretary of the Board of Trade and Plantations gave an opening to the younger brother.

That Board was in those days regarded as being the best place for a young man to obtain a knowledge of the commerce, politics and interests of the country.[1] Established by Lord Sommers in the time of Queen Anne,

[1] Nichol's *Literary Anecdotes*, 1814, vol. viii., note to p. 61.

it consisted of "all the great officers of State, the Bishop of London, the Secretaries of State for the time being and those more especially called the Commissioners of Trade."[1] Under the Secretary of State this Board administered colonial affairs, its members were addressed as "The Lords of Trade," and it was the equivalent, or perhaps one should say the germ, of the present Colonial Office. The President of the Board when Thomas Pownall entered it was George, second Earl of Halifax.[2] Pownall had acquired a good knowledge of the Greek and Latin authors. An anonymous contemporary, who was by no means friendly to him in America, admits that his classical attainments were such as to attract notice, and gives him credit for being "a person of uncommon application, and a good memory."[3] He was also a good mathematician, skilful with his pencil, and had studied law and surveying. In a footnote to the Grenville Correspondence he is described as a man of profound experience and learning, both as a politician and antiquary.[4]

British subjects, both abroad and at home, will find here a curious historical precedent for the present situation between England and her colonies. Pownall spent fourteen years in the House of Commons endeavouring to prevent the "slamming and barring and bolting the door" in the face of the old English colonies which that policy, as carried out by George III., converted into the United States of America. That separation Pownall nearly prevented in 1774 when he won Lord North over to his views.

It may be of interest to Americans to follow the career of one who came late in the long list of British Governors of Massachusetts Bay, and during his term of office not only conceived an affection for that country which he never lost, but there formed a friendship of thirty years with Benjamin Franklin, and played a considerable part in the defence of New England against the French during the critical years from 1757 to 1760.

Canadians may care to hear something of the man

[1] *Administration of the Colonies,* Thomas Pownall, 1774, p. 22.

[2] His monument is in the east transept on the north side of Westminster Abbey.

[3] *Collections of Massachusetts Historical Society,* iii. p. 86.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 312.

who instigated Mr. Pitt to send Wolfe's expedition to Quebec, and drew up a plan for that campaign at Mr. Pitt's request.

After Pownall had been for eight or nine years occupied with departmental work in the office of the Board of Trade he was selected by Lord Halifax to accompany Sir Danvers Osborne, brother-in-law of the Earl, who was going to New York as Governor of that Province, in the capacity of Secretary. But it was believed at the time that Pownall's position was more than that word usually conveys, and rather that of a technical adviser, drilled in the methods of the head office, who was to use his expert knowledge in support of a man who, though well connected, was an amateur in the business which had to be dealt with.

Sir Danvers and Pownall left Portsmouth on August 22, 1753, and arrived in New York six weeks later. There we must leave them for a while. New York was then in every respect such an utterly different place from what it is now, that it is impossible to understand the conditions in which they found themselves when they landed there unless we recall, as briefly as possible, the natural and historical causes which had produced the city and its inhabitants, amongst whom these newcomers from the old country found themselves placed.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW ENGLAND COLONIES

To find the roots of the first English colonies in America we have to go back as far as the reign of Henry VII., whose grant of 1498 to the Cabots, Venetian mariners settled in Bristol, was the foundation of the English claim to suzerainty beyond the Atlantic. Little came of that enterprise except the foundation of the valuable fishing industry of Newfoundland, and nearly a century passed till in 1578 Sir Humphrey Gilbert received an open commission to occupy any heathen lands wherever they might be.

Gilbert, like the Cabots, achieved nothing. Next came Raleigh in 1584; he made a settlement in Virginia, but it was not till twenty years later that the Virginia Company was founded. In 1606 the Crown authorised Sir Thomas Gates to take possession of all the territories westward from the Atlantic, in a belt bounded on the north by the present frontier between Canada and the United States, and on the south by a line running between North and South Carolina. Carolina was granted in 1629 to Sir Robert Heath; Maine in 1639 to Sir Ferdinand Gorges; Maryland to the first Lord Baltimore who had previously made a small settlement in Newfoundland. Pennslyvania was assigned in 1681 to William Penn, whose father was a creditor of the Crown.[1] New York was taken from the Dutch in 1664, and named after the Duke of York, afterwards James II. Such were some of the main grants; they do not concern our present purpose so much as the colony of Massachusetts. New

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1754. Note on map facing page 231.

England, of which Massachusetts was the chief province, saw its first English residents in 1584 in the persons of Sir Philip Amadas and Captain Arthur Barlow.[1] It owed its rise neither to industrial enterprise, like Virginia, nor to a desire to gratify some court favourite as was otherwise the case. It rested on the much deeper motive of religious conviction. The seventeenth century, which saw the real acquisition by England of colonies beyond the Atlantic, saw also a bitter religious strife in Europe, especially in England. That dates back to the Reformation when Henry VIII. claimed to succeed the Pope in spiritual supremacy over his subjects. That large body of Protestants who afterwards became known as Puritans denied absolutely that a king by virtue of his succession to the throne, was endowed with any such spiritual powers. They held that it was for each man personally and individually to appeal for guidance to Heaven when and how he chose. Those views, so diametrically opposed, were pushed to the uttermost on both sides, it was impossible to reconcile them in this world. Men were torn asunder by them, and the Reformation of England became also a disintegration.

While the Continent held two parties, those for and those against the doctrines of Rome, in England there were three,—the Church of Rome, the Church of England, and the other reformed Churches, each bitterly opposed to the other.

The extreme claims of her father Henry were not pressed by Queen Elizabeth; but when she died and was succeeded by a narrow-minded Scotch pedant, who had that taste for theological splitting of hairs which has so often disrupted Scotland, the old pretensions of Henry VIII. to spiritual domination were revived. James I. plumed himself more upon his learning as a theologian than on his position as a Sovereign, but the power which he derived from the latter he used without mercy or hesitation to support the doctrine he favoured. Early in his reign, at the Hampton Court Conference between the prelates of the Church and the Puritan divines, when the latter ventured to question the authority of the King he broke up the assembly saying, "I will make them conform or I will harry them out of the land." Those

[1] *British Colonial Policy*, H. E. Egerton, 1905, p. 100.

words, spoken in anger, were no empty threat; they were grimly acted on by himself, his son and his grandson, who between them, without the least knowing what they were doing, laid the foundation of the present United States by driving across the Atlantic exactly that class of the English people best fitted to cultivate and develop the soil and resources of these New England provinces, which were, at the same period, the subjects of the Royal grants.

Under the Tudors and the Stuarts that which the throne decreed to be right had to be right. The definition of what was right varied from time to time, according to who might be sovereign and what mood he might be in. The latter again was distinctly uncertain, depending as it did on the statesman or prelate who might happen to have the King's ear at the moment. Hence those variations in the earlier rubrics, which have been such a fertile source of controversy among churchmen and of gain to ecclesiastical lawyers. The doctrine of the Church of England thus moved sometimes in the direction of Rome, sometimes the other way; every move towards Rome, such as those when Laud was the pilot of Charles I. further embittered the more extreme Protestants. But, whatever else was uncertain one thing was clear, the law stood behind the King, and those who differed with him had the law and its penalties to reckon with. Men differed at their peril. If those who did not agree with the King on matters of opinion were persons of importance they might go to the block like Sir Thomas More, ex-Chancellor of England. If they were men of low degree they might share the fate of Bunyan the tinker who spent a dozen years in Bedford gaol, a gaol being then not only a place of confinement, but often a pest-house. The offence for which the authors of *Utopia* and the *Pilgrim's Progress* suffered, a century apart, was simply that they were not of the same mind as their kings. There were men of the same mind, men who found in the Church of England an acceptable shelter, a half-way house between the lofty pretensions of the Church of Rome on the one hand, and the gloom of Calvinism on the other. They sought, and found, refuge in that spirit of compromise between extremes which has always been natural to the English temperament.

And there were others who could equally conform to the doctrines from time to time promulgated by the throne, not perhaps because they considered those doctrines very carefully, but because to them loyalty came first and outweighed every other consideration. Of such were the nobles and gentry who, with their retainers, formed the Cavalier Army in the Civil War.

To each of those two classes all the good and desirable things of life, so far as within their reach, were open. They could take the oaths of supremacy and allegiance, and then lead their lives in peace; but as there was no peace in life for any one who did not take those oaths, another set of people came in to reinforce those two and make up the adherents of the Church. There are always in any community a large class of men, Gallios or Laodiceans, who either do not much care, or who are lukewarm, about the questions at issue. It is notoriously they who turn the scale at modern elections. It was they who then had to choose between taking the oaths, by doing which they had much to gain, and refusing them, by which they had much to lose. Human nature being what it is, can one doubt that a multitude of those who conformed did so with an eye to their own interests lest evil should befall them? They were influenced by fear, an influence which the Stuarts had no hesitation in invoking. And can we blame them? we who are free from that terror. The temptation to pocket his scruples must have been enormous to a man of that class; one cannot judge too hardly those who yielded to it. A great mass of them must have gone to swell the ranks of the sincere Churchmen and the sincere loyalists above mentioned. Then there remained the men who would not conform, the Puritans, called "Nonconformists." They were men who really did not believe what the King said they should believe, and absolutely refused to say they did, even when it was so much easier and pleasanter to say so than to refuse.

To them the pillory and the gaols were open, but the universities were closed. That closing of the universities affected them not only as regards the opportunity of education, but socially, and in that aspect it kept them on an inferior footing. They were debarred from holding any municipal office, from holding any commission, from

filling any preferment in the Church. One-fifth of the English clergy, among them many of the best and most learned in their profession, were driven from their livings in 1662, because they would not conform. Once ejected, by the Act passed three years later, they were prohibited from going within five miles of any borough or of any place where they had previously ministered. Cut off thus from their fellows, they were reduced to the extreme of poverty. Turned out of their own churches, the right of meeting in other buildings for public worship was denied them; if they did so meet, the congregation was liable at any moment to be invaded by the officers of the law, who could arrest whom they pleased. In a Nonconformist chapel at Bristol, a town then strong in its Puritanism as in its commerce, there is still pointed out a special exit through the gallery into a back street, provided for those of the congregation to whom sudden flight was most necessary when the front doors were seized by the authorities. Such precautions must have been required not only in that particular instance, but generally throughout the country.

So far as the ordinary affairs of life were concerned the men thus suffering disabilities and persecution were not criminals; on the contrary, they had among them, besides many of the gentry, some of the best of the middle class and the professional class of their day. How could men of that description, living in the reigns of James I., Charles I. and II., watching their conduct, pretend to believe in the spiritual infallibility, as kings, of people whose personal character as human beings was such as to destroy respect?

The Puritans made no such pretence; having the courage of their opinions they stood out and took the consequences. What those were we have seen. From them there were only two ways of deliverance—emigration and civil war. The one offered escape from an intolerable existence; the other, if successful, would render existence tolerable. Emigration was tried first. It meant that the emigrant, going under compulsion, had to break up his home, sacrifice his prospects, and part with his property for what it would fetch at a forced sale. Then, with what scanty funds he could so raise, he had to embark—if married, with his wife and children—for a

strange country inhabited by savages, among whom he was to take his chance without the protection of the Crown from which he had fled. He had to look forward to a voyage which usually lasted two months, often more. Measured in time, the other side of the Atlantic was more remote from him than an inland station in the heart of China is from us. The voyage had to be made in small sailing vessels never of more than 300 tons, many of them half that size, in which the refugees were closely packed together; to them the perils of the sea, always great to such vessels, were exaggerated by their fears. Turning your back on friends and kinsmen at home to start life again abroad under such conditions was no light undertaking. When it was done by thousands of people who chose it as the least of two evils, one can judge how great in their estimation was the other evil, that of remaining under the persecution from which they fled. To the earlier emigrants the actual getting away from England was no easy matter. It was soon after the Hampton Court Conference, at which King James proclaimed his intentions, that in 1606, a party of Nonconformists from the counties of Nottingham and Lincoln made arrangements with a ship captain to embark them at Boston.[1] He, however, played them false. For a long time he did not appear. When he did come, and took them off by night, he betrayed them to the searchers and other officers, by whom they were landed again and put in gaol, where they were kept a month. Then they were sent to their homes, with the exception of seven leaders who were held till the Assizes. What happened to those unhappy seven we do not know. We do know that the others, undaunted by this failure, made another attempt the following spring. An English captain was amenable of course to English law; it was a very dangerous business for him to be in. So this time they found a Dutch captain who agreed to pick them up between Grimsby and Hull. The women, children and baggage were sent to the rendezvous in a small vessel, which, arriving there before the Dutch ship came in, unfortunately got aground. Seeing the ship, the men of the party came down to it; but after the first boat-load of them had been taken on board there came

[1] Hutchinson's *History of Massachusetts*, 1765, ii. p. 441.

"a great company, both horse and foot, with bills and guns and other weapons, for the country was raised to take them." The Dutchman took alarm and made sail, leaving behind him the greater number of the men and the women and children, all of whom, in sorrow and confusion, were separated from their relatives. Eventually, they got together in Holland, where they stayed several years, till, in 1620, their party embarked again on the famous *Mayflower* of 180 tons, whose passengers, only 101 in number,[1] formed the first Puritan settlement at Plymouth, for which a patent was obtained in the following year.

That was not the only such voyage the *Mayflower* made. In 1629 we find her being equipped again, together with four other vessels, to carry more refugees to the new settlement. They were chartered by "The Company of New England, ayming at the glory of God, the propagation of the gospell of Christ, the conversion of the Indians and the enlargement of the King's Majesty's dominions in America." So says a detailed journal of the voyage written by a Mr. Higginson, who had held a living in Leicester which he had to abandon on refusing to conform. It is printed in the collection of original papers relative to the history of Massachusetts Bay, published by Governor Hutchinson in 1769, and is well worth reading in full on account of the vivid description of what the Puritans were and what they had to undergo. Space forbids more than a summary of it here. We find that the other four ships consisted of the *Talbot* of 300 tons, with 19 guns and 30 seamen; she carried 100 planters, "with all manner of munition and provision for the plantation" for twelve months; the *George*, of like size, armament and crew, she took 52 planters and some provisions, besides 12 mares, 30 kine and some goats; the *Lyon's Whelpe*, "a neat and nimble ship of 120 tunnes," with 8 guns, carrying many mariners and some planters, especially from Dorchester; the *Four Sisters*, of about 300 tons, with many passengers, provisions and cattle. Lastly, the *Mayflower* herself, carrying passengers and provision. There was some difficulty in getting all this little fleet ready for sea at the same time, so the *Talbot* and the *Lyon's Whelpe* sailed together

[1] Hutchinson's *History of Massachusetts*, 1765, ii. p. 453.

in advance of the others. Leaving Gravesend on Saturday, April 25, it was not till May 4, that they were off the Isle of Wight, at Yarmouth, where they spent two days ashore. A modern cargo boat would have landed them in America in those nine days. On Monday, May 11, they made a fresh start from Yarmouth, and two days after they "left their deare native soyle of England" behind them, losing sight of the coast. On Tuesday the 19th Mr. Higginson's child sickened and died of "the pocks." On the 27th they met a southerly gale. "The sea roared and the waves tossed us horribly, besides it was fearful dark and the mariners mait was afraid . . . yea, by the violence of the waves the long boat's roape which held it was broken, and it had like to have been washed overboard had not the mariners with much payne and daunger recovered the same." By Thursday, June 4, forty days out from Gravesend, they considered themselves half-way across the ocean, and a week later, the wind being in the north, they saw to their amazement "a mountayne of ice, shining as white as snow; like to a great rock, or clift on shoare, it stood still and therefore we took it to be on ground and to reach the bottom of the sea." Taking soundings they were surprised indeed to find 40 fathoms of water alongside the marvel.

Then they got into the usual fogs of the West Atlantic, and in them lost sight of their consort. Land on the north-east was seen from the masthead on Friday June 19. But another five days had to pass, in beating off the coast, before it was visible from the deck, Cape Sable being a few leagues to the northward. On Saturday, June 27, they put into a "fyne and sweet harbour seven miles from the head point of Capan," and their voyage of two months and three days was at last over. Their promised land lay indeed a long way from them, but to get to it in Laud's time those men would go through anything. Whatever they did was done in quite uncompromising earnest; people of that kind are not easy to live with, they were not liked. In the Preface to the Bible drawn up by the translators, as the "Epistle Dedicatory" to King James I., we find them described by those divines of the Church as "self-conceited brethren who run their own ways and give

liking unto nothing but what is framed by themselves and hammered on their anvil." That was the official view as expressed in restrained language. In ordinary parlance they were spoken of as crop-eared knaves and sour fanatics; sour of disposition they very likely were; what they went through was enough to sour sweeter natures than theirs probably were. But when all that is said the fact remains that whether their form of belief was right or wrong they were perfectly sincere; they went without flinching through bitter persecution, through the trials of war and those of exile. Men who will do that are men. A hard race they were and a hard race they bred; the strain which came from them became the backbone of the American people, among whom those count themselves fortunate who can trace back to the Puritan stock. England, as she looks back, rejoices at the gain to her race and her industries which the Huguenot immigration from France gave her; she is apt to forget what she lost, at the same period and for the same cause, in the emigration to America of the pick of the Puritans. We may consider that, under oppression common to all of them, it would be those most resolute who would take their fate in their hands and go; those of weaker nature, who could not make up their minds to the risks and sacrifices involved, would remain behind.

In order to realise what America was like when the first exiles from Europe landed there in the time of the Stuarts, it is essential to clear one's mind absolutely of everything one has ever read, or of anything one may happen to have seen, of the present condition of the United States. Obliterate all the great cities, with their hurrying crowds and their skyscraper buildings, all the railways, the steamers, telegraphs, telephones, tape machines; that whole apparatus which makes the modern American, more than any one else, the man whose life is spent in such a fevered scramble that he has scarce time to eat and sleep. Put the clock back to the time when men had not yet begun to fight for rapidly acquired millions in order to display them as trophies of success in business, exactly as the original inhabitants displayed the scalps of their enemies as trophies of success in war.

Imagine that country when there was not an advertisement in it, more wonderful still when the word dollar was

never spoken; for not a single solitary dollar existed in the length and breadth of the land. That coin was only introduced long afterwards by the trade with the Spanish West Indies. The red man lived there in scattered and roving tribes, occupied in the chase and in war; he was free from the unending worry and the consequent nervous breakdown which drives his white successor into rest-cures and asylums. He was ignorant of the struggle for swift and colossal riches which has produced such weird phenomena as the Ward politician, the Wall Street speculator, the Tammany boss and the Standard Oil plutocrat. Freaks of humanity in its most mercenary aspect they are; each and all of them utterly remote from the ideals of either the red man or the Pilgrim Father.

All those modern things and people being blotted out from the mental picture there remain on the canvas only the great natural outlines of the mighty rivers, the dense forests and the boundless prairies—the works of the Creator in their original simplicity not yet interfered with by the created.

Then see, as you stand on the shore and look eastward, a small sailing craft on the horizon, feeling its way cautiously to a strange and uncharted coast with our friend Mr. Higginson and his like on board, pioneers of a new race of men coming to dispossess that already on the continent.[1] But no such idea was in their minds, they were only refugees who had to begin with the very rudiments of existence. Some rude shelters against the weather had to be made, the cattle, goats and pigs, to be landed, together with provisions for subsistence till the seed they had brought with them could produce crops. When Higginson went ashore he was cheered at once by the sight of strawberries, gooseberries and sweet single roses,[2] he found also about half a score of dwellings, "and a fayre house newly built for the Governour." The soil proved marvellously fertile; peas, turnips, parsnips, carrots and fruits of all kinds, did better than in England. A case is recorded[3] of a planter who sowed thirteen gallons of Indian

[1] After this was written the scene described was shown by Mr. C. M. Padday in his picture, "The Landing of the Pilgrim Fathers," at the Royal Academy in 1907.

[2] Hutchinson, *Original Papers relative to History of Massachusetts Bay*, 1769.

[3] *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, 1795, i. p. 118.

corn which cost him six shillings and eightpence. From that small outlay and his labour he obtained a crop which filled fifty-two hogsheads, each containing seven bushels; this he traded off with the Indians, receiving for each bushel eighteen shillings' worth of beaver skins, which gave him a return of £327. A similar account is given in an original letter from William Penn,[1] dated Philadelphia, August 16, 1683, a marginal note to which says, "Edward Jones, son-in-law to Thomas Wynn, living on the Sckuykl, had, with ordinary cultivation, for one grain of English barley, seventy stalks and ears of barley. And 'tis common in this country from one bushel sown to reap forty, often fifty, and sometimes sixty. And three pecks of wheat sows an acre here." Any surplus harvest could be disposed of to the Indians in profitable barter, they looked down on the tilling of the soil with which they saw the newcomers busied. Simple-minded sportsmen of the primitive and bloodthirsty Esau type all they cared for was the life of the hunter and the warrior. Their habits are well described in Penn's letter, some extracts from which will portray them in his own words:—

For their persons they are generally tall, straight, well built and of singular proportion, they tread strong and clever, and mostly walk with a lofty chin. Of complexion black, but by design, as the Gypsies in England; they grease themselves with bears fat clarified, and, using no defence against sun or weather their skins must needs be swarthy. Their eye is little and black, not unlike a straight-look't Jew. The thick lip and nose, so frequent with the East Indians and Blacks are not common to them, for I have seen as comely European-like faces among them as on your side of the sea. . . . Their houses are mats, or barks of trees set on poles in the fashion of an English barn, but out of the power of the winds for they are hardly higher than a man; they lie on reeds or grass. In travel they lodge in the woods about a great fire. . . . Their diet is maize or Indian corn, divers ways prepared, sometimes roasted in the ashes, sometimes beaten and boiled with water which they call Homine, they also make cakes, not unpleasant to eat, they have likewise several sorts of beans and pease that are good nourishment, and the woods and rivers are their larder. If an European comes to see them or calls for lodgings at their house or wigwam, they give him the best place and first cut. If they come to visit us they salute us with an "Itah," which is as much as to say "Good be with you," and set them down, which is mostly on the ground close to their heels, their legs upright; maybe they speak not a word more but observe all passages. If you give

[1] Reprinted at Tottenham by James Coleman, 1881.

them anything to eat or drink, well, for they will not ask; and, be it little or much, if it be with kindness they are well pleased, else they go away sullen but say nothing. They are great concealers of their own resentments, brought to it I believe by the revenge that hath been practised among them, in either of these they are not exceeded by the Italians. . . . But in liberality they excel, nothing is too good for their friend, give them a fine gun, coat or other thing it may pass twenty hands before it sticks; light of heart; strong affections but soon spent. The most merry creatures that live. Feast and Dance perpetually, they never have much nor want much. Wealth circulateth like the blood, all parts partake, and, though none shall want what another hath, yet exact observers of property . . . they care for little because they have but little, and the reason is a little contents them. In this they are sufficiently revenged on us, if they are ignorant of our pleasures they are also free from our pains. They are not disquieted with Bills of Lading and Exchange, nor perplexed with Chancery suits and Exchequer reckonings. We sweat and toil to live, their pleasure feeds them, I mean their hunting, fishing and fowling, and this table is spread everywhere, they eat twice a day, morning and evening, their seats and table are the ground. Since the Europeans came into these parts they are grown great lovers of strong liquors, rum especially, and for it exchange the richest of their skins and furs. If they are heated with liquors they are restless until they have enough to sleep, that is their cry, "some more and I will go to sleep," but when drunk one of the most wretched spectacles in the world. . . . These poor people are under a dark night in things relating to religion to be sure—the tradition of it—yet they believe in a God and immortality without the help of metaphysics, for they say there is a great King that made them who dwells in a glorious country to the southward of them, and that the souls of the good shall go thither where they shall live again. . . . In the Fall when the corn cometh in they begin to feast one another, there have been two great festivals already to which all come that will; I was at one myself, their entertainment was a green seat by a spring under some shady trees, and twenty bucks with hot cakes of new corn, both wheat and beans . . . and after they fell to dance. But they that go must carry a small present, in their money, it may be sixpence, which is made of the bone of a fish, the black is with them as gold, the white silver, they call it Wampum. . . . Every king hath his Council, and that consists of all the old and wise men of his Nation which perhaps is two hundred people; nothing of moment is undertaken be it War, Peace, selling of land or traffic, without advising with them, and, which is more, with the young men too. 'Tis admirable to consider how powerful the Kings are, and yet how they move by the breath of their people.

That picture, as Penn drew it from personal knowledge, does not shew us the barbarous savage sitting in darkness waiting for the light of the so-called Western

civilisation to illuminate him. That other people are in this condition is the conventional fallacy of the white man when thinking of other races, many of whom have civilisations different to, but older far than his own.

Whether the conditions of human existence, as above described, were better or worse on that continent than they are now it is for the struggling man of business, the needy breadwinner, the sweating furnace-man to say.

But the old order of things had to go, the white man with his rum bottle, the effect of which Penn notices, was too strong for it; the few survivors of the red man live now in special reserves like the remnants of the great droves of buffalo their ancestors hunted and lived on. There remain to them only small plots of the vast territories over which those ancestors roamed at will. When the emigrants from Europe first arrived among them they were received without hostility, that only began when the encroachments of the white men became insupportable to the red.

Among the first to follow the original *Mayflower* pilgrims were some of their Dutch co-religionists, who had been their hosts during their sojourn in Holland. The year 1622 saw the foundation of the Dutch settlement of New Amsterdam which, with the province of Delaware, became British territory in 1664 when the inhabitants were merged in the English population which was always receiving and assimilating alien elements of men who had no inherited allegiance to England, and who, as they increased, became a powerful factor tending to separation. During the first half of the eighteenth century from four to eight thousand "Palatines" arrived each year in Pennsylvania alone from Rotterdam.[1]

In his speech at the opening of the Jamestown tercentenary exhibition in May 1907, President Rooseveldt alluded to the settlement of the Dutch and the Swedes, intermediate between those of the English in Virginia to the south, and in Massachusetts to the north. The latter he described as containing the men who took the lead in shaping the life-history of the American people.

After Amadas and Barlow, already mentioned as having formed a settlement at the end of the sixteenth

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1755.

century in New England, came the Puritans of the first *Mayflower* voyage. They were followed in 1622 by a dissolute crew of fifty or sixty adventurers who landed at Wessagusset, afterwards called Weymouth in Massachusetts.[1] They robbed and abused the Indians. It must not be supposed that all the emigrants were of the Puritan class, actuated by religious motives. Though the majority answered to that description there were many men among them of broken fortunes, and England long used the shores of America, as she afterwards did those of Australia, as a dumping-ground for her political exiles and criminals. Many of the latter were, however, men who had committed but slight offences; all crimes were then so severely punished that people were transported who would now get only a very short term of imprisonment.

In 1627 there arrived from England eleven ships with over fifteen hundred passengers,[2] a substantial reinforcement. Coming later in the year they had little time to provide their huts before winter set in. Indeed they first thought of concentrating in a fort so as to be secure against the Indians, whose temper was uncertain after the treatment they had received from the undesirables five years before. In 1629 came the *Mayflower* again with her consorts above mentioned. All these emigrants were so much occupied in self-support that any other questions, such as government, could receive but scant attention. The assistants and Court of Assembly met seldom, but Hutchinson tells us that in 1631 they enacted that none but church members could vote as freeholders. The original name of Boston was Shaumat or Trimontaine.[3] The peninsula on which the old town stands was claimed as his property by Mr. Blaxton, a Nonconformist refugee from England, because, in 1627, he had been the first white man to sleep on the site. The first Charter to Massachusetts was granted by Charles I. in 1629. It gave the power to select a Governor, deputy and eighteen assistants, and to make their own laws. As regards these a proviso was added, which afterwards became a precedent in preparing similar documents for the settlements, that they were not to conflict with other English statutes.

[1] *History of Massachusetts Bay*, Hutchinson, 1756, i. p. 5.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 24. [3] *Ibid.* p. 21.

This Charter was addressed to residents of Plymouth. If it had been kept there within reach of Westminster no doubt could have arisen as to the grantees being directly amenable to English law, as a company now is which has its office in England though its operations are abroad. But the Charter was taken to the Colony in 1630, by Winthrop and others, and a claim was set up there that English Acts required endorsement by the local assembly before they were binding on the colonists. In 1638, differences having arisen on this and other matters, a formal demand was made from England for the surrender of the Charter; that was refused, but the outbreak of the Civil War diverted attention from the subject. While that was going on the colonists were, between 1640 and 1660, in a virtually independent position, the more so because their leaders were friends of Pym and Hampden and so had connection and influence with the winning side. Cromwell, who was of their own type, did not much interfere with them, and they were practically left to govern themselves and formulate their own laws; but instead of basing them on those of England, as the Charter had provided, they, quite characteristically, sought their precedents in the laws of Moses. The code which they thus drew up is still extant.[1] The death penalty is applied freely, and to matters of which the law takes no cognisance at all nowadays. Blasphemy, witchcraft, heresy, were capital offences, so was profaning the Lord's day or a careless neglect thereof, or reviling the Governor and Council. Opposite each offence is the chapter and verse of the Bible, which is quoted as the authority for dealing with it. The whole thing is intensely severe, but as they had themselves received no toleration in such matters they had little or none of it to give to each other. That power of capital punishment which they claimed and exercised had not been given to the colonists by the Charter, but the distance from home and the few opportunities of sending condemned men to England for execution made it necessary for that to take place on the spot. Neither were they justified by the Charter in proceeding to elect a representative body of their own; but its members, with the Governor and his assistants

[1] *Collection of Original Papers relative to the History of Massachusetts Bay*, Hutchinson, 1769, p. 172.

whose election was authorised, were then chosen from the upper class of the community. Winthrop, who had been the first to hold the office of Governor, was again elected to it in 1637, 1642-46.[1] In the last-named year the Court of Elders in New England went so far as to announce that, while they owed allegiance and fidelity to England, they were only bound by the home laws while living at home. They declared that "by their Charter they had absolute power of Government, to make laws, to enact all sorts of magistracy, to correct, punish, pardon, govern and rule the people absolutely . . . for the laws of England reached no further nor do the King's writs under the Great Seal go any further."[2] The original commission of Charles I. establishing a Board for the government of the plantations is given in full by Pownall in the Latin text;[3] the view he took of the powers conferred by it will be found in subsequent chapters.

While the war between Crown and Parliament was impending and during its progress, men stayed at home to fight the quarrel out in preference to running away from it, but when the issue had been decided there was an emigration from both parties. To Barbados and Virginia by cavaliers who had been ruined in the struggle, "for the miseries of the civil war had reduced many good families of the King's party to change climate."[4] It was to Virginia that Colonel Esmond went.[5] Many of the Puritans, whom the seventeenth-century writer just quoted from describes as driven out by "the persecutions on account of conscience, set a-foot by the warm churchmen," left also to join their fellows in New England. They saw all that had been won for their cause swept away after the death of Cromwell; and then the accession of Charles II., embittered by his father's execution, brought in its train enactments against the Puritans more severe than any which had gone before. Both parties

[1] *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, 1795, iii. p. 262.

[2] *British Colonial Policy*, Egerton, 1905, p. 57.

[3] *Administration of the Colonies*, Thomas Pownall, 1774, ii. p. 155. This book is hereafter referred to as *Administration*, the date of the edition (of which there were five) being added.

[4] *Dissertation on Colonies and Plantations*, Dr. Davenant, 1698.

[5] There was also a large emigration of men of good family to the West Indies. In the Cathedral at Spanish Town, the old capital of Jamaica, one sees that most of the tombstones of the early settlers bear their arms and quarterings. Chiefly west-country houses. See *Monumental Inscriptions of the West Indies*, L. Archer, 1875.

thus contributed to the population of America. "So that in a manner several nations which in time may grow considerable have been formed out of what was here thought an excrescence in the body politic," says Davenant. But the two types of men, those who went to the southern and the northern colonies, were quite distinct. The former were of better extraction, they were not prepared to work with their hands, nor in a hot climate could they do so, that was done for them either by negroes or by poor whites sent out for their sins or their political offences. So they became slave-owners. The emigrant to the north tilled his land himself; if his hands were hard so was his nature. This difference of origin made itself apparent long after the English Civil War had ended by throwing out these offshoots who could neither live together at home nor embark for the same destination when they had to leave. They were of different natures and they fought out their difference two centuries later in the War of Secession, when the Northerners, descended from the successful side in England, were victors again. The civil war in America was thus the sequel to that in England 200 years earlier.

Before we leave the period when the power of the Sovereign was in abeyance in England, Charles I. being dead and Charles II. a fugitive on the Continent, it must be observed that, though during those years the colonists were left a good deal to themselves, the tranquillity they then enjoyed was bought at the price of much increased trouble afterwards. For the rule of Parliament during the war and the interregnum which followed, 1642-60, brought that body on the scene, where hitherto it had not been permitted to appear.

Such disputes as the colonists had previously had with the old country had been of the nature of a duel between themselves and the Crown. Two combatants at home were ranged against one abroad when Parliament took a hand in it. Having exercised authority under special circumstances for a time, it was bent on continuing to do so. By the time of Charles II. the colonists had ceased to be, as in earlier days, a negligible quantity. On the contrary, they were fast developing both their agriculture and their commerce, but the collar of the Charters was

round their necks, and the end of the chain attached to it had been left in the old country. There the pulls on it increased in force and frequency as the wearers of the collar grew more numerous and prosperous and consequently there was more to be got out of them.

There was always trouble about the Charters, the colonists read them in one sense, the English authorities and their local representatives the Governors, in another. This happened in all the colonies; in each of them when such controversy became too acute and no terms could be made between the disputants, the existing Charter was revoked and another substituted for it. This made confusion worse confounded, because one party to the dispute based its arguments on one document, the other on a different one. In the case of Massachusetts, with which we are most concerned, because it is there that we have to follow Pownall's career as Governor, a new Charter was granted by Charles II. to replace that of his father, and a Council of Trade and Plantations was formed to deal with colonial affairs. In doing this the King stipulated for religious freedom, not without cause, for by this time Baptists and Quakers, as well as Episcopalians, were complaining of the treatment they received. In 1684, the same King declared the Charter forfeit, the government was entrusted to a President, his deputy, and a council of sixteen members. Two years later Andros, the Governor of Massachusetts, was given authority to impose taxes and the oath of allegiance. He had also power to make laws, but those had to be transmitted to England within three months for endorsement or otherwise.[1] After the short reign of James II. the Charter was resumed by the colonists on the accession of William of Orange who regranted it, and its bearer, Sir William Phips, arrived at Boston with the new deed in May 1692.[2] By this Charter, wrote Pownall, the province of Massachusetts was erected and incorporated into a real province. He added that all these provinces had the power of peace and war, of exercising martial law, of life and death, of creating towns, counties and other corporations within themselves, and the powers of their general assemblies were very different from, and went beyond, the

[1] *British Colonial Policy*, Egerton, 1905, p. 97.
[2] *History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay*, Hutchinson, 1768, ii. p. 14.

powers of the common councils within the realm.[1] The office of Governor was now invested with more importance; he was to be appointed by the Crown. Under the previous system he had been little more than a member of Council provided with an extra vote to turn the scale in case of an equal division. He had now no vote, but could call the Assembly together when he chose; he had the sole power of appointing military officers and those of the Courts of Justice, as regards the latter with the consent of Council; the same consent was required to the disbursement of money from the Treasury by his warrants. There were now twenty-eight councillors of the Upper House, and the representatives in the Lower House were elected by those who held a freehold of forty shillings, or owned property worth forty pounds. In order to prevent sectarian persecutions, liberty of conscience was given to all except Roman Catholics.[2] If the colonists had been left without interference to manage their affairs on those terms, which much resemble those on which the present colonies live, all might have gone well. But henceforth the interference of the Crown was aggravated by that of the Parliament; the principle which underlay all the English enactments dealing with the colonies was that they existed for her benefit. She was to have the monopoly of purchasing what they produced, paying for it not in money but in manufactured goods. On them, as vendor, she could make a large profit in a market closed to competition, and this on the top of what she had already obtained by buying their raw materials at her own price. That the colonists should establish factories in which they could work up that raw material themselves appeared a monstrous idea. The position, from the English point of view, is expressed in a pamphlet of 1718,[3] which says:—

> The colonies take off great quantities of our manufactures and give in return tobacco, sugar, indigo, cotton; the surplus of which is exported to Hamburg and Bremen at a further profit . . . they are a spring of wealth to this nation since they work for us and their treasure centres all here. And as the laws have tied them fast to us it must be through our own fault and misgovernment if they do

[1] *Administration*, 1774, i. p. 60.

[2] *History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay*, Hutchinson, 1768, ii. p. 14.

[3] *Dissertations on Colonies and Plantations*, William Wood, published 1775, pp. 87, 89, 94.

not ever continue to enrich Great Britain, or if all or any of them become independent of it. . . . If in New England or any other of our northern colonies in America they should pretend to set up manufactures, and so clothe as well as feed their neighbours, their nearness and low price would give them such advantage over this nation as might prove of pernicious consequence.

Acting on those lines Parliament, all through the century of development from the accession of Charles II., to that of George III., was continually passing acts to restrain and prohibit the erection in the colonies of factories which would compete with home industries. Those laws were more difficult to enforce on buildings inland than the Navigation Acts were on ships, whose commerce came in contact with the Customs House officials at the ports and the commanders of warships at sea. In both cases the English ordinances were defied by the colonists, who held quite a different view of their position to that accepted in England. There, in the first instance, they had been regarded as refugees, and afterwards, when they had made good their footing abroad, as people to be exploited for the benefit of those who had remained at home. The idea of the colonists was that, as they had found these territories and developed them by their own enterprise and industry, their right to enjoy the fruits of their labours ranked first. That of England to benefit by them they regarded as a secondary consideration. The colonies, with the exception of the Dutch settlements in New York and its neighbourhood, had not been won for them by England, so they disputed her claim to any such complete suzerainty as is conferred by conquest.

Meanwhile France had not been idle, she treated her subjects who crossed the Atlantic as her pioneers. In 1604 they had founded Port Royal, afterwards renamed Annapolis in Nova Scotia; they had pushed their way thence up the St. Lawrence to Quebec where they built a fortress to command that river. From its head-waters they penetrated overland to those of the Mississippi which they followed down to the Gulf of Mexico. As they went they established on the line of these rivers a series of forts and trading posts which, strengthened and linked up as time passed, became a cordon and base of operations in rear of the English.

— PROPERTY OF —
SWAIN SCHOOL

In 1627 a French Charter was given to these settlers; it preceded by two years that of Charles I. to Massachusetts. Five years later the Treaty of St. Germains recognised Canada and Nova Scotia as French possessions, and for more than a century afterwards there was an unceasing conflict between France and England for the supremacy of a continent which, in its entirety, was destined to belong to neither of them. The English colonists of the south, Virginia and the Carolinas, had little to fear from attacks by the French on the Mississippi which lay far to the west of them. New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine, enveloped by the French to the north as well as the west, bore the brunt of the fighting. That was guerilla work when the mother countries were at peace, it became organised during their long and frequent wars. In a region of forest and swamps as yet unprovided with roads, it was by water only that any large bodies of men could be moved. The French early recognised the importance of the Lakes. In 1678 they had a 10-ton brigantine on Ontario, in 1679 a ship of 60 tons on Erie.[1] For this purpose Lakes Champlain and George, the northern end of the former within some forty miles of the French base at Montreal, gave the French a direct water route of more than a hundred miles into the English territory. Once there they could follow the Hudson river to threaten Albany and New York itself. Into Maine they had access from Canada by following down stream the courses of the Kennebec, the Penobscot and other rivers. There was a scheme in 1702 for bringing 2000 men down the Kennebec, to be joined at Penobscot by another force, the two combined to then advance along the coasts, supported by their ships, to the attack of Boston and New York.[2]

The boundaries of New England formed a vast exposed frontier, very difficult and very costly for its inhabitants to defend.[3] In the early part of the eighteenth century Massachusetts and New Plymouth were fairly populated. Maine was not so, and had been overrun by the French shortly before; in Nova Scotia there were several thousand French but no English. During the

[1] *Administration*, 1774, ii. p. 237.
[2] *Half Century of Conflict*, Parkman, 1901, i. p. 2.
[3] *History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay*, Hutchinson, 1768, ii. p. 13.

long campaigns of Marlborough and the subsequent wars of the eighteenth century between England and France, which arose from causes beyond the control of the colonists, it was they and not the Englishmen at home who might at any moment have to fight for their lives. The colonist of the outpost had to have his weapon within reach like the men of Nehemiah. His musket was as necessary to him as his spade; he wanted it not only for the French beyond the boundary but for the Indian within it. The life of those early settlers has been a fruitful topic for subsequent fiction; it was at the time a matter of very grim hard fact.

The wars of Marlborough ceased in 1713 with the Peace of Utrecht. France was exhausted, she needed a period for recuperation; she was confirmed in the possession of Canada, she retained that right to dry fish caught on the banks of Newfoundland on its shores, which has been a vexed question till lately. She had to vacate the province which she had called Acadia, the present Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and hand that, with Newfoundland, over to England. But she kept the island of Cape Breton, commanding the main entrance to the St. Lawrence, and on it she proceeded to form a strong place of arms to which the name of Louisburg was given. It played an important part in the two following wars, and meanwhile had a considerable fishing population and became a great resort of privateers.[1] At the time of the Peace of Utrecht there were but 400 Frenchmen, including the troops, in Louisiana, the vast territory west of the Mississippi, which was left in her possession though her hold on it was so feeble. She claimed later that the Mississippi was not her boundary but that the whole great valley of that river was hers, and she pushed her outposts eastwards across it to the Alleghanies, where they came into contact and conflict with those of the English. Though beaten France never relaxed her efforts to win the great prize of America; it was her pressure, from her bases on the great rivers, which kept the colonists steady to England, whose sea power was their support. Until they were strong enough to stand alone they had either to lean on England or fall to France, but it had long been foreseen that if ever the

[1] *Half Century of Conflict*, Parkman, 1901, p. 177.

power of the latter was shattered in America that of the colonists would arise as an independent state on its own account.

The Declaration of Independence came eventually; it had been seen coming for a long while. The iron hand of Cromwell had found these colonists hard to hold; he was aware of the possibility of their cutting the ties which bound them. Twenty years later Evelyn the Diarist, recalling his first day's work as a member of the Board of Trade and Plantations, to which Charles II. had appointed him, put down on May 26, 1671:—

> What we most insisted on was to know the condition of New England, which, appearing to be very independent as to their regard for old England and His Majesty, rich and strong as they now were, there were great debates in what style to write to them. For the condition of the colony was such that they were able to contest with all other plantations, and there was fear of their breaking from all dependence on this nation.

A few days later, on June 6, Evelyn made another entry in his Diary on this subject:—

> I went to Council . . . of the best expedients as to New England, on which there was a long debate. But at length it was concluded that, if any, it should be only a conciliating paper at first, a civil letter, till we had better information of the present face of things, since we understood they were a people upon the very brink of renouncing any dependence on the Crown.

Writing in 1698, Dr. Davenant,[1] Inspector-General of Exports and Imports, said that if the New England colonies were unchecked in their disposition to develop on the sea—

> We may let them grow in naval strength and power which, if suffered, we cannot expect to hold them long in our subjection. . . . Some such causes may indeed drive them or put it into their heads to erect themselves into independent commonwealths. . . . An interest in America, generally speaking, may bring an immense profit to this kingdom if it was well looked after by the Government here, but otherwise in all likelihood it will either decline or come to a strength that may be turned against us.

In 1711 a French writer, quoted by Parkman,[2] declared that "There is an antipathy between the English of

[1] *Dissertations on Colonies and Plantations*, 1775, pp. 32-48.
[2] *Half Century of Conflict*, Parkman, 1901, i. p. 55.

Europe and those of America who will not endure troops from England even to guard their forts." This writer proceeded to say that if ever the French colonies should fall, those of England would control the continent from Newfoundland to Florida. A wonderfully accurate prediction on his part, the only thing that was hidden from him was exactly where the northern boundary of the United States would be. That it would fail to include the great valley of the St. Lawrence and so leave Canada, then French, among the noblest possessions of the English Crown was the only point he missed. There is no doubt that when Wolfe took Quebec and made Canada English, that battle was the prelude of the War of Independence, as disastrous for England as the conquest of Canada was glorious. At the time when that Frenchman so well foresaw the future, his country was, for a time, reduced to impotence. England, though victorious, was also tired of the war. But the peace made at Utrecht was only a lull in the storm. It left outstanding several questions which had to be settled afterwards; and in that settlement, as it affected America, Pownall was half a century later to take no unimportant part. We shall see that it was he who pressed upon Mr. Pitt the master-stroke—the despatch of the expedition to strike Quebec. Anxiety as to foreign aggression being thus for a time removed from the colonists, they were left to occupy themselves not only with industrial progress, but with their troubles of home growth. One of the most important of these, arising out of Charters, was the claim of the Throne that it should appoint the Governors and officials, and that the colonists should pay them a fixed annual salary. As a link between the central and the provincial authority, a Governor nominated by the former was indispensable. His coming to the colony on those terms had been provided for in the Charter of 1692. The royal authority necessary for him was, in a less degree, also necessary for the judges. The fixed salary was a different matter, especially as the colonists had not always cause to be satisfied with the men sent out to them. While some of the governors who came from England were men of character and ability, all could not be so described; many were hangers-on of the Court which wished to provide for them, perhaps to get them out of the way. That policy

of the Court was followed by others. The Marquis of Steyne was not the only great personage whose influence was used to remove to a colonial appointment a husband whose presence in London had become inconvenient.[1] Even if a colony were so fortunate as to obtain a capable man of the right kind as Governor, it might be saddled with very queer people in other capacities. Lord Bellamont, an Irish Peer, who did good service as Governor of New York and Massachusetts, wrote in 1696 that—

> The Chief-Justice is no sort of lawyer, having been bred a soldier; he is a man of sense, and a more gentleman-like man than I have met in this province, but that does not make him a lawyer. So far from being barristers, one of them (the Judges) was a dancing-master, another a glover.[2]

Such cases as these were no doubt exceptional, but their existence shewed what was possible. Small wonder that those who had fled from the Home Government had no such confidence in it as to put some unknown quantity, coming out with plenary powers as its representative, in a perfectly independent position as regards money matters. So instead of the Governor receiving the regular income which his rank demanded and his official superiors at home judged necessary to support that rank, the colonists preferred to keep him in hand by voting only an annual grant for his support. Beyond that they would not go or be driven, many and constant as were the attempts to drive them. To take one instance out of many, Governor Belcher of Massachusetts dissolved the General Assembly of Massachusetts in 1731 on this ground. A new Assembly met; they again refused the salary.[3] In 1735 the question was settled as regards that colony, by the Governor being authorised to accept the annual grant. Bad blood was made thus between the Governor and his neighbours. The Home Government for years refused steadily to establish a precedent against itself by admitting that an annual grant was sufficient. So it required the Governor in each case, before touching the money in that form, to make a special application to headquarters across the Atlantic for permission to do so. Months were occupied in this correspondence. Meanwhile, the unhappy

[1] *New York Historical Society Collections*, iv. p. 284, gives a case in point.
[2] Egerton, *History of Colonial Policy*, 1905, p. 129.
[3] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1731, i. pp. 87-213.

Governor was in a cruel position. His earnings were inaccessible; his expenses had to be met. Unless he happened to have private means to carry on with, he was not only involved in money difficulties, but placed in great temptation. With all this difficulty and delay about their earnings and no pension to look forward to, it is not wonderful that some men sought remuneration on irregular lines, such as the sale of appointments in their gift. Governor Clarke of New York, the predecessor of Clinton, retired in 1743, after many years' service, with a handsome fortune. "By his offices of Secretary, Councillor, and Lt.-Governor, he had every advantage of inserting his own name, or that of some other person in trust for him, in the numerous grants which he was in a condition for near half a century to quicken or retard. His estate when he left us, by the rise of his lands and of the population of the Colony, was estimated at £100,000."[1] Pownall, who was not one of those empty sacks which find it hard to stand upright, was keenly alive to the false position in which needy men were placed. He wrote strongly on the subject.[2]

> The appointments of the Governors, etc., are such wherein no fortunes can either be made or saved with honour. If they have no fortunes of their own they must, after their services, return home to starve. There is no man, (says an American) . . . long or much conversant in this overgrown city of London, who hath not often found himself in company with the shades of departed Governors, doomed to wander out the residue of their lives full of the agonising remembrance of their past eminence and the severe sensation of present neglect. Sir William Keith, upon his return, was added to this unfortunate list, concerning whom the least that can be said is that either none but men of fortune should be appointed to serve in such distinguished offices, or otherwise—for the honour of Government itself—such as are recalled without any notorious imputation on their conduct should be preserved from the wretchedness and contempt which they have been but too frequently permitted to fall into for want even of a proper subsistence. The means of avoiding this wretched issue of their service by making up a fortune to live on when they shall be recalled is a temptation which ought to be removed from this situation by those who regard the King's service, even if they have no feeling of compassion for his servants.

Yet while Pownall, who had himself been one of those servants, could so clearly appreciate and express

[1] *History of New York*, Smith, 1757, p. 68. (*N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll.* iii. iv.)
[2] *Administration*, 1774, i. p. 84.

their point of view, he was quite aware of the other side of the question, saying:[1]—

> The two great points which the colonists seek to establish are: first the exercise of their several rights and privileges as founded on the rights of an Englishman; and secondly, as what they suppose to be a necessary measure of a subordinate Government, the keeping in their own hands the command of the Revenue and the pay of the officers of the Government as a security for the conduct of those officers towards them.

Placed thus between the hammer and the anvil, the Governor of a colony in those days had a dignified, but by no means pleasant, post. Franklin described it by saying that a Governor took his orders from the King and his bread from the colony. His responsibilities were as great as his income was uncertain, he had to keep one eye on the Board in England who, under the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, were his official superiors. They, or the Secretary, could and would supersede him if dissatisfied with his vigilance for English interests. With his other eye, the Governor had to watch his neighbours, who could reduce or refuse the annual grant if they were not satisfied with the way in which he attended to local interests. As those two sets of interests were always conflicting, the Crown wanting to keep the colonists down and the colonists wanting to get up, the middle course between them was a very difficult one to steer. There was too much Scylla and Charybdis about the position. Though a Governorship might be an object of ambition before it was attained, it could not, legitimately, be valuable. As it was by no means comfortable under the conditions described, many men, Pownall among them, had had enough of it after a few years. One thing, among many, which tended to discomfort was that there was originally no Customs House, all vessels had to enter and clear before the Governor or his deputy, who were regarded as naval officers for this purpose. This brought the officials in direct conflict with the merchants and community in the region of the pocket, that most sensitive part of the human anatomy. Every ship's cargo became a bone of contention, for a constant trade was carried on with

[1] *Administration*, 1774, i. p. 69.

foreign countries despite the Acts of Parliament restraining it. The navigation laws, dating back their origin to the end of the fourteenth century, had become obsolete by the middle of the seventeenth, when they were re-enacted by Cromwell to wrest the carrying trade from the Dutch, then powerful at sea. In that they succeeded. If those Acts had been limited to discrimination between English and foreign vessels the good they did would have been an unmixed blessing. But they went further, they discriminated between the English merchant and his fellow-countryman across the Atlantic. As amended in 1660, they forbade such colonial produce as sugar, indigo, tobacco, dyeing woods, being shipped from their place of origin to any port not in England or in an English plantation. This hit the colonists very hard. For all these things they had a natural market to the South in the Spanish and French possessions among the West Indies and South America, and to require all this produce to be shipped across the Atlantic and then back again was a very severe measure. Salt fish from the banks of Newfoundland was a staple commodity of the New England trade; there was a great demand for it in the Roman Catholic countries of the Mediterranean, but its direct export there was barred by the Acts. A further alteration of the law in 1664 compelled all European goods destined for the colonies to be first taken to England and re-shipped thence.

> The laws of trade respecting America were framed and enacted for the regulating *mere plantations*, tracts of foreign country employed in raising certain specified and enumerated commodities, solely for the use of the trade and manufacturers of the mother country—the purchase of which the mother country appropriated to itself. Those laws considered these plantations to be a kind of farms which the mother country had caused to be worked and cultured for its own use. But the spirit of commerce . . . has wrought up these plantations to become objects of trade; has enlarged and combined the intercourse of the barter and exchange of their various produce into a very complex and extensive commercial interest.[1]

Laws so severe and so restrictive were naturally more honoured in the breach than in the observance; the protests of all the colonists against them were incessant, and a regular evasion of them became a recognised part of

[1] *Administration*, 1774, i. p. 251.

colonial existence. Of a Customs collector at Boston it was said after his death that "with real humanity he took pleasure in directing masters of vessels how they ought to avoid the breach of the acts of trade."[1] That kindly reference to the merits of the deceased is instructive, as showing how his duties were regarded by his neighbours. But though England failed to establish the monopoly she desired in the commerce of the colonies, that large portion of it which she enjoyed was highly profitable to her. So early as 1669 Sir Joshua Child[2] described the plantation trade as being as large and employing as much shipping as most others, but he was afraid that the Dutch would get hold of it unless the restrictive laws were strictly enforced. As the products of New England were similar to those of the old country, he described that as "the most prejudicial plantation to England," fearing its competition in the supply of food stuffs to the southern colonies, which produced other things, such as sugar, tobacco, cocoa, ginger and dyeing woods. But of the New Englanders he thought well, saying, "I am now to write of a people whose frugality, industry and temperance, and the happiness of whose laws and institutions do promise to themselves long life with a wonderful increase of people, riches and power." He complains that the New Englanders, despite all laws, shipped tobacco and sugar in their own vessels to Spain direct, thus paying no duties to the King, and competing with English shipping. Of all the American plantations he found New England much the most advanced, both in building vessels and in manning them with seamen who were trained in the fisheries. But, while he doubted what this might lead to, he admits that the export of English manufactures to these colonies was tenfold the value of what she nominally paid for her imports from them. Her payment was only nominal, because in return for what she took she gave goods and not cash; for this reason a deficiency in current coin was another trouble to the colonists, who had no actual currency except what came in from the West Indian and Mediterranean trade; hence the dollar as their unit of value. That foreign trade was jealously watched in England. The Dr. Davenant above

[1] *Short History of Colonial Policy*, Egerton, 1905, p. 154.
[2] *Dissertations on Colonies and Plantations*, published 1690.

mentioned wrote in 1698, "While we are strong and they are weak at sea, they may be compelled to obey the laws of England and not to trade directly and upon their own account with other countries . . . if we shall go to cultivate among them the art of navigation, and teach them to have a naval force, they may set up for themselves, and make the greater part of our West India trade precarious." By 1731 the New England fisheries were deriving £138,000 a year from their sales to the Mediterranean; there were not less than 600 sail of ships and sloops amounting to 38,000 tons, part of them engaged in the fisheries (which employed five or six thousand men), the rest in foreign trade. The population of those colonies, of British origin, was estimated at 120,000. In Philadelphia there were 2400 houses, and its population was estimated at 12,000; there were more white people in Pennsylvania than in both the Carolinas, Virginia and Maryland put together. The city of New York had nearly as many inhabitants as Philadelphia. Mr. Hall who communicated these facts to Sir Robert Walpole[1] says of New York that it was "a most delightful place, the gentlemen here are exceeded by none in kindness and civility to strangers. The country one of the pleasantest in the universe, the climate temperate, the air serene. . . . Here are no phthisis nor consumptions, and so very few doctors that people live to a very great age; they have very few clergy and are signal for their morals and beneficence." He may perhaps have been mistaken in attributing the longevity and the virtues of the people to the scarcity of doctors and clerics. By the middle of the eighteenth century the prosperity of the colonies was still more firmly established, their population was about one-fourth of that of England, or nearly a million and a half. How rapid the increase had been is shewn by the fact that in 1682-88 Davenant had estimated that there were 200,000 of English birth. A detailed account of their condition when Pownall went out is given in the *Gentleman's Magazine*,[2] which describes them as having 1600 miles of coast line and all the necessaries of life for a population then greater than that of Spain, Prussia or Holland; inferior only to that of England,

[1] Select Tracts relating to the Colonies, *British Museum Catalogue*, 1029, E. 15.

[2] 1755, p. 15 *et seq.*

France, and the German Empire. It says: "America has become the fountain of our riches, for with America our greatest trade is carried on. . . . This is the country which the French have many years envied us and which they have been long meditating to make themselves masters of." We find in this account of the colonies the following particulars of the New England provinces which give a good idea of the position they had reached. Massachusetts had a large sea-coast and many good harbours, its climate was very good and the air much clearer than that of England. The soil was but indifferent, and grew no wheat but yielded rye, oats, barley, Indian corn, while the pastures were excellent. The export of cod to Spain, Portugal and Italy was considerable. The fisheries were more important here, as was the shipbuilding, than in the other provinces; besides this there was a considerable trade with England and the West Indies. From another source[1] we learn that the entries and clearances of vessels to and from the port of Boston for 1749 were 80 and 115 with the West Indies; 27 and 18 with Great Britain, but by 1773 the latter figures had risen to 71 and 26 respectively. Many parts of Massachusetts were in 1755 as populous as England; there were numbers of fine towns, and Boston was as large and well built a city as Bristol.

New Hampshire and Maine, like Massachusetts, had a large industry in the fishery and another in its timber, no such good masts and spars for the English Navy could be got elsewhere. The difficulties of transport are shewn by the statement that these masts were brought down to the water side, over the snow in the middle of the winter, by seventy or eighty yoke of oxen.[2] Connecticut was a province which few people in England then knew of, but along its coast of 150 miles ran as good a road as any in the old country, passing along it the traveller was never out of sight of houses; every ten miles or so there was a market town with from 300 to 500 houses. The soil was better than that of Massachusetts, and grew every kind of corn; there were no manufactures, the regions adjoining Massachusetts and New York obtained their woollens and other goods from those markets.

[1] *Massachusetts Historical Society*, 1795, iii. p. 288.
[2] *Administration*, 1765, p. 197.

Rhode Island was in area about as large as the Isle of Wight; Newport, its capital, was as large as Worcester in England at that time, but had three times as many inhabitants.

New York was divided into ten counties, three of them on Long Island, where all corn and vegetables throve better than in England. In the city there were 5000 houses, all of brick and stone; the streets were then, before the days of Tammany, better paved than those of London. There were large regiments of well-disciplined militia; and down the Hudson came all the produce of the counties of Albany, Ulster, Duchess to the six markets of New York, which were better supplied with good and cheap provisions than any in Europe. They had good corn crops of all kinds, and excellent pasturage well stocked with cattle, sheep, horses and hogs. Every kind of English timber, besides many others, grew there. New York took "several hundred pounds per annum" of English manufactures, for which she paid in gold and silver obtained from her trade with the West Indian and South American possessions of Spain.

Pennsylvania had the same products as New York, and was as well populated. Philadelphia contained about 5000 well-built houses and a market-place equal to any in Europe. A considerable trade was done with London and Bristol as well as with South America and the West Indies.

The peaceful development of these provinces to the condition above described had been checked for a time, shortly before these particulars were given of it, by the outbreak in Europe of the war of the Austrian succession, in which England took part against France, winning the battle of Dettingen and losing that of Fontenoy. Though the mother countries were thus engaged, the American colonists were far removed from the scene of operations, and might perhaps have been spared participation in the struggle which did not arise from, or touch, their interests. But the French Governor of Louisburg, on the east coast of Cape Breton Island, so soon as he heard that war was declared, made a raid on the English fishing-station of Canso, 80 miles to the south of him on the north-east corner of Nova Scotia. That, as part of the French province of Acadia, had been taken over by England at

the peace of Utrecht. Annapolis, on the west coast of Nova Scotia, the capital of that island, was the Frenchman's next objective. The fort there was weak and had only a small garrison, but it held out for a month and beat off the French who retired, having brought a hornet's nest about their ears. The merchants of Boston had long suffered from the privateers who made Louisburg their head-quarters to prey on the New England commerce. The idea of getting this thorn out of their side, by retaliating on Louisburg itself for the attack made thence on Canso and Annapolis, was too much for them when Shirley, their Governor, first proposed the scheme. But he pressed it, and they undertook the desperate venture of attacking with raw militia, unprovided with siege artillery, one of the strongest fortresses in the world. Raising 3000 men themselves they were helped by a contingent of 1200 more from Rhode Island, Connecticut and New Hampshire. This force was embarked in local craft on March 24, 1745, under the command of William Pepperell, a Boston merchant and landowner, who had served in, and risen to the command of, the Maine militia. On April 3 the expedition got to Canso, where three English men-of-war happened to meet them, and were able to cover the landing at Louisburg a month later. Smitten with panic, the French detachment which held the Grand Battery at the entrance to the port abandoned it, a small party of the invaders took possession and turned the guns on their original owners. This piece of good fortune, and the sinking by the English squadron of a French vessel bringing supplies, led to the surrender of Louisburg, with its garrison of 2000 men on June 17 without the final assault being necessary. It was a most remarkable enterprise on the part of amateurs in the art of war, experts in which would never have ventured to undertake it under such conditions. The success was due, apart from good fortune, to the quality and fighting power of the hardy farmers and fishermen engaged. The lesson of what such men could do, if provoked, might well have been laid to heart by the authorities in England who tried to coerce their sons thirty years later.

To the intense disgust of the colonists, Cape Breton including Louisburg which they had so gallantly won,

was restored to France in exchange for Madras, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in October 1748. England, however, recouped the colonies for their expenditure in the Louisburg expedition, and in the following year there arrived in Massachusetts for this purpose such a mass of coin as the colony, always short of it, had never seen. It consisted of £183,649 sterling, 653,000 ounces of silver and ten tons of copper.[1] The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, like that of Utrecht in 1713, was merely a truce, which lasted till 1756. Meanwhile both England and France were girding their loins for the decisive struggle, and it was during this period that Pownall arrived on the scene in 1753, with three or four years before him in which to study the situation before he was called to take a responsible part in it.

This chapter has been devoted to explaining in what condition he found things. It may be summarised by saying that in the course of about a century the colonists, aided by the fertility of the soil and other natural advantages, such as the fisheries, had advanced from the position of a few settlers scattered on the edge of a wilderness to that of organised and powerful communities living in a considerable degree of prosperity. The map at end of this chapter, and especially the profile sketch below it, will serve to shew that even at this time they had merely got a foothold on the fringe of the continent, nothing to the west of the Alleghanies was theirs.

To obtain as much as that, they had had enormous difficulties to contend with; they had been in constant strife with the Indians; sometimes at war with the French, always menaced by them; harassed by disputes with the Crown and its Governors; hampered in their industries and their commerce by the English legislature whose authority they disputed. Those troubles had still to be disposed of before the new country could fully expand. We shall now see what part Pownall took in dealing with these people to whom, when he landed, his name was not unfamiliar. In the days of the Commonwealth to which they dated back Ralph Pownall, born at Witton in 1601, was in Cromwell's army. As a Major he was one of those who commanded the "Forlorn of

[1] *Economic and Social History of New England*, Weedon, ii. p. 675.

Foot" at the battle of Preston in 1648,[1] he was afterwards on the Court-Martial at Chester which condemned the Earl of Derby to death in 1651.[2]

The best of the colonists in New England came from the upper middle class in old England to which Pownall himself belonged. They largely derived their origin from the eastern counties ; he was a Lincolnshire born man and country bred, thus able to understand their outdoor ways of life. Lastly, he had connections among them. George Pownall, born at Witton in 1638, emigrated in 1682 to Massachusetts, and his descendants are still in the United States.[3]

[1] Thomas Carlyle, *Cromwell's Letters*, Preface to No. lxiii.

[2] Earwaker's *East Cheshire*, ii., note to p. 13.

[3] He appears on Penn's chart of Philadelphia, 1683, as part-owner of Block No. 38, containing 1000 acres, it fronted the Schuykill River, and was the sixth from the north side. On the same chart appears the name of Joseph Pownall who owned Block No. 3, less than 1000 acres, two blocks back from the Schuykill, and the same distance south of the High Street.

MAP SHEWING THE CONDITION OF NORTH AMERICA IN 1763.
Reduced in scale from that facing p. 284, vol xxxiii., of the *Gentleman's Magazine*.

The South Prospect of the City of New York in North America

CHAPTER III

FIRST YEARS IN AMERICA

1753–1756

In the year 1753 what is now the great city and port of New York was in size and population very much what Bangor is at the present time, and distinctly smaller than Ryde in the Isle of Wight. Originally settled by the Dutch it still had many of that nationality among its inhabitants. It extended about a mile inland from the water front and was less than half that width.

The streets were irregular and paved with rough cobbles, the houses were well built of red brick. In the south-west part of the town was a square fort with four bastions; within its walls stood the Governor's town residence and he had another on Nothen Island, which it was proposed to fortify lest an enemy seizing it should bombard the town. Opposite the fort were the barracks of the independent companies, below its walls was the Battery, mounting ninety-two guns, which was the sole defence of the place. The population was of mixed descent chiefly Dutch, but their language was dying out and being replaced by English. Some Dutch farmers had outside the town a small village called Harlem where they cultivated market gardens for the supply of vegetables to the town. Broadway is described as being "the pleasantest street of any in the whole town."[1] Trinity Church, built in 1696 and enlarged in 1737, stood on Broadway and must have been on the outskirts of the town, a view of which at that time is given opposite. Upon this scene there arrived from England on Sunday, October 7, 1753, a new Royal Governor

[1] *Geographical Description of New York*, 1753. New York Historical Society.

in the person of Sir Danvers Osborne, who was accompanied by his secretary, Thomas Pownall, a young man of thirty-one, on the threshold of his career. Sir Danvers came to succeed Governor Clinton, a son of the Earl of Lincoln. Having married one of the Pelham family Clinton was connected with the powerful Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State from 1724 to 1755, and afterwards the colleague of Pitt. He had been brought up in the Navy, and family interest had sent him out in 1743 to replace Governor Clarke. He was an easy-going man who wanted to mend his fortunes abroad and live quietly till some better post offered at home. In the hope of quiet he was disappointed, for he soon shared the fate of other Governors and became embroiled with his assembly, which at the end of his stay made things very unpleasant for him. On Wednesday the 10th he handed over the seals of office to Osborne and gave a commission as Lieutenant-Governor to James de Lancey, Chief-Justice of the colony, who since 1729 had been one of the twelve members of the Governor's Council; a House of Lords in miniature. That evening Clinton and Osborne went together to a banquet given to welcome the latter, who retired early. On the following day Osborne was very moody and said to de Lancey: "I believe I shall very soon leave you the government, I find myself unable to support the burden of it." Early on the next morning, the Friday in the week of his arrival, the newly arrived Governor was found dead—he had hung himself in the garden of the friend's house where he was staying. He is described as a man of good sense and great modesty, but the death of his wife, a sister of Lord Halifax, had broken him down. Pownall stated at the inquest that Lord Halifax had sent Osborne out in the hope that the change would benefit him and that he had previously attempted his own life.[1]

The Governor being thus tragically removed, de Lancey published his commission and took the oaths as Governor, receiving the seals from Pownall, whose position as Secretary had vanished, but who earned the approval of the Lords of Trade by declaring that if he found any of their confidential instructions among Osborne's papers he should refuse to part with them.

[1] *New York Historical Society's Collections*, iii. p. 151.

De Lancey descended from a wealthy Huguenot of Caen who had sought refuge in New York where he had bought land, and the family were among the richest and most powerful in the colony. James de Lancey was no longer young, he was a well-educated man with a pleasant manner, and had been advanced to the position of Chief-Justice by Governor Clinton. At that time he had looked at affairs from the point of view of the old country, but he afterwards became colonial in his opinions.

Pownall thus found himself stranded, but as brother to the Secretary of the Board of Trade he naturally saw a good deal of de Lancey during the time when the news of Osborne's death was travelling to England and instructions were coming thence for the future disposal of the Secretary to the dead Governor. Those months Pownall appears to have divided between New York, where de Lancey now reigned, and Boston, then under the rule of Governor Shirley of Massachusetts.[1]

William Shirley, a barrister by training, had gone out to the colonies in 1731 to practise his profession. The Duke of Newcastle gave him an introduction to Governor Belcher then in charge of Massachusetts, from whom Shirley expected more than he obtained. One of the many drawbacks to a Governor's life was that he had some preferment, but not much, in his gift. There was just enough to make it impossible for him to avoid giving offence to many of his neighbours. As there were more candidates than places, every man appointed to any position left many disappointed, and they turned on the Governor. Shirley applied for several things—a clerkship of Common Pleas at Boston, a collectorship of customs there, the office of Attorney-General at New York, and he got none of them. After nine years' waiting for something to fall to him he was made Commissioner in a boundary dispute at Rhode Island, but by this time he had lost patience with Belcher. So he wrote letters home[2] which led to the transfer of Belcher to the governorship of New Jersey in 1741, and to his being himself appointed, in Belcher's stead, to be Governor of Massachusetts. A very hard-working, energetic man he did well in that position and made many friends. His success

[1] *Massachusetts Historical Society's Collections*, vii. p. 78.
[2] *Dictionary of National Biography*, "Shirley."

in so doing was the more remarkable because he was one of those Governors who piqued themselves on representing the Crown and were strong for those privileges which constantly clashed with the claims of the colonists.

At the time we are dealing with, Shirley was a man about sixty, whose chief, and very notable, achievement had been the suggestion and organisation of the attack on Louisburg in Cape Breton eight years earlier. It was a hazardous enterprise as devised by Shirley, and though it was attended by success, that eventually did him more harm than good. Not only did it cause jealousy on the part of others in like positions to himself, but it gave him the idea, which subsequent events failed to justify in the eyes of his superiors, that he had a natural genius for war.

Both he and de Lancey were old residents in the colonies, but they were of very different natures. Shirley was a man of action and determination and, like all such men, liable to provoke hostility from those he had to overrule or set on one side. De Lancey was a subtle person who made his way by ingratiating himself with his superiors and scheming against his rivals. He had sought preferment from Governor Clinton, and when he got it led a party against him. The powers of intrigue he had then shewn were now to be turned against Shirley.

Between these two very dissimilar people, both much his seniors, Pownall found himself placed. Though he had no definite position or occupation after Osborne's death, he was by no means idle, but devoted his attention to the study of local problems, among which he picked out as the most important the French aggression on the English colonies and how it could best be met. In that aggression the French had always made use of the Red Indians, with whom they had established friendly relations. It seemed to Pownall that it was necessary for the English to do the same, and he was one of the few Englishmen who troubled themselves to understand the Indian tribes, among whom the whole country from the Gulf of Mexico to the Great Lakes was then divided, as shewn on the map which faces this page. How the Great Lakes and the great rivers could be utilised for the transport of troops during the impending war, and for the development of commerce subsequently, was recognised by Pownall from his first arrival in the country. His



LOUISIANA
VIRGINIA
CAROLINA
GEORGIA
FLORIDA
GULF OF MEXICO
NEW MEXICO
Country of the Sioux
Large Meadows
High Land
High Land
ILLINOIS
CREEKS
OUTAWAS
L. HURON
LAKE MICHIGAN
Country of the Chicasaws
Caouitas Nation
Low Creeks
Allibamous
British Miles
Longitude West from London
Walkers Settle
Cherokees R.
Ohio R.
Missouri
Mississippi
Sioux R.
Magdalen R.
Leon R.
Rio del Nort
St Augustin
C. Canaveral
C. Lookout
C. Fear
C. Carteret
Port Royal
Philadelphia
Mouths of the Missisipi
J. Gibson Sculp

thus becoming a specialist in the topography of America largely affected his subsequent career. While thus occupied he kept up correspondence with the Lords of Trade and Plantations, in whose service he still was. On their behalf, as well as on his own, he watched closely the first beginnings of the Seven Years' War between France and England.

Three weeks after Pownall landed with Osborne at New York, Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia had despatched the future first President of the United States to see what the French were doing on the Ohio, and to warn them off if they had crossed the frontier.[1] Washington, then a major in the colonial service, left Williamsburg on the east side of Virginia on October 31, 1753. It took him twenty-five days to cross the province, and on December 4 he came on a party of French who had invaded it, and taken possession of an old Indian town called Venango, which lies on what was known as the French creek on the Ohio, and is to the north of Pittsburg, about half-way between it and Lake Erie.

The French had turned an Englishman out of his house and hoisted their flag above it. They received Washington civilly, but told him in so many words that they had come with orders from the Marquis du Quesne to take possession of the Ohio, and were going to do so. This their commandant, M. Legardeur de St. Pierre, confirmed in an official letter which he gave Washington to take back to Governor Dinwiddie.[2] With this, and the news that he had himself seen the French fortifying themselves at Venango, Washington returned to make his report to Dinwiddie. The difficulties and dangers of travelling through that country in those days are well described in Washington's diary. Dinwiddie passed the report to England, and received orders that, though there was ostensibly peace with France, the invaders were to be ejected by force if necessary. For this purpose 2000 men were assembled on the Ohio. Meanwhile 1000 French had pushed further east from Venango to the forks of the Monongahela River, where they attacked a small English fort held by only 30 men, who had to surrender. English reinforcements came up from

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1754, pp. 252, 321.
[2] *Journal of Major George Washington*, 1754.

Alexandria in Virginia, and encamped near the surrendered fort; the French tried to cut off a convoy making its way to this force, but were themselves attacked and destroyed by Washington. That was the beginning of hostilities in the spring of 1754, but the formal Declaration of War was not made till two years later, when it was rendered inevitable by an action between English and French ships off Newfoundland.[1] Though the population of the English colonies outnumbered that of the French in a ratio of about ten to one, the latter had a compact military force such as the English had not. The French officers at Venango told Washington they did not care about the numerical superiority of the English because they were too slow to fight.

France held a very strong position. She had refortified Louisburg in Cape Breton after its restoration to her in 1748, and made it even stronger than it was before Pepperel took it. The French there were only a few days' sail from New York; they lay on the flank of all ships passing between England and her colonies. Their possession of Quebec and Montreal gave them complete command of the great river St. Lawrence. Where it emerges from Lake Ontario their Fort Frontenac secured that inland sea to them, and at the western extremity of it they had a fort at Niagara which covered the access to Lake Erie. Thence in a southerly direction they had the fort which they called after Du Quesne, and from it, down the Ohio and the Mississippi, they had a chain of forts which extended to New Orleans. The whole system may be compared to an arch thrown round the English colonies, which had its keystone at Quebec; that was the vulnerable part, for if the keystone of an arch be destroyed the whole fabric collapses.

Thrown southwards from Quebec and Montreal towards New England the French had a series of minor forts along Lake Champlain, at whose southern extremity was the fortress of Crown Point, 30 miles within what the English claimed as the boundary of the province of New York. This was otherwise called Fort Frederick.[2]

[1] Date June 10, 1755. Admiral Boscawen was the English commander.

[2] A plan and description of Fort Frederick is to be found in the *Gentleman's Magazine* of 1755, p. 255.

It was a stone structure with guns which commanded the southern entrance of the waters from Lake George



to Lake Champlain. Crown Point will be seen at the top of another facsimile of a contemporary map here reproduced from the *Gentleman's Magazine* of 1759.

This French stronghold at Crown Point threatened

both New York and New England. "What distresses they occasioned by their scalping parties last year, which are now again setting out from that place, are so well known that I need not repeat them," says a letter in the *Gentleman's Magazine*.[1]

1754

In the spring of 1754, though fighting had begun at their outposts in America, neither of the home Governments in England or in France were prepared to declare war on the other. But the English Government was so seriously alarmed by the report from Major Washington of what had happened on the Ohio in the previous autumn that it had to sacrifice its reluctance to permit representatives of the colonies to meet for the discussion of concerted action. Their doing so had been suggested at the end of the previous century by Dr. Davenant,[2] but then and afterwards it was looked coldly on in England. Difficult enough to deal with separately, it was obvious that the colonies would be much more so if combined. It was recognised that if they united they might turn against the mother country. But in face of this crisis, so inconveniently caused by the action of the French, any apprehensions on that score had to be set aside. They were quite outweighed by the urgent necessity of conciliating the Indians at once, so as to obtain their services and prevent their being enlisted by the French, who, if they were joined by many thousand Indian warriors, could carry fire and sword through the English colonies. Letters were therefore sent out from England early in 1754 to the colonial governors to say that the King was despatching gifts to the chiefs of the Six Nations of the Indians. The Governor of New York was at the same time instructed to arrange a formal meeting, at which the formal presentation of these gifts should be made an occasion for obtaining promises of support from the chiefs. On receipt of these orders, couched in similar terms and assigning the lead to New York, the governors communi-

[1] 1754, p. 593.
[2] *Select Dissertations on Colonies and Plantations*, 1698, p. 57.

cated with each other, and arranged that a conference of Commissioners from each province should assemble at Albany on June 14, 1754.[1] It was intended to be a meeting between the chiefs of the white men and the chiefs of the red men. It became much more than that; it was the first Congress of the colonies, the germ of the Congresses of the United States. The Six Nations of the Indians who were invited to it were formed by the union of the Tuscaroras with the Mohawks, Senecas, Oneidas, Cayugas and Onondagas. All these tribes lived in the northern extremity of the province of New York, on the shores of Lake Ontario. Before the Tuscaroras joined them they had been the Five Nations, recognised by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 as being under English protection, and it was on their territory, against their wishes and rights, that the French had since that time built the forts which now threatened the English settlements in that region. It was through their country, and with them as intermediaries, that the trade of New York and New England with the Indians of the west passed. As a depot for this trade, and to ensure its security, Governor Burnet of New York had built a fort at Oswego on Lake Ontario thirty years before this time. It became the advanced post of the English to the north, as Crown Point was that of the French to the south. For commerce as well as for war these Indian tribes then held a commanding position, and their goodwill was an important factor in a struggle between two of the greatest Powers in the world. A century and a half has passed and nothing remains to show that they ever existed there at all except the fact that some of their names are applied to counties in that part of the State of New York.

The Congress at Albany assembled on June 18, 1754, under the presidency of Lieutenant-Governor de Lancey, who had four of his council with him.[2] Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maryland, Pennsylvania, also sent their delegates. Fewer Indians than had been expected attended, but those who did come went away well satisfied on July 11.[3] Arrange-

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1754, p. 321.

[2] *Mass. Historical Society Collections*, vii. p. 86.

[3] *History of New York*, Chief-Justice Smith, 1757, p. 121. Printed in vol. iv. *Mass. Hist. Soc. Collections*, 1821. (This will be hereafter quoted as Smith, C. J.)

ments had been made with them for building forts in their territory, and that in these, and such as already existed, shelter should be given to the women and children of the Indians while the men went to the war. Gratified by these assurances and the Royal presents, the chiefs undertook to take up the hatchet against the French. So far the meeting had served the purpose for which it had been arranged in England, but what else had been expected there happened also. The Commissioners, finding themselves together, discussed such matters as the creation of a common fund and a plan for a general union of the British colonies. Nor did they stop at discussion; these questions were put in the shape of a formal resolution introduced by Benjamin Franklin, who moved that "one general government should be formed under which each colony should retain its present constitution, and that the general government should be administered by the President General, appointed and supported by the Crown, and by a Grand Council elected by the respective colonial assemblies, etc."[1] This received the approval of all the Commissioners. De Lancey, the only Governor present, gave a tacit consent. As the King's representative he could not express himself in favour of the very thing which the King and his Ministers were only less afraid of than they were of the dangers from the French. News of what had passed transpired. A letter from New York of July 29 mentioned the arrival there, on the 16th, of the Commissioners of Maryland, Virginia and Philadelphia, "from whom we learn that at the said Congress the Commissioners of the several governments were unanimously of opinion that an union of the colonies was absolutely necessary."[2]

That this would result from the meeting at Albany had been foreseen by Pownall as well as by others, and he wrote a strong despatch to Lord Halifax on the subject.[3]

He was present at the Congress, an unaccredited agent of the Home Government, and saw it result as he had anticipated. The collapse of the secretaryship he had left England a year before to take up had brought him to the centre of affairs at the critical time. To him

[1] The document is given in full in *Administration*, 1774, ii. p. 144.
[2] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1754, p. 483.
[3] *Literary Anecdotes of the XVIIIth Century*, Nichols, 1814, viii. p. 61.

the Congress was valuable not only officially but personally, for he found himself brought by it in contact with the picked men of the colonies, men full of information on all the subjects which he was engaged in studying. With Franklin he there formed a friendship which lasted for life. Both Franklin and Thomas Hutchinson, who was one of the delegates from Massachusetts, were at this time of the same mind as Pownall. All three then saw that the colonies had outgrown leading strings, but believed in the maintenance of the connection with the Crown. Subsequent events carried these men in different directions. Hutchinson became an extreme advocate for the prerogative, Franklin for the colonies, Pownall maintained his original view and steered a middle course.

It was at Albany that direct taxation of the colonies by Parliament was first mooted. In face of the heavy expenditure which the colonial war was sure to entail on England it was proposed that she should be allowed to recoup herself in this way. The colonists, led by Franklin, refused assent. John Adams, afterwards President of the United States, ascribes the idea to Governor Shirley, and says he was responsible for raising the question, as his adherents, Hutchinson especially, were for pressing it in later years, till the rupture between the colonies and England was thereby caused[1] when Hutchinson was Governor of Massachusetts.

Among this group of notables at Albany, Pownall became so convinced, both of the justice of their claims to fair treatment by the mother country and of their value to it, that he subsequently advocated their cause in Parliament as no other man did. He wrote years afterwards :—

> When I had first an opportunity of conversing with, and knowing the sentiments of, the Commissioners of the several provinces in North America convened at Albany; of learning from their experience and judgment the actual state of the American business and interest; of hearing amongst them the grounds and reasons of that American union which they then had under deliberation, and transmitted the plan of to England; I then first conceived the idea and saw the necessity of a general British union.[2]

His mind was also occupied with the other important

[1] *History of the Dispute with America*, John Adams, 1784, p. 4.
[2] *Administration* preface, p. 13, June 1768.

topic of the day, the measures to be taken against the French. He wrote a memorandum about it which is dated from Albany, June 1754,[1] and was read at the Congress on July 11.[2] In it he points out how it was the policy of France, working southwards from the St. Lawrence and eastward from the Mississippi, to hem in the English. He quotes a French priest to show that the forts at Niagara and Frontenac on Lake Ontario, as well as the one called Fort William, had been built partly for this purpose in time of war, partly to intercept the English trade with the Indians in time of peace. He shows how the intention of the enemy was to join Canada to Louisiana and, obtaining command of the great Lakes, to squeeze the English out and make of the whole continent one great French kingdom. In proof of this he cites French writers, and then he points out that the English reply should be:—To keep open at all costs their communications with the Indians, for which purpose Oswego on Lake Ontario was necessary: to disjoin and keep separate Canada and Louisiana, piercing their communications with each other by a fleet of armed vessels on the great Lakes: for the colonists to "throw off this yoke of forts which the French are laying on their necks."

The third object he regarded as difficult to attain directly. It meant disputing by force of arms every pass and stronghold in the country. It meant taking the English settlers off their farms, which would go to ruin while their owners were away. He says that "the English could fight as well as the French, but must then give over settling." Moreover, the detached French forts would become untenable if their communications were cut, so he considered that the best course was to ignore them, and to strike boldly for the Great Lakes and break the enemy's line by establishing a maritime force there. It was the Englishman's instinct for fighting on the water instead of on land which led him to the scheme outlined in this pamphlet. That, he tells us in a footnote, was laid before the Commissioners at the Albany Conference, and received by them with thanks, which were coupled

[1] *Administration*, 1774, ii. p. 234. It was reprinted in May 1756 by the *Gentleman's Magazine*, which said that the measures proposed in it were being adopted.

[2] *History of America*, Winsor, 1887, v. p. 613.

with a request that it might be copied for the consideration of their respective Governments. This led to its being printed in New York soon afterwards. The footnote proceeds to say that the pamphlet was sent, with the other papers of the Congress, to England, where "the measure was immediately adopted by government and ordered accordingly to be carried into execution in 1755, and became in its effect a decisive stroke." Meanwhile, Governor Shirley of Massachusetts had been busy. In that spring of 1754 he had been making arrangements with the Penobscot and Norridgwalk Indians of Maine for the building of forts on their territory. Shirley built two forts on the Kennebec, Fort Western 37 miles, and Fort Halifax 54 miles, from the mouth of that river.[1] These were not great military works. They were about forty yards square, sometimes built with stone walls, sometimes with palisades; they could shelter a few hundred men armed with muskets, and they served as depots and rallying places. When artillery was brought to bear on them they could offer no defence, but that rarely happened, because the great difficulties of transport made it almost always impossible for an attacking force to bring field guns with them. Shirley went right up the Kennebec to its source, which, as in the case of the Penobscot, was not far from that of the tributary of the St. Lawrence called the Chaudiere. The French had an easy approach to Maine by coming up the Chaudiere to its head-waters; then they had only a short portage by land before they could embark again on the Kennebec or Penobscot to row down to the English colonies. We shall see that later on Pownall had to take an active part in preventing the enemy from using this method of approach. Washington was fighting on the Ohio in the autumn of 1754, but then, and during the winter, little was done by either England or France. Neither was strong enough on the other side of the Atlantic to engage in serious operations, and both were preparing to send out troops. In September, Shirley received orders to act in concert with Lawrence, the Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia, in clearing the French out of that region; he raised two regiments which effected their purpose in the spring. In December, Shirley had fresh instructions to

[1] *Conduct of Major-General Shirley*, 1758.

raise a regiment of which he was himself to be Colonel. This gave him military rank besides that which he already had as a civilian Governor.

1755

In the early spring of 1755 Pownall was in Boston with Shirley. His intention was to sail for England,[1] but Shirley had laid before the Massachusetts Assembly a scheme for the operations of the coming year, in which he wanted to ensure the co-operation of the other colonies, especially New York. Having Pownall on the spot, Shirley utilised him as his emissary to go to New York in order to sound de Lancey, and lay the project before him and the New York Assembly. The idea was that an attack should be made on Canada from Maine by the Kennebec route, which Shirley had examined the previous summer. Another force was to go up Lake Champlain to Ontario. General Braddock, now expected from England with two regiments, was counted on to move westward and drive the French out of the Ohio country.

Starting from Boston

> At the beginning of March Pownall's prospects of success at New York were at first not very encouraging. De Lancey, jealous of Shirley's rising reputation, appeared, with regard to the expedition recommended, extremely phlegmatic. . . . A gentleman of distinction, with whom Mr. Pownall advised on the subject of his commission, thought it a prudent step to open his message in part to those members of the assembly who were then in the opposition. Several of the leading men were secured by this method. It was beyond de Lancey's power to obstruct it.[1]

Out of pique with Shirley, de Lancey got the arrangements for the expedition postponed till Braddock appeared on the scene.

General Braddock, with the reinforcements from England, arrived in Virginia while Pownall was negotiating on Shirley's behalf in New York. De Lancey could no longer afford to block Shirley, so on March 26 he sent a message to the New York assembly, and at the same time communicated to the Council the letters he had

[1] *Mass. Hist. Society's Collections*, vii. p. 88.

received from Shirley earlier in the month. The Council called for a delegation from the Assembly, with whom they formed a joint committee, to which Pownall was introduced in order that he might explain the plan in detail. The Committee resolved that "the scheme was well concerted, and that if Massachusetts would raise fourteen hundred men we ought to find eight hundred."[1] In bringing the people of New York to support the proposal, notwithstanding their Governor's reluctance, Pownall had discharged the duty entrusted to him by Shirley. It will be observed that they only proposed finding about half the force Massachusetts was to put in the field, but it was a good deal to get them to do that. Unlike the New Englanders, the New Yorkers of that day were largely of other than English birth; it has been mentioned how de Lancey himself was of French extraction. The call to arms against France was keenly taken up in Boston; not so in New York, where the people were more full of commercial than military instincts and grudged parting with their money for war. Provided they were not interfered with by the French troops at Crown Point neither New York nor Albany were disposed to bestir themselves.

Shirley was mortified at the lukewarm support they gave him. On March 18 he had a letter from Braddock to say that he had arrived and that he wished Shirley to come to meet him in Virginia. Shirley reached Alexandria in that province on April 14.[2] Among others assembled there was Pownall who, having fulfilled Shirley's mission to New York, went on to Alexandria to take part in the conference, not in the wake of Shirley but in consequence of orders sent out from England by the Duke of Cumberland, son of the King, who had his eye on this young man and befriended him. At this meeting it was decided to omit one of Shirley's proposals, that for the Kennebec route, and to adopt the others to the Ohio and to the Lakes; for these purposes two expeditions were to be fitted out, Braddock to command the one, Shirley the other.

William Johnson, whom Braddock created at Alexandria the Superintendent of the Six Nations, was to

[1] Smith, C. J., 1757, p. 206.
[2] *Conduct of Major-General Shirley*, 1758, p. 49.

command a third force composed of provincial troops and such Indians as could be obtained. Pownall pointed out that this could only be done on the grounds of the existing treaties between the English and the Indians.[1] Shirley and Braddock then asked him to put his views on paper. He did so, and the document was sent to Johnson, who afterwards wrote to Pownall that it was by acting on it that he had been able to enlist the Indians.[2] Among the strong men who came to the front in that age and country Johnson stood out so prominently, and was so much associated with Pownall, that a short account of him is necessary. By birth he was of that tough race of the Scotch-Irish whom the pressure on Ulster of a hostile Celtic population made still tougher in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the former they rolled back the rabble army of James II. from the glorious walls of Derry, in the latter they emigrated in large numbers to America. There it was observed that they usually pushed through the settlements of their predecessors near the coast and made their homes on the most exposed parts of the frontier. Johnson, when he left Ireland in 1738, did not do that, he was attracted to New York by the fact that his uncle, Sir Peter Warren, had already settled there, having married one of the powerful de Lancey family. To him young Johnson went. Trading with the Indians, his fair dealing and force of character gave him an influence over them which was so exceptional that six years later Governor Clinton put him officially at their head. In 1748 Johnson was in command of the force raised to protect New York.

All this naturally led up to his being granted by Braddock at Alexandria the local rank of Major-General in command of what may be called the irregular contingent. His duty was to support Shirley's advance and to himself invest Crown Point if possible. On June 12 he wrote to Pownall:—

> In a few days I expect the Six Nations down here upon the summons I have sent them. What will be the event of that meeting the result can only make certain, but I hope and flatter myself it will be favourable to the common cause. I wish the several provinces had adjusted their quotas towards the expedition which I am to

[1] *Administration*, 1774, 1, note to p. 243.
[2] The Memorandum is printed in *Administration*, 1774, ii. p. 270.

have the honour to conduct, that the preparations were carried on with more spirit, and that all matters relative to it were put on a more firm and orderly footing. I dread those delays, that confusion and those alterations which are consequences but too natural to so divided a system has often been fatal and may once more be so to the general cause.[1]

Braddock moved off from Fort Cumberland on June 10 with 2200 men on his journey of 130 miles to attack Fort du Quesne on the Ohio.[2] On July 9 he was within seven miles of his destination when a heavy fire was opened on the advance party. They fell back on the main body which became panic-stricken and broke. The men were out of hand, though the General and other officers, Washington among them, did their best. Braddock had five horses shot under him before he received a mortal wound. His secretary, Shirley's eldest son, was shot through the head. With the collapse of that expedition Shirley became senior officer in North America, and the command devolved on him for a year.

Shirley had meanwhile returned from Alexandria to Boston where he heard in May of the success of the expedition he had helped in the winter to fit out against the French in Nova Scotia. Leaving Boston for the front on June 28 he got to New York on July 2. As he passed through that city he took occasion to complain to the people there of their lack of spirit, and he "expressed himself to de Lancey with a tartness not easily to be forgot."[3] Events showed that de Lancey did not forget it. Shirley then proceeded to Oswego, where he arrived on August 18, having heard on the way of Braddock's defeat. He found the fort at Oswego in a very weak state and stayed there till October 23, strengthening that place, building a new fort alongside it, and putting a flotilla on Lake Ontario. After this he wished to move on to the attack of Niagara, but the season was too far advanced. That he spent the whole season at Oswego and had taken no steps to reduce Crown Point, was made a cause of complaint against him by the people in New York, for they were much more interested in the capture of the latter than in the security of Oswego.

[1] *New York State Archives at Albany*, Sir William Johnson's MSS., i. p. 215.
[2] *Mass. Hist. Society's Collections*, vii. p. 89.
[3] Smith, C. J., 1757, p. 213.

Meanwhile the French, alarmed at Shirley's presence on Lake Ontario, which threatened Canada, had resolved on a diversion. Under Baron Dieskau, their Commander-in-chief, 3000 men embarked at Crown Point and came down Lake George intending to reduce Fort Edward, 20 miles north of Saratoga, and then to march on Albany and the English settlements.[1]

Johnson and his expedition had left Albany for the North on August 8 and arrived at the southern end of Lake George a few days before the French appeared. They attacked Johnson on September 8 in a position he had fortified, and were beaten off by him as completely as Braddock had been by them on the Ohio.[2] Johnson was granted a baronetcy for this success which went to counterbalance the failure of Braddock.

While the summer of 1755 was so eventful to those with whom Pownall had been associated at Alexandria in April, he himself had not any definite part to play. He accordingly retired to Philadelphia,[3] probably attracted there by its being the home of his new friend, Mr. Franklin. On May 13 he was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of New Jersey, of which Mr. Belcher, who had been compelled to make way for Shirley in Massachusetts, was then Governor. Lying between New York and Philadelphia, with a seaboard of some 150 miles to the Atlantic and another fifty to Delaware Bay, it was an important province, though not a large one. In a report drawn up for the Board of Trade and Plantations the previous winter, Governor Belcher estimated the population at 80,000 whites and about 1500 negroes and Indians. To be second in command of a community of that size was no great matter, but the appointment gave a definite official position. His commission did not reach him till September when it was brought out by Sir Charles Hardy, a naval officer who came to New York to succeed Osborne as Governor. Since Osborne's death two years before, that province had been in charge of de Lancey, but whether, and on what terms, he would now revert to the positions of Chief-Justice and Lieutenant-Governor was uncertain. Pownall had come from

[1] "Dieskau's Path," is marked on the map on p. 47 *ante*.
[2] *Mass. Hist. Society's Collections*, vii. p. 106. [3] *Ibid.* p. 134.

Philadelphia to New York in August to meet Sir Charles, and had been sounded about this. "Before the Governor arrived it was reported by Pownall and believed, because his brother was Secretary to the Board of Trade and a necessary instrument to the Earl of Halifax who presided there, that a new commission, *durante bene placito*, would be sent to the Chief-Justice."[1] That does not look as if de Lancey, who was to be put on good behaviour, was much appreciated in England, nor as if Pownall, who thus spoke of him, had fallen under his influence as many did and the new Governor was to do. Sir Charles Hardy arrived in New York on September 2, 1755; he knew nothing of his duties, and from the first made a very poor figure, "though he had Mr. Pownall then about him from whom he could be well informed of the state of our parties."[2] The next day came the news of Johnson's engagement with the French at Lake George. Sir Charles determined to go up to Albany, and started on September 14, taking with him two members of his council and the two Lieutenant-Governors, de Lancey of New York and Pownall of New Jersey. The French had retired to Crown Point and the country was so difficult that Johnson could not follow them up, and to block his advance they built another fort called Ticonderoga, seven miles south of Crown Point, at the lower end of Lake Champlain. To this the English replied by building Fort William Henry at the south end of Lake George, which reference to the map of this district on page 47 will show to have been an advanced post to Fort Edward as Ticonderoga was to Crown Point.

By this time Shirley had incurred the wrath of Sir William Johnson who, on September 4, four days before he was attacked by the French, wrote from his camp at Lake George a letter to Pownall in which he complained that Shirley

> Reports facts notoriously false and attempts, though very clumsily, artfully to pervert all my actions and arguments. . . . I perceive plainly from the style, temper, and character of the man that I may expect everything that can be executed by a bad man abandoned to passion and enslaved by resentment. I have, therefore, in defence of my character, which is all I am truly anxious about, thought it a prudent step to write the letter I herewith send you to the Lords

[1] Smith, C. J., 1757, p. 226.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 219.

of Trade. After perusal you will please to seal and forward it. And, if truth and prudence permit, I wish it might carry with it your sentiments in a general way.[1]

Sir Charles Hardy and his suite remained in the neighbourhood of Albany till the end of November, when they returned to New York. A few days afterwards Shirley joined them there on his return from Oswego, and a council of Governors was held at which the operations for the next year were discussed, and it was decided that 6000 men should then be employed against the Freneh forts on Lake Ontario and 6000 against Crown Point.

1756

Shirley returned to Boston in the latter part of January 1756, and soon afterwards Pownall sailed from New York to England. The two years and a half of his absence had been well spent, for he was now becoming recognised as an authority on colonial questions. He took with him a letter to the Board of Trade and Plantations from Sir William Johnson who excused himself, on the score of pressure on his time, for not having written more fully of late, and said,

> Permit me, my Lords, to refer myself in general to the letters I have had the honour to write your Lordships, and in particular to Mr. Pownall, who, I find, is going to England, as he knows every particular of my sentiments and is also perfectly acquainted with Indian affairs as they stand connected with the interest of the Continent and His Majesty's service.[2]

To be thus spoken of as an expert by Johnson and to have earned his friendship and that of Benjamin Franklin was no small matter.

Leaving New York in February, Pownall could not reach England before the end of March, and he then found active preparations being made for the war with France, which even the Duke of Newcastle, loath to face an issue, could no longer confine to local hostilities in the colonies.

On March 20 Major-General John, Earl of Loudoun,

[1] *New York State Archives at Albany*, Sir W. Johnson's MSS., ii. p. 291.
[2] Smith, C. J., 1757, p. 245.

was appointed to be General and Commander-in-Chief in America,[1] and when Pownall arrived from the colonies an army was being collected to serve there. He came in the nick of time, for he could tell the Home Government just those things they wanted to know about local conditions, and his information was promptly utilised.

By command of H.R.H. the Duke of Cumberland, Commander-in-Chief, who two years before had instructed him to attend the Conference at Alexandria, Pownall now drew up a scheme for a general plan of operations in America. This is reprinted in full in the *Administration*,[2] where a footnote says that it was based on letters and memorials sent home during the two preceding years to Lord Halifax, with whom it thus appears that Pownall had been in constant correspondence.

This paper begins by pointing out that operations had hitherto been carried out in a disjointed manner by separate expeditions, specially organised either at home or in the colonies. Though it is not mentioned as such that of Shirley to Louisburg was a case in point. Worked independently, these schemes had failed to support each other; "fruitless detached measures had been pursued by vague random fits and starts," so that much money had been wasted without definite result. It was urged that such operations should be discarded in favour of one comprehensive scheme, based on the natural features of the country, and on the interests of the various colonies.

The account given of those natural features corresponds to what is illustrated by the profile sketch below the general map on page 40. They are described as an inclined plane running up from the Atlantic to the Alleghanies, whence a high plateau intersected by the basin of the Mississippi and the tributaries of the St. Lawrence extended westwards to the Rocky Mountains, then an unknown region.

The waterways of those two rivers and of the Great Lakes are next discussed in detail. Special mention is made of a broad reach of the St. Lawrence, at a place called La Loubiniere, a few miles above Quebec, which was well within reach of the tide; it is mentioned that at ebb tides the small channel which remained in the middle of the river was no wider than the Seine at Paris.

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1756. [2] 1774, ii. pp. 174-233.

Quebec was then known to very few Englishmen; Pownall himself had not been there, but his detailed description of the nature of the river and of those upper reaches from which the final attack was made by Wolfe three years later shews that he had collected information about the St. Lawrence. At this early period of the war he saw that accurate knowledge of the physical conditions of the centre of the French power might be valuable in leading to a decisive stroke there.

America is described as being then "a wilderness of woods and mountains, incapable of land carriage in its present natural unwrought form"; but while this prevented the movement of large bodies of men by land, their transport by water was perfectly feasible, by utilising the combined system of lakes and rivers, interlocking with each other and giving access in every direction. The report draws special attention to this subject. Beyond the Alleghanies the country was still in a state of nature, "a cover for vermin and rapine, a den for wild beasts and the more wild savages who wander in it." Here and there a solitary post might be found, but that was all to the west of those mountains. Eastward of them on the Atlantic slope the land was then under cultivation by farmers, millers or fishermen dwelling upon bays or rivers in scattered and independent settlements. The inhabitants of each river basin were cut off from the adjoining ones by the hills of the watershed, and thus lacked communication with each other and means of combined action. They were liable to be attacked in detail and cut up while occupied in husbandry.

> The English, with an insatiable thirst after landed possessions, have gotten deeds and other fraudulent pretences grounded on the abuse of treaties, and by these deeds claim possession even to the exclusion of the Indians not only from many parts of their hunting grounds . . . but even from their house and home. . . . The Indians, unable to bear it any longer, told Sir William Johnson "that they believed soon they should not be able to hunt a bear into a hole in a tree but that some Englishman would claim a right to the property of it as being his tree," . . . this is the sole ground of the loss and alienation of the Indians from the English interest, and this is the ground the French work upon. On the contrary, the French possessions interfere not with the Indian rights but aid and assist their interests and become a means of their support.

It is pointed out how, while the English entered the

country as agriculturalists the French did so as hunters. They thus obtained the sympathy of the Indians of whom Pownall says "they are all hunters, all the laws of nations they know or acknowledge are the laws of sporting, and the chief idea which they have of landed possession is that of a hunt. The French settlers of Canada universally commenced as hunters, and so insinuated themselves into a connection with these natives." Having made good their footing with the aborigines on that freemasonry and good-fellowship in sport which is always a binding tie between men naturally addicted to such pursuits, the French then developed into traders and established trade depots or posts in the Indian territory.

Those trading posts next developed into forts, for they were placed on the rivers and commanded the waterways, thus giving military domination of the adjacent territories. Of those forts and their garrisons all through Canada and down the Mississippi to New Orleans Pownall gives a complete list. His estimate of the total number of troops thus employed on garrison duty only adds up to 2000 men, and he says: "Not all the power of France could—'tis the Indian interest alone that does—maintain these posts." He proceeds to shew how the French had by means of this policy acquired an ascendency over the Indians throughout the whole country, not excepting the Five Nations, who were only held to the English interest by means of the fort at Oswego on Lake Ontario, and by the personal influence of Sir William Johnson on account of "the great esteem and high opinion the Indians have of his spirit of truth and honour." That Sir William should hold the position of British agent for all dealings with the Indians was considered by Pownall to be matter for congratulation. He was able to claim in a footnote[1] that he had himself suggested the appointment in 1754.

The immense importance of detaching the Indians from the French side in the coming struggle is dealt with in the latter portion of this paper, which suggests that all interference with the hunting-grounds should cease, and that all treaties should be scrupulously observed. It was further pointed out that the English might well take a leaf out of the French book and establish trading-posts in commanding positions under the control and superintend-

[1] *Administration*, 1774, ii. p. 215.

ence of a central, not a local, authority. The assemblage of other Indian tribes near the Ohio in a confederacy similar to that of the Five Nations on Lake Ontario was also advocated, because when thus grouped together they were more easily dealt with, and became a stronger outpost to guard the colonies against attack from the French or their Indians. The importance of retaining a hold at Oswego on Lake Ontario, and of expanding this so as to secure maritime control of the great Lakes, is again pressed, as it had been in the memorandum written by the same author at Albany in 1754. With evident reference to Braddock's disaster of the previous year, caused by marching regiments trained in parade ground formation through the forest without scouts in advance, the memorandum ends by recommending that colonial troops, used to reconnoitring and bush fighting, should deploy in advance of regulars on the march. This suggestion was adopted, and the colonials so employed were called rangers. Lord Howe, who fell at Ticonderoga two years later, trained regulars to the same work, and this passage in Pownall's memorandum became, as he says in a footnote, the origin of the employment of light infantry in the British service. The preparation of this long paper must have occupied much of its author's time during his stay in England, which was but a short one, for he sailed with Lord Loudoun at the end of May,[1] and arrived in New York on July 23. A letter of that date from Mr. Peter Wraxall, then Secretary to Sir William Johnson and afterwards Secretary for Indian affairs, is preserved in the New York State archives at Albany. It describes how the writer called on the new Commander-in-Chief, and was civilly received by him and by Pownall, whose exact position on the staff Wraxall did not at first understand. It appears to have been much the same as that now held in India by a political civilian attached to a general in the field. It was not that of a secretary, Wraxall was clear about that, for he found that Lord Loudoun had some one else in that capacity. It was a responsible office; for Wraxall says, "Pownall seems thoughtful and loaded with cogitations; the Boston people, I hear, begin to yelp against him." This was in allusion to a report that Pownall was intended to succeed Shirley,

[1] *Life of Sir William Johnson*, W. L. Stone, 1865, ii. p. 4.

who was popular with the official class in Boston. Though Pownall did succeed him, the appointment was not made till the following year, and then by a different administration, so there was nothing definite about it at this time. Shirley's management of the military operations since Braddock's death a year before had led to no result, and he had fallen into disgrace with the English authorities, by whose instructions the command was transferred on June 25 to General Abercromby, who had preceded Lord Loudoun. The mail which arrived in New York on July 7 had brought news of the formal declaration of war against France, and orders to Shirley to return to England. He was therefore under a cloud when he called on Lord Loudoun, from whom he had but a rough greeting, for the Earl appears to have been a man more vigorous in his language than in his conduct of war.

Shirley had to hand over the care of Massachusetts to Lieutenant-Governor Spencer Phips, and leave the scene of operations in which, despite his zeal and his exertions, he had met with no success.

Lord Loudoun, accompanied by Pownall, lost no time in going up to Albany. He arrived there on July 29, and reported to England that he found things in great confusion, and was much dissatisfied with the results of Shirley's organisation for the campaign. He complained especially of the great delay that there had been in sending up reinforcements to the all-important fort at Oswego, then held by 1400 men under Colonel Mercer, and the first place open to attack. It was not till August 9, ten days after his arrival, that Loudoun succeeded in starting a column under Colonel Webb to support Mercer. Meanwhile, two days before Webb began his march of over 150 miles through a rough country, the blow had fallen on Mercer. Montcalm, who had succeeded Dieskau in the French command, had crossed Ontario and landed at Oswego on August 7. By the 13th he had established a battery sixty yards from the fort, which surrendered the following day after Mercer had been killed. The French demolished the place, thereby conciliating their Indian allies, who had always disliked it, re-embarked in their boats and retired to Fort Frontenac — the present Kingston—leaving the still smoking ruins to be found by the scouts who preceded Webb's force.

No greater disaster could have happened, for it destroyed the English access to the Lakes. News of it reached Albany on August 20; "The panic was universal, and from this moment it was manifest that nothing could be expected from all the mighty preparations made for that campaign."[1] Johnson tried to rally the Indians, but only forty of them appeared; the Five Nations went over to the victorious French, and ravaged the northern part of the State of New York through the autumn.

Loudoun was utterly disheartened; he cursed the Indians and all who had to do with them. In his despatches he denounced Shirley for having left Oswego to its fate all the summer, and for dawdling in Boston and there intriguing against him and Pownall. Shirley, a man with a grievance, retaliated. It was probably due to this quarrel that he did not obtain the Governorship of Jamaica which his letter of recall from America had informed him that he might expect.[2] It had also told him that Pownall would probably be his successor in Massachusetts, and from the time he knew this his animosity to Pownall was marked.

Meanwhile the French had not pushed their offensive as was feared; in Crown Point and Ticonderoga they had but 3000 men,[3] while Loudoun was left with 10,000, of whom he made no use against those French garrisons. Of that force 7000 were New Englanders, enlisted to attack Crown Point, but they insisted on making the attempt without the aid of the regulars,[4] for when these were present the superior colonial officers were denied their rank and regarded as only senior captains. Men like Sir William Johnson and Washington might therefore have to take their orders from a newly arrived Major of the Line, quite inexperienced in the bush fighting which they knew so well. Braddock's defeat had shewn what that might lead to, and the New Englanders, unwilling to serve under leaders they could not trust with their lives, began to desert from the ranks and their officers to throw up their commissions. Washington threw up his, and was with difficulty induced to resume it.

[1] Smith, C. J. 1757, p. 236.

[2] Record Office, *Chatham Correspondence*, vol. cxv. In future references these papers will be quoted under initials *R.O.* and *C.C.*

[3] *Mass. Hist. Society's Collections*, vii. p. 157.

[4] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1756, p. 450.

Seeing this deadlock, Pownall applied to Lord Loudoun for the command of the provincial troops, and was much hurt at not getting it.[1] With the example before him of Shirley, ruined by amateur soldiering, it was a very strong move to make. Though he no doubt counted on having the assistance of his friend Sir William Johnson, he was fortunate in failing to get the appointment.

Loudoun put an end to the situation by stopping this provincial force from going further, and contented himself for the rest of the season with watching Montcalm while Montcalm watched him. Loudoun then drew off into winter quarters at Albany, and the campaign being over there was nothing more for Pownall to do. His position as Lieutenant-Governor of New Jersey was a sinecure, for Governor Belcher was quite able to handle that small province himself, and there is nothing in the Record Office to show that Pownall was ever there in Belcher's lifetime. What he had really had for the three years since he first came out with Sir Danvers Osborn was a roving commission to make himself useful and collect information for the home government wherever he might be.

So he left for England at the beginning of October. Lord Loudoun wrote on the 6th of that month that he "had sent home Mr. Pownall who has been present on all occasions, and will be able to give any explanations that may be desired."[2]

He left a military crisis in America to find himself in a political one in England, where one piece of bad news succeeded another through the autumn of 1756.[3] Not only in America had things gone wrong. In June Minorca had been taken by the French, Admiral Byng had failed to relieve it as Webb had failed to relieve the fort at Oswego. In the same month the tragedy of the Black Hole took place at Calcutta. Overwhelmed by these disasters the old Duke of Newcastle resigned in December, and a new Cabinet was formed under the Duke of Devonshire and Mr. Pitt.

Just when this change was taking place and Mr. Pitt was looking for new men to carry out a new policy,

[1] *Diary of Thomas Hutchinson*, 1883, p. 60. [2] R.O., *C.C.* vol. xcv.

[3] Exactly what happened in the autumn of 1899 at the beginning of the South African War.

Pownall came on the scene, full of information about the American situation which the Commander-in-Chief on the spot described him as competent to explain. Moreover, he had got some ideas to impart. We have seen that in 1754 his memorandum at the Albany Congress had recommended a maritime attack on the French in the Great Lakes, and that he had followed this up in the spring of 1756 by the memorial, written by command of the Duke of Cumberland, the chief suggestions in which had been the study of the country and the conciliation of the Indians; in it he had shewn that his mind was occupied by Quebec. To push the English attack beyond Lakes Ontario and Erie and strike direct at Quebec by a twofold expedition, one part sailing direct up the St. Lawrence from England, and the other operating from the colonies, was the form into which his previous thoughts had now developed. As to the former, there was nothing original in it. Mention has been made in the last chapter of an abortive expedition to the St. Lawrence in 1711. Since then the idea had lain dormant for the half century which had followed the Peace of Utrecht. It may perhaps be claimed for Pownall that he was the first to revive it for use in the Seven Years' War; it may certainly be claimed for him that he was the first to suggest that attack from east to west in conjunction with another from south to north by a force working from New York and New England. The last named had been his scheme of 1754, when he wanted to make for the Lakes; he had now incorporated it with the other, and he thus produced the duplex campaign which Mr. Pitt adopted, with the result that Canada passed from the French to the English flag.

After describing how the English had lost command of Lake Ontario in the summer of 1756, and how the Indians had fallen away from them, so that nothing could be done by way of Crown Point and Lake Champlain alone, Pownall writes:—

> There remained no other alternative but either to make peace *or to change the object of the war* by making a direct attack up the river St. Lawrence upon Quebec itself, urged to a radical destruction of Canada.[1] The writer of these papers came over to England in

[1] A footnote says that the above words were quoted from a letter of 1756 to Lord Halifax.

the latter end of the year 1756 to propose and state these measures nearly in the same form as was afterwards repeated by the paper that follows[1] particularly marking *the necessity of the two fleets and two armies.* One army destined for the attack; the other under orders to invest Canada by taking post somewhere between Albany and Montreal so as to cover the English colonies. One fleet to escort and convoy the army up the river St. Lawrence; the other to cover and protect the sea line of the colonies.[2]

Equally distinct and more vivid was the way in which Pownall from his place in the House of Commons,[3] described how it had been he who when Mr. Pitt first took charge of affairs had put before that statesman the proposal for the double attack on the French positions in Canada.

I remember the time, and a very critical one too, in the last war, in actual time of war, when for several days there was no minister in this country. In the year 1756 I came over from America with the plan and proposal of changing the object of the war by making a direct attack on Canada commenced by the siege of Quebec. I was in town for several days without anybody being able to tell me to whom I was to address myself. Mr. Fox was just then gone out and no successor was as yet fixed upon. At last I had the pleasure to find that Mr. Pitt became the Minister and from that happy moment commenced the era of all the successes and glories of the last war.[3]

We shall see that two years later, before Mr. Pitt launched that human thunderbolt called James Wolfe at Quebec, he turned again for final advice to Pownall, from whom he had inspiration as well as assistance. That the mouse was useful to the lion has been recognised across the Atlantic, where the work was done, though all memory of it has been lost here, where the work was planned.

Writing in 1834, Mr. Alfred Hawkins described the whole conception as "GOVERNOR POWNALL'S PLAN" (*sic*), and traces it, as has been independently done here, to Pownall's presence at the Albany Congress, and to the papers he subsequently drew up for the Lords of Trade and the Duke of Cumberland leading him to the idea of the double attack. Mr. Hawkins ends his remarks by saying that "the result of the campaign proved the

[1] A despatch to Mr. Pitt of December 5, 1758, which will be noticed under that date.

[2] *Administration*, 1774, ii. p. 245.

[3] *Hansard's Parl. History*, xix. p. 942, date March 17, 1778.

foresight of Governor Pownall."[1] Mr. Pitt's policy was to employ young energetic men who knew their business; the claims of seniority did not weigh with him. He afterwards picked out Amherst and Wolfe, who were only colonels, to conduct his military operations in America. For civil work there he had not to look far; the kind of man he wanted walked into his room, as soon as he was installed in it, in the person of the Lieutenant-Governor of New Jersey. Thirty-four years of age, he had spent the last three years in the colonies as confidential agent of the Lords of Trade and Plantations. Sir William Johnson vouched for his knowledge of the Red Indians; Lord Loudoun for his competence to describe the military situation. The Duke of Cumberland had specially employed him to draw up a scheme of campaign. He had in his pocket an extension of the idea therein expressed, which he was able to lay before the new minister, to whom he could give complete topographical details unobtainable elsewhere, and destined to be most useful.[2] At the exact moment when Mr. Pitt wanted all this information on which to base his programme Pownall made his appearance at Mr. Pitt's office, an opportune arrival not only for himself, but for the great statesman whose instrument he at once became.

[1] *Picture of Quebec,* Alfred Hawkins, 1834, pp. 321-3.

[2] To the interviews which Pownall had this winter with Mr. Pitt may be attributed the fact that when Governor Morris was in England twelve months later, he was surprised to find that Mr. Pitt shewed an intimate knowledge of American geography which was then little known in America itself (*New York Hist. Soc. Collections,* iv. p. 266).


A MAP of
that part of
AMERICA
which was
the Principal Seat of War,
in
1756.
CANADA
NOVA SCOTIA
EASTERN PART OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW YORK
NEW ENGLAND
MASSACHUSETTS
PENSILVANIA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
LAKE ONTARIO
Quebec
Le Trois Riviere
La Galete
Lake St. Francis
ANTIENT COUNTRY
Crown Point
Lake George
Albany
BOSTON
Cape Ann
Sako Bay
Cape Elizabeth
Ft. Ontario
Ft. Oswego
Ft. Frontenac
ONONDAGAES
MOHOCKS
TUSCARORA
This Country by reason of Mountains, Swamps and Drowned Lands is impassable and uninhabited.
English & French Leagues 20 in a Degree.
West Longitude from London.

CHAPTER IV

GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS

1757

One of Mr. Pitt's first appointments was that of Pownall to the most important and responsible civil office in the American colonies, all of which based such action as was now necessary on the example of New England.

On February 26, 1757, Pownall was gazetted "to be Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of Massachusetts Bay in New England, in the room of William Shirley, Esq."[1] It must be remembered that the province of Massachusetts Bay in those days was far larger than the present State of Massachusetts. It covered what is now New Hampshire, the State of Vermont and all the great State of Maine up to the frontiers of Canada and New Brunswick.

Unlike other Royal Governors sent out from England to America, Pownall had the great initial advantage of knowing all about the country to which he went. He had that in his favour, and also the fact that he was well connected at home, and was one of Pitt's men, representing a new order of things which had arisen to replace that which had utterly broken down in colonial as in other matters.

Judge Minot expressed his opinion of the appointment a few years later by saying of Pownall, "It is highly probable from his connections and prospects that he considered his appointment to this Government as a

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1757, p. 93. From this time onwards the subject of this memoir was generally known and addressed as "Governor" Pownall. That courtesy title was retained by others after their tenure of office had expired, and in his case it was specially necessary to distinguish him from his brother, John Pownall, whose position as Secretary to the Board of Trade and Plantations made him also well known in public life and colonial affairs.

temporary measure, introductive of future promotion and subservient to personal views. However this may have been, he entered into the cause of the country with spirit."[1] But in taking the position he had to expect, and he met with, ill-will from the official class in Boston, the friends of the late Governor.

Nothing remains to shew that there had been ill feeling between Shirley and Pownall except a pamphlet which was published anonymously in New York, and dated September 20, 1756. It is reprinted in vol. vii. of the *Massachusetts Historical Society's Collections*, where it occupies ninety-six pages, and a footnote, made at the time of that republication sixty years afterwards, attributes the authorship to Governor Livingston and two New York lawyers, Messrs. Scott and W. Smith. This note on the *Collections* is no more than a guess made long after the pamphlet first appeared, and cannot be relied on as fact. There is no reason for supposing that Governor Livingston was concerned in the matter; it is possible that the lawyers were those whom Shirley employed in New York. There is strong internal evidence that he either wrote or instigated the original publication, and if that were the case, what it contains on this personal matter, in which he was far from disinterested, must be regarded with suspicion. The pamphlet is very powerfully written by some one who had been in the very centre of affairs during the preceding years.

Shirley had been there; he could write well, and he was not scrupulous in the use he made of his pen. What Sir William Johnson thought on that subject has been seen in the last chapter. In Lord Loudoun's despatches charges are brought home to him of irregularities in the granting of commissions, and of wilfully misdating them to make them valid. This anonymous pamphlet describes the particulars of the fort built at Oswego in 1755 in minute detail, giving the height of each parapet and the width of each ditch in a way only possible to some one actually engaged on that work or to its designer. Shirley designed it and superintended the construction. No one can read this paper without recognising that its writer had for some reason or another a bitter grudge against Pownall. No one is known to have entertained such

[1] *Continuation of the History of Massachusetts Bay*, G. R. Minot, 1798, ii. p. 27.

a feeling except Shirley, who had been informed that Pownall would probably succeed him in Massachusetts,[1] and was likely to have that jealousy which men often feel towards their successors when they have to own themselves failures.

We have had it from Lord Loudoun that Shirley, though he had been recalled in June, was at the time this pamphlet appeared still in Boston busy in stirring up prejudice against his successor. Minot tells us that Shirley did not embark from Boston till September 25; he was therefore still on the spot when the pamphlet was published. Many of the statements it contains about Pownall are demonstrably false if compared with other equally good authorities. When that is the case, and a spirit of detraction—just that of a man soured by failure—runs through the whole of it whenever Pownall's name appears, what else on this personal matter it contains would not be worth notice were it not that some later writers, recognising the historical value of the account it gives, have evidently taken their estimate of Pownall's behaviour at this time from it.

He is charged in that paper with having been concerned in an unholy alliance with James de Lancey of New York and with Sir William Johnson to upset Shirley in Massachusetts, and so to obtain the reversion of his place as Governor after having received favours from him. There is nothing in the history of the relations between Shirley and Pownall to shew that the latter had ever been under any obligation to the former. The only work Shirley ever put in Pownall's way was the errand to the New York Legislature in 1755 to induce that body to accept Shirley's programme for the coming campaign. As that mission was successfully carried out any obligation entailed was from Shirley to Pownall, not the other way. A man who, like Pownall, was regularly employed by Lord Halifax, one of the most powerful men in England, and occasionally by the Duke of Cumberland, had no need to look to Shirley for favours. That de Lancey was Shirley's enemy, and would act as such, there is no more doubt than that Johnson had a bad opinion of him whom he charged with reporting facts notoriously

[1] *Continuation of the History of Massachusetts Bay*, G. R. Minot, 1798, i. p. 291.

false. That de Lancey was intimate with Pownall is doubtful, the way in which Pownall spoke of him at the time of Sir Charles Hardy's arrival in New York leads to the opposite view. That Johnson and Pownall were mixed up in any such combination with de Lancey is to suppose that they departed for such a purpose on this special occasion from their usual habits of life as straightforward men of action. Moreover, Johnson had nothing to gain by doing so, and Pownall could get all he wanted without doing it. He could then quite easily have obtained a governorship elsewhere; that of South Carolina was given to him later; those of Jamaica and of New York he afterwards declined to accept. The emoluments of Massachusetts were £1300 a year, and though that was a larger sum then than now, it was not essential to him, for when he left America he lived independently, supporting the position of a member of Parliament for many years.

These charges do not appear to have been sifted before, but when that is done they, and what has been based upon them, will probably be recognised as no more than a parting shot fired at his successor by a disappointed man who left Boston just five days after they were published in New York. Shirley's imagination seems to have led him to believe that much the same methods were being used to get rid of him as he had himself adopted in 1741 to get rid of Belcher and succeed him. It was not by a hostile combination of three men, two of whom had no inducement to be in it, that Shirley was upset, but by his own excess of zeal which led him to undertake duties he was unable to fulfil. The *Gentleman's Magazine*[1] describes him as "worn out in the practice of the law as a barrister, by nature slow, diffident, and inert; who had never seen siege or battle, and yet was made Commander-in-Chief of the King's armies with the appointments and pay of the late Duke of Marlborough. Shirley marched with great deliberation to Lake Ontario, found he was too late to do anything, so marched deliberately home." That "in military affairs he was slow and inapt to seize upon the right moment for success" was the opinion of Judge Minot.[2] Though he never held command again,

[1] August 1756, p. 387.

[2] *Continuation of the History of Massachusetts Bay*, 1798, i. p. 295.

he was promoted from Major- to Lieutenant-General in 1759. He was afterwards Governor of the Bahamas, and died at Roxbury, Massachusetts, in 1771.

Nichols said of Pownall that Shirley's friends "propagated a variety of slanders against him,"[1] and Tudor, in his *Life of Otis*, remarks that "Mr. Pownall's biographers say a few hard things of him that we cannot say are justified."

From the time of Shirley's departure in the autumn of 1756, and through that winter and spring, while Pownall was in England, Massachusetts was administered by Mr. Spencer Phips, the Lieutenant-Governor. He died at the beginning of April, and the care of the province then devolved on the Council, who on the 8th of that month signed conjointly a despatch announcing that they had taken charge. As they were the leading men of the colony at that time, and several of them will be hereafter mentioned, their names, as there signed, are given below.[2]

The new Governor left Cork on May 7, 1757, in Admiral Holbourne's fleet,[3] with General Viscount Howe as a fellow-passenger, and arrived in Boston on August 3. During his absence from America no effort had been made to turn the French out of their positions on the mainland. On the contrary, the English garrisons in the north of the province of New York had been weakened by Lord Loudoun, who had drawn upon them to form a force with which he had sailed to attack Louisburg in company with Sir Charles Hardy, who on July 2 had handed over the government of New York to de Lancey and hoisted his flag to serve under Admiral Holbourne in this expedition.[4] It was an utter failure. When the English got to Louisburg they found that a powerful French fleet, much too strong to attack, had recently arrived there, and, after spending some time at

[1] Nichol's *Literary Anecdotes of the XVIIIth Century*, 1814, viii., note to p. 61.

[2] Record Office, *Colonial Papers*, vol. lxxv.
Joseph Pynchon. John Otis. Thomas Hutchinson.
Stephen Sewall. Benjamin Lincoln. Richard Cutt.
William Lepporell. John Osborne. Jacob Wendell.
John Cushing. Daniel Russell. Samuel Watts.
John Hill. John Chandler. Andrew Oliver.

[3] *Annual Register*, i. p. 29.

[4] Smith, C. J., *History of New York*, 1757, p. 245.

Halifax and wasting the summer, the English had to sail back, having done nothing.

In their absence Montcalm did a good deal; the absence of the English Commander-in-Chief gave the Frenchman who held the same position an opportunity which he was not the man to let slip. Loudoun had left General Webb with only five or six thousand men to guard the frontier, and they were not in one body, but scattered in different places. The chief avenue of approach by water up Lakes Champlain and George, which Dieskau had used two years before, was thus left open to another expedition.

In July, just after the departure to the north of Loudoun and Hardy, Webb heard that Montcalm was collecting several thousand men with boats at St. John's, and that the French at Crown Point were concentrating at Ticonderoga. Knowing what that meant, he sent off expresses to warn the colonies—but warnings were useless; he wanted the men who had been taken away and were quietly sailing to Louisburg, hopelessly out of reach. So there was no force to check the troops in Montcalm's flotilla when it arrived at the south end of Lake George, and Fort William Henry, which stood there, was invested on August 3, the day of Pownall's arrival in Boston, by an overwhelming force of some 10,000 French and Indians who had brought artillery with them.[1] That fort was held by 2000 men under Colonel Munro, who sent for help to General Webb, in command at Fort Edward, only fourteen miles distant. Webb replied that he himself had but 1500 men, and it would be as much as he could do to hold his own, so he refused to move, and told Munro to make the best terms he could with the enemy.[2] Meanwhile couriers bearing messages to rouse the colonies were posting through the country, but it took three or four days at least for a letter to traverse the 180 miles between Albany and Boston. There Pownall received, on August 6, a letter written on July 31 at Albany by Captain Christie, 48th Regiment,[3] who was on Webb's staff.

[1] Reference may here be made to the map on p. 47 *ante*.

[2] *New York Hist. Society's Collections*, iv. p. 245.

[3] Major Walter Pownall, 48th Regiment, died at Darjeeling, December 28, 1864.

Right into the middle of all this trouble the new Governor had stepped when he landed at Boston three days before, responsible for the safety of one of the most important and most threatened provinces. He had had no time to sit down in his saddle and take up the reins, but he promptly called out the forces of the colony and set them in motion. He gave orders that the men should bring their own provisions to start with and be prepared to march as far as Albany if necessary. He had no right to send Massachusetts men there, beyond the boundary of the province, without the authority of a General Court. That was not sitting, and there was no time to summon it. He held a meeting of the Council, and then, strengthened by their approval, took the responsibility himself, writing to Webb that he was doing so.[1]

> A glorious gift is prudence, and they are useful friends
> Who never make beginnings till they can see the ends.
> But give us now and then a man that we may make him King,
> Just to scorn the consequence and just to do the thing.

Another despatch from Webb followed. It is endorsed on the back "received at night August 7," and was dated from Albany on the 4th. It described Fort William Henry as attacked by a force which was said by a Canadian prisoner to amount to 11,000 men with thirty-six guns, whose continuous firing could be heard.

Webb implored all Governors and colonels of militia to instantly send what help they could, for he himself could not spare a man from Fort Edward. Next morning Pownall's measures were taken. Among the other things he had to improvise was a Commander-in-Chief of the colonial troops, and in that position he placed the best man available, Sir William Pepperell, who had distinguished himself at Louisburg with Shirley in 1745. Sir William was to go up to Springfield, where a magazine was to be formed, and all the mounted troops, with a fourth part of the militia, were to assemble there, to be passed on to Fort Edward under Sir John St. Clair. Mindful of the trouble the year before between colonial and regular officers, the Governor wrote Pepperell a letter to be shown to St. Clair, in which it was pointed out that

[1] All the correspondence here referred to and quoted from is in the Record Office, vol. lxxv. of the *Massachusetts Papers*.

the latter, "as a good servant to his Majesty and the public, will be more solicitous for the good of the service than to start difficulties about military rank and command." Nothing was forgotten. If the French advanced on the colony all wagons west of the Connecticut River were to have their wheels removed, all horses to be driven off before the invaders, all provisions to be either brought away or destroyed.

Meanwhile the Governor had written a despatch to Lord Loudoun, whom he informed of the French attack, and of the action that was being taken. He said, "I shall collect all the forces I can, I shall send Sir William Pepperell forward to receive them at the rendezvous, I shall employ General Winslow to collect them while I stay here to give such directions as shall be necessary to form an army, and as soon as such shall be formed I shall go and take the command of it." This he had power to do, so far as the colony was concerned, by his commission as Governor, and on that he was quite prepared to act, keeping his nerve through the crisis when many people lost theirs. The anxiety in Boston was great, for a large contingent of Massachusetts men was in the garrison of the captured fort. As Lord Loudoun's whereabouts was uncertain, it was doubtful where a letter would find him. But as he was probably at or near Halifax in Nova Scotia there were means of communication with him through Brigadier Monckton, the Lieutenant-Governor of that province,[1] to whom Pownall addressed himself on the 12th in a letter which has not before been published, and is in the possession of the present writer, who inherited it with several others many years ago. It is reproduced here in facsimile in order to show not only what but how the much harrassed Governor of Massachusetts wrote in the midst of his difficulties.

How long it took to transmit intelligence is shewn by the fact that this letter, written in Boston on August 12, is endorsed on the back, "Received August ye 19th by the schooner *Merimack*, Ed. Hemptnan, Master."

Christie wrote on Webb's behalf another letter to

[1] In 1759 Monckton was one of General Wolfe's three Brigadiers at the siege of Quebec, where he commanded the detachment on Point Levy, opposite the city, on the south bank of the St. Lawrence. James Murray and George Townshend were the other Brigadiers. The latter succeeded Wolfe in the command. His name will appear later in another connection.

Boston Augst 12. 57.

Sir.

This being the first Letter I have
occasion to write to you, Permitt me to congratu-
-late you upon ye Honor of your Command, & to
desire that every Intercourse & Cooperation may
subsist between us for his Majesty's Service &
upon that footing of Friendship that I shall ever
think myself happy in cultivating & honour'd in receiving
I enclose Copy of a Letter to me from Capt
Christie also a Copy of a Letter from one Wm Soal
to a Gentleman in this Town, containing a more
particular account, These Letters came to hand since my
last Dispatch to Ld Londoun, in which I acquainted his
Lp^{p}ship what Vigorous & Expeditious measures I had
taken tho' ye Reinforcements I have sent could not possibly
have arrived on ye 8th from the Distance of ye Way which
Capt Christie is unacquainted with. or does not consider-
-ed. I did not receive his first Letter till sunday evening ye 7th.
I sent off immediatly to Wm Pepperel & Sr John St Clair.

Tho' these Letters contain nothing so material as
to require my sending them by Express, yet as a Vessel

is to sail this Afternoon to Your Government
I cannot but send them to You & beg I favor of You
to transmitt them by I first Opportunity to Ld Loudoun.

I have I honor to be Sir

Your most Obedt
&
Most Humble Servt

Townall.

The Honble
Ld Governor Monckton
Commander in Cheif of his
Majesty's Province Nova Scotia.

Pownall of August 5, which ended by saying, "The General once more commands me to inform you that if you do not order your troops in motion this country must be lost." At midnight on the 6th Christie wrote to say that Sir William Johnson had arrived that day with 300 men, and so had Lord Howe, who told the people at Albany that his fellow-passenger Pownall was in Boston. Lord Howe had gone on to join Webb at Fort Edward, the Militia were coming in slowly, for it was harvest time and the colonists had to leave their crops to go to the front.

On the 10th, Christie had to write another letter announcing that Fort William Henry, overpowered by numbers, and having made a gallant defence, had surrendered the day before. De Lancey was at Albany, but there were no men or artillery there. Christie appealed to Pownall. "For God's sake exert yourselves to save a province. . . . General Webb is still at Fort Edward with the troops left there, and the militia he is collecting as fast as possible. Let us save *that*, Sir, otherwise New York may fall, and then you can judge of the fate of the continent."

This loss of Fort William Henry was an even greater blow to the English than that of Oswego the year before; it brought the enemy much further within the English territory, and left Fort Edward as the only remaining defence against an attack either on New York to the south, or on Massachusetts to the east. Webb daily expected the French to appear at Fort Edward, where the panic was increased by the arrival of the survivors of Monro's force in a shocking condition. After a formal capitulation to Montcalm, according to which they were to leave Fort William Henry with the honours of war, they had been set upon as they marched by the Indians who fell on their rear, massacring and scalping many, and maltreating the survivors, whose demand to the French guard for protection was unheeded.

It was not known till later that Montcalm was prevented by dissensions with Vaudreuil, the French Governor, from proceeding to attack Fort Edward, which might have been carried by an assault delivered quickly before the Massachusetts men arrived in force. The French returned to their boats, and went north a few days later, but among other things they had done they had given the

new Governor of Massachusetts an anxious fortnight to begin with.

Further particulars of his action in this emergency may be best described by himself in a letter he wrote officially to his brother, the Secretary of the Board of Trade and Plantations.

BOSTON, *August* 16, 1757.

SIR—I landed at this place August the third, the very day, as appears by the following papers, that Fort William was invested. By the death sometime before of Lieutenant-Governor Phips, and by the manner that the people here do interpret and act upon the clause of their Charter wherein the Council are directed in such cases to administer the Government and the eldest to preside, there has been no government at all for some time, but everything in confusion and all business in arrears. Though the eldest Councillor is directed to preside yet they understand that no otherwise than as chairman, and to do any one act of government there must be a majority of the whole, so nothing has been done. As to the military part of the government, the Militia, it is absolutely ruined. We have here neither form nor law by which to order or govern them to any one effectual purpose. I have no returns, nor is there provided a means of providing any one thing necessary for taking the field. 'Tis very hard to have this country to form into a military posture when they should have been long ago—and they are reported to be a fine military body —ready to march at a minute's notice, and are at this moment wanted for the aid and assistance of His Majesty's forces and God knows when they may be wanted for their own defence.

The people of this country do now so universally and so unanimously agree in the melancholy truth of these points that I have hopes given me of getting an effectual militia law, a thing that has never been obtained by any Governor since the first setting out of the Charter. A thing, however, that I shall propose to the General Court which I meet to-morrow. Under these circumstances I received General Webb's letter dated Fort Edward, July 31st. The enclosed papers show what I have been able to do, what I have done, and what I am doing. Most that I have done exceeds the power of my commission and goes beyond the limits that the Charter prescribes to the Governor, and everything which I have done which incurs an expense anticipates any provision made for it, but I hope the General Court will make proper provision.

You will find also among the papers a list of particulars absolutely necessary for anybody when they take the field and yet totally deficient and unprovided for. This list among other papers I shall give in to the Assembly, as I mean by these papers to show them not only what I am doing but what I would do if properly supported. I must beg of you to lay these matters before the Right Honourable the Board of Trade, as also that you will be good enough to order copies of the whole to the Secretary of State's Office as I do in my letter to

His Majesty's Secretary of State refer to these papers as lying before the Board of Trade.

All the above difficulties and confusions in the administration of Government must again take place as soon as I go from hence to take the field, which I cannot dispense with myself from doing as soon as any body of troops can be formed which I can take command of.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

T. Pownall.[1]

The next day he met the Assembly of Massachusetts and made his first speech to them. Mentioning first his reverence for "the power of Government as residing in the Magistrate," he coupled with that an expression of the same feeling for "the sacred liberties that should ever inviolably remain with the people," and he promised to always religiously observe their rights and privileges as conferred by Charter. Having thus made clear to them that they had not in him one of the Governors of the domineering type, he proceeded to address them on current events, observing that the question was no longer whether the boundary should be in one place or another with the French but whether they should be allowed to drive the English out of the continent altogether. He added words as true now as when they were spoken.

If our colonies and trade are ruined where is our naval power? If our fleets become inferior where is our dominion? and if our naval dominion is lost Great Britain is no more a free government and the British colonies no more a people.

He went on to say that Massachusetts had earned a military reputation which it was necessary to maintain in the existing crisis, and he therefore asked the Council and the House of Representatives to enact three measures:—

That the Governor may rely on the service of those called out.

That when an enemy is in the territory he may be attacked or pursued beyond the boundary.

That the colonial forces be put in proper order and discipline.

He then turned to the representatives asking them to grant the supplies which were necessary in "the almost desperate condition to which the province is reduced," so as to assist the mother country, who, while threatened herself,

[1] Record Office, *Colonial Papers*, vol. lxxv.

had sent out a large armament. He called attention to letters received from Mr. Secretary Pitt, and Vice-Admiral Holbourne commanding the station, as to the local needs of the Navy, and ended by assuring his audience of his determination to do his utmost for the interest, honour and safety of the province. That the Assembly fully appreciated what he had done in the fortnight since his arrival was shewn by their reply, which ran thus :—

> Your Excellency's acquaintance with His Majesty's just rights upon this continent, your knowledge of the state of the colonies in general and of this province in particular, your concern for the support and defence of His Majesty's interest against an encroaching and perfidious enemy, evidenced by your zealous and successful solicitations for an additional naval and land armament, and by your active vigorous measures immediately after your arrival and entry upon the Government — these, together with that tender regard which you have been pleased to express for the liberties and privileges of His Majesty's subjects, all concur in giving us the prospect of as great happiness under your administration as can consist with the involved and perplexed state of our affairs.

The Assembly further expressed their feelings by approving all his actions, constitutional or otherwise,[1] voting him an additional £300 for equipage money, and antedating his income by three months, so that it began from May 1. This, as the Governor wrote to his brother, was what they had never done for any of his predecessors, many of whom, Shirley among them, had found it difficult to get the Assembly to pass their grants at all.

On August 18, Pownall wrote to General Webb that the additional expense thrown on Massachusetts at this time amounted to £1000 a day, a terrible burden on the colony. He went on to say :—

> I have no opinion and can have no confidence in expeditions as they have been formed and carried on hitherto, and shall never enter into such, as they only waste the money, destroy the people and exhaust the strength of this country. But if there be a probability of carrying any point worth attempting . . . I shall be glad to come into such with all my soul and spirit. I do not mean to propose any particular measures, for I should have a much higher opinion and trust of any such proposals as shall come from you, as I had rather trust your judgment than my own in these matters. If anything should arise or occur to you agreeable to these sentiments of mine,

[1] The despatch of the Massachusetts militia outside the colony was a clear infringement of the constitution.

and you will please communicate it to me, I will do everything that my station and situation enable me to promote such with the people here, and I will not fear, if you leave it to my management, of getting the other Governments to concur with us.

He points out to Webb that it was only on August 6 that the first warning of the French attack had reached Boston, while the second despatch arrived on the night of the 7th, and as Fort William surrendered on the 9th it was a physical impossibility to call out the men and get them to the threatened point, distant a week's march, in those two days.

The colony was not alone in recognising that it had fallen into strong hands. When Lord Loudoun received tidings at Halifax of what had happened in his absence, he wrote a despatch on his voyage back to New York stating how the different provinces would behave under the strain put upon them, and in that paper he said, "Massachusetts will go on well as Mr. Pownall is Governor."[1] The colony had been much neglected for some years; Shirley had hardly been there since the difficulties with France began three years before, and during his governorship he had been often absent. From 1749 to 1753 he had been in Europe, spending part of the time in Paris to negotiate the Canadian frontier. Mr. Phips had acted for him then, as he did later while Shirley was soldiering and after his dismissal, but Phips was an old man a good deal past work.

While Pownall found much to do in reorganising Massachusetts and its defences, he was suddenly called away from it to New Jersey, where Governor Belcher had died on August 31, and there was no one to replace him. Pownall still held the commission of Lieutenant-Governor of that province, and it was necessary for him to act as such, for Mr. Reading, the senior on the Council, was in bad health, and the next man was unsuitable.

New Jersey could not be allowed to drift. So Pownall, busy as he was in Boston, posted off to the south. It was a week's journey then, but in the few days he could spend there he persuaded Mr. Reading to take charge, and Reading did so till a new governor came out next year in the person of Francis Bernard, who afterwards succeeded Pownall in Massachusetts.

[1] R.O., *C.C.*, vol. xcv.

The New Jersey people appreciated what he had done for them; in a resolution of the Mayor and Aldermen of Perth Amboy, dated September 24, 1757, they say that his appearance among them showed "that distance is no hindrance to Governor Pownall's zeal, and that no fatigue can check the application always shewn by him for His Majesty's service." They said they were only sorry he could not stop longer, so that they might have benefited more by his acknowledged abilities.[1] Pownall replied that he would come down again if it were necessary, that he would always do what he could for them, but he was urgently required at Boston. This appears to have been the first, as it was the last, occasion on which he really had anything to do with that province of which he had been Lieutenant-Governor for two years.

From New Jersey he wrote on September 23 to his brother John, acknowledging his letter of June 3, which covered copies of the resolutions of the House of Commons on May 23, as to colonial affairs.

The Governor remarked that the House would have little influence on the colonists unless an act were passed restoring the King's government to the just form of the Charters. He significantly added that "the bringing any of the Crown's rights into dispute with the people is the sure way to lose them."[1]

On his return to Boston, Pownall broke his journey in New York, and thence wrote to the Board of Trade on September 26, to report what had taken him from Boston, and that he was in consultation with Lord Loudoun. He had also interviews with de Lancey as to a boundary dispute between New York and Massachusetts which had caused rioting. This led to a correspondence between them which continued till the end of the year. De Lancey claimed that the overseer of Mr. Robert Livingston, a New Yorker, who was held in gaol in Massachusetts for his share in the disturbance, should be given up, and Pownall declined to surrender him.

There having been no one to take charge of official correspondence while he was in New Jersey, Pownall had early in September appointed Mr. Andrew Oliver to be Secretary of Massachusetts. Oliver was confirmed in that position by an Order in Council made in England on

[1] Record Office, *New Jersey Papers*, 3 B.J.

January 27, 1758, and at the same time Mr. Thomas Hutchinson was made Lieutenant-Governor,[1] an office which had been vacant since the death of Mr. Phips in April. Oliver wrote on September 16, 1757, to the Lords of Trade to announce his appointment, sending them a Bankruptcy Law which the Assembly had passed and the Governor had approved, after consultation with the judges. That is to be seen in the Record Office, copiously annotated by Pownall in his own handwriting on the margin. Some measure of the kind appeared necessary in consequence of so many people in the colony having been such heavy losers by the war that they were unable to meet their obligations. Some of these were to merchants in England, and as it was thought there that colonial debtors might be unduly eager to take advantage of the Act and escape payment under its shelter, the Lords of Trade reported against the measure, which did not receive the King's approval.[2] The only other important enactment of the colonial legislature that autumn was a Militia Act, which also bears on its margin the notes of the Governor, who was able to record that more extensive powers had been given now, under pressure of the crisis, than ever before to obtain an efficient force. Writing to his brother at the Board of Trade, he mentioned that he had in the province 32 regiments which gave over 37,000 men liable to service under the new law.

Meanwhile Lord Loudoun, after his arrival in New York from Halifax, had revived a quarrel with the local authorities which had begun in 1756, when he came down at the same season from Albany after the loss of Oswego. His difficulty then had been to provide with shelter for the winter a force of several thousand men for whom there were no barracks. It was impossible to build the great number of huts required, so, as the troops could not be left out-of-doors to perish, the only way to give them cover was to billet them on the inhabitants, who objected to this course, especially as no payment was offered for taking in these unwelcome guests for some months.

[1] Oliver was sixteen years, Hutchinson eleven years, older than the Governor; they had both been friends of Shirley, who had sent them as delegates to the Albany Conference in 1754. They were both on the Massachusetts Council, they held Shirley's extreme monarchical views, and they worked together, becoming eventually the best hated men in America.

[2] Record Office, *Lords of Trade Correspondence*, iv. p. 85.

Loudoun's view was that the system of billetting troops was legal in England under the Mutiny Act, and he saw no reason why the colonial householder should be exempt from what was obligatory on the English householder. This at once raised the question whether that Act was binding on the colonies. The people of New York, many of whom were not English, said it was not binding and that the precedent did not apply. There was a hot contention about this question, which might have been arranged by some payment and a little tact. Neither was forthcoming on the part of the Earl, who, on the contrary, swore very hard and said that if New York did not find quarters for the troops already there he would send for every man he had in the country and quarter them all in the place. The matter was at last settled by the New York magistrates, who got up a subscription to defray the expense the inhabitants were put to by receiving the soldiers.[1]

This autumn the whole thing came up again. Lord Loudoun went from New York to Albany on October 26, 1757, and then visited Fort Edward. For a few days "he cantoned his troops in several of the provinces with such a magisterial tone as gave fresh and general offence.[2] Among those provinces was Massachusetts, where that tone did not succeed with the new Governor, who was quite as masterful a man as his chief of the year before. Boston had made provision for 1000 men for the winter at Castle Island, but some recruiting officers refused to go there and demanded quarters in the town. Loudoun supported his officers violently, and went so far as to threaten to march regulars into Boston to enforce the demand. A sharp correspondence ensued between him and Pownall, who declared that his people were not bound by the Mutiny Act, and that sooner than be a party to enforcing it he would throw up his Governorship. Loudoun then admitted that he was of a hasty temper and wrote in a conciliatory manner.[3] Upon which Pownall got his Assembly to enact themselves some of the provisions of the English Act, so that they made the authority colonial and not English. This "saved the

[1] *New York Hist. Society's Collections*, iv. p. 241.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 258.
[3] R.O., *C.C.*, Lord Loudoun to Governor Pownall, December 6, 1757.

face" of the Assembly. He then persuaded Loudoun to accept the compromise, and a dispute which might have had very serious consequences was amicably settled.

It was a curious sequel to this matter in which Pownall had championed the cause of his people against the Commander-in-Chief that some of them assailed him almost immediately afterwards for his action.

Lord Loudoun had a letter from Pownall, dated in Boston, December 19, to say that the writer was accused there of being in league with the army to suppress civil rights. This was exactly the opposite to what he had done, for he had stood up for those rights. The story was being circulated to cripple Pownall's endeavours to get the colony into good order, especially by Mr. Livermore, who had opposed the Militia Bill; and to prevent the House from authorising the formation of the Rangers whom Loudoun had asked for. Political feeling evidently ran very high in a place where charges so utterly at variance with the facts could be made, but in all small communities the lines of cleavage are more marked than in large ones. In Boston those lines were clearly drawn between the official and the commercial class, much as they exist to-day in small colonies and English settlements abroad. While those of the business men who are insufficiently provided with capital lead very struggling lives, the few who have succeeded in establishing themselves firmly are much better off than the officials. They in turn console themselves with the halo of their commission. At their head stands the Governor, Minister, or Consul, as the case may be. Above his roof, and his only, floats the flag which men salute in his person when they raise their hats to him in the street. Fierce is the light that beats upon his throne; he needs a great deal of tact to escape the criticism which is always waiting for him. Everybody knows exactly whom he asks to dinner; if he does not ask enough people, or if he does not ask those who think themselves the right people often enough, things become unpleasant for him. An unsociable or a constitutionally shy man has no chance at all. Exposed to that sharp scrutiny Pownall found himself. Accordingly we have his personal relations thus described.

On his arrival in his government he could not be treated with

much cordiality by those officers of the customs and other departments who had been the friends of Shirley and who thought the new Governor had used unfair intrigues to supersede him.[1] He cared less about the obnoxious Acts of Trade and for the collection of the revenue by means of them than for the vigorous prosecution of the war; to this point he directed all his efforts and gave many proofs of activity and address. He took into his confidence Judge Pratt[2] and Dr. Cooper,[3] who had much popular influence, and he associated affably and readily with all classes of people.[4]

The author just quoted from points out how the long-standing disputes between the rights of the Crown and the claims of the colonists were at this juncture thrown into the background by the urgent necessity of combining all forces within the province to dispose of the French. From an inland base they threatened to sweep the English of America into the sea in 1757, exactly as the Dutch threatened to do the same thing in South Africa in 1899. Massachusetts was the loyal British buffer state which took the brunt of the first onslaught in the one case, Natal held the same position in the other. The early English reverses in the loss of Oswego and of Fort William Henry may fairly be compared to those of Colenso and Spion Kop, also on the boundary of the English bulwark. On both occasions British troops, supplemented by colonial levies, were eventually successful. The parallel is curiously exact. As no sane English Governor of Natal would have pressed on his people, just after Spion Kop and Colenso, an old claim of the Crown which caused much soreness of feeling, so Pownall refrained from harassing Massachusetts with the question of prerogative after Oswego and Fort William Henry. There was something much more important to attend to—the defeat of the enemy.

That was the great object of Mr. Pitt, whose representative in the colony, sharing his views, felt justified in subordinating to them any minor ones, such as the claims of the Crown to absolute supremacy over the people. When the crisis was past and the French had been

[1] This was the legacy bequeathed by Shirley, who, as he had left the country, could not be held accountable for it.

[2] Benjamin Pratt, Chief Justice of New York, 1761. Died 1763.

[3] Rev. Dr. Cooper, a popular divine, a good scholar, and a Fellow of Harvard University.

[4] Tudor's *Life of James Otis*, 1823, p. 43.

defeated, his having failed to support the Crown *versus* the colony, and indeed the sympathy he had for the latter, were remembered against him and prejudicially affected his career when George III. came to the throne. Meanwhile he had to do his best. As head of the official class he was sure of their support, they had to follow him however much they personally and privately resented having to do so. The people he had to win over and conciliate were the business men whose co-operation and votes of militia and money were necessary to him for the safety of the province and the conduct of the war. He had to rally all parties to the common cause.

When the Assembly met again in November he pointed out in his opening Address that the condition of affairs was very gloomy. The French possessed every post, had won over all the Indians, and were masters of the communications of the whole continent except the strip on which the English stood. For the latter an offensive policy was impossible, all they could do was to build up a strong defence, covering the frontiers, organising the militia, putting local finance on as strong a footing as was possible under the heavy drains upon it. That those drains were heavy the recent Bankruptcy Act, in a province till recently so prosperous that bankrupts were unknown, was evidence. He said that when reinforcements came from England more active measures would be possible, meanwhile reorganisation and rearmament were the essentials. Not a word was said in that address about the prerogative. Shirley, keen for it as Pownall never was, had been wise enough to drop the subject so soon as the war began. Those who had taken their cue from Shirley had less wisdom, they had been accustomed to see the King's Governor intent on the King's claims, and any departure from that attitude was to their minds heresy. They were extreme party politicians, and they could not understand having over them as Governor a man who was no partisan but an Imperialist.

It is doubtful whether Pownall at any time of his life cared whether he were called Whig or Tory. The struggles among themselves of those parties did not interest him, he worked not for the benefit of one side or another, but for that of the whole country. If he had any politics they were those of Mr. Pitt.

All this was perfectly unintelligible to the senior men who were his subordinates ; in their eyes he was no doubt a capable but somewhat aggressive youngster, full of the pushfulness for which Pitt had chosen him, but which they did not admire. They would have much preferred going on with old Mr. Shirley, to whom they were accustomed, instead of having this new young man sent to them. His ardour for reorganising the colony disturbed them, it upset everything they were used to. The popularity he was so rapidly gaining, proof of which lay in the Assembly's liberal treatment of him in money matters, threatened to throw them into the shade. That being their view of the Governor, his view of them appears to have been that they were a set of old fogeys who could not lift their eyes from the small things they were used to, in order to see the big thing he was working for—the destruction of the power of France in America. He found them full of prejudices, one of which was personal to himself. Mr. Tudor tells us that Hutchinson in these circumstances tried to destroy the popularity of Pownall, who in return associated very intimately with the enemies of Hutchinson. The latter was well born, of the family of that colonel of the same name who was distinguished by his conduct, and by the account his wife Anne wrote of him, in Cromwell's time. He was a man of education, and his history of Massachusetts is a standard work. If he and Pownall had met under other conditions they might have got on well together ; as things were they became antagonistic to each other. Hutchinson showed himself in his subsequent career to be an extremist of the high prerogative school, which was exactly what Pownall did not belong to.

Occupied with larger affairs, somewhat unconventional in his habits, Pownall paid little attention to the studied dress and deportment which, in a society still largely Puritan in its habits as in its descent, were rated more highly by others than by himself. He was a man with a sense of humour, and nothing is more disconcerting than a joke to those who cannot see it and have to reply not knowing whether they have been addressed seriously or otherwise.

Tudor describes him as a man of wit and pleasure, whom a severe community found it hard to understand.[1]

[1] *Life of James Otis*, 1823, p. 57.

The same author says that one of the objections raised to him was that he would sometimes "sit in the Chair without a sword, in a plain short frock, an unruffled shirt, with a scratch wig and a little rattan."

How these words bring before us the scene of 150 years ago! We can see those two elderly gentlemen, Messrs. Hutchinson and Oliver, attired in their best after the stately fashion of that age, duly provided with swords and ruffles, and hear one whisper to the other, "Good heavens! what would our poor friend Shirley have said to this?" What they did not see was that in the coming years they were to contribute more than any other two men in the colony to that breach between it and the old country which their then young Governor was to fight harder than any man in England to prevent.

We read of him that—

> With some failure in that gravity of manner which among so sedate a people was thought to beseem his place, the conciliation which he habitually studied accomplished its amiable purpose. He was diligent and impartial in the business of administration, and in particular his plans of economy were well conceived and carried out with success. He had liberal ideas respecting the relation of colonies to the parent country, and did and said nothing to awaken jealousy of arbitrary designs.[1]

Besides his official work he was occupied in his studies. "While here he took great pains to gain information respecting the country, historical, geographical and statistical."[2] The same writer describes Pownall as a thick-set man of medium height, the frontispiece to this book confirms that impression of his personal appearance. Statistics of population especially appealed to him; he has left it on record that Massachusetts Bay contained 164,484 inhabitants in 1751, and 216,000 in 1761. He gave the population of the province of New York as 96,776 in the former year, and 168,007 in 1771,[3] and predicted such a marvellous increase as has since taken place.[4] While not busy with such matters he amused himself with drawing; one of his sketches, which shews

[1] Palfrey's *History of New England*, 1884, iv. p. 254.

[2] Drake's *History of Boston*, 1857, p. 655.

[3] *Memorial to the Sovereigns of Europe*, 1780, p. 58.

[4] The census of 1900 shewed three and a half millions for Massachusetts (with Maine, which was part of the "Bay"); seven and a quarter millions for New York State.

Boston as it appeared in 1757, when seen from Castle William, afterwards called Fort Independence, is here reproduced on a smaller scale.[1]

As to his personal accommodation, he was well treated. The official residence in Boston of the Governors at that time was the Province House, which stood opposite the head of Milk Street. It was built of brick in three storeys, and had a magnificent interior, which included a large reception room on the first floor, which was used for official audiences and entertainments. The house was approached from spacious and finely timbered lawns by twenty freestone steps which led up to a handsome portico.[2] The inhabitant of that house had in his first months of office seen Massachusetts through her time of sharpest trial. It was no doubt due to the fact that the French were aware of the preparations the new Governor had made to receive them that they did not then descend on his province as they did on that of New York. In November they laid waste 100 miles of country, called the German flats, near Albany, scalping women as well as men at their homesteads, and carrying off forty families into captivity.[3] The time when residents in the neighbourhood of Albany and Saratoga were exposed to such perils must appear very dim and distant to those who now live there. Measured in units of years it is so. But if a larger unit be taken, that of a half century, we can measure as accurately and more intelligibly with that. One such unit takes us back to the middle of the Indian Mutiny; many who took an active part in that campaign are still with us. With two more of those units we are in touch with the period here described. Exactly a century passed between the time, in August 1757, when 2000 men under Munro were overwhelmed at Fort William Henry by a superior force of French and Red Indians, and August 1857, when a like number of Englishmen, holding the ridge at Delhi against the multitude of rebel sepoys, were in their turn almost overwhelmed by a far more numerous enemy. When we meet a veteran of the Mutiny, a comrade there of Sir Evelyn Wood, of Lord

[1] The way in which the Union Jack is introduced in the foreground may be worth notice.

[2] *Magazine of American History*, xvi. p. 411, where a view of the house is given.

[3] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1758. New York letter of November 16, 1757.

A View of the City of Boston the Capital of NEW ENGLAND.
in North America

[illegible] by His Excellency Governor Powna.
1937

Wolseley, and Lord Roberts, we have only to multiply threefold the time he has lived through since then, and the measure we thus construct reaches as far back as the men who were comrades of Lord Loudoun, of Generals Abercromby, Amherst, and Wolfe, in those early struggles of the colonies which are here summarised.

CHAPTER V

SECOND YEAR AS GOVERNOR

1758

The early part of this year found Massachusetts sorely tried, the Governor perhaps more so than any one else. His official responsibilities were great, but he had shewn himself equal to them; what weighed on him most was the opposition he had to encounter from the official class. He had written fully, and not cheerfully, about his position to Lord Loudoun, who replied from New York at Christmas-time in a very thoughtful and kindly letter, just one of those by which an older man can help a younger one.[1] There is a great deal of good advice in it, some stress is laid on the importance to a Governor of not confining his dealings with the Assembly to written communications and thus standing aloof from those he had to act with.

The Earl said he had seen several Governors fail to get on with their people by adopting this attitude; in preference to it he recommended personal intercourse and verbal treatment of the matters to be arranged. As Commander-in-Chief he expressed anxiety to know how the new Militia Bill was faring in the Assembly, and his hope that he might be supplied from Massachusetts with a further contingent of rangers, whose services were becoming recognised as indispensable for the purposes mentioned in Pownall's memorandum of the previous year to the Duke of Cumberland. As to the personal questions in Boston with which Lord Loudoun must have been well acquainted, for he knew all the people concerned

[1] R.O., *C.C.* vol. xcv. Lord Loudoun to Governor Pownall, December 26, 1757.

and how the Governor had really been appointed by Mr. Pitt, he remarked "Pardon me, my friend, to say that you have taken a very few troubles too much to heart."

At their first meeting of the year the Council of Massachusetts returned thanks to Admiral Holbourne for having refrained from exercising his power to impress colonial seamen into the navy "at a time when the province is under many heavy burdens and the effect of former impresses upon our trade and navigation are still remaining."[1]

Those burdens fell heavily on the people collectively and individually. Till the strain of war was felt the fertility of the land and sea, in crops and in fisheries which had given the early settlers so good a start, had maintained their successors in a prosperous condition. Now the land was harried by war which called the farmers from its cultivation, and the fishing craft, so soon as they got to the north where their best grounds lay, were exposed to capture by the French from Louisburg. While this was the lot of the working-classes, and owners of property were paying in taxes two-thirds of their incomes, it is not surprising that the records of the Council at this time are full of cases in which the affairs of men unable to meet their liabilities had to be dealt with. Those records also contain notice of very many instances of personal hardship and suffering, one or two of which will show what individuals had to go through.

As a specimen of one of the numerous entries of this kind in the Minutes of the Assembly we may take this, dated June 6, 1758:—

> A petition of John Patten of Stoughton: Setting forth: That his son William Patten was a soldier in the Crown Point Expedition of 1756 and died in the service. That he carried his own gun which after his death was lost, and praying an allowance. Read and Resolved—that there be allowed and paid out of the public treasury for the petitioner's use the sum of thirty-two shillings in full consideration for the loss of the gun mentioned.

William Ross petitioned for help: he and his two sons when working on their land at Sheepscott in May 1755 had been surprised and carried off by Indian allies of the

[1] R.O. vol. xxxii. Massachusetts Bay, Minutes of Assembly, January 2, 1758.

French, to whom they were sold in Quebec by their captors for 250 livres a head. To work off that sum Ross and the elder son served two years, the father was then shipped to France and conveyed to England under a flag of truce. He made his way to Ireland and shipped to New York, whence he returned to Boston, where he was penniless after those years of slavery and months of travel. But the younger son had not been able to redeem himself, he was still a prisoner in Canada; to redeem him the father had given to Colonel Schuyler a note of hand for the price, and that he was unable to meet. The Council found the money to restore the son to the father, to whom they gave an extra sovereign to take him home.

Joseph Barker petitioned the Council on the ground that he was very poor and disabled by a bullet, still in his head, received at the engagement at Lake George when Johnson defeated Dieskau. This affected his sight and hearing and incapacitated him from work. He was granted 190 acres on condition that he and his sons built a house on the land and settled there. These may seem small matters to record, but they were very serious to Ross and Barker, whose sufferings were only typical of those of others, and what those men had to undergo then is best brought home to us now by mention of actual cases such as theirs. They serve, too, to show how great was the mass of detail which the Council, with the Governor nearly always in the chair, had to deal with at every meeting.

On January 6 the Assembly sent to the Governor a message acknowledging the way in which he had negotiated the billetting question with Lord Loudoun; they said: "We thank your Excellency for your good offices on our behalf and for the care and pains which we are sensible you have taken to avert the troubles which seemed to be coming upon us." They proceeded to explain the attitude they had taken thus:—

> We are willing by a due exercise of the power of civil government —and we have the pleasure of seeing your Excellency concur with us— to remove as much as may be all pretence of necessity of military government. Such measures, we are sure, will never be disapproved by the Parliament of Great Britain, our dependence upon which we never had a thought or desire of lessening . . . the authority of all Acts of Parliament which concern the colonies and extend to them

are ever acknowledged in all the courts of law and made the rule of all judicial proceedings in the province. There is not a member of the General Court, and we know no inhabitant within the bounds of the Government, that ever questioned this authority.

The authority was questioned pretty severely within sixteen years from the date of this address—the good faith of which there is no reason to doubt—when Boston was in revolt, utterly alienated, and that for ever, from the English Crown and Parliament.

On January 15 Pownall wrote to Mr. Pitt that he had succeeded in getting the Assembly to pass an effectual Militia law. By dividing that force into smaller bodies he attempted to improve the training. There is to be seen in the Record Office[1] a printed document on the exercise for the Militia which is signed by the Governor. While the latter portion, which gives the details of handling the old musket and the rudiments of drill, is no doubt the work of some soldier by profession, the preface may be ascribed to the Governor, and the first portion will probably be of interest to the National Service League. It begins by saying—

> As it is the essential property of a free Government to depend on no other soldiery but its own citizens for its defence, so in all such free Governments every freeman and every freeholder should be a soldier. A freeman that is no soldier does as much as in him lies that he should be no longer free. . . . 'Tis base not to be allowed to bear arms in his own and his country's defence. 'Tis perfidy and treachery in a free citizen not to be willing to bear arms. But to affect to bear arms, and not to know or learn the use of them, is worse than slavishness or treachery, it is cruelty, with aggravation, to mock his country in its distress.

This paper proceeds to say that the colonist whose duty it was to serve in the Militia was already acquainted with the use of arms, as to the firelock "'tis almost as constantly in his hand as any of his implements of husbandry or of his trade." Having in mind the story told above of how William Ross was carried off when working on his farm we may well believe that. It is pointed out, however, that what such men had to acquire was the knowledge of how to act not separately, but in concert. Only the elements of drill were required, but these

[1] R.O., vol. lxxvi. *Massachusetts Bay Papers.* From this source are drawn the speeches to and addresses from the Assembly which are hereafter mentioned.

were indispensable and the levies were exhorted to learn them.

With the above-mentioned letter to Mr. Pitt there was enclosed a long memorandum on the measures which Pownall considered necessary for the defence of the western frontier, the extremities of which were as far apart as London and Liverpool. He thought it impossible to protect such a distance by a chain of forts, each of which must of necessity be so far from its neighbour that a party of raiders might easily slip between them "like the bears and the wolves." In preference to the building of forts he advocated the employment of scouting parties, always on the move and able to concentrate on any threatened point.

On the north-eastern frontier where the enemy, if they came by water down the rivers, had their course well defined, he proposed the construction of a fort on the Penobscot river which, with the existing Fort Halifax built by Shirley on the Kennebec, would in his opinion make that district safe against a raid from Quebec. That there was reason for his anxiety about the frontiers was proved by his having to write two months later to the Lords of Trade that—

> The French and Indian enemy have been down upon our frontiers to the westwards and attacked two of the garrisons or lodgements of rangers which I have posted there. The garrisons defended themselves with steadiness, and two large detachments from Colonel William's and Colonel Worthington's regiments of militia marching up with alacrity the enemy retired.

The Governor's plan for the defence of the frontiers was laid before the House of Representatives on January 23. He then told the House that, as no proper force had hitherto been provided, a very dangerous condition of things existed on the west, and as to Fort Halifax in the other direction, the establishment of men voted was actually less than what had previously been stationed there. He told them they were too parsimonious, that a weak garrison was no use for such a place which might as well, or better, be dismantled altogether. His message ended by saying "I have no further arguments, gentlemen, to use with you. It is your own interest you neglect, and it is to you and not to me that the consequences of such measures must be attributed."

This he followed up with another message three days later, complaining that the vote for the scouts on the western frontier had prescribed certain stations for the men to occupy; it was for the colony to find the men, their disposition it was for the Governor to decide. The Charter was explicit on that point, and he hoped they did not desire to infringe it. The House was obdurate. Unless the Governor accepted the allotment of the scouts none would be found and the frontier would be left unprotected to take its chance. Sooner than face that prospect and "in order to prevent the distressed state that the inhabitants must be put in by this your conduct," he signed the papers, but in doing so he made his position clear by saying—

> I protest against the breach you have made upon the constitution of your Charter and the infringement of the rights of the Crown. . . . In the plan I have laid before you I have told you, and given you my reasons for it, that I should employ the forces in the same manner that you determine by your vote that they should be employed, so there is no difference about the service. The only question is who shall direct and limit this service, the House of Representatives or the King's Governor. But this your Charter leaves no room to make a question of.

In that passage it is significant how the infringement of the Charter precedes mention of the rights of the Crown and is again brought in at the end. At this time and in later years he always looked on the prerogative as an *ex parte* claim. What he attached far more importance to was the Charter, the bed rock and the binding obligation, a contract between Crown and Colony, which both sides to the bargain made by it were bound to observe for their mutual advantage. We shall see him acting on that view through the whole of his subsequent career in this period, and after he had left America in the years which led up to the Revolution.

In this month of January the province of Connecticut proposed to form a scheme of mutual defence to be acted on by the New England colonies. New Hampshire and Rhode Island were invited to come into it but only Massachussets responded, and that with some misgivings on the part of the Governor, who had seen four years before at Albany what co-operation between the colonies might lead to. He reported on February 10 to the

Lords of Trade that he could not quite understand what motives might be at the bottom of this proposal. But as nothing but what was proper appeared on the surface he had preferred to the churlish course of putting a veto on the idea that of trying to lead the conference of Commissioners from Connecticut and Massachusetts, over which he had himself presided in Boston, to proper conclusions. He had been very careful as to the powers conferred on the Massachusetts Commissioners—Messrs. Hutchinson, Pratt, Choate and Tyng. Being present himself he could have frustrated at once any improper tendencies if they had shewn themselves, but that had not been the case.

Without saying so, he gives the impression that he was rather doubtful how the account of this proceeding would be received in England, where so much jealousy of combination between the colonies was felt. That Lord Loudoun disapproved of it is acknowledged by Pownall in a letter he wrote on March 15 to Mr. Pitt. This conference resulted in an agreement to send the militia of any province beyond its own territory into that of its partner, and into New York if necessary. The command of the united force was to be held by the Governor of the colony in which it was serving at the time. This did away with any intercolonial jealousy about authority. Attention was drawn at the meeting to the need of a fort on the Penobscot river, and of another on the Connecticut river in New Hampshire, which would protect that part of the country and encourage settlement there. The provision of a suitable train of artillery was recognised as necessary, and also that a colonial vessel of war was required to guard the coast in the absence of the navy. This Massachusetts proceeded to supply by equipping the *King George* of 20 guns at a cost of £7000.

It was further agreed by the Commissioners that a proper survey, suitable for military purposes, should be made of the country, and that the colonies should unite in sending raiders into the enemy's country "to distress them in like manner as they have us." Such mutual action by the colonies in all these particulars was regarded as "more than ever necessary now the French power was growing and several important fortresses had been captured."

Reporting to the Lords of Trade on this matter Pownall dealt handsomely with Hutchinson, saying :—

> I must acknowledge the great assistance I had from Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Pratt. I take the liberty to mention these names, that gentlemen so greatly capable and so entirely inclined to serve the Crown may not be unknown to the Government at home. It is to Mr. Hutchinson alone—who was many years Speaker of the House and is now constantly chosen of the Council—owing that the administration of this Government has not been run into total confusion.

As to the general question of the conference between Connecticut and Massachusetts, he observes : " I must beg leave to refer to your Lordship's consideration whether you would, or would not, think it advisable to carry this matter to any further length. When it comes to be laid before the House I shall be better able to say determinately. But at present I do believe, were it thought proper, I could carry it to a union of the Governments of New England."

Meanwhile he had his own Assembly to attend to. On February 2 he addressed them again in a message in which he said :—

> When you see the enemy possessed of every pass and post, and masters of the entire water communication throughout the whole country you will see how firmly they hold the command of the continent. When you consider their alliance and ascendency over the savages you will see how firmly they hold the command of every Indian on the continent. When you consider this command, as it is, united and effective in its power and feel how great that power is, what it has done and is prepared to do, if the facts themselves will not convince you of the danger you are in from the enemy my words cannot. Consider the state of this country whether it be not labouring almost to its utmost strength under the weight of taxes and whether it be in any suitable or effective state of defence either in its frontiers or its militia, to which the liberties, the lives, the dear-bought property of the people can be faithfully entrusted. If your own eyes will not convince you of the danger you are in from your own helpless condition my words cannot.

He proceeded to say that, while he urged on them the necessity of self-preservation, he had no intention of unduly calling on them to take more than a fair share of costly and distant expeditions. About measures of defence he had been opposed the month before, but now, with the help of Connecticut, he was seeing his way to them ; the

arrangements for the offensive against the enemy must come later, and they were being arranged in England. Meanwhile he told his Assembly to "save your strength, collect your force, treasure up your money till God, by the course of His providence shall call us forth."

In February the House was prorogued for some weeks, and the Governor made use of the interval to comply with a request from Lord Loudoun to meet him at Hartford in order to discuss arrangements for the campaign and the contingents to be furnished for it by the various colonies. He met Lord Loudoun at Hartford on February 20, and stayed there till the 25th. Lieutenant-Governor de Lancey of New York and Governor Fitch of Connecticut were also there. To them Lord Loudoun explained what men he wanted and that his plan was to operate on two lines, one by way of Lake Champlain, the other to the eastward, that is up the Kennebec or Penobscot. He asked for 7000 men from New England, 2128 of them from Massachusetts.

Followed by Lord Loudon, to whom the action of Massachusetts, the leading colony, was of special importance, Pownall returned to Boston, where he arrived on February 28. On March 2, when the Assembly met again, its members were told in the Governor's speech that the season was now approaching when the interests, and perhaps the existence, of the colonies was to be decided by arms. The speech pointed out that while the English had long been occupied in cultivating the country, the French had been equally busy in "works of war" to obtain it. "It is not therefore enough that we have settled and planted this country. We must take possession of it or we shall be found to have settled and planted it for the French." Saying this, the Governor put before the House the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief for men and supplies. They were but coldly received. The colonists of Massachusetts in those days lacked confidence in War Office administration, much as the British householder does now. The last named has seen the machine of War Office organisation break down very often, and what have been called "regrettable incidents" occur in consequence. He has his doubts on the whole subject. Just so the Massachusetts colonist had his doubts; he too had seen several regrettable incidents.

That of Braddock had made a deep impression on the colonial mind. After it, colonial officers had shewn themselves very shy of serving with, and under, inexperienced officers of regulars, whose leadership the colonial rank and file had refused to accept when assembled to attack Crown Point eighteen months before this time.

The Assembly was not at all keen on co-operation with the Commander-in-Chief, who had estranged them in the winter about the billets for his troops. The reply to the Governor's address was that of men who did not care to commit themselves to anything without further information. They desired to know for how long their Militia were wanted? where they were to serve? who were to be the officers? who was to have the chief command? who was to pay and arm the provincial troops? and what others were to be employed with them?

This was the formidable list of questions returned to the Governor by his hesitating Assembly on March 8; he said it was impossible for him to reply fully without conferring again with Lord Loudoun. While he was doing this there arrived, most opportunely, full information from the highest authority in England.

Pownall received on March 10, two days after he had the lukewarm reply of the Assembly, a despatch of December 30 from Mr. Pitt which explained the whole programme. Part of it was the recall of Lord Loudoun, who was responsible for having left the frontier open to Montcalm's raid the year before, and who had become so unpopular in all the colonies that it was not desirable to retain him there. He was to be succeeded by General Abercromby in the command of the 20,000 regulars who remained in America from the previous campaign.[1] With them and the provincial troops Abercromby was to attack Ticonderoga and Crown Point on Lake Champlain, while an entirely separate expedition was being organised in England to sail thence to reduce Louisburg.

This despatch removed all Pownall's difficulties with his Council; he went straight to them with it, and, as he says himself in a letter to the Lords of Trade, he "put the whole Court under an oath of secrecy" and told them the news. Having done that, he sent for the Representatives and "harangued them upon *that good time* coming which

[1] *Annual Register*, i. p. 30.

they had always sought for and was the end of all their hopes." He says he explained the several points of Mr. Pitt's letter, and then "when I found them warm and discovered them to be animated, I laid the whole letter before them." Thus left to discuss the altered situation, the Assembly saw that Mr. Pitt meant business; that their Governor did the same they had evidence in his actions and in the forcible addresses with which he had plied them. Next morning they came to a unanimous vote, and agreed to furnish themselves the whole of the 7000 which had been asked for from New England. In a matter of this importance, Pownall wrote, there were sure to be some difficulties, one of which would be the getting the full number equipped within two months, for by the 1st of May Mr. Pitt desired that all should be ready, together with 200 whale boats required for the operations on the Lakes.

Many arrangements had to be made in order to put so large a force in the field at such short notice; one of them was the providing of a sufficient number of competent officers. As to this a letter of Pownall's addressed to the Council a fortnight later may be worth quoting; it is as follows:—

> I perceive that an opinion prevails abroad, and perhaps it is too well grounded, that in some former expeditions sums of money have been given to some of the colonels for recommendations to commissions in their regiments. I have an abhorrence of such practices, and unless some care is taken to prevent them for the future I am afraid of very bad consequences. The only rule of my conduct in appointing officers is the fitness of men for the service; for their characters I must depend on other people as I have not a personal knowledge of a sufficient number. But if these characters can be purchased with money, what a situation are we in. I recommend this affair to your speedy and serious consideration.

That was promptly given; the House expressed its hearty gratitude to the Governor for bringing the matter before them, they said they desired to support him in his wish to suppress any such malpractices, and they forthwith brought in and passed a Bill to prevent them.

While the Massachusetts contingent was being prepared a curious question arose out of the massacre in the previous autumn of part of the garrison at Fort William Henry. Fourteen of the officers of the provincial regi-

ment who had surrendered there were bound by parole not to serve again. But they sent to the Governor a memorial in which they claimed to be free from any obligation of this nature to the French, who had flagrantly broken the capitulation as soon as it was signed. That had guaranteed the garrison all the honours of war—very much more than their safety. They had received something quite different. To use their own words they had been, by the Indians

> mostly stripped of our arms and baggage before we marched out of the retrenched encampment, and also stripped of the clothes we had on our backs and rifled of what money we had. And so far from being protected and escorted to Fort Edward, numbers who applied to the French officers for protection could have none granted, but obliged to take to the woods. Some were murdered in sight of the French troops.

By this treatment, and the breach by the French of another condition which provided that the English wounded—many of whom the Indians killed—should be properly cared for, they considered themselves freed from their parole. As they had lost all their effects and were in want, they asked the Governor to re-engage them in the new force he was raising. Whether he was justified in doing so was a point of international law which he felt unable to decide, so he referred the question, enclosing the officers' petition, to Mr. Pitt on 16th March.

The organisation of all these preparations for a war of which he himself was to remain but a passive spectator was too much for the Governor. He was one of those civilians—and there are many such—who hanker for the honour of military service which is denied them. He had volunteered eighteen months before and he did it again now; a postscript to a letter of March 14 to Mr. Pitt runs thus:—

> To give a spring to this good measure I have offered my people to go with them myself. Since which I have had some of the best gentlemen of the country to offer their services, with whom the best of the yeomanry will go. So that I hope once more to see such people turn out as did when Louisburg was taken. I have wrote to General Abercromby on this head, and made a tender of my services to him.

As in 1756, he was disappointed. Moreover, he felt that while his personal readiness to go to the front had stimu-

lated recruiting, the refusal of his services had to some extent checked it. In another letter some six weeks later he tells Mr. Pitt that—

> Could I have been admitted to have gone with them myself I should have had the whole by this time by enlistment. When I made my offer of service I offered at the same time to remove all difficulty about rank, and to acquiesce in anything for the good of the service.[1]

But he was able to assure Mr. Pitt that, notwithstanding the check which had thus been given to the movement, its success was assured. The General Court had voted a bounty of £4 to every man who came forward, and another £10 was to be paid to each soldier who returned from the expedition if that resulted in the conquest of Canada. The General Court went still further, they did what was without precedent in their own or any other colony. To ensure the requisite number being made up they enacted that one man out of every four in the Militia should be drafted for active service.

Another message from the Governor to the Assembly, dated April 18, pointed out the advantage of further mutual arrangements with other colonies—such as that lately formed with Connecticut—for supporting and protecting the settlements and their commerce. There were, he said, many measures which could well be adopted for this purpose, but any detailed independent expeditions appeared to him "to obstruct and ruin the King's service and the public interest, which are one."

This community of interest and the consequent necessity of common action between ruler and ruled he kept ever before him at a time when many men, blinded by party feeling on one side or the other, made strife and destroyed power by treating the interests of the Crown and those of the colonies as antagonistic to each other. In the message of April 18 the Governor announced that the King had placed all regular and provincial troops for the land campaign under Abercromby as Commander-in-Chief. Ten days later Lord Loudoun embarked for England.

For the due equipment of the Massachusetts forces too much care could not be taken. On April 22, the

[1] *Colonial Governor's Letters*, vol. lxxi., Governor Pownall to Rt. Hon. Mr. Pitt, April 22, 1758.

Representatives were asked by the Governor to provide the troops intended to invade Canada with knapsacks and camp equipment "so as to make their service as comfortable to them as the nature of the thing will permit." On May 7, Pownall wrote to the Lords of Trade that he had got his 7000 men ready by the time Mr. Pitt had appointed, and everywhere, except in the fishing-towns and on the sea coast, the levies were complete and ready to march. Orders for them to do so would be issued as soon as the contractor for provisions reported that magazines on the route were ready. Contracts had been placed for these supplies instead of following the old plan of allowing officers of provincial forces to act as sutlers, a system "which has been hitherto the ruin and disgrace of the troops." In addition to what Mr. Pitt had asked for, camp necessaries and medicine chests had been provided by the Assembly.

That body was addressed on June 1 by the Governor, who called on them to make provision for the pay of the troops and for the cost of supplies to the expedition, all outlay on which he assured them should be carefully watched so that there should be no waste.

He was able to announce that a sum of £394 had been received from Nova Scotia for the support of French inhabitants of that country who had been deported to Boston. As to these people, he said that, if further help for them were wanted, the good feeling of Massachusetts would not allow the aged and infirm to suffer; but he added: "Let those who are able to, work and support themselves and their families. They will soon cease to be a burden, they will become happy and prosperous subjects."

To this the Assembly replied a fortnight later that as to the French exiles they would be treated as well as possible; but the hope was expressed that England, who had thrown them on Boston charity, would refund what was spent on these people. As to the general situation they said:

> We think ourselves happy that, when we are engaged in affairs of the last importance, we have a gentleman at the head of the province of distinguished talents for government and zealously affected to His Majesty's service. Our burdens your Excellency knows are extremely great, and you have been pleased to put us in

mind of the encouragement we have that a proper compensation will be given us. We earnestly intreat your Excellency to represent to His Majesty in a just and full light our distressed case and our ready disposition to exert ourselves to the uttermost in His Majesty's service, for if we should fail of relief, and our taxes be increased, our burdens must be insupportable. It is a satisfaction to us to see the concern your Excellency is under that no misapplication be made of those moneys which we raise with so much difficulty, and that the affairs of government are administered by your Excellency with economy, vigour and integrity.

After less than a year's residence among them Pownall found himself on these pleasant terms with a stubborn race of men, whom no one could drive but whom he could lead. Since his arrival he had made it his first business to put the province in a sound state of defence. He had then been backed, exactly at the right moment, by his chief in England in the endeavour to assume the offensive. His efforts had been successful, Massachusetts had put in the field a force twice as large as that which in the following year sufficed Wolfe on the Heights of Abraham.

Now that the summer, the campaigning season, had come it was for the Governor to remain at the base watching the conduct of operations by the military commanders at the front.

He occupied himself with another subject, that of topographical inquiry, in which he was always keenly interested. About this he wrote to Mr. Pitt on June 8 to say that he was now sending out to different districts some scouts who had been trained as surveyors. One of these men was going up the Penobscot river to the falls, another was to push farther on, cross the watershed which divided the Penobscot from the Chaudiere, and make his way down the latter river as far as possible into the French settlements; this man's escaping capture was considered very doubtful. A third was to reconnoitre the ground between the Kennebec and the Penobscot rivers. A fourth was to proceed up the Connecticut river to the source, "for if we mean to preserve any command or even peace in New England it must be by a military settlement on the height of the land among the heads of the waters. Who can possess that will command the country, and if we do not the French and Indians will."

On November 5 he was able to send Mr. Pitt the results of these surveys. A Captain Nicholls, a backwoodsman, had undertaken the dangerous one, that down the Chaudiere, and had returned safely. The Governor's detailed instructions to him had been that he should note the nature of the rivers and where they were passable; the positions of the falls, and the carrying-places at their sources; what forage was to be found in the forests; where there were swamps to be crossed, and where the ground lent itself to ambuscade. The report received on these points confirmed Pownall in the opinion he had held, and which others had not shared, that this route was not suitable for an army invading Canada.

Starting from Boston in the middle of May, the Massachusetts levies had nearly 200 miles to cover before they joined General Abercromby at the southern end of Lake George. Fifteen miles a day was then considered a good march through that country; as they had to follow each other in detachments the last did not arrive at its destination till June was well advanced, but by the end of that month Abercromby had his whole force of 16,000 provincials and regulars at Fort Edward ready for use. Pownall was not at all sure that this force was sufficient; he wrote from Boston on July 3 to Lieutenant-Governor Monckton in Halifax:[1]—

I think General Abercromby has a very hard (I had almost said unequal) task. The enemy at Ticonderoga and Crown Point[2] are very powerful in their numbers and very strong in their works, and more so in the ground. They have eight regiments there besides Canadians and Indians and the marine provincials. It seems to me that the General will want more regulars. However, everything is in great forwardness, and on the 21st of last month Lord Howe, with the advanced body, 6000, was got to Lake George and had 300 whale boats, batteries, etc., afloat. The General acquainted me that he was to follow soon so that by this time he is, I suppose, there with the main body if all the provincials have joined him.

Two days after this not very confident letter was written in Boston, Abercromby embarked his troops and guns to proceed up Lake George to attack Ticonderoga, the most southern French work, at the back of which lay

[1] The original of this letter is one of those above mentioned as in the present writer's possession. It is reproduced in facsimile in the Appendix.

[2] The works at Crown Point are shown by a diagram in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for 1755, p. 525.

Crown Point. The former was placed on a tongue of land which lies between the northern end of Lake George and a narrow gut which joins Lake Champlain; three sides of the place were surrounded by water, part of the remaining one was covered by a morass.[1] The strength of Ticonderoga was thus due to natural features such as Pownall alluded to in his letter above quoted; it was not a regularly built work like Crown Point, but the only exposed side was covered by trenches backed by an abattis of timber.

The English landed near it on July 6, the day after they had embarked at Fort Edward, and advanced on Ticonderoga in four columns. Lord Howe, nominally the second in command—actually the first, for Abercromby had practically left the matter to him—was with Putnam's rangers in front of the columns when he was shot in a skirmish. The columns as they came up got confused and mixed up in the forest, and while they were in this condition the advance guard of the French fell on them, killing 300 of their number. Abercromby now took charge himself; owing to the difficulties of the ground he had left his artillery at the Lake, and on July 8 he made his attack without it. The troops, and especially the Highlanders, then newly raised, behaved with great gallantry, but they failed to carry the place, and were repulsed with a loss of 2000 killed, wounded, or prisoners.

Abercromby drew off and retired to Fort Edward, but in August he despatched Colonel Bradstreet, a colonial officer, with 3000 of his men to Lake Ontario, which they crossed to attack Fort Frontenac, the French post, now Kingston, at the east end of the lake. Bradstreet had the honour of striking the first blow at the French by taking the place on August 27 without losing a man.

On the defeat at Ticonderoga, Pownall commented in a letter of July 27 to Monckton,[2] saying: "The inadequateness of the troops to the nature of the service seemed to me what was all along to be feared, and proved unequal to it. . . . The General has strengthened the Mohawks river with 5600 men under Brigadier-General Stanwix, an advanced post of which will be commanded by Colonel Bradstreet which may possibly act offensively, but of this to yourself only."

[1] *Annual Register*, i. p. 72.

[2] Facsimile in Appendix.

While that portion of the English operations which had been organised in America had only the success at Frontenac to set off against the failure at Ticonderoga, the other expedition, prepared in England itself, had met with better fortune. For its command, Mr. Pitt had selected Jeffrey Amherst, whom he had specially promoted from the colonels' list for this purpose.

Amherst had served on Lord Ligonier's staff at Dettingen and Fontenoy, he was distinguished not only by the service he had seen but for his coolness and self-control, in which latter qualities he was a contrast to his second in command, the fiery and immortal James Wolfe. They sailed from Portsmouth for Halifax on February 19, 1758, with 14,000 men, in a powerful fleet commanded by Admiral Boscawen, and on June 2 they appeared off Louisburg, which was taken on July 26, between five and six thousand French becoming prisoners. The commanders then separated; Wolfe, who had shewn remarkable gallantry in the operations, returned to England, while Amherst, leaving a portion of his force to garrison Louisburg, proceeded with the remainder to Boston. News of this important success, which freed the colonial commerce from the attacks of the French privateers, had been received in Boston with enthusiasm on August 16. On September 12 Pownall wrote to the Lords of Trade[1] that the transports bringing five regiments under Major General Amherst were then coming into the harbour, some had arrived, others were off the port. He was able to report that preparations had been made to receive them, provisions and transport for their march to Albany and the west awaited their arrival. He went on to say that—

> Amidst these important affairs I am ashamed to mention the inglorious efforts which we poor Governors, after having put our whole strength into the hands of others, are able to make upon any occasion which calls upon us for the King's service. Of 10,000 men belonging to this province employed in the public service, not 500 remain under my own command to cover a frontier of above 200 miles. All our sea coast is without the assistance of one regular or one King's ship, instead of which I sent last month off the Bay of Fundy an armed sloop to open the communication between this and Fort Cumberland and Annapolis in Nova Scotia, which a privateer from St. John's River had interrupted.

[1] Record Office, *Massachusetts Papers*, vol. lxxvi.

One of the English outposts on the north-eastern coast was a Fort called George's, situated near the boundary of Nova Scotia, whose Governor, Brigadier Monckton, had written that the French at St. John's River were meditating an attack, in conjunction with the Penobscot Indians, on the eastern frontier. Pownall's reply, of August 6th, taken from the originals above referred to, is here given in facsimile.[1]

On August 30, Pownall wrote again to Monckton to tell him what had happened on the expedition :—

The intelligence you sent me of the enemy's meditating an attempt upon George's proved not only true but came very seasonably. Immediately upon the receipt of it I fitted out an armed sloop as a tender to the *King George* and went down to George's. Threw into the fort a reinforcement of 33 men, their stores, ammunition, and provision. Saw the fort prepared to receive the enemy, visited the other little fortified places and then proceeded directly in two routes, the *King George* on the outside of the islands of Penobscot Bay, and the tender on the inside of the islands to Mount Desert harbour. The sloop discovered two bodies of the enemy, one on Long Island and the other on Maskeag point. Some of the latter party of the Indians shewing themselves separate from the main body Lieutenant Sanders and ten more, contrary to the orders I had given the officer commanding the tender, went out in the boat in pursuit of them, were drawn into the very snare laid for them and taken by about 40 Casces. As soon as the sloop joined me at Mount Desert I returned back the same way and endeavoured to get up the western side of Penobscot Bay. The wind would not permit. I went therefore a second time to George's and found all quiet and well there, they had heard nothing of the Indians. I left them and made a third attempt for the western side of Penobscot and could not get in. So came away for Boston. The day after I left George's the enemy appeared and made their attempt upon the fort, their number 50 French, 255 Indians. They continued firing for about twelve hours on the fort without effect. As soon as Captain Saunders in the armed sloop, whom I had left with orders to proceed to George's, or to any place where he heard of an attack, appeared in sight in George's river the enemy withdrew, and soon afterwards sent in a flag of truce with a woman they had taken whom Captain North, commanding at the fort, redeemed for £9. I have thus the satisfaction to hope that I had put the fort in a posture of defence beyond the strength of the enemy's force. However, as soon as I heard of the matter I sent down again immediately Captain Hollowell. I have also sent down some French prisoners to exchange for such as the enemy may have of ours. I must expect that some of the straggling outsettlers must be drove in if not taken.[2]

[1] The reader will perhaps pause for a moment to look at this letter.
[2] The original of this letter is in the present writer's possession.

Castle William Boston
Aug 6. 60—

Sir.

Last night I was honord with Yours Letter of ye 26th ult°. I am much obliged to You for your Intelligence; Twas extream kind & Prudent to acquaint the People at ye Eastward. I had indeed received, by some private Letters to our Merchants, received a flying report of this matter. I was preparing two small Vessels to cruise against these privateers of ye Enemy in the Bay of Fundi— But since hearing that You have sent One of Your Armd Vessels thither I have changed my plan & fitt out only one Sloop as a Tender to Capt Hollowell in ye King George whom I send down there directly. as I have some time since entertained a Design of Reconnoitring myself Penobscot Bay & R. If nothing from ye Westward prevents me I shall go down in ye King George I shall take about 30 Soldiers with me from this Garrison. —— as a reinforcement

with intent to throw into Georges Fort should ye Enemy appear in that Quarter. & if they should leave their Vessels in any of the Rivers thereabouts I will hope to see them destroyed,—

Our accounts from ye Westward in private Letters not to be depended on, my Courier yesterday brought me public ones. A Party of ye Enemy attack'd a Convoy of 30 Ox Teams Kill'd half way brook between Fort Edward & ye Lake, killd & destroyed ye Whole, the Indians of ye Party gott drunk with ye Plunder, which offerr'd a fine opportunity of revenging ye Blow — sed Diis aliter visum —

Our Insurance Officer & Wager Layers begin to grow impatient for ye News of ye Reduction of Louisbourg, but they little judge what a peice of work it is to carry on Works thro' Rocks &c —

I have ye honor to be with great respect

Sir your Honor's most Obedient & mos humble Servant

Pownall

To The Honble B Genl Monckton
L Governor &c of Nscotia.

The above-mentioned letter of September 12 from Pownall to the Lords of Trade on this subject ends by informing them that

> The day after I came away the enemy came out of the woods and made their attack, but without the least effect. Finding also all the inhabitants upon their guard they attempted nothing further but killed about 70 cattle and went off with the greatest precipitation. For want of rangers it was not in my power to prevent this attack, I have on this occasion the satisfaction to see that the measures I was able to take have rendered it abortive. For not one life is lost, not one single settlement destroyed and His Majesty's frontiers were maintained.

This service was acknowledged in grateful terms by the General Court of Massachusetts; the terms in which Mr. Pitt recognised it will be found in the next chapter.

As soon as the news of General Abercromby's failure reached England he was superseded, and instructions were sent out by Mr. Pitt that General Amherst was to succeed to the chief command; the right man was at last in the right place, and the military situation cleared at once as did that in South Africa when Lord Roberts assumed the command in 1900. Pownall's view of this appointment may be seen from what he wrote to Mr. Pitt, acknowledging the letter of September 18, which brought the news. His answer is dated from Boston on November 4, and runs as follows:—

> This whole country, sir, as well as myself, will be greatly spirited to execute His Majesty's commands in the general service under a gentleman whose services have already given so happy an omen to, and done so essential a benefit to, the British Empire in America as General Amherst has done. Everything that my services can effect shall be done. General Amherst, since his return from Lake George, has been here with me two or three days.

He then mentions how the General had sailed for Halifax on October 30, and what measures had been taken to forward to him despatches which had arrived after his departure. This letter ends by acknowledging what Mr. Pitt had said about himself in the following terms:—

> Your favourable acceptance and representation of my imperfect endeavours to serve His Majesty not only reward me for what I may have done but pays me beforehand for all I can ever do and demands my future services by every sense of gratitude and attachment.

At the request of the Assembly of Massachusetts the Governor wrote a long letter[1] to Mr. Pitt on September 30 to explain the position of the Colony. He described it as having been

> for many years the frontier and the advanced guard to all the colonies against the enemy in Canada. This province has always stood its own ground and preserved His Majesty's dominions. It was once able to do this. It was once the channel of all the European trade to America and the mart of all the American Colonies.

The Governor proceeded to explain how this was no longer the case. The heavy burdens upon Massachusetts had diverted commerce to New York and New Jersey, where the people could work more cheaply because they lived less expensively, not having such heavy taxes to pay. Not only was Boston, the port, thus affected, but the inland districts bordering upon other colonies were trying to throw their lot in with them, claiming to be within their boundaries and beyond those of Massachusetts. Several large towns on the frontiers had thus revolted against the colony they really belonged to and gone over to Connecticut. On the New York frontier the same thing was happening, and it was this which had given rise to the dispute with de Lancey as to where the boundary was and where the jurisdiction of the respective Governors had its limit. This letter pointed out that

> those of the inhabitants which border upon the surrounding Colonies seeing their neighbours at ease and unencumbered while they themselves were loaded and almost sinking under their heavy burdens and worn out with their severe services have . . . gone into measures to desert a labouring and sinking province.

The greater the number who thus slipped away the heavier was the load which had to be borne by those who remained. He then gave actual figures shewing that the three years of war, 1755-57, had cost Massachusetts some £242,000, against which £70,000 had been refunded by England. That left the colony with a balance against it of £172,000, to which must be added as much more already incurred for the special effort of the current year. The actual position, therefore, was that the colony was paying 6 per cent on a loan of £357,000, all of which had to be

[1] R.O., *Colonial Governor's Letters,* vol. lxxi.

repaid in three years' time.[1] To meet this obligation there was a poll tax on the whole population of 10s. a head, and those who owned real or personal estate had to pay no less than 13s. 2d. in the pound in taxation. The colonists were not suffering in their pockets only, they did so in their persons. Most of the men in the ranks of the provincial forces were freeholders, many of them were the sons of members of the House of Representatives or of officers of rank; they were men of good standing taken away from their usual occupations. But despite all this they had provided in the spring a force more than three times what Loudoun had asked for.

> They make no claims on the mother country for what they have done, they have done their duty . . . they are happy in reflecting that they have been able hitherto to do their duty.

It was impossible, however, to suppose that this state of things could continue; some recompense or remuneration from England must be forthcoming if this colony, which had hitherto been in the forefront of the struggle, was to play the same part as it had done hitherto in that position. After this long letter of appeal had been written a postscript was added to it to acknowledge the receipt from England of an instalment of such help as was asked for. A sum of £27,000 had been paid by the Treasury in London to the agents of the colony there on account of the expenditure on provisions for the troops in the campaign of 1756. Pownall wrote that he should be glad to announce this to the General Court when he met them in a few days' time, and he added, "as I know them to be a grateful as well as a dutiful people it will, I may be answerable, have every good effect upon them."

His opening speech to the Assembly on October 4 began by alluding to the successes at Louisburg and Frontenac as matters of congratulation, and in the same connection he mentioned this support of England to her colony as "the very foundation that enabled you to make the efforts you have done." Addressing himself to the Representatives, he asked them to make provision for

[1] These figures were then enormous. A footnote to the *Administration*, p. 93, of 1765 shews the ratable value of Massachusetts Bay as £260,000; that of the province of New York as only £160,000. Page 100 of the same book gives the normal peace expenditure of Massachusetts for government and public services as £13,000 a year, and that of New York as £4000.

troops at the front, for those on the frontier, and for the Province ship, *King George*. Alluding to some irregularities in the despatch of soldiers which had been dealt with—probably in his own absence at Penobscot—by Hutchinson, he said, "I cannot here omit making my public acknowledgements to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor for the labour he took, and the effect his labours had, in stopping some evils that were arising from these faults." He had heard that many men who had been discharged from the army as unfit to serve from sickness or wounds, were lying on the roads in great distress. He informed the Assembly that he had already given orders that all cases which deserved relief should have it, and that those who were undeserving should be sent to their homes and not suffered to loiter on the roads.

Repulsed in larger operations, the French were now becoming more and more troublesome in raiding the frontiers with Indian support. The Governor ended his speech by alluding to this in connection with the ineffectual attempt which had been made on the English fort at George's, and by saying that "the state and situation of our frontiers becomes every day more and more critical; I must therefore earnestly recommend them to your serious consideration."

In the first days of that session the difficulties were removed which had arisen in the spring between the Governor and his Assembly, in consequence of their claim that in voting for the supply of troops they could at the same time prescribe at what posts within the province those should be stationed. That prerogative which the Governor had claimed by the Charter for himself, on behalf of the Crown, was conceded. He wrote on October 15 to the Lords of Trade to announce that the matter was settled, and finished his despatch with the words: "I have great pleasure in informing your Lordships thereof as it is a great pleasure to me to commend, and do justice at the same time to, a people who are well inclined to His Majesty's service when rightly understood."

Meanwhile Colonel Bradstreet's capture of Fort Frontenac had borne fruit by bringing the Indians of the Great Lakes and the West back to the English side. By a treaty made with them at Easton in October, they were bound to give no assistance in the defence of Fort du

Quesne to the French, whose garrison there was weak. Pownall had written to Monckton on July 3 that it did not consist of more than 500 Europeans.[1] These were no match for the force which Amherst had at his disposal, and they evacuated the place on November 24 when General Forbes, one of Amherst's officers, approached it. The colonists, rejoicing in at last seeing Braddock's disaster avenged, and in obtaining possession of so important a post, renamed it Pittsburg, in honour of William Pitt, who had directed the operations which led to its capture.

With the success at Fort du Quesne the military operations of this year ended, and it may be worth while to trace the sequence of Mr. Pitt's actions during the time which had passed since he took office in December 1756.

He had then been approached by a junior official on the colonial establishment who had spent three years in America studying the situation there very closely, and had an extensive and carefully-thought-out scheme ready to submit. Considerable attention was evidently paid to him; he and his ideas must have made an impression on the mind of Mr. Pitt, for he was at once promoted to the Governorship of Massachusetts. If the course of events be watched it will be seen how closely it corresponds to that which he had outlined.

The military arrangements for 1757 Mr. Pitt could not deal with, he had no time to do so; they were in the hands of Lord Loudoun, who was recalled when found inefficient. For 1758 Mr. Pitt could make his own plan, and that consisted in the double attack on the French in Canada which Pownall had suggested. As Louisburg lay on the flank of an approach to the St. Lawrence that fortress had to be dealt with first; Amherst, who succeeded in that portion of the plan, was moved on to New England, to replace Abercromby, who had meanwhile failed at Ticonderoga in his share of the proceedings. Meanwhile Pownall had reorganised Massachusetts, and secured the hearty co-operation of that most important province. Having New England solid behind such a general as Amherst, all was ready for the attack on Canada from the colonies; Mr. Pitt was now free to concentrate his attention on the other branch of the subject, the naval and military expedition to be despatched from England to Quebec.

[1] Facsimile of original in Appendix.

With this much in his thoughts in the second half of the year 1758, the man he turned to for further information and advice was Pownall. His doing this goes far to support the opinion here advanced that Mr. Pitt had all along been indebted to the local knowledge and experience of Pownall for the policy by which Canada was won for England. On December 8, 1758, Pownall wrote a letter[1] from Boston to Mr. Pitt which acknowledged the receipt of orders received from the Minister to draw up a scheme of operations for 1759; to lay it before General Amherst in the first instance, and then to send it to England for Mr. Pitt's use. These instructions Pownall wrote that he had complied with; he had drawn up the scheme, General Amherst had seen and approved it, and the document was therefore forwarded. The original is in the Record Office with the above-mentioned covering letter. With Mr. Pitt's permission a copy of it was afterwards published by Pownall in the edition of 1765 of his *Administration*, and in the three other editions of that book which followed.[2] It is dated at Boston on December 5, 1758. As the Atlantic voyage was then a matter of six weeks or two months, this paper would be in Mr. Pitt's hands at the end of January or the beginning of February 1759—quite in time for it to be thoroughly discussed by Mr. Pitt and General Wolfe before the latter sailed from Spithead on February 17.[3] It is very probable that Wolfe had among his papers a copy of this despatch of Pownall's which Mr. Pitt had sent for. As we follow the ideas it contains, and compare them with Wolfe's actions, a close coincidence between the two will be seen.

With the evident intention of recapitulating in writing the whole argument verbally submitted to Mr. Pitt two years previously, this paper begins by saying that at the commencement of the war in 1754, the question between the French and the English had been one concerning their respective boundaries; it was then "a petty skirmishing

[1] R.O., *C.C.* vol. liii.

[2] 1765 edition, Appendix, p. 51; 1766 do. p. 51; 1768 do. p. 52; 1774 do. ii. p. 246.

[3] *Montcalm and Wolfe*, Parkman, 1884, p. 192. Major Wood's *Fight for Canada*, 1905, p. 45, recognises that to Pownall was due the initiative of Mr. Pitt's action, but associates de Lancey with him. It was however Pownall, not de Lancey, whom Mr. Pitt now finally consulted, and de Lancey had not the topographical knowledge which caused Mr. Pitt to use Pownall as what Major Wood calls "a sort of Intelligence Department."

war," one in which the French had always obtained the upper hand because they best knew how to choose their posts. It is pointed out how that stage had now been passed, the issue had become far greater, it had developed into a struggle between the inhabitants of Canada, the province of France, and the English settlements for the mastery of America. "*A general invasion of Canada in conjunction with the European troops and fleet*" is therefore recommended, and attention is drawn to the fact that this could never be effectually done by land only. The hold on the country which the French possessed by means of their well-placed forts, their command of the portages or carrying-places at the heads of the rivers, and their control of the Indians, would make an attack on them by land very tedious if not impossible unless it were supported by sea power. That was ours. "The road to Quebec up the St. Lawrence river we possess by the superiority of our marine navigation." There appeared no reason why the fleet should not convoy transports ascending the St. Lawrence as far as the large island of Orleans which lies at the top of the estuary immediately below Quebec, its western extremity only five miles from the city. That island could be used as a base for operations. "If our army can once set down before Quebec we must take it, if Quebec be taken the capitulation may at least strip Canada of all regulars, after which the inhabitants might possibly be induced to surrender."

Attention is then drawn to two precautionary measures, the keeping a very strong squadron on the Atlantic to protect the coast of the maritime colonies while the frigates and cruisers were escorting the transports up the St. Lawrence, and the early despatch of some men-of-war to the Bay of Gaspe. That lies on the Atlantic under the southern promontory at the mouth of the St. Lawrence and to westward of the Gulf of the same name. The ice coming down the river in the spring swept about the Gulf and rendered navigation there dangerous for a long while. It was pointed out that the French, knowing this, got their ships to Gaspe, where they could lie till the ice came down the St. Lawrence, and then make their way up the river behind it. It was therefore suggested that some English warships might be early despatched to Gaspe, so that by

cruising thence as soon as the navigation opened they could close the river to French reinforcements. The neglect of this measure in the following year enabled a fleet of eighteen French transports to slip in to Quebec just before Wolfe arrived. The absence of an English fleet to guard the seaboard while the siege of Quebec was in progress caused great anxiety to the Governor and people of Massachusetts, who feared the French might despatch a squadron to make a counter attack on them.

Pownall's despatch proceeded to state that, while the attack by the St. Lawrence must be the main one and receive the chief attention, it would be well to simultaneously occupy the French with other expeditions on the lakes. He recommended another attempt to take Ticonderoga and Crown Point; should it be successful he thought that those places should be held as defensive positions so as to cover the Lake Champlain district. There were plenty of regulars already available for this purpose at Albany, Schenectady, and Fort Edward—their number could be augmented by provincials if necessary. Further to the west he points out another line of operations. The English had now recovered the Oneida carrying-place, not very far south of their old fort at Oswego; this gave them the opportunity to act again on Lake Ontario and there threaten the region from which the French at Quebec drew their supplies.

An appearance of an attack on Canada that way must greatly alarm the enemy at Montreal and though I do verily believe we shall never succeed to make an effectual irruption that way until Quebec is taken, yet . . . even supposing the first to prove abortive that will prove a most essential point of service, namely the gaining dominion of the navigation of the lake . . . Besides if we remain, during the campaign, superior in the lake the enemy's communication with their southern posts is cut off, their connection with the Indians of the Five Nations interrupted, and we may, in the course of chances, possibly take Niagara. This amphibious kind of service seems adapted to the provincials, especially those of New York and Rhode Island, accustomed to privateering and batteauing, but these should be supported by good garrisons of regulars . . . For the attack on Quebec . . . a number of provincials will certainly be necessary, and these such as are used to the water and marine navigation, for such will be of the most essential service in the passage of the army from the lower part of the Isle of Orleans to Quebec where most of the difficulty and danger will lie. Now, for this service none can be so well adapted as the people of the province

of Massachusetts Bay as they are all, in the southern parts, whalers and fishermen. After the troops are landed near Quebec numbers will be wanted, such as are used to carrying heavy lumber and timber, etc. through the woods. None can be so well adapted as the inhabitants of New Hampshire and the county of York in the province of Massachusetts Bay.

Defining the suitability of various colonists for special employment the report goes on to say that the best woodsmen for use as scouts before Quebec would be obtained from the counties of Hampshire, Worcester, and York in Massachusetts, and it mentions the writer's cherished idea of a fort on the Penobscot.

In so far as this despatch alludes to the importance of the Great Lakes and operations on them to menace the French right it is a reaffirmation of what its author had written in his report from Albany at the beginning of the war. But since then further study had shewn him that the western attack, important as it was, must be subordinated to the use of the St. Lawrence by the fleet and army combined. This had been previously advocated on many occasions. So early as 1711, it had been actually attempted by Harley, who then despatched an expedition intended for Quebec,[1] but it was led by incompetent men, for whom the navigation was too much. The fleet was broken up in a gale and no real effort was made.

If we compare the method of operations proposed in this document with what was actually done at Quebec six months later, we find that to the Isle of Orleans, here pointed out as a base, Wolfe went direct. He landed his men there and thence established lodgements at the Falls of Montmorency, seven miles below Quebec on the north bank of the river, and also at Point Levy opposite the city which he bombarded across the river from that position. It was near La Loubiniere, mentioned in Pownall's report of 1756 to the Duke of Cumberland, that those British ships which during the siege had made their way up-stream past Quebec found anchorage. Thence they sent their boats down-stream with the troops who climbed the cliffs to form for battle on the Heights of Abraham and win Canada. When Wolfe sailed from Spithead some vessels were despatched to New York to pick up colonial troops for the services,

[1] *Half Century of Conflict*, Parkman, 1901, i. p. 163.

as rangers, boatmen, and lumbermen, which had been thought out and described in this paper. As it proposed, two secondary expeditions in support of that up the St. Lawrence were organised, one by Lake Champlain, the other by Lake Ontario. With them we shall have to deal in the next chapter; it is sufficient to say here that they played exactly the parts assigned to them in this document, to which it so happens that attention is drawn just 150 years after it was written and immediately after the tercentenary of Quebec, in which Wolfe's campaign was so great a feature.

In his letter of December 8, which covered this important despatch, Pownall suggested that if, when he had finished raising the provisional troops required from Massachusetts for 1759, he were wanted in England, he was ready to proceed there. He thought he might be useful either in negotiations for peace or in revising the position of the colonies. Peace was still some years distant; as to the relations between the colonies and the mother country, Mr. Pitt was too much occupied with the war to spare time to attend to that question, which had to be left for his successors to deal with.

While he had been busy levying and equipping men for the attack on the French, Pownall had not lost sight of the fact that they might make a counter attack on him in the form of a raid on his head-quarters, the port and city of Boston. That was safe enough when a British fleet was off the coast. In the Governor's opinion, as expressed in his letter to Mr. Pitt of November 1, it was just as well that the colonies should realise that they owed the safety of that coast to the sea power of England, and not only to their own forts and garrisons. But, if the fleet were absent elsewhere, the port lay open to an attempt by the French for which four or five ships would suffice. The only protection against that was Castle William, which stood on an island in the harbour. With the letter last mentioned was enclosed to Mr. Pitt a plan of this work, to which Governor Shirley had made some additions and his successor was now making more. Four hundred and sixty men had been warned to be ready for garrison duty there on an alarm being given, but it was possible that before they could respond to such a summons the few men regularly on duty might be overpowered. If French ships

lying off the place sent up even a few boatloads of men they might seize the fort before its full complement of defenders appeared, and hold it till the ships themselves came up to shell the town. Alive to this danger, the Governor reported that he was trying to persuade his Assembly to increase the permanent garrison, and to put that under his own orders. He inquired of Mr. Pitt whether, if the Assembly were unwilling to do this, he might hope for a company or two of regulars being allowed for this purpose.

In this, as in all else within his jurisdiction, he was intent on making the colony secure. That had first been provided with a powerful defensive, on which, as a basis, the offensive had been built up so far as the resources of the province would permit; those resources had been but a small addition to the forces Mr. Pitt despatched from England. But for the British troops and fleet events would have taken a different turn. The French, with their superior organisation, with the command of the country and the control of the Indians, would have driven the English colonists into the sea or reduced them to subjection. England did loyally, though at first without success, support her colonies through those years when they were struggling against absorption by France. If it had not been that England, when her hands were very full in Europe and in India, spared no effort to help the colonies, they would have become French possessions. As such they would have shared—like Hayti, which has never recovered from it—in the horror of the French Revolution, committees of public safety, denunciation of individuals, the guillotine, and the rest of it.

There are some people in America now who still harbour against England an old grudge,[1] studiously kept alive in their school primers of history, from the time of the subsequent War of Independence. May it be suggested to them that but for England's action during the Seven Years' War there would have been no War of Independence to leave so regrettable a legacy of ill-will. If the English had stood aside, or been half-hearted, while the French swept the land on the methods they followed at Fort William Henry, New England would no doubt have fought to the bitter end, but it would have gone

[1] Strongly expressed in a letter cabled from New York to the *Times* of November 2, 1907.

under. Any independence it might have afterwards tried to assert would have been against France, not against England; and after such an experience as that of a French revolution in their midst, the United States could never have become what they are now. If they owe nothing to George III. they owe a great deal to Lord Chatham. Is it fair to remember the one and to forget the other, to preserve the memories of the War of Independence, and to ignore those of the Seven Years' War which led up to it? There was less than twenty years between them, many colonists fought in both, what they endured in the second was nothing to what they would have had to endure if the result of the first had been different. Surely, after all these years, the two can be looked at dispassionately in conjunction, and on the balance of account it may be seen that the Americans at that period were much indebted to England.

Never had the French been so near success as at the end of 1757. The year following it, which this chapter has dealt with, was the most critical in the history of New England up to that time. But it had seen the turning of the tide. After the long series of reverses in preceding campaigns, the repulse of Washington from the Ohio in 1754, the destruction of Braddock in 1755, the loss of Oswego in 1756, that of Fort William Henry in 1757, the English had at last something to shew. Louisburg on the extreme east, and Fort du Quesne on the extreme west, of the line on which the contending nations faced each other had both been won by English regulars. In the centre of that line the colonists had contributed their share in the heavy blow they had dealt under Colonel Bradstreet to the French at Ontario.

When the Assembly met on December 30, the Governor was able to allude to the occupation of Fort du Quesne as a recent additional success. But he told his audience that—

> all is not yet effected which seems absolutely necessary to be done that His Majesty's colonies may be in a state of peace and security. We must expect to be engaged in, and cannot too soon be prepared for, the service of another year which, if the vigorous efforts of the colonies be equal to the promising circumstances in which things now are, bids fair, according to the course of human affairs to be decisive.

CHAPTER VI

THIRD YEAR AS GOVERNOR

1759

MUCH as the military situation had improved in the last twelve months, the financial strain on Massachusetts became more intense as the war continued. On January 6 the Assembly, after acknowledging the Governor's last address and saying they agreed with him as to the necessity of further efforts, explained their position thus :—

> Burdened and oppressed as we are with taxes we shall be still ready to aid and assist in promoting His Majesty's service to the utmost of our abilities. And we have full confidence in His Majesty's paternal regard to his Colonies that he will graciously be pleased to afford us all necessary relief from time to time as our circumstances may require. And from the experience we have had of your Excellency's administration in the year past shall be induced with the greater cheerfulness to engage under the same direction in such measures as shall be found necessary for the service in the year to come.[1]

The letter to Mr. Pitt which covered this told him that the Assembly was quite prepared to act as soon as they heard from England what the plan of the campaign was to be. The Governor was able to announce that in order to do honour to the memory of Lord Howe, who had fallen at Ticonderoga the previous summer, a vote for a monument to him[2] had been passed by the Assembly. This Pownall regarded as—

> attended with every good consequence that mutual good offices must produce between the provinces and the army. As it shews the

[1] R.O., *Colonial Governors' Papers,* vol. lxxii. Enclosure with letter of January 19, 1759, from Governor Pownall to Rt. Hon. W. Pitt.

[2] This is in the Belfry Tower—the north-west corner of the nave—in Westminster Abbey.

grateful sense they have of the aid His Majesty is pleased to send them in his officers it will, 'tis hoped, be very pleasing to His Majesty. As it shews the regard they have to the services of these officers and how they must esteem the service in general it must be very agreeable to the army. It shews that they take every opportunity to conciliate the minds of the people towards the service, and to promote that universal good confidence and harmony without which the King's service and the public welfare must be subverted.

On such grounds as these the recognition by the Assembly of Lord Howe was more than a tribute to an individual, it went to allay the friction which had long existed between the regulars and the colonists, the provincial forces especially. That Pownall instigated the Assembly to this course there can be no doubt. He knew Lord Howe very well; it will be remembered that when they went out in 1757 from Cork they had been thrown together for two or three months in the close relation of fellow-passengers. Lord Howe, as soon as he landed in America, had taken up the idea of using light infantry for the operations there, which Pownall had pressed on the Duke of Cumberland in the memorandum written just before that voyage. Where Lord Howe got the idea from it is easy to see. The two men had evidently got on well together, and the survivor was glad not only to do honour to this gallant and distinguished soldier but to make the occasion one for promoting harmony in the colony. He did not escape censure for his action. We have seen in the last chapter how he had made a point of bringing the services of Hutchinson to public notice. But Hutchinson was unappeasable, he now made it a grievance against the Governor that the cost of this monument was a charge too great for the resources of the colony.[1] That cost was £250.

The Penobscot Indians, who had failed to make any impression on the eastern frontier of Massachusetts the autumn before, were now minded to come to terms. They sent emissaries to George's Fort with a letter in which they complained that the French had treated them badly, had killed some of them, and would grant them no supplies because when the tribe met an Englishman they "passed him by." That sounds like an euphemism for abstaining from tomahawking him. So they wanted to

[1] Tudor's *Life of Otis*, 1823, p. 45.

send some of their chiefs to Boston to treat with the Governor. He replied that there was no occasion for that: "I am young and can travel anywhere, ye need not come to Boston I will see ye at George's." He reminded them that by their action they had broken all the treaties which Shirley and others had made with them; that they only wanted to make their peace now after they had found they could do nothing in war; and that they had brought all their troubles on themselves. Thereby they had forfeited their lands and liberty, but he was willing to let byegones be byegones, so "if you seek peace you may live in security and plenty. If you seek war you seek your own destruction."[1]

The day after he had reported to England on this subject he received Mr. Pitt's instructions for the coming season. Those were contained in a circular letter of the 9th December 1758, addressed to the Governors of New England and New York.[2] Mr. Pitt called on the provinces which were most open to attack to improve on the advantages gained in the past season by furnishing 20,000 men to join the regular troops by May 1. These were to attempt to break into Canada by way of Lake Champlain under General Amherst, to whom was assigned the part which had been that of Abercromby the year before. What Amherst had then had, the command of a separate expedition fitted out in England, was now given to General Wolfe, who was to sail for Quebec as Amherst had sailed for Louisburg. Mr. Pitt enjoined the colonial Governors to use all their influence with the Assemblies to obtain the number of men locally required; all he asked for was the levying, clothing, and pay of the provincials. The expenditure thus incurred Parliament would be asked to refund. England would provide arms, tents, and provisions, from the first. She was thus taking upon herself the greater part of the burden and her interest was a secondary one; that of the colonists was more urgent, for it was their lives and fortunes which were exposed to the French. Mr. Pitt at the same time removed a grievance which had long existed among the provincial forces by announcing that their officers, up to

[1] R.O., *Massachusetts Bay Correspondence.* Governor Pownall to Lords of Trade, February 24, 1759.

[2] R.O., *Letters to Governors and Commanders in North America,* vol. lxxvi.

and including the rank of colonel, were to have their commissions recognised when serving with regulars.

Three days after these despatches arrived the Massachusetts Assembly met, and on March 2 they were addressed by the Governor, who told them that the King had resolved to make an end of the contest with the French, and that he called on all his subjects to support him in so doing. Almost all the expense of the last campaign had been borne by England, and the same thing was to be done again. The Governor made his appeal in these terms :—

> His Majesty's service and your affairs are wrought up to a crisis. The war is now no longer a dispute about limits, for the French, having broke all terms on which treaties are founded, on which even enemies act towards each other in time of war, have rendered all terms with them impracticable and impossible. They have brought matters to that issue that the contest now is—whether the French usurpations shall be erected into a kingdom or whether the British Empire in America shall be established on a solid and lasting basis—if Canada be not taken the empire of the French will fix its root, and as everything is ripe for its reduction and nothing to obstruct, if it be not taken now it never will be taken.

Having thus urged necessity he invoked what they owed to their reputation. Reminding the representatives of the province that it had always taken its full share in these services, he called on them to continue to do so, and proceeded to have laid on the table, as a basis for deliberation, the papers he had received from England.

The people were so exhausted that they needed rousing for a final effort; in their reply of March 14 the Assembly pointed out that 5000 men were as difficult to furnish this season as the 7000 had been a year before. Beyond 5000 they did not think they could go, but they would do their best. Writing to Mr. Pitt two days later, the Governor told him that he had accepted the 5000 and had asked for more, who would probably be provided. He said there was not so much difficulty about levying the men as in getting the money for their pay and maintenance. It has been stated in an earlier chapter that currency had always been scarce in the colonies and was principally obtained from the trade with Spain and her West Indian colonies.

A note to the last chapter has shewn that the public

debt of Massachusetts at that time was not more than could be raised to-day on the signature of one of many inhabitants of Boston, and the expense of governing the province of New York—£4000 a year—would be but a small item in the household expenses of one of the millionaires of that city now. We see the same thing in the salaries voted by the Massachusetts Assembly at the beginning of 1759. Mr. Bollan, the agent in London, who had charge of Massachusetts finance there, had £200 a year for his services. The Treasurer and Receiver-General in Boston had £267. Mr. Oliver, the Secretary of the Province, drew £50 a year. Mr. Hubbard, Speaker of the House of Representatives, received 4s. a day for acting in that capacity in addition to his pay as a member. Private soldiers returning from the front to the colony were allowed 4d. a day for subsistence money. Eight cents would be regarded by such a man to-day as absurd for his board and lodging, and still more absurd would it seem to a member of Congress to draw a dollar a day as extra remuneration for a responsible and distinguished position.

These things may be worth mentioning to illustrate how utterly different was the value of the same sums then to what it is now. But just at this time, after the colony had been engaged four years in war, there was not only a difference in the value of money,—there was none of it. In his letter above mentioned Pownall told Mr. Pitt that everything that could be spared from commerce had already been borrowed from the merchants, and there was absolutely no available cash in the place. For the raising of the 5000 men the General Court had sanctioned the issue of short-dated Treasury notes, but there were limits to that expedient, and Mr. Pitt was told that as he required an additional force he must provide for it by remitting funds to the colony to replace what had been spent in the operations of the last campaign.

Besides the needs of the army there were those of the navy which was short of men on that station. The seamen of the province had hitherto objected altogether to serve on board men-of-war, and the Assembly had refused to urge them to do so. In the same letter Pownall was able to tell Mr. Pitt that he had brought the different parties together, and made an arrangement which

would help the navy. Admiral Durell, the officer in command, had been induced to pledge himself that Boston sailors who joined the fleet should do so for a fixed term, on the expiration of which they should be discharged, not in Europe or the West Indies, but at their home port. The Admiral had also promised that when the men left the service they should at once have their wages, and that all towns which thus provided men should be free from forced impressment. Those conditions satisfied the sailors; the Assembly was contented by an arrangement the Governor had made with General Amherst that the men who joined the navy should be reckoned as part of the quota to be furnished by the Province to the army. If the sailors and fishermen entered the navy on those terms in any numbers a new and valuable recruiting field was opened to that service. This arrangement of Pownall's appears to have been much the same as that made of late years for the training of the fishermen and sailors of Newfoundland for naval duties.

With Mr. Pitt's despatches, which set all these wheels moving, came an official letter to Pownall from the Minister, who had been glad to receive the Governor's letter of September 12 reporting his expedition to George's Fort, to which he had given such timely succour before the French and Indians made their raid in the previous summer. Mr. Pitt spoke of him as

having by your activity and diligence happily succeeded in the object of your expedition . . . these marks as well as many others that have appeared by the several despatches I have received from Major-General Abercromby of your constant zeal and attention for the King's service have met with His Majesty's most particular approbation, and, though I am persuaded there wants nothing to animate you to exert your utmost abilities on every occasion, I would not defer giving you the satisfaction to know how graciously the King is pleased to receive your endeavours to forward his service in a Province of so much importance as that under your Government, and which has so frequently had a considerable influence with regard to the conduct of some of the adjoining colonies.[1]

To this expression of Royal and ministerial approbation the Governor replied on March 14:—

I am always sensible of the unworthiness of my services in proportion to my duty. But His Majesty's gracious notice of them

[1] R.O., *Letters to Governors and Commanders in North America,* vol. lxxvi.

overwhelms me with confusion to see them now infinitely removed from any possibility of my coming up to the obligations I lie under. Permit me, Sir, to acknowledge my obligations to you and to make my most grateful and sincere thanks for your favourable report of my services to His Majesty, and for the undeserved friendship you have been pleased to shew me.[1]

Through March and the beginning of April he was urging his Assembly to fresh exertions. That everything had to be done through that body did not please the Lords of Trade in England, from whom Pownall received about this time a letter[2] dated November 22, 1758, which combined approval with its opposite. They told the Governor that,

the zeal and activity you have shewn in raising in so short a time so large a share of the provincial force required by His Majesty, the methods you took to render this force as effectual as possible by breaking through the abuses, corrupt practices, and irregularities which had, we find, prevailed to so great an extent, cannot fail to meet with His Majesty's approbation.

This letter proceeds to notice favourably the good use which had been made of the forces of the colony in dealing with the raid by the French and Indians at the Penobscot in the previous summer; this is described as evidence of the strength of the colony. Then another tone is taken by the Lords of Trade, who

sincerely wish that the state of the Province with regard to its internal policy and government were such as might leave room for the like agreeable reflections. But the facts resulting from an examination into the acts and proceedings of the Council and House of Representatives, which we were induced to enter into from your representation of their conduct in your letter of January 27th last, are such as convince us that the dependence which by the constitution the Colony ought to have upon the executive part of the government of the mother country and the sovereignty of the Crown stands upon a very precarious foot, and that unless some effectual remedy is at a proper time applied it will be in great danger of being totally set aside. From these facts it appears that almost every act of executive and legislative power, whether it be political, judicial, or military, is ordered and directed by votes of the General Court, in most cases originating in the House of Representatives, to which all applications, petitions, and representations are addressed, and where the resolves are drawn up and prepared. And though we apprehend that such resolves are insufficient and invalid without the concurrence of the Council in the

[1] R.O., *Colonial Governor's Letters*, vol. lxxii.
[2] R.O., *Lords of Trade to Colonial Governors*, vol. N, 85.

first instance and ultimately that of the Governor, yet such concurrence seems to be rather matter of form in proceeding than essential, and that the measure, whatever it be, derives its effect and operations from the judgment and sense of the House of Representatives.[1]

The next paragraph observes that whether the view of the initiative which was above taken were correct or not the action of the House of Representatives was certainly quite out of order as to military or judicial matters. All that had been written at such length on the subject is then qualified by the last portion of this despatch, which admits that "upon the whole, however dangerous and prejudicial as these proceedings appear to us, we are doubtful whether it would be advisable in the present situation of things to attempt an effectual remedy." That is practically an admission that the Governor with whom they were always satisfied in the external, but not always in the internal, affairs of the province had, as regards the latter, no option for the time being but to treat them as he did. We may read between the lines of that paper that when a favourable opportunity came at the end of the war the Lords of Trade intended to revert to former and more severe methods of dealing with the Assembly. This was the opinion of Mr. Bancroft, who wrote that "the threat of interference at the close of the war was incessant from Halifax and the Board of Trade. I can trace no such purpose to Pitt."[2] Nor was the greater freedom given to the Assembly by Pownall in such matters as the above the only grievance the Lords of Trade had against him.

Mention has been made of a Bankruptcy Bill, prepared before he arrived in the colony, which he sanctioned and sent to England when he was distracted by the threat of the French invasion and by a journey to New Jersey from his ordinary duties. In the interest of English creditors the Lords of Trade had objected, and led the King to refuse assent. There followed a long correspondence, in the course of which the Lords of Trade shewed to what an extent they were prepared to sacrifice the necessities of the distant colony to official etiquette. They wrote that the Assembly was far from justified in thinking itself injured by its enactments having to be sent to England in

[1] Mr. Bancroft mentions that this letter was sent to Pownall by the Lords of Trade without Mr. Pitt's knowledge (*History of the United States*, 1863, iv. 297).

[2] *History of the United States*, Bancroft, 1863, iv. p. 377.

all cases for approval. It ought, on the contrary, to be very thankful that the Governor was enabled to give temporary sanction to measures so as to enable them to become operative till the King's pleasure was known. If it were not for this royal benevolence no colonial acts could have any force till they had been sent to England, approved by the King and returned to the colony. As to this benevolence they said that "if the House of Representatives shall still persist to misapprehend and misrepresent it, it will be for His Majesty's consideration what method it may be proper to take to prevent His Majesty's subjects from being any longer imposed upon by such misrepresentation."[1] At a time when it took six months for a document to go to England, be there considered and returned, the rigid insistence on this procedure meant the virtual refusal of the power of legislation for any urgent or immediate purpose. This Bankruptcy Bill was eventually sanctioned by the King, but not till nearly three years had elapsed, and the Governor had reported that the lack of it had put a stop to business.

The Lords of Trade, when reporting, on July 31, 1759, to the Privy Council on a batch of thirty Bills passed by the Massachusetts Assembly, pointed out that in two of them, which related to small private estates, the clause suspending execution till the King's approval was received had been omitted. It was therefore recommended that the royal assent should be refused. There was no doubt a fear that even from such small matters there might arise a precedent which could be used in larger ones, and to a Government department there is nothing so formidable as a precedent which may be quoted against it. The Lords of Trade thought the Colonial Legislature was getting out of hand, and in that opinion they were probably encouraged by what they heard from Hutchinson and his party in Boston. That their influence was considerable and constantly used against the Governor we are told by President Adams, who wrote sharply in after years[2] of the way in which they attacked Pownall at this time in order to get him out of the way of their very opposite methods, to

[1] R.O., *Massachusetts Bay*, N, 85. Lords of Trade to Governor Pownall, February 6, 1760.

[2] *Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States*, 1856, x. p. 242. Letter of February 4, 1817.

which Mr. Adams attributed the War of Independence which he had witnessed and could trace back to its causes. It becomes evident that at this time the Lords of Trade were disposed to resist the power which the Assembly had obtained to a much greater degree than formerly, partly because of the war crisis, partly because of the long absences from his post of Governor Shirley, during which Lieutenant-Governor Phips, who was a local man, had been content to allow his neighbours to have their own way.[1] This, as the Lords of Trade admitted when they complained, was no time to make trouble about prerogative. Mr. Pitt did not trouble about those things; as we have seen he was pressing the Governor and everybody else to beat the French, and for that purpose it was necessary to use the Assembly and to avoid contentious subjects in dealing with it. How vigorous Pownall was in his addresses to that body has been shewn; the result was that they informed him[2] that they had considered his appeals, and in consequence of them were adding 1500 men to the 5000 they had promised a month before. They recognised that even with this extra number they did not make up so many as the 7000 of the previous year. That, however, had been a special effort, and they had understood it was to be the last one. Since then the number of inhabitants had been much reduced, some had been killed in action, others had died of disease when on service, many were already engaged in the King's service as rangers or artificers. They pointed out that apart from contributions to the attack on Canada the defence of the frontiers was costing £30,000 a year. They considered it hard that because they had, of their own good will, raised so much larger a force a year before than they had been asked for, that figure of 7000 should be quoted as a precedent against them. Especially as it had always been accepted that special allowance should be made to a colony which, being an outpost, was put to extra expense for the common defence of the frontier. They wound up by remarking that

> We are told we are the leading colony. We have been so for many years past, and we have been so long unequally burdened. We

[1] *Introduction to the History of the Revolt of the American Colonies.* Written and suppressed, 1782. Published, 1845, ii. p. 309.

[2] R.O., *Boston News Letter*, Thursday, April 19, 1759.

have borne it patiently though we have seen our inhabitants leaving us and removing to other governments to live more free from taxes. And a few years ago for this reason alone four of our principal towns refused any longer to submit to our jurisdiction, and another Government found a pretence for receiving them and they are not yet returned to us.

The news that he had obtained an additional force, though at the enormous bounty of over £10 a man, was at once communicated by Pownall to Mr. Pitt, together with the statement that 200 men for the navy had been raised and were being sent to the admiral.[1] He also informed the Minister that he was on the point of starting for the Penobscot river "to shut the last and only door to the Atlantic which the enemy has left in North America."

The St. Lawrence was at this time threatened by the English fleet convoying Wolfe's expedition which left Spithead in February and made its rendezvous at Louisburg in May. Having made his arrangements with the Assembly for the contingent which was to be placed under General Amherst the Governor left Boston at the beginning of this month on a little expedition of his own to attend to that Penobscot country which had been so long on his mind and so often mentioned in his despatches. Reference to the map facing page 71 will shew Penobscot Bay and the river running into it on the extreme east of the then province of Massachusetts Bay. We get an idea of the condition of this region at that time from a notice in a newspaper of the month of June about some property on the Kennebec river, sixty miles further within the boundary of the Province. Of that land we are told "in the year 1752 the proprietors began a settlement on the river Kennebec called Frankfort, in which there are at this time about eighty fighting men who raise grain sufficient for the use of the said settlement."[2] No one could expect to harvest his crop there who was not really a fighting man as well as a farmer. Six years later Pownall described frontier existence by saying—

A settler, wholly intent on labouring on the soil, cannot stand to his arms, nor defend himself against, nor seek his enemy. Environed

[1] R.O., *Colonial Governors' Letters*, vol. lxxii.

[2] R.O., *Boston Gazette*, June 18, 1759. *Letters from Governors in North America*, vol. lxxii.

with woods and swamps he knows nothing of the country beyond his farm, the Indian knows every spot for ambush or defence. The farmer, driven from his little cultured lot into the woods is lost . . . The farmer's cow, or his horse, cannot go into the woods where alone they must subsist, his wife and children, if they shut themselves up in their poor wretched log-house will be burned in it, and the husbandman in the field will be shot down while his hand holds the plough . . . . A settler is the natural prey to an Indian whose sole occupation is war and hunting.[1]

Occupying the same unhappy position then as the inhabitants of Manchuria in 1904-5, when two of the Great Powers were fighting each other on Chinese territory, the Red Indians had by this time been much reduced in numbers, for they had been drawn into the struggle and shared the loss of life it caused.

But even a few roving bands were dangerous to the farmers; and the Penobscot, a large river "navigable for the largest ship for nearly sixty miles from the sea,"[2] could not be left open to the French when the St. Lawrence was closed to them. Pownall spent three weeks of May in securing that district; the original of his journal is preserved in the Record Office,[3] and has been printed in the collections of the Maine Historical Society. It describes his proceedings day by day. On May 4 he arrived at Falmouth, then with one exception the most eastern town in the province. There he mustered and reviewed his men. The Assembly had voted 400 provincial troops to act on this expedition as a guard to the Governor and to the artificers who were to construct the intended fort. When that was built the garrisons at St. George's Fort at the mouth of the river and at Pemaquid were to be moved in to it, those places being dismantled.

On May 8 Pownall embarked at Falmouth with 350 of the provincial troops, and on the next day he arrived at the north of the George's river, where he found some lurking Indians with whom a small skirmish took place. Some others who came in were detained as hostages; they professed to represent the whole tribe of the district, but had nothing to shew that they did so. They were told

[1] *Administration*, 1765, p. 163.

[2] R.O., *Colonial Governors' Letters*, vol. lxxii. Governor Pownall to Right Hon. W. Pitt, Nov. 4, 1759.

[3] R.O., *Letters to the Lords of Trade*, vol. lxxv.

that if all their people came in and surrendered they would be protected, but if they ever killed a single Englishman in future they would all be hunted down. With this message and the warning that as a strong fort was about to be built submission was their only chance, they were liberated in order that they might spread the news of the expedition's arrival. This policy was successful, the few survivors of the Indian tribes in that district accepted the terms offered them, and were settled on lands under control of the fort with liberty to hunt in the adjoining country. After thus dealing with the Indians the Governor prospected the river to choose a site for his fort. By May 14 he had sailed up the Penobscot till he came to a likely place about thirty miles from its mouth, where it received a tributary stream. There he built a redoubt and spent a week making it into a defensible base. On the 22nd he moved further up the river to within six miles of the falls where the sloop *Massachusetts* got aground. Parties were at once landed on each bank of the river to prevent her being a mark for Indian muskets. The sloop was got off, and the river was examined without any better site being found than that on which the temporary redoubt had already been placed.

The expedition returned there and began the permanent work, first holding Divine service to bless the occasion and then treating the troops to a barrel of rum. On May 26 the Governor himself

> set out the lines for parapets, ditch, and glacis. Gave Mr. Burbeck whom I had appointed engineer particular directions in what manner to complete the works in each part as the ground lay and shewed it him in each spot.

Having selected the site, seen to the water-supply, and laid out the work, he left it to be finished. The cost was only £5000, and the Assembly afterwards described it as the best and least expensive fort that had ever been built in the province. All that remains of it now is the name, that of its originator and builder, on a map of 1776 where it is shewn about thirty miles above the mouth of the Penobscot. Built to secure that region on the borders of Nova Scotia for England it did exactly the opposite. Settlers flocked into the country it

protected in such numbers that, twenty-four years later, at the end of the War of Independence, this district, with its "hinterland" extending northward to within thirty miles of the St. Lawrence, was recognised as inhabited by citizens of the United States to whose possession it passed.

Having accomplished the object of his journey Pownall returned to Boston where he arrived on May 28. On June 1 he informed the Assembly that he had come back from Penobscot,

> a large and fine tract of land; but for many years a den of savages, and a lurking-place for some renegade French.

On June 9 the Assembly congratulated him on his expedition as

> a fresh instance of your great care for the interests of this Government and of your zeal and faithfulness to His Majesty. The securing to us the possession of this river is a matter the Court have very much at heart, and it gives us the highest pleasure to see your Excellency, always attentive to the public welfare, leading us into such measures as are likely to effect the same.

While these compliments were passing in Boston the French had an anxious time in Quebec, where it was known that a great expedition was coming up the St. Lawrence. On June 21 the masts of the first English ships were seen, by the 26th the whole fleet was anchored off the Island of Orleans, and the rest of the summer was spent by the French in making their last stand against the varied and determined attacks of Wolfe. While thus occupied at Quebec it was quite possible that they might attempt a diversion against the seaboard of the maritime colonies, for the protection of which no squadron had been despatched, as Pownall had suggested to Mr. Pitt verbally in December 1756 and in his despatch of December 1758. He had therefore to do the best he could for himself. Immediately on his return from Penobscot he again took in hand the protection of Boston Harbour, about which we have seen that he had written to Mr. Pitt on the preceding 1st of November. The Governor now arranged to have a proper chart made of the harbour to shew all the soundings, and for two 30-ton schooners to be kept cruising off the entrance, one in the East, the other in the West Channel, on the look

out for an enemy's approach. He got the Assembly to increase the permanent garrison in Castle William and to have hulks ready to be sunk in the narrows to block approach. Militia colonels were warned to have all their men well prepared and within reach, and all possible precautions were taken to meet an attack if it was delivered. It was not; but it might have been and that with very serious consequences. Pownall wrote afterwards that

> the whole fleet was taken up the river St. Lawrence where, as General Wolfe expressly declared, it was a part of the force least adapted to the object, the sea-line of the Colonies was left uncovered and open. If the French had had sense enough to have sent two ships of the line, with a frigate or two and one or two bomb ketches, they might have burnt Halifax, Boston, New York or Philadelphia without interruption—and perhaps thus the whole of the operations of 1759 have been disconcerted and defeated.[1]

That summer was one of excitement to those who, like Pownall, stood on the defensive and far more so to those who conducted the attacks. While Wolfe was busy at Quebec, seeking first in one place and then in another for a weak spot in the French lines along the north bank of the St. Lawrence on which he could drive home an attack, the forces under Amherst's command, which included the Massachusetts contingent, were beginning their march northwards. The western army, under General Prideaux, 2200 strong, with several hundred Indians under Sir William Johnson who was always to the fore, began their advance on July 1. They landed at Fort Niagara and opened their trenches, in which Prideaux was killed, on July 20. Sir William Johnson succeeded to the command and defeated a French column which had been despatched from Venango on the Ohio to relieve the garrison at Niagara. On July 25 Sir William was able to report the capitulation of Fort Niagara to General Amherst, who when he received this news had himself just taken Ticonderoga. He had brought 12,000 men to assault that place, and did not leave his artillery in the rear as Abercromby had done the year before. The French blew up the place on July 26 and retired to Crown Point. Amherst followed them up; his scouts reported to him on August 1 that this fort also was

[1] *Administration*, 1774, ii. p. 258.
[2] Letter in *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1759, p. 436.

abandoned; he moved in three days later and took possession of what had been for many years a thorn in the side of the English settlements. The French retired to the Isle aux Noix on Lake Champlain, where they could muster but 2000 men, and those in a starving condition.[1]

Six weeks later, on September 13, Wolfe at last got his blow home on the French and added his name to those of the other English generals, Braddock, Lord Howe and Prideaux, who had laid down their lives to free the English provinces of America from the rule of France. And not the generals only; in those days of hard and constant fighting thousands of men of less degree did the same.

> All we have of freedom, all we use or know,
> This our fathers bought for us long and long ago.[2]

With the fall of Quebec there was no further possibility of French rule in America, but the reduction of Montreal could not be attempted this autumn as the season was too far advanced. The French troops who remained there made a serious effort to recover Quebec in the following spring. But after that, as they were hopelessly cut off from Europe, they would make no resistance when a move was made upon them in the summer, and from the capitulation of M. de Vaudreuil to General Amherst on September 10, 1760, dates the possession by England of Canada and all its dependencies. That question had been practically settled a year before when Quebec fell. The Massachusetts Assembly, which had been in recess from June 1579, met again on October 3. Pownall's speech told them that the English Parliament was about to refund the outlay of the province, and that, as Amherst's army now covered its western frontier, the colonials, who had been employed as scouting parties for the defence of that district, were no longer necessary. He added that though the stronghold of the enemy had been destroyed those of the French who had not been included in the surrender must seek sustenance somewhere, and would probably look for it by raiding the northern portion of Massachusetts which lay near the St. Lawrence. The winter was coming on, and it had always been in that

[1] *New York Historical Society's Collections*, 1821, iv. p. 275.
[2] *The Five Nations*, Rudyard Kipling, 1899.
[3] R.O., *Massachusetts Bay, Minutes of Assembly*, vol. xxxiii.

season that the worst raids had come from Canada; the Governor pointed out that while the west was safe no precautions should be relaxed on the north.

We find in the Minutes of the Assembly for October 16 that when the members met in the morning they received a message from the Governor to say that he and the Council were starting to attend Divine service at the old South Church "to return thanks for the happy occasion of the reduction of Quebec." He hoped the Representatives would join with him in this and in dining afterwards at the Faneuil Hall. There was no business done that day. Pownall spent some time this autumn in drawing up a memorial, or despatch, on the arrangements to be made with France at the end of the war, which he afterwards printed.[1] It begins by saying that if England did not press for the acquisition of Louisiana in the Mississippi region to the south-west as well as of Canada to the north the question of the dividing-line between the two must be considered. On such a subject he had a right to be heard; very little was known accurately and scientifically at that time of the physical geography of North America, he was indeed the only man who had made a study of it. We find in the Annual Register three years later, when the terms of peace were discussed, that "as the French did not themselves know the boundaries of their own provinces, it was not clear what was meant when Canada was ceded."[2]

The memorial under notice says that the French had made a demarcation between Canada and Louisiana about the year 1752. That was based on the watersheds of the two great rivers; every district whose streams ran to the Mississippi was regarded as in Louisiana, which was thus brought up to the summits of the Alleghanies. In the same way all the country which discharged its waters into the St. Lawrence had been held to be part of Canada, whose territory thus extended to the north of Massachusetts, as far as the sources of the Kennebec and the Penobscot rivers. Nothing of that kind could be tolerated in future; this memorial points out that a "determinate line of demarcation" was necessary, and it proceeds to discuss that in detail under four headings,—

[1] *Administration*, 1774, ii. p. 259.
[2] Vol. v. 1762, p. 55.

Hudson's Bay and the Labrador coast come first, restrictions here on French trade with the Indians are advocated. Then come the Labrador fisheries :—

> As the enemy obtained a right to fish and cure their fish on the north parts of Newfoundland as a cession of no consequence to the English, so will they no doubt endeavour at some such acquisition by concession of a right to do the same on the Labrador coast. They know the worth of this, they know the fishery continues to lessen on the Banks and to the southward, they know the best and most plentiful is to the northward and will hope from our inexperience of this truth to keep still to the northward of us. The Labrador coast . . . is not that inhospitable inaccessible land of terrors that it has been represented. The climate, like all others, uncleared of its wood and uncultivated, has its extremes, but is at the same time the most delightful in its mean that can be conceived. It not only abounds with the finest harbours but, like all the eastern shore of the north part of North America, is so hemmed in with islands that vessels may sail within such the whole length of it as within a harbour where there is an inexhaustible source of fish and peltry, and they add also of naval stores, but this is not certain. The chart sent herewith done by and from the observations of an adventurer from Boston will give an idea of it.

Turning next to the division between Canada and New England or Nova Scotia the despatch points out that there could be no doubt of the British territory being carried up to the St. Lawrence, but that any joint rights with France on that river were to be avoided. Then it is pointed out that on any boundary-line drawn between the English and French, the latter would use their ascendancy over the Indians to draw them over "and have them always ready to pour down upon us as a continual check and scourge." It was therefore necessary that the French should be answerable for their native allies, and if by them any depredations were committed on English property reprisals would have to be made on French maritime commerce.

Next came the division between Canada, with the northern portion of Louisiana, and the provinces of New York and Pennsylvania, together with the rights of those English allies, the Five Nations of Indians. This boundary is mentioned as having been already described in Pownall's previous memorials, that from Albany in 1754, and that to the Duke of Cumberland in 1756.

As to the west, if the Mississippi were not made the

frontier, it was suggested that the English territory might cover all tributaries—down to the lowest falls or cataracts on each which blocked navigation—which ran from the Alleghany Mountains to the great river. If the falls of the Onaback, the Ohio, the Cherokee and other rivers were connected by a frontier line drawn between them the French would be debarred by those falls from passing up to the headwaters, while the English would be equally unable to interfere with French rights on the Mississippi itself.

This despatch was dated at Boston on October 22, 1759, when the fall of Quebec was quite recent, and it was still uncertain whether the French would be permitted to retain any hold on the country. They had in 1748 received Louisburg back as a set-off against Madras, and if in the present war, when things had at last gone so well for the English in America, the French were more fortunate elsewhere, they might again claim compensation in Canada.

In view of such a contingency, and to be prepared for it, this memorandum was doubtless written; as the event proved Canada was annexed in a block by England, and Louisiana west of the Mississippi was retained by France. The latter was then so remote as to be of little importance, and the French never developed it. As to Canada that was important. The boundaries of the province of Quebec at that time are shewn on a map in the *Gentleman's Magazine* of 1763, p. 477. It began with a line drawn north-westward for about 300 miles from the east end of Lake Ontario to Lake Nipissing, thence the boundary ran north-east to Cape Strawberry in Labrador, where it turned south again and met the St. Lawrence opposite the Island of Anticosti. That the area included is a very small fraction of what is now Canada between the Atlantic and the Pacific will be seen by referring to a map in the Supplement of this volume. Besides it there were, of course, the scattered French settlements on the Great Lakes. Such was the Canada of the French, and when peace was made it was all taken over.

It did not occur to our forefathers, with whom a maudlin sentimentality had not usurped the place of common sense, to return as a free gift to the foreign nationality from whom it had been recently conquered

a great territory won at the cost of millions of money and thousands of English lives. Any one who had ventured to suggest to Mr. Pitt the idea that the best way to consolidate such a possession under English rule was to hand it back hurriedly to the former, and quite different, rule, would have been more likely to find himself in a lunatic asylum than in the Cabinet.

Pownall sent his despatch of October 22 on possible boundaries with the French to Mr. Pitt, with a letter of the 27th of that month,[1] in which he expressed a hope that the document might be of some service since

> by my residence in this country from the first rise of the war, by my intercourse with all the men of business in every province when I was a private character, by my having been admitted into His Majesty's general affairs here for some time, I have had opportunity of a more extensive acquaintance in these matters than falls to the lot of many who have been employed only in one single department.

He went on to say that he thought the end of the struggle with France made his continued stay in Massachusetts unnecessary. Moreover, he thought that if peace came soon his knowledge of American affairs might be useful at home to Ministers who were negotiating it. He added that when, after two years' absence on his first journey to America, he was ordered to return to that country with Lord Loudoun in 1756, he had gone off "at a minute's warning." When he got back to England after that expedition he was there but a very short time, none of which he could devote to his own affairs, and he had then come into some property to which neither at the time nor afterwards was it possible for him to attend. On the contrary, he had been despatched, at short notice, to Massachusetts, where he had been so much occupied with public affairs that he had been unable to spare any thought for his own concerns, which were suffering from this enforced neglect and his absence from home. He therefore asked Mr. Pitt, both on public and on private grounds, to obtain for him the King's permission to return to England for a few months.

On November 17 the Governor wrote again to inform Mr. Pitt that as all the regulars who had taken Quebec were required to hold it, and General Amherst was unable

[1] R.O., *Colonial Governor's Letters*, vol. lxxii.

to spare from the central army enough men to relieve the 2500 Massachusetts provincials who were in garrison at Louisburg and Halifax, with detachments at Forts Cumberland, Frederick, and St. Johns, it had been necessary to adopt "a measure of a most critical and perilous cast." Those provincials had been individually enlisted, and provided by the Assembly, for the summer and autumn only. That term was drawing to a close, there was no obligation on the Assembly to maintain the men, and none on them to serve, any longer. But it was quite impossible to leave Louisburg and Halifax without defence in order that the only troops available to hold those places should return to their homes, and so an effort had to be made, both with the men and the Assembly, to arrange for their continuing longer under arms. Pownall told Mr. Pitt that Governor Shirley, who attempted to retain the time-expired provincials in 1755, "threw the whole country into a flame" by so doing.

On this occasion the matter had been better managed. Instead of issuing an arbitrary order on the subject Pownall had enlisted the good-will of the Assembly by putting the case before them in a message of November 5, which ended by saying, "You will therefore not only make further provision for their pay, but take care that they have what is comfortable and necessary for their health, clothing, and lodging, during these cold winter months." Addressed in this way the Assembly assented at once to the future maintenance of the men "for the winter season or until they shall be relieved." This, as Pownall pointed out to Mr. Pitt, was a very handsome way of doing the thing, the terms used were so wide that they left these troops available even for the next season if it was impossible to relieve them earlier, and no fresh levies were made meanwhile. When complying with the Governor's request the Assembly made use of the occasion to compliment him; they acknowledged "his paternal care and tenderness for our men in the Eastern Service, for whom the House have most readily made what they apprehend is a proper and ample provision."[1]

The Assembly having thus agreed to the extension of the men's term it remained to see how they would themselves behave; under the terms of their enlistment they

[1] R.O., *Massachusetts Minutes of Assembly*, vol. xxxiii.

were free to go home then or to remain in garrison as they pleased. The Governor was as sure of them as of the Assembly; he ended that letter to Mr. Pitt by saying that according to reports received from the various stations the men were willing to stay on. Those who had been serving with Amherst to the west were now returning. But the Governor had noticed that as they did so they ran up great bills against the community by billeting themselves on the roadside taverns; and he told the Assembly that "I believe the sums paid on this account would exceed what you would imagine." Always watchful of expenditure, he had therefore arranged with General Amherst to provide magazines to supply the men with necessaries on their homeward journey, as had been done on their march to the front in the spring.

The country was now settling down. In a letter of November 20 Pownall was able to tell Mr. Pitt that Colonel Arbuthnot, commanding 250 Provincial troops at St. John's, had received the surrender of the French in that district when news came of the capture of Quebec. This had been led up to by the construction of the fort on the Penobscot, which left the French and Indians there no alternative but to come in. Many applications from settlers for grants of land in that country were reaching the Governor, and when these people moved there in the spring they would serve to further strengthen the English position.

The following summary of the year's operations, published in December,[1] may be worth quoting as contemporary opinion :—

> We have been blessed by Heaven with a success in that part of the world scarcely to be paralleled in history. The rashness of Braddock, the inexperience of Shirley, the inactivity of Loudoun, and the ill-success of Abercromby, seem only to have been so many necessary means of producing that unanimity in our Colonies . . . as hath not only recovered from the enemy all his possessions, but Louisburg is an English harbour, Quebec, the capital of Canada, is already in our possession, and the rest of that country will fall of course.

It had been a great year for Mr. Pitt. The victory of Minden had re-established Frederick II. of Prussia, our ally on the Continent. Admirals Boscawen and Hawke

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, December 1759, p. 590.

had beaten the French fleets at Lagos and at Quiberon Bay; Clive had won Bengal and destroyed the French hopes of India.

But nowhere had the success been so great as in America. There the men whom the great Minister had selected and used as his instruments had swept all before them. Foremost among their number stands out the great personality of James Wolfe, next to him are Amherst and that first-class fighting man, Sir William Johnson, whose influence with the Indians was so valuable to the cause. Hardly less important than his influence with them was that which the Governor of the leading colony brought to bear on his Assembly and people, whom he found in 1757 disheartened by many reverses, and whom he animated with his own zeal for the fray. Nor was this his only, or his chief, contribution to the result. In that speech in the House of Commons of March 17, 1778, to which reference has already been made, he was able to mention, "The share I had last was in the plans, as well as execution, of the measures in America." To this he added that, "Those who never knew, or those who have forgotten, my services may see all that I say, and perhaps more, justified by referring to the Secretary of State's Office or the Board of Trade." Those words may no doubt be regarded as an allusion to that despatch of December 1758, now in the Record Office which, with the first introduction of the same views to Mr. Pitt two years earlier, appears to have been the root of the whole matter.

In the life of Pownall, as in that of his chief, this was the most successful year. As this story proceeds it will be seen that he had now, at the age of thirty-seven, reached the high-water mark of his career, and that through the many years of disappointment which followed he always looked back with satisfaction, if with regret, on this period.

CHAPTER VII

LAST YEAR IN AMERICA—RETURN TO ENGLAND

1760

Massachusetts could now breathe more freely; the New Year found the struggle with the French practically over so far as America was concerned, and the strain on the local finances was at last relaxed. In his speech to the Assembly on January 2 the Governor was able to announce that the agent in London had received and had remitted to the colony a sum of £20,000 to reimburse previous expenditure, and this made it unnecessary to raise any fresh loan for the present. He said that a great many families were ready to leave for the Penobscot country, and that some further demands for military service must be expected in order to secure the results of the previous year's operations, while the question of the men who had stayed through the winter in garrison at Louisburg and other places must also be considered. To all those who had done so the Assembly voted a bounty of £4, and an additional bounty of £9 to each man who volunteered for further service.[1] The provincial force for this year was 5000 men. With regard to these bounties the Governor sent a message to the House on January 26, in which he pointed out that their very liberality laid them open to abuse. Men were sometimes so eager to get the money that they gave in their names and then repented having done so; either they did not appear, or when they had joined they absconded. The colonial law provided for the apprehension of such offenders, and when they were taken there was no alternative but to hand them over to the

[1] R.O., *Minutes of Assembly, Massachusetts*, vol. xxxiii.

military authorities. They then came under the Articles of War which, for desertion, imposed either the death-penalty or "such severe corporal punishment as is next to it."

The responsibility of handing men over to such a fate rested with the Governor, and he did not like it. He said that when they

> have been taken up and sent by my order to the Castle or other place in order to be transported to their regiments or companies according to law, I never could prevail on myself to send them as deserters. By which means they have escaped all punishment; and indeed were this severe punishment inflicted on them, however much they may have deserved it, the country itself would very unwillingly discover and apprehend such deserters.

The province was thus being defrauded, for in no case could it recover the bounty. The Governor pointed out that if the man "be not returned as a deserter no stoppages can be made on his wages, and if he is returned as a deserter he has no wages to receive." For long after this period the discovery was not made that an extreme penalty which is not enforced is a less effectual deterrent than a moderate penalty which is enforced. In advance of his time the Governor recognised this, and recommended an alteration of the law which would free him from the necessity of consigning such men to the terrible fate which awaited them under the Articles of War and enable him to send them to serve in the provincial garrisons, drawing no pay till the bounty and all other expenses incurred had been worked off. This was more merciful to the men and better for the community, which could thus recover what was due to it. The suggestion was adopted and a Bill to that effect was passed. Every detail of administration received the Governor's close attention. We find him sending to the Assembly on January 25 a detailed account of the above mentioned refugees from Nova Scotia; there were about 1000 of them, and they are carefully arranged under headings, the children and the adults are separately stated, and the latter are subdivided into those who were and those who were not capable of working. On the next day he wrote to the Assembly pointing out that in their military arrangements for the season they had omitted to include field officers and adjutants who must be provided.

When a large part of Boston was burnt down on March 20 and 220 families were homeless, he was prompt not only to organise relief on the spot but to appeal for it to other provinces. He reminded the Assembly that in London, after the Great Fire of 1666, the opportunity of widening and rearranging the streets was used for the future benefit of the city, and he suggested that Boston should be improved in the same way.

On January 29 Pownall wrote to inform Mr. Pitt that hitherto the Assembly had always waited at the beginning of each year to receive the King's orders to raise troops for the summer before they took any steps. Their prospects of having their expenditure refunded were much better if they could afterwards plead that the money had been spent in carrying out the Royal will than if they exposed themselves to being told that what they had done was for a scheme of their own. This year, however, they had taken that risk, and, as the Governor wished to have the troops early in the field, the Assembly was already providing them without waiting for instructions from England to do so. On February 14 he enclosed to Mr. Pitt the resolutions the Assembly had passed on this subject, and in his covering letter to the Minister he pointed out how willing Massachusetts thus shewed itself, and observed

> It would be injustice to me as a Governor to assume any part of the merit of their services. It requires no art, no management in a Governor, except what his duty requires, to lead the people. Their unremitted zeal for the service, their unbounded affection and duty to His Majesty, their actual confidence in the wisdom and vigour of his administration, are the true sources of these efforts. The spirit of these services are really the present spirit of the people, and theirs should be the merit. As to myself I shall think it sufficient honour if I be found doing my duty amid so zealous and faithful a people, and His Majesty, by your favourable representation, shall accept the same.

Pownall's correspondence with Mr. Pitt was much more full and more frequent than that which he kept up with the Lords of Trade. We may infer from this that his interest in the war was greater than that which he felt in the administrative repression of the local Legislature. He attended in the first instance to Mr. Pitt's requirements, the views of the Lords of Trade he considered as

secondary considerations. How the two conflicted we have seen in the last chapter. In a book specially devoted to the Colonial Governors of earlier days,[1] Mr. E. B. Greene tells us that many of them did not take the trouble to correspond with the Board of Trade at all. Those men probably felt that they were so strong in their influence with the Secretary of State that they could afford to take that course. Pownall never attempted it, but he was perfectly aware not only how difficult it was for a Governor to deal with two Government offices but for those two to act in harmony in directing the Governor's policy. To this latter phase of the question he drew attention at some length in his *Administration*, published five years later.[2] He there advocated the centralisation of authority as regarded colonial matters by the erection of a Secretary of State for America, in addition to the then existing Secretaries for what were called the Northern and Southern Departments. Meanwhile Pownall had to act in Boston during the war crisis under the original regime, and the position was an impossible one. In an earlier chapter it has been shewn that a colonial Governor had usually to serve two masters. This man had to serve three, the Colony, who paid him; the Secretary of State, intent on the prosecution of the war; and the Lords of Trade, who were equally intent on repression of the colony as soon as the time came when it was safe to revert to that policy. Of the two latter the Secretary of State was the superior in official status, with him rested the power of appointing and dismissing Governors. But those officials were responsible for their ordinary work to the Lords of Trade who were very great people, able, if they wanted a Governor removed or dismissed, to bring pressure to bear for that purpose on the Secretary of State. The type of Governor who can, and does, act with energy in an emergency is not that which is most appreciated by departmental officials at home. They are somewhat afraid of him, they prefer some one more pliable. The history of Jamaica has within the last forty years furnished two instances, one an insurrection, the other an earthquake disaster, in which strong men who have done

[1] *The Colonial Governor*, E. B. Greene, 1898, p. 70.
[2] *Administration*, 1765, pages 13 to 22.

their best under difficult circumstances have had their careers closed by the authorities at home. What happened to them recently serves to illustrate what happened to Pownall in his day.

When Mr. Pitt had broken the French power in America there was no longer the same necessity for acting on his lines. Then came the opportunity of the Lords of Trade who were only biding their time to reintroduce the old methods of repressing the local Legislature. For that purpose Pownall was not their man; from their standpoint he was better somewhere else. So far as his position allowed him to do so he was known to sympathise with the colonial idea that sovereignty, like property, has its duties as well as its rights. No other Governor in New England had ever taken that line and acted on it; his adopting it was as little appreciated by the Lords of Trade as it was by Hutchinson, Oliver, Chandler and Choate, who had had things all their own way under Shirley, and were furious at seeing others in Boston consulted instead of themselves. Both then and afterwards the Lords of Trade failed to realise, what Pownall saw, that the colonies had outgrown the stage in which despotic power could be enforced, and on its enforcement they were determined. Correspondence of theirs which has already been quoted, shews that a year earlier they considered that Pownall, whether by inclination or of necessity—it was really from both causes—had relaxed the reins which they intended to tighten. It is to these influences that we may trace the receipt by Pownall in February 1760 of an official letter from the Lords of Trade[1] dated on the previous 14th of November, which informed him that he was transferred from the Governorship of Massachusetts to that of South Carolina.

It is probable that this change had been decided on some time previously and that the actual announcement had been withheld till the news of the capture of Quebec reached England. That success, which decided the war in America, was only gained in the middle of September; it took two months for despatches to cross the Atlantic and this is exactly the time which passed before the Lords of Trade sent off their letter to Boston. It contains no word of recognition of Pownall's services, such as had

[1] R.O., *Massachusetts Bay*, N, 85.

appeared in other letters from the same quarter, and the omission of a courtesy usual on such occasions is in itself a mark of the same displeasure which the Lords of Trade had plainly expressed a year earlier when writing of the powers enjoyed by the Massachusetts Assembly.

The announcement of his removal must have come as a surprise to Pownall who, at the time he received it, was awaiting an answer to the letter, quoted in the last chapter, which he had sent to Mr. Pitt on October 27, 1759, asking for leave of absence; it was not half-way to its destination when the writer was gazetted to another post.[1] It is clear from this that it was not his own doing, nor by his desire, that he left Boston; a man who wishes to resign does so, the fact of applying for leave implies an intention of returning to work when the leave has expired. Nor can the initiative be ascribed to Mr. Pitt, whose letters have shewn that he considered his purpose had been very well served by Pownall. But the Lords of Trade could assert themselves when Quebec fell, and to keep Massachusetts in good humour was no longer essential.

For what was now intended another kind of man was wanted, and he was not far off; it was easy to move him to Boston. Mr. Bancroft confirms the idea that his appointment was due to the Lords of Trade by speaking of him as "Francis Bernard whom the Board of Trade favoured as the most willing friend to the English Church and to British authority."[2] Bernard was at this time Governor of New Jersey—a solicitor by profession,[3] well educated but tactless, a man of about fifty; in the first part of his administration he was well liked in Massachusetts, but he afterwards threw himself into the arms of Hutchinson, who eventually succeeded him as Governor.

The Lords of Trade ordered Pownall to see Bernard and give him full information as to current events and then to return to England to receive instructions before proceeding to South Carolina. The appointment was better paid; so far as income went it might be regarded as a step upwards, but it was a much less important and

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1759, p. 551.

[2] *History of the United States*, 1863, iv. p. 17.

[3] Tudor's *Life of Otis*, 1823, p. 315, says that before Bernard went to America he had an office as a solicitor in Doctors' Commons.

more out-of-the-way position than that in Massachusetts. To a man who did not care for money, but who did care very much for power and responsibility, an increased salary did not prevent this alteration in his circumstances from appearing in the light of promotion downhill. That he so regarded it is shewn by the fact that though he was nominally and indeed officially, Governor of South Carolina for more than a year, he never went there to take up the appointment. Etiquette of course required that he should put a good face on what had happened to him, and that the Assembly should do the same, though they no more wanted him to go than he wanted to leave them.

When they met again on March 19 he alluded to the subject in these terms:—

His Majesty having been pleased, as a mark of his Royal favour, to appoint me to the government of his Province of South Carolina and having favoured me with leave to go to England to receive his further commands, the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations think it expedient that I should return thither as soon as conveniently may be. I am therefore this session to take leave of you and of the Province, which I do under the most grateful sense of the honour and happiness which I have enjoyed therein, and though this parting with friends will be an unpleasant task yet I cannot upon this occasion but congratulate you upon the appointment which His Majesty has been pleased to make of Governor Bernard to the command of this Province, a gentleman whose abilities and good inclinations to the public weal must render any province happy that he governs."[1]

To this formal announcement the Assembly replied, three days later, in terms of equal good-will. They said that

gratitude will not allow us to part with your Excellency without acknowledging the many advantages which have accrued to His Majesty's service in general and to this Province in particular by means of your Excellency's administration, an administration, short indeed, but active, vigorous, and filled with affairs great and important. The public good has evidently been your Excellency's chief and constant view. To promote it you have engaged in wise and spirited measures. A general harmony between the several branches of the Legislature has been the natural consequence of such views and such measures. The approbation of your Royal Master has been the great and just reward, and although taxes and other burdens heavy and unprecedented have been brought upon the people yet they have borne them cheerfully, sensible that their burdens were necessary and

[1] R.O., *Massachusetts Bay, Records of Assembly*, vol. xxxiii.

that their monies were applied by your Excellency with faithfulness and the best economy. A regard to the interest of the Province obliges us to wish that such an administration might have been long continued. His Majesty has a right to employ his servants where he thinks proper, and it is our duty to submit to his royal pleasure. . . . Your Excellency's relation to us as our Governor must cease, your affection for us we hope will not.

That the House of Representatives shewed no less appreciation will be seen by the following extract from their address :—

Permit us at the same time to express the deep regret that we and our constituents feel when we reflect how soon we must be deprived of a Governor so perfectly acquainted with the interest of the Crown and these Plantations, and so indefatigable and successful in jointly promoting the same. 'Tis your knowledge of the country, the mildness and probity of your administration, attention to public economy, spirited efforts in every measure for his Majesty's service, care of our civil and religious liberties and tender concern for the distresses of this barrier colony that have endeared you to the good people of this Province and must transmit to posterity a grateful remembrance of your Excellency.

He is still remembered in Massachusetts ; but American writers, Mr. Drake for instance,[1] while they speak kindly of the part Pownall afterwards played in Parliament about American affairs, are not always so discriminating in their praise as the House of Representatives shewed themselves to be in those words, which recognise that it was the interest of the Crown and of the colonies conjointly, which Pownall had at heart. The interest of the colony was so often subordinated to that of the Crown by both his predecessors and his successors that it has been supposed because he attended to the former he preferred it. As we follow his Parliamentary career we shall see this was a misconception, and that what he worked for was neither Crown alone nor colony alone but both together, and the Empire as a whole.

In his reply to the above the Governor told the Assembly that his

opportunities of doing service must be few and confined. But if ever His Majesty's service shall place me in any situation wherein I may be, in any degree proportionate to my inclinations, capable of serving this country I shall think my preferment and happiness

[1] *History of Boston*, S. G. Drake, 1857, p. 649, *et seq.*

complete, and there my remembrance of and gratitude towards this Province will be incessant motives to my endeavours to serve it.

At the end of March there was a considerable sum due as war expenses from England to Massachusetts. The Assembly proposed to send the province ship, *King George*, to bring it out; they requested the Governor to have her fitted for the voyage, and shewed him a final mark of good will by offering him a passage home in that vessel. On April 7 he replied that he had given the necessary orders about the *King George*, but he added :—

> As to myself I am much obliged to the two Houses for the compliment they have taken occasion to pay me of accommodating me with my passage by this opportunity, but as my time of going may not suit this opportunity, and I have provided myself with a passage, I hope the two Houses will not impute it to any disesteem of their offer as doing me an honour. But, as I am conscious that I have never once since I have been in the chair sought, or even mentioned, my own interest, I should be sorry, just at my going away, that anything meant to accommodate me should interfere with the interest of the Province, or even be represented by any one to do so.[1]

During the next months we find that at the Council meetings, over which the Governor had hitherto hardly ever failed to preside, the chair was usually occupied by Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson. Mention is made of the Governor's absence; he had probably gone to carry out his orders and instruct his successor. He had played his part, and had no doubt lost interest in the work he was so soon to quit. On May 17 a deputation waited upon him to present an address signed by 150 merchants and others who wished to express their obligation for the benefits conferred by his rule; in it they said: "The happy influence of your administration, while it has extended itself to every branch of the public interest, has been too sensibly felt by the merchants and others concerned in trade to allow us to part with your Excellency without the most particular acknowledgment of gratitude and respect."[2]

His term as Governor had been much shorter than usual:[3] barely three years passed between his arrival in

[1] R.O., *Massachusetts Bay, Minutes of Assembly*, vol. xxxiii.

[2] *History of Boston*, S. G. Drake, 1857, p. 649.

[3] *The Provincial Governor*, E. B. Greene, 1898, p. 51, gives the average tenure of office by a Governor of Massachusetts, 1692-1774, as eight years.

Boston in August 1757 and his sailing thence for England in June 1760. But to quote Judge Minot: "As he had arrived in the Province at the most gloomy state of the war so he had the good fortune before his departure to find the success of the British arms established and the fruits of victory in some measure realised."[1] In a letter to Dr. Cooper of Boston written by Pownall ten years later he summarised the events of the long struggle with France as he had lately described them in the House of Commons,[2] in a speech made to shew how great a change in colonial relations had by that time been effected. He wrote to Cooper that

as the people of the Massachusetts were the people whose case was more particularly in question, I went into a long eulogium of their affection to the mother country—their loyalty to the King—their zeal for the service. I mentioned Quebec 1711; Nova Scotia for a series of years; Louisburg 1745; Beau Sejour;[3] the united expedition to Crown Point; their setting the example in raising men at the requisition of the Crown—instead of 2300 as a quota of 7000—7000 men as their quota; the 300 men sent to the fleet; the *King George*; the *Snow* sloop; their raising £80,000 per annum during the war.[4]

Writing of his American experiences more than twenty years after they were over, he said of the people

he began his career by learning to serve them, and he afterwards so commanded as to obtain the approbation of those where he governed and the honourable testimony they bore him. Afterwards, in the private station to which he was consigned in his native land he invariably endeavoured to serve the cause of freedom and peace.[5]

In another passage, where he was dealing with the disputes which subsequently arose, and criticising the part his successors played therein, he wrote:—

This is the opinion, and was the system, of a poor practical Governor who did govern His Majesty's provinces, this is the "leaf out of his book" which the late Earl of Halifax directed him to give to his successor, Sir Francis Bernard, that he might govern them as well as they had been governed by the forgotten servant who writes this.[6]

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[1] *Continuation of the History of Massachusetts Bay*, G. R. Minot, 1798, ii. p. 60.
[2] Hansard's *Parliamentary History*, xvi. p. 985.
[3] A French fort in the Bay of Fundy captured by Monkton in 1755.
[4] MSS. Dept. British Museum, vol. ccii. Pownall's letter of May 11, 1770.
[5] *Memorial to the Sovereigns of America*, 1783, p. 7.
[6] *Memorial to the King*, 1784, Appendix, p. 54.

Writing in 1798 Judge Minot devoted considerable space to the consideration of Pownall's administration, which he described as—

short but extremely successful. He saw the prevailing feelings and habits of the people, and, realising that his future advancement might depend much on the reputation he might acquire in Massachusetts, he accommodated his measures to them with such success that he was even exempted from exceptions to appearances in his personal conduct which would have been highly censurable, according to the strict notions of the times, in a less favourite character. The savings of the public money, which he made by his exertions, rendered him justly popular in a province where the want of affluence could be supplied only by industry. He effected this by the greatest attention to the despatch of public business, which shortened the sessions of the General Court and of course reduced the drafts on the treasury for the pay of members. . . .

He associated with an easy condescension among those leaders in the capital who generally directed the voice of the multitude whilst he indulged his natural gaiety in the politer circles of fashion and pleasure. The importance of his connections and his supposed influence in England had great weight with those to whom the public affairs of the Province were particularly entrusted, and indeed in his future parliamentary conduct he shewed himself not unmindful of this respect. The concerns of the war kept nearly out of sight the great controversial points respecting rights and prerogatives on which the General Court and former Governors usually divided, and when they came up, as once happened in the case of stationing troops on the frontier, he yielded to a spirit which had cost so much to subdue on similar occasions and which he was not ill adapted to manage by apparent concessions. It was the height of his good fortune that the British arms prevailed beyond all rational calculations, which cast a lustre on his exertions in the military department and gave an exultation to the people which naturally elevated their immediate rulers in their view.[1]

Another contemporary writer, Mr. John Adams, the second President of the United States, took much the same view, saying that "Mr. Pownall was a friend to liberty and to our constitution, and seems to have had an aversion to all plots against either."[2]

Writing, some years later, the same author further expressed himself on this subject:—

Pownall, when he came into administration thought there ought to be a good understanding between the capital and country and harmony between both and the Government. . . . When Whiggism

[1] *Continuation of the History of Massachusetts Bay*, G. R., Minot, 1798, ii. p. 62.
[2] *History of the Dispute with America*, John Adams, 1784, p. 8.

under Pitt declined and when Toryism under Bute revived Pownall faded and Bernard flourished. If the plan of subjugating America did not originate in Shirley's administration it was meditated and matured and digested, and there Hutchinson learned it. Pownall did not favour it and therefore displeased Hutchinson and his friends in America and his patrons in Scotland and England. Pownall was the most constitutional and rational Governor in my opinion who ever represented the Crown in this Province. He engaged in no intrigues, he favoured no conspiracies against the liberties of America.[1]

Many later authorities in American history might be quoted to the same effect, but the above passages, written by men who had themselves witnessed that which they described, may suffice to shew how Pownall was regarded in Massachusetts. Though he never saw the province again or the friends he had made there—except such as visited England—he never forgot them. The years he had spent there furnished him with what became the absorbing interest of his life, and for the next forty years he chiefly occupied himself with thinking, writing, and speaking—so long as he was in Parliament—about the relation of colonies to the mother country. We have now come to the end of his career in America, but as this narrative proceeds frequent reference to the course of events there will be necessary in order to shew how he regarded them during the period when they were leading up to the separation of those provinces from England, which he did all in his power to prevent. When he embarked he was treated with all possible honour, both Houses of the Legislature attending him to his barge.

He had earned the good-will of the whole community except the clique of officials who had throughout opposed him, and whom he had overmastered in the colony if not in England. Their feelings found final expression in a squib, published in pamphlet form a few weeks before his departure.[2] This is a poor thing which hardly repays perusal. The chief complaints of him are that he was authoritative in manner and looked into everything himself. It harps on Shirley's grievance against him, but

[1] *Works of John Adams*, 1856, x. p. 243. His letter of Feb. 14, 1817, to Mr. Tudor.

[2] *Library of Massachusetts Historical Society*, Catalogue Number 427.26. It was probably written by Samuel Waterhouse, a well-known lampooner for the official class in Boston, who is mentioned by Mr. Tudor, on p. 240 of the *Life of James Otis*, as having attacked Otis by splitting up his name—O'tis he—who did this, O'tis he—who did that, etc.

contains nothing more than has here been described, except that he is represented as a man who was a good hater. Incidentally it appears that by this time Pownall and Hutchinson were barely on speaking terms; the former no doubt resented how the latter had worked against him. Mr. Tudlow Fowler[1] mentions that a town in Vermont, just over the Massachusetts border, is called after John Pownall of the Board of Trade, but that no place in the province which this Governor worked so hard for while there, and had so deep an affection for always, derives its name from him. What is now Dresden on the Kennebec river, in the region which his expeditions opened for settlement, was at first called Pownall-borough, but at the beginning of the last century the present designation was adopted.

While Pownall was on his voyage to England James de Lancey died in New York on July 30. During the continued absence of Sir Charles Hardy, still the nominal Governor, de Lancey had been administering that province as Lieutenant-Governor. On his death the charge of it devolved on Dr. Cadwallader Colden, the senior member of the Council. He was a man of seventy-three, and wanted a permanent official to whom he could hand over the responsibility. He knew Pownall and all about him, and it appears that within a month of de Lancey's death Colden followed up the ex-Governor of Massachusetts with a letter to suggest that he might return to America to govern New York. Pownall's reply, dated in London November 1, 1760, is as follows:—

I am just come out of the country and upon my arrival here the other day I am honoured with your letter dated August 22. You do me great honour in supposing that my friendship can be of any use to you, and I should do myself great happiness in being so. But however you personally may not be known to the King's Ministers your services and you are in your public character, and I daresay you will find so by experiencing every mark of confidence and honour and friendship from them. . . . As to my undertaking the administration of the government of New York it is a thing that I weighed some years ago and I must acknowledge non valeat haberi; and have absolutely declined it, and nothing but the King's positive commands can ever drive me to any such arduous task.[2]

[1] *Magazine of American History,* xvi. p. 432.

[2] Reproduced in facsimile from original in possession of the New York Historical Society by Mr. R. Tudlow Fowler in *Magazine of American History,* 1886, vol. xvi.

This letter shews that the Government, though they had removed him from Massachusetts, were perfectly willing to employ him elsewhere, and had in fact given him the opportunity of going to New York instead of to South Carolina. They also offered him the Governorship of Jamaica this autumn, he first accepted and then declined it. We are told exactly what happened in a letter from William Coney to Sir William Johnson.[1]

> I forgot to acquaint you of an affair of your old acquaintance Mr. Pownall. He was appointed Governor of Jamaica. Then courted a lady of fortune in England, flattered himself of success, gave up his governorship of Jamaica on account of the nuptials. Upon a more intimate acquaintance with the lady she one day frankly told him that he had a *positiveness* in his temper she could not bear with and would certainly make her unhappy. She therefore would not further admit of his addresses. Upon which he applied for his government again, but it was given away.

We have seen how, on every occasion when he arrived either in America or in England at the end of a voyage he found himself in the middle of a crisis of some kind, either political or military. On his return home the usual thing happened, leaving Boston in June he would get to England in August; some two months later, on October 25, King George II. died. Under him and his Ministers Pownall had worked for some years, the Royal approval of his services had been conveyed to him by Mr. Pitt, and a man still young who had deserved this while holding a prominent position might look to go further under the same régime. But when the old King went his régime disappeared completely, and it was a detail in much more important changes that Pownall's prospects of such employment as he desired were utterly destroyed by the accession of George III. This King's character exercised so vast an influence on the events of the next fifty years that no one can write of this period without considering what manner of man he was. It is necessary to do so here because his personality so largely influenced the career which we are following. No one had better opportunity of estimating from personal knowledge the nature of the young man who now came to the throne

[1] *Life and Times of Sir William Johnson*, W. L. Stone, 1865, ii. note to p. 155. No date is given for this letter, but it is placed under events of the autumn of 1760.

than Lord Waldegrave, who had been his Governor or tutor, and who said of him—

> His parts though excellent will be found very tolerable if ever they are properly exercised. He is strictly honest but wants that frank and open behaviour which makes honesty appear amiable. . . . He has great command of his passions and will seldom do wrong except when he mistakes wrong for right, but as often as that shall happen it will be difficult to undeceive him because he is uncommonly indolent and has strong prejudices . . . whenever he is displeased he does not break out into heat and violence but becomes sullen and silent and retires to his closet . . . for several years he made the punishment of Wilkes a darling project of his government; when that mock patriot grew tired of brawling the subjection of America became the prevailing object of the royal policy.[1]

The opinions expressed of this King have varied widely because they have usually been coloured by party feeling. Men of the old Whig school, which had put his house on the throne, and whose influence he did his best to uproot, have criticised him as freely as the Tories have praised him. But there is a general agreement that in the tendency to confuse right with wrong, to which Lord Waldegrave so pointedly alluded, lay the cause of the confusion and disasters which marked the early part of his reign, and chief among them was the loss of the colonies. Some of Pownall's patrons were the first to feel the effect of the change. We have seen that on more than one occasion he had been employed by the new King's uncle, the Duke of Cumberland, who under the old order of things was so great a man that much might have been hoped from his influence. That the Duke was no longer in favour was shewn by his name being struck out of the Liturgy two days after the King's accession.[2]

The King's first object was to end the war and get rid of the Minister who had so successfully conducted it. On the first day of the reign Mr. Pitt was kept waiting two hours for admission to the royal closet.[3] A curious historical parallel suggests itself between England in 1760 and Germany in 1888. There died in each of those years an aged Sovereign who had personally and success-

[1] *Waldegrave Memoirs*, 1821, p. 8.
[2] *Anecdotes of the Earl of Chatham*, 1793, i. p. 344.
[3] *Bedford Correspondence*, 1846, iii. p. xiii.

fully led his troops to battle against France.[1] At the close of their reigns the conduct of affairs had been delegated by each ruler to a Minister whose position, based on victory in war and the building of Empire, appeared unassailable but vanished soon after the accession to the throne of the grandson of its former occupant. In each case the Minister was so strong in the country that some time had to elapse before his removal, but when Bismarck fell he did so exactly as Pitt had done before him and from the same cause.

When George III., intent on reversing every move that had been made, so shook up the chessboard as to threaten the security of so great a piece as Mr. Pitt, there was little chance for such a small pawn as Pownall to take further part in the game. As regards the colonial part of it he was full of useful and special information and experience, but while he had the knowledge the King had the power. No two men could have been more diametrically opposed in their ideas of how North America should be treated than George III. and this Colonial Governor now out of harness, removed from the position which he had liked, and unwilling to take up another which he held but did not like. He knew all about the colonies, their strength and determination, he had deeply studied their history and had seen with his own eyes what a strong race they had become. From this time forward he had to stand by and watch the King, who knew none of these things, pursue a course the end of which this subject of his clearly foresaw and was powerless to prevent. Up to this time his career had been a successful one, the seven years he had spent abroad had been turned to good account and he had made powerful friends. He might have gone much further if his new King had been of a different disposition, but on that the whole fate of this subject—as of multitudes of others—rested. We have watched him during a period of rapid advancement and we now have to follow him through twenty years to his retirement from public life. We shall see how he bore himself during that time under adversity, struggling in vain to make others see what was clear to his own vision.

[1] Dettingen, 1743; Sedan, 1870.

CHAPTER VIII

CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY—'ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES'—MARRIAGE

1761-1766

BEFORE we take up again the thread of Pownall's story we must glance for a moment at the fortunes of his superiors on whom his own lot depended; especially at those of Mr. Pitt in whose eyes he had found favour, a man who if himself secure in his position, might have been a most powerful patron. Mr. Pitt was far from secure, on the contrary the King had come to the throne fully determined to turn him out of office as soon as possible. The Earl of Bute, who was favoured by the King's mother and became the King's confidential adviser, had been immediately admitted to the Privy Council, and in March 1761 he was forced as a colleague on Mr. Pitt, taking place in the Cabinet as Secretary for the Northern Department. The King, Lord Bute, and the Court party, were eager to end the war; in his speech to Parliament in November 1763 the King referred to this period saying that "the re-establishment of public tranquillity was the first great object of my reign."[1] While the war had been disastrous for France its cost to England had been great, and there were many men in both countries desirous of peace. Negotiations for this were opened in the spring of 1761, and in May Mr. Hans Stanley was sent to Paris to conduct them. He found the French Minister, the Duc de Choiseul, anxious to make terms, prepared to let England retain her conquests in the East Indies and at Minorca, ready to relinquish Canada, but firm in his objection to part with a hold on

[1] *Anecdotes of the Earl of Chatham*, 1793, i. note to p. 344.

Cape Breton and Newfoundland. The Duc insisted that the fisheries there and the right to dry fish on those shores, or some of them, should still be shared by France.

To such terms the Court party, together with the Duke of Bedford, a great Whig noble and a force in political life, were willing to assent but Mr. Pitt was not. He knew all about the colonies and all about the fisheries. A year and a half before this he had received the above-mentioned despatch from Pownall, who was then in Boston, which warned him that in previous negotiations the French had obtained rights to catch and to cure fish off the Banks of Newfoundland "as a cession of no consequence to the English," and would probably put forward the same plea again.

Those fisheries were a nursery for the seamen of France whose Navy Mr. Pitt wished to cripple.

While these matters were under discussion[1] Pownall thought that occupation might be found for himself in connection with them. We find him writing to Mr. Pitt on June 24, 1761, that, when the time came for England to settle the future administration of Canada, the opportunity should be taken to keep that new colony clear of some of the difficulties which had arisen with the old ones. He says in that letter that if he "may hope to be employed on this occasion" he thinks he can undertake to put Canadian affairs on a solid basis. He adds that, whether employment be given him or not, such experience as he has is at Mr. Pitt's disposal, and if not wanted for this purpose he will retire "with the consolation of having done my duty while employed to the satisfaction of the King and His Ministers, and still willing to be useful so far as any one out of employment can be."[2] This letter seems to have brought Pownall, his former adviser in American topography and affairs, to the mind of Mr. Pitt who two days later wrote a long despatch to Mr. Stanley on Canadian boundaries.[3] Those two days would just suffice for Mr. Pitt to send for Pownall and hear

[1] A paragraph in Lloyd's *Evening Post*, No. 617, June 26-29, 1761, runs thus: "Pownall Esqre. goes as Second Secretary to the Earl of Halifax, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland." This was probably Thomas Pownall, but it will be seen that he went to Germany, and not to Ireland in this capacity.

[2] R.O., *Chatham Correspondence*, vol. liii.

[3] *British Museum*, vol. 32,924, MS. p. 247, Mr. Pitt to Mr. Stanley, June 26, 1761.

what he had to say before writing to Stanley. It was perhaps due to Pownall's advice that Mr. Pitt made a firm stand in making no concession to the French about the fisheries, he foresaw that to do so would cause trouble, and with the support of the City of London he was strong enough to prevent it for a time. When the matter was brought up again in the following year his successors granted those fishery rights which he had refused, and thereby left occasion for friction between England and France which has lasted till recently.

At the end of July 1761 Mr. Stanley presented the English ultimatum which demanded those fisheries almost exclusively. M. de Choiseul refused to accept it; he said to Stanley "I wonder that your great Pitt should be so attached to the acquisition of Canada . . .; in the hands of France it will always be of service to you to keep your colonies in that dependence which they will not fail to shake off the moment Canada shall be ceded."[1]

To the cession of Canada France was willing to agree, to exclusion from the fisheries she was not; the negotiation broke down on this point and the war had to continue. M. de Choiseul then turned to Spain, whose dynasty was akin to that of France and who was also interested in seeing these fisheries did not become exclusively English. With her he concluded what was called the Family Compact, and by another deed it was arranged that Spain should join France in the war by the beginning of May in the following year unless peace were made by them. Mr. Pitt became aware of this and wished to anticipate Spain by declaring war on her at once before she had made her preparations. As this was vetoed by the King and the Court party Mr. Pitt resigned at the beginning of October 1761.

While he was watching these proceedings Pownall had definitely renounced the Governorship of South Carolina, to which office Mr. Thomas Boone was appointed on April 14, 1761.[2] That ended Pownall's colonial career, but the prolongation of the war gave him the opportunity of active employment on the Continent. We have seen that in America he had

[1] *History of the United States*, George Bancroft, 1863, iv. p. 399.

[2] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1761, p. 189. On February 27 Mr. W. H. Littleton had been gazetted Governor of Jamaica.

always liked being with troops in the field and now, shortly before Mr. Pitt left office, he returned to that manner of life being appointed First Commissary-General, with the rank of Colonel, to the English-Hanoverian army which was serving under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick against the French on the Rhine. This meant a drop from the administrative to the departmental grade of official, but he was still in a position to correspond with and report to the Cabinet. When Mr. Pitt left office his colleague the Duke of Newcastle remained as Premier for some months. To the Duke we find Pownall writing from Hoxter in the south of Hanover on September 21, 1761, to say that he was inspecting the various magazines and was arranging to make his headquarters for the winter at Bremen.[1] This city on the lower waters of the River Weser commanded the waterway of that river, which was utilised for the conveyance of supplies to the British army holding that part of Germany against the French, while our ally King Frederick of Prussia was operating to the south and south-east.

With that letter to the Duke of Newcastle are others which shew that the new Commissary was going about his duties in a business-like manner. There are circular instructions to local inspectors requiring them to report how each storekeeper takes in material, how he keeps check of weights and quantities. His receipts are to be seen, so are the condition in which he keep his stores. If any suspicion of fraud on the storekeepers' part exist the inspector is to closely investigate the matter.

Mr. Dundas, a contractor, writes from Pyrmont, 20 miles south of Minden, to Pownall on September 10, in reply to his complaint that out of 1000 wagons only 161 were in use. Dundas says the 20 leagues of road from Hamlein to Geismar were in such bad order that he could do no better; he pleaded it would be hard measure to stop payment for the teams unemployed. This is evidently what the Chief Commissary had threatened, the Contractor declares that this kind of work really cannot be "performed as a jobb of a coach and six horses," he is evidently disgusted at the clean sweeping of this new official broom —says he is tired of the contract and would like to

[1] *British Museum*, MSS. Dept., Newcastle Correspondence, 32,928, p. 274.

relinquish it. On September 20, Pownall writes to Colonel Pierson from Obervilliers that he wants to get at the facts about the supply of the granaries. He wants a clause in every forage contract fixing a time for delivery, and if that is not complied with there must be a penalty. If goods are delivered after the due date their acceptance should be optional. The Treasury clause that the Commissary should have access to the Contractor's books of delivery should be enforced. Anything not up to specification, but not bad enough to reject, might be taken over at a lower price on the valuation of some disinterested person, but if a contractor were found trying to pass off stores receipts he had obtained from some one else he should forfeit all he had in the stores. We may infer that there had been a good deal of roguery about these matters in this as in other campaigns, and that the new Commissary meant to put a stop to it. Action of this kind provokes hostility on the part of the persons affected. A Mr. Guest, Inspector of Magazines, in a memorial to the Treasury accused Pownall of allowing damaged oats to be accepted at Bremen. An inquiry was held which resulted in Guest's dismissal from the Service, his charge was declared unfounded,[1] and Pownall's accounts were passed with honour.

1762

Through 1762 Pownall continued in Germany, it was the last and the most featureless year of the war, but in January Spain threw in her lot with France.

The Duke of Newcastle was driven from office in May[2] and succeeded by Lord Bute, who in September sent the

[1] Nichol's *Literary Anecdotes of the XVIIIth Century*, 1814, note to p. 61.

[2] On the 21st of this month a distant cousin of the subject of this memoir, Captain Pownall, R.N., H.M.S. *Favourite*, when cruising off Cape St. Vincent with H.M.S. *Active*, Captain Sawyer, took the Spanish ship *Hermione*, one of the richest prizes of the war. The *Hermione* had on board an immense cargo of great value, to take which from Portsmouth to London 22 wagons were required, and besides this she had 2,600,000 dollars for the Court of Madrid (*History of the Late War*, 1779, Entick, v. p. 406). His son, Captain Philemon Pownall, R.N., was killed in action off the Downs on June 15, 1781.

Duke of Bedford to Paris to negotiate peace. While that was being done the question of American boundaries and limits had again to be considered. We find Lord Egremont, Secretary of State, writing to Pownall on October 18, that he desired information as to the distance from the shore of the Gulf of the St. Lawrence within which French fishermen should not be permitted to come. Lord Egremont wrote, "I have taken the liberty to mention you as a likely person to have some acquaintance among those who are judges in this matter," and he said he would be much obliged for any assistance Pownall could give him.[1]

Hostilities between the English and French ceased on November 22, 1762, and the Treaty of Paris was ratified in the following February. The peace was very ill received, for it was believed that if Mr. Pitt had been allowed to reap his own harvest there would have been more of it.

1763

Lord Bute became so unpopular that he resigned in April 1763.[2] He is credited with having recommended Mr. George Grenville to the King as the new Premier and Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the hope that Mr. Grenville might be found an amenable person, but that proved a mistake. He was brother-in-law to Mr. Pitt, with whom he was not on good terms, he was a very stubborn man, narrow-minded, pedantic, and something of a prig, but behind that unattractive exterior he concealed a warm heart. He lived in the atmosphere of Party politics which was no cleaner then than now. If a man in Parliament wanted office in those days the simplest way to get it was to toady King George. To pander to King Mob is the modern equivalent, offer him anything or everything he fancies—never mind to whom it belongs—if he will give you his vote and interest, and you will get on and become a person of distinction. It is only the

[1] R.O., *Foreign Office Entry Book*, No. 241.

[2] On the 30th of this month Richard Pownall, a brother of Thomas, was gazetted Captain in the 1st Regiment of Guards, from which he retired as Colonel in 1769, died 1811, *s.p.* Another brother, Edward, had been gazetted to that regiment on December 3, 1753, but he exchanged to the Line and became Captain in the 34th on February 26, 1764, died 1779, *s.p.*

old jobbery in a new form, whether a man sells himself to his superior or to his inferiors in station he equally becomes a slave. But there are always some disinterested men who are not for sale and Mr. Grenville was one of them, he did not toady the King, on the contrary he stood up when others abased themselves. By no means a rich man he would touch no perquisites of office, nor would he shut his eyes to any tampering with the collection or the expenditure of the revenue. During his administration he made one fatal mistake in his dealings with the colonies, but he was a high-minded gentleman, and he went quite straight. Very many men, Pownall among them, looked on him with respect, though he did not often inspire affection.

Such was the state of affairs, and such was the man at the head of them, when Pownall returned from Germany, after spending a year and a half as Commissary-General. His appointment had ceased with the war, he was now again seeking for work and without much prospect of it. In his case, as in that of much more prominent people, all depended on the King, who had now got things into his own hands and was shaking the statesmen of the day into constantly varying groups and combinations, like the bits of glass in a kaleidoscope. Thus were they shaken into or out of office, or from one office to another, by the self-willed lad on the throne who, at the age he then was, might have been a useful member of society as a subaltern, for he had plenty of courage. Later in life he would have been a very respectable country gentleman. As a Sovereign he so mismanaged affairs that within twenty years he had reduced England from the proud position in which she stood after the Seven Years' War—Pitt's War —to the half-ruined condition in which she found herself after the American War of Independence—the King's War.

His first purpose had been achieved, he had got rid of Mr. Pitt, who was now living in retirement, suffering in his body from gout and in his mind from mortification. He was disgusted with the world in general, and with the other Whig leaders in particular. Though the King was doing his utmost to divest them of the power they had long possessed, they were still so strong that his only course was to play them off against each other. To do

W. Ridley sculp.

GEORGE III.

King of Great Britain

From an Original, Painted in the Year 1778.

this, and to get his own way by doing it, he had in some manner to get round the House of Commons. Bullying it and strangling it had been attempted by Charles I. with unfortunate results. As those methods would not bear repetition others were adopted. Instead of attacking the House as a whole pressure was brought to bear on individual members. Lord Bute organised a party of about eighty men who were known as the "King's Friends," and were sufficiently numerous to turn the scale in a division according to the wishes of the King, who could thus displace any Ministry at his pleasure. This party was composed partly of the descendants of the old Tories, who had seen their last hopes for "the King over the water" crushed in 1745, partly of mere placemen ready to sell their votes to the Crown for what it would give them in the way of positions and pensions. That the Crown should find funds to purchase seats for men who would vote to order became a recognised thing. Members who had made their own way into the House could equally find a market for their votes, in the purchase of which five and twenty thousand pounds are said to have been on one occasion expended in a single day by the Treasury.[1] The King himself went through the division list to see how members had voted, and he treated them accordingly. With these forces at work no administration was safe or could pursue any settled policy.

England had emerged successful from a great war in which colonial possessions had been involved. They had to be dealt with on new lines, for they had outgrown the old status of being treated as what Pownall called "mere plantations." An attempt will be made later to shew how close is the correspondence between our colonial problem to-day and that of the England of King George. It was possible either to succeed in conciliating the colonies or to attempt to subjugate them, between those alternatives the King had to choose, and the event shewed that his choice was wrong. The individual with whom we are dealing held the other view quite as strongly as the King held his, but his position, as he stood on the outer fringe of affairs, unable to influence them, was exactly what Lord Curzon described last year when he wrote—

[1] *England in the XVIIIth Century*, W. E. H. Lecky, 1882, iii. p. 56.

There is at this, or any, moment to be found within a three mile radius of Whitehall a reserve of knowledge, ability and experience in Imperial and Administrative problems unequalled in any other country. What use do we make of this material? As far as I can see little or none. . . . It might be thought that we should adopt some machinery by which the experience of those who know so much might be utilised for the public gain.

After the years he had spent in America, and the work he had done there, Pownall did, as Lord Curzon expresses it, "know so much" of the conditions of the colonies that he at once saw that the wrong road was being taken. The opportunity was given him of treading that road—with his principles in his pocket. It would probably have led him to rank and distinction, it would certainly have given him more of the administrative work abroad which had exactly suited him, and which he much desired to resume. Tempting as the bait must have been he would not take it; we have his reasons for refusing in his own words written twenty years later:—

When, in the year 1763, I returned from Germany I was offered any government in America if I would return to America and undertake that line of service. I excused myself. I had had occasion to experience the ignorance and false conceptions by which the men of business in England were prejudiced and perverted as to the state and affairs of our establishments in America.[1]

Sooner or later most men fall by the wayside in the race of life. It is not every one who, at the age of forty, feels compelled to drop out of that race and abandon all prospects of advancement. But one who has to write himself a failure, and to admit that his own career is closed, may continue to work for others.

Question not, but live and labour,
Till yon goal be won,
Helping every feeble neighbour,
Seeking help from none.
Life is mostly froth and bubble,
Two things stand like stone
KINDNESS in another's trouble
COURAGE in your own.[2]

The "feeble neighbour" to help whom Pownall henceforth devoted himself was his friend and fellow-countryman in America, especially in Massachusetts, the colony

[1] *Three Memorials*, Thomas Pownall, 1784, General Preface, p. vii.
[2] *Ye Wearie Wayfarer*, Lindsay Gordon.

where the oppression which followed was most felt. Things had been going badly there since his departure three years before. His successor, Mr. Bernard, had shewn himself to be even a greater stickler for the royal prerogatives than Governor Shirley had been. Far from keeping the old adherents of Shirley at arm's length as Pownall had done, he had, a month after he took charge, given Mr. Hutchinson, the Lieutenant-Governor, the additional office of Chief-Justice, and this though Hutchinson, then fifty years old, had not been called to the Bar, and only began to read law after his appointment.[1] The reversion of this place, which became vacant by the death of Chief-Justice Sewall, had been promised by Shirley to James Otis of Barnstable, who had hitherto been loyal to the connection with England.[2] Now, soured by this disappointment, he became opposed to it, as did his son of the same name who took a prominent part in the events which followed. Bernard's rigid enforcement of the Acts of Trade made much ill-feeling in the colony, and his arbitrary and ungracious procedure caused great dissatisfaction.

Pownall's correspondence with his friends in Massachusetts kept him informed of what was happening there, he also saw how things were shaping in England, and, though debarred from any public position, he was not content to be merely a passive resister. For something more than that he felt called on; having refused to take an official position under a system which he believed to be wrong he now wanted to shew where it was wrong and what, in his opinion, was right. For this purpose he resorted to his pen, which he had already used before he first went to America, in writing a book called the

PRINCIPLES OF POLITY

published in 1752 by Edward Owen in Warwick Lane. It consists of 142 quarto pages, and deals, in the form of a dialogue, with the theory of Government and with constitutional questions. More noticeable for what it led up to afterwards than for what it contains, it had been his first attempt at writing for publication. In later years he himself did not take it very seriously. He then

[1] *Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson*, P. O. Hutchinson, 1883, p. 66.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 63.

described it as "a little treatise which I wrote when I was very young, and which is very imperfect and incorrect in its manner and composition."[1]

1764

But it had been a beginning, he now had time on his hands, what he had done before he could do again. In the years that had passed he had qualified himself to write, not only theoretically but practically, of the art of government which he had been called upon to practise. What he now wrote, in the attempt to influence public opinion, is called

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES

and was published by Wilkie in St. Paul's Churchyard; like many similar publications of the day it appeared anonymously. There are but 131 octavo pages, there is no preface, and it can hardly in this stage be described as a book, though we shall see that in later editions it became one. The copy in the library of the British Museum is bound with other political pamphlets of like nature and the same period—1764. Pownall was perfectly well aware that his action in thus publishing his views, which were totally opposed to those held by the Court, destroyed his official prospects. Twenty years later he wrote of his coming forward in this way after refusing employment—

> Instead of engaging in that line of service under such a system I, on the contrary, seeing the mischiefs which must attend such ignorance and the dangers which must follow such presumption, drew up a paper describing the state of our colonies. Drawing, as in a plan, the administration by which they ought to be governed, as being what they actually were, not what they were imagined to be or were intended to be. In this paper I first stated that nascent crisis which America was forming. . . . But that if the Government of Great Britain, instead of acting by the principles of nature and her constitution, would not consider these establishments as part of her realm but as external dependencies to be governed by external government, if she adopted this repellent principle the colonies, having a common principle of action amongst themselves, would converge, by that principle to a common centre of their own *without the realm*, I ventured to assert . . . that the managing of the events

[1] "Letter to Adam Smith," Thomas Pownall, 1776, note to p. 5.

of that crisis was the precise business and duty of the ministers of that period. . . . I then stated what would be the particular points of business which would require the attention of the Government and by describing, under their respective heads, the several branches of Colonial Government, pointed out what was wanted and what was practical. I ventured to assert that such a system and state of things as then were, conducted by such an administration, would form *Great Britain and its dependencies into one great marine Empire and Dominion extending over the Atlantic and America whose centre would be found within the British Empire.*

After having made a precis of this business and seeing no hope that the statement which it contained would be admitted by the Government, nor the reasoning it led to be acquiesced in, I extended this paper into a treatise on the subject and published it in the year 1764[1] as an appeal to the nation at large under the title of *The Administration of the British Colonies.* . . . The refusing to go to America on this service, and the publication of this treatise ruined me with those who had the real power of Government in their hands. I was not ignorant that it would have such effect. I sacrificed to what I thought truth and right, and I thank God that I have never yet once, to this hour, repented that I made that sacrifice. Perhaps they have more than once repented that they did not follow this advice.[2]

Having noticed the circumstances under which this pamphlet was written we may now see what it contained. It begins by saying that with the recent conclusion of peace with France and Spain a new order of things began, which led the author to put forward those views for the formation of which special opportunities had fallen to him. The power of the sword is described as having been, in the early ages of mankind, "the predominant spirit of the world," and this is said to have been followed by the power of religion which, as directed by the Papacy, had for many generations formed and given away kingdoms, created their rulers, and again excommunicated and deposed those sovereigns at will. Later on had come the finding of communications with Asia and with America which had thrown open other worlds to trade, it was predicted that "the spirit of commerce will become that predominant power which will form the general policy and rule the powers of Europe, and hence a grand commercial interest, the basis of a great commercial dominion

[1] It appears from this that the paper had been written for submission to the Government, and that the idea of publishing it was an afterthought.

[2] *Three Memorials*, Thomas Pownall, 1784, General Preface, p. ix, the allusion in the last line is to the then recent establishment of the United States.

. . . will be formed and arise; the rise and forming of this commercial dominion is what precisely constitutes the present crisis." If that era of commerce which he then foresaw, and in which we and our fathers have lived, was to come, the question next asked is—To whom would the control of it fall? At the beginning of the Seven Years' War it had been doubtful whether France or England would obtain this power of control. The issue had been decided in favour of the latter. What use was she to make of it?

> It is now the duty of those who govern us to carry forward this state of things . . . that our kingdom may be no more considered as the mere kingdom of this isle, with many appendages of provinces, colonies, settlements, and other extraneous parts, but as a grand marine dominion consisting of our possessions on the Atlantic and in America united into a one interest in a one centre where the seat of government is. . . . The taking leading measures towards the forming all these Atlantic and American possessions into a one dominion, of which Great Britain should be the commercial centre to which it shall be the spring of power, is the precise duty of government at this crisis.

He then explains that all this cannot be done at once, much time must elapse before so great a policy could be carried out, but it was quite possible to form, without delay, a general system designed to lead up to it. *In his opinion the first essential was the maturing of a plan for uniting the interests of the colonies with those of the mother country irrespective of ministerial changes or party politics.* That there was plenty of good-will he was sure, "for these are our own people, our brethren, faithful, good, and beneficial subjects and free-born Englishmen—or, by adoption, possessing all the rights of freedom." He said that nothing seemed to him further from the nature, the interests and the thoughts of the colonists than a revolt, he believed that "nothing can eradicate from their hearts their natural, almost mechanical affection to Great Britain which they conceive under no other sense nor call by any other name than that of Home."[1]

But while he recognised that such sentiments were good so far as they went, he also saw that in community of interest lay the real guarantee for community of action.

[1] It will be observed that this was written a year before the introduction of the Stamp Act, which upset the previous relations between England and the colonies.

He wanted business and not sentiment only. That links of sentiment would stand a severe strain he was not at all sure, but he was quite certain that if the interests of different communities were identical the peoples would hold together. On that solid foundation he wanted to begin the building of a structure of permanent Empire. He desired first of all to see a proper organisation replace the existing subdivision of authority in dealing with the colonies. The offices of the Lords of Trade and of the Secretary of State should be amalgamated in a separate one, where every action as regards colonial affairs should centre, for, as things were, no official abroad knew whom he was dealing with.[1] In that new office all colonial correspondence should, he thought, be concentrated and conducted; within its walls all information as to the natural and geographical features of the then newly acquired possessions should be collected. This office should know all there was to be known about the state of the colonial fisheries and manufactures, the prospects men had of employment in those industries, and the resources of each province. Endowed with such large functions it should be the office of a Secretary of State and rank as such, being specially created for the purpose.[2] This was actually done four years later, whether from his suggestion or from other reasons.

Pownall defined successful commerce as the securing of many and good customers :—

> The wisdom therefore of a trading nation is to gain, and to create as many as possible. Those whom we gain in foreign trade we possess under restrictions and difficulties and may lose in the rivalship of commerce; those that a trading nation can create within itself it deals with under its own regulations and makes its own and cannot lose. In the establishing colonies a nation creates people whose labour, being applied to new objects of produce and manufacture, opens new channels of commerce. By which they not only live in ease and affluence within themselves, but while they are labouring under and for the mother country (for there all their external profits

[1] This came from his own experience. It was between those two offices that he had himself fallen to the ground in Boston.

[2] The Board of Trade and Plantations of those days differed in many ways from the Department which now bears the first half of that name. But it is curious, in connection with this recommendation of 1764 to find Sir W. Holland, M.P. for Rotherham, on February 6 of the present year moving, as an amendment to the Address, that "it is highly important that the status of the Board of Trade should be raised and that it should be placed on a par with the office of a Secretary of State."

centre) become an increasing nation of appropriated and good customers to the mother country. These not only increase our manufactures and increase our exports, but extend our commerce, and, if duly administered, extend the nation, its powers and its dominions, to wherever these people extend their settlements. This is therefore an interest which is, and ought to be dear to the mother country.

While he was assured that both loyalty and interest had up to that time bound the colonies to England, he was not so certain that in the future they would be content to be bound by the English laws and form of government. In order to dispel and remove any doubt or question on this head, he suggested that inquiries should be made, and that any jealousies discovered should be dealt with and removed amicably while in the bud, before they blossomed into grievances and caused strife. If the colonies were to be regarded as Crown domains nothing more would be required than to revise and bring up to date the old Charters under which they were governed. It might, however, be urged by the colonists that though they lived outside the realm of England they remained Englishmen, and, as such, retained their inherent right to govern themselves and to be taxed only by their own consent. Such questions were most likely to arise in the case of laws made subsequent to the foundation of the colonies, and containing no special clauses which made the colonists bound by them. Those would undoubtedly require careful handling, but for that very reason it would be better to clear them up without delay. Unless this were done he foresaw nothing but constant jarring and discord about them. He enters at some length into this constitutional question, as to which it appeared to him that it was absolutely necessary to pass an Act for settling the extent of the English laws, and to formulate a set of rules to regulate their practice.

He then discusses the legal procedure of the colonies and shews how it differed from that of England because they had no Chancery procedure. He points out that, at the origin of the colonies, the only precedents for a judiciary beyond the realm lay in Guernsey and Jersey, the fragments which remained of the old Duchy of Normandy.

As to the control and existence of the military establishment remaining after the war in the colonies, and how the Indians were to be dealt with, the difficulties

which had lately arisen with the latter prevent him, he says, from entering into discussion. Next he comes to the revenue. No doubt the colonies should contribute their share to the Imperial exchequer. The customs duties should continue to be the chief source of revenue, and a moderate land tax is recommended instead of the existing quit rents. A Stamp duty, such as there was in England, seemed to him a fair impost, but as to this, and the customs also, he wrote that "a point will arise no doubt how far these colonies who, for the necessities of government and the emergencies of service, have already, by their proper powers, laid these duties on the people and granted the revenue arising from them to the Crown . . . may or may not have precluded any act of administration here on these heads."

What he saw, and what Mr. Grenville and those who advised him failed to see, was that the Crown, by accepting these grants and ratifying the acts of the Colonial Legislatures which passed them, had created a precedent against itself. When such action by those Legislatures had been endorsed and the money it had produced had been taken, further sums could not equitably be levied by the English Parliament passing other Acts to over-ride those of the colonies. The trouble which arose in the following year was directly caused by this consideration being ignored. Then comes a lengthy investigation of the rights of the colonies to use a paper currency of their own, and of currency generally.

He then deals with the question of colonial trade; as we follow his views about this we must remember that he lived at a time when rigid protection was regarded as indispensable. He says that the general principle of the laws of trade in relation to the colonies was that all colonial produce should be shipped to a British port. But the law was constantly evaded by that produce being consigned direct to a foreign port instead of passing through England, where duties were levied on it. But provided the duties were collected what did it matter to England where that was done? He proposed that English factories should be established at such commercial centres as Riga, Hamburg, Lisbon, Cadiz, to which colonial merchants wished to send their goods, and that at those factories there should be English officials who could levy

what was due, the goods being consigned in the first instance to the English firms there established. This would keep the trade (its profits to individuals, and its dues to the Crown) just as much in English hands as the existing system. England lost nothing, he pointed out, and the colonists gained a good deal. They would have to pay freight on one voyage, say Boston to Cadiz, instead of on two, Boston to England and England to Cadiz. Moreover, "if instead of confining this market for the colonies to Britain only this colony trade was made . . . an occasion of establishing British markets, even in other countries the true rise would be derived to the general interest from those advantageous circumstances, while in particular the colonies and the mother country would be mutually accommodated."

Nor did he see why the English colonies should be debarred, as they then were, from trading direct with the colonies of France and Spain in the West Indies and South America; it only needed due regulation and could then be conducted with the sanction of the law instead of in defiance of the law. The government and the colonists were at constant feud about this question, which it would be well to settle. To us who know what the manufacturing power of America has since become he appears, for once, wide of the mark when he thought England need not fear competition there. But unless difficulties were allowed to continue in the imports of English manufactures to the colonies he was not afraid of their being undersold. He had his reason, and he gave his warning.

> Nothing does at present, with that active and acute people, prevent their going into manufactures except the proportionate dearness of labour as referred to the terms on which they can import. But increase the price of their imports to a certain degree . . . let their trade and navigation be, in some measure, suppressed . . . this proportion of the price of labour will much sooner cease to be an object of objection to manufacturing there than is commonly apprehended. . . . If the colonists cannot on one hand purchase foreign manufactures at any reasonable price, or have not money to purchase with, and there are, on the other hand, many hands idle which used to be employed in navigation, and all these, as well as the husbandmen, want employment, these circumstances will soon overbalance the difference of the rate of labour in Europe and in America.

We have now had a brief outline of this pamphlet

which expressed opinions not only in advance of the time when it was written but, in some respects, of our own time also. Such reorganisation of the colonial office as he advocated in order to concentrate information there was not introduced till 1907, when a permanent secretariat was established at the instigation of Mr. Deakin, who said he wished "to create a brain for the trade and commerce of the Empire." That is exactly what Pownall wanted to see done long ago; he tried to make what is called in America a business proposition, instead of leaving bones of contention lying about for people to stumble over. His pamphlet attracted notice, and another edition was called for.

1765

In January 1765 Pownall wrote to Mr. Pitt from New Norfolk Street, Grosvenor Square,[1] asking permission to publish, as an appendix to a second edition of the *Administration* which he was preparing, the memorial of December 1758 on the French boundaries which has been previously mentioned. In that letter he told Mr. Pitt that he was undecided whether he should put his name to this new edition. To do so was to incur further displeasure from the Court party; knowing that, he did it. The original pamphlet was now enlarged into a book of 202 octavo pages, with an appendix of 60 more. The publishers were Dodsley in Pall Mall and Walter in Charing Cross. It contained a formal dedication to Mr. George Grenville, to whom Pownall, not long returned from Germany, unconnected with English parties, was probably unknown. If Mr. Grenville's attention could be drawn to the book, and he could be induced to accept and act upon its ideas, it was possible that he, the Premier, might turn the King's head in the right direction. Nobody else could. Mr. Pitt had taken up Pownall's suggestions on other subjects a few years before; if he had been in office at this time he might have done so again. But he was hopelessly out of the question, if only what he had done before would be done now by Mr. Grenville there was hope. A cause that has commonsense and reason in its favour may languish for years till it is taken up by

[1] R.O., *C.C.*, vol. liii.

some one whose station gives him the right to speak with authority;[1] that station belonged to Mr. Grenville, Pownall had not got it.

The dedication begins with the compliments inevitable on such occasions, and its writer proceeds to say that

> the experience I have had in the affairs of the colonies must at least have given me a practical knowledge of them. And the relation I have borne to the people has given me an affection for them. Not being employed in any Department, wherein that knowledge can be reduced to practice, I thought it a duty, if indeed it may be of any use, to publish my sentiments on this subject; and I have taken the freedom, Sir, of addressing them to you. I have professed an affection for the colonies because, having lived among their people in a private, as well as a public character, I know them. I know that in their private social relations there is not a more friendly, and in their political one a more zealously loyal people in all His Majesty's dominions.

He then declared that, despite some prejudices which might have lately arisen, there was no more law-abiding people. But when they became alarmed they were like others, and might fall a prey to demagogues, "perhaps the worst, as well as the lowest, part of the people." Of such things a wise man would take no notice if he saw them "loyal to their King, obedient to his government, active in every point of public spirit." Such a man would overlook what might be done in moments of excitement, he would by his conduct acquire an ascendency over them and see them return to "their genuine good temper, good sense, and principles."

Then he adds:—

> Let not the colonists imagine that the people of England have any ill idea of them or any designs of oppressing them. The people of England love them. Let not the people of England imagine that the colonists have a wish but for their welfare and to partake of it as fellow-subjects. For the people of the colonies would sacrifice their dearest interests for the honour and prosperity of their mother country, and the last wish of their hearts will be for ever to belong to it. I have a right to say this because experience has given me this impression of them. I do not say it to flatter them. I never did flatter them when I was connected with them in business, but I speak it as a truth which I think should be known, lest the intemperance of their false or mistaken patriots . . . should cause any alienation of that natural affection which at present subsists, and will, I hope, for ever subsist between the people of Great Britain and those of the colonies.

[1] In May 1903 we ourselves heard such a man speak.

As this dedication is not dated, it is not possible to say at what time in 1765 it was written. The above-quoted letter to Mr. Pitt shews that Pownall was preparing the book in January, but there is evident allusion in the dedication to the troubles which took place in Boston in the spring and summer, so the book was probably not published till news of them had reached England. Pownall was in that case trying to prevent their being taken too seriously. They became serious and were due to Mr. Grenville, who, in provoking them, made the mistake of his life. As Chancellor of the Exchequer he had found the country bearing the burdens of the war, as it had still to maintain a force in the colonies, for though the French had gone the Indians had not.

Probably unaware of what has been here described, the enormous extent to which the colonies had taxed themselves, and the sacrifices they had made in the struggle against France, it seemed to Mr. Grenville quite reasonable that they should pay for these troops. The idea was not his. President Adams who was on the spot, and knew what went on says that it was suggested to Grenville by Governor Bernard and the official group in Boston.[1] But Grenville took it up and acted on it, and thereby became responsible.

In his Budget speech of March 9, 1764, he had incidentally alluded to the possibility of a Stamp duty, similar to that in England, for the colonies, and to the need for measures to defeat the contrabrand trade carried on by those colonies with foreign countries. It has been seen that Pownall was at this time writing about both these topics, expressing the desire to legalise the trade and also doubts as to whether a Stamp Act, though a justifiable measure, could properly be imposed by Parliament. From the Stamp Act about £100,000 a year was expected; it was passed on February 7, 1765, but was not to take effect till the following November.

News of it reached Boston in April, and provoked fierce resentment which found vent in a riot in August. As Hutchinson was considered to have prompted the action of the English Government his house was sacked. Oliver, who had been appointed distributor of the

[1] *History of the Dispute with America*, John Adams, 1784, p. 12.

obnoxious stamps, was intimidated into swearing publicly that he would have nothing to do with them.

There had already been one Congress, that of Albany in 1754; a second one was now held in October 1765 at New York, where the representatives of nine colonies met and drew up petitions to the King and to Parliament. What they objected to was not the amount of the taxation, but the way in which it was imposed by an Assembly in which they had no voice,—exactly what Pownall had foreseen and expressed in his pamphlet a year before. In November, when the Act should have come into operation, it proved futile, nobody would touch or use the stamps; the stock which had been sent out from England was left on the Governor's hands, legal proceedings came to a standstill. Meanwhile the King had become tired of Mr. Grenville, who had been fiercely opposed by Mr. Pitt. He was succeeded by the Marquis of Rockingham, another Whig magnate, with whom were General Conway and the Duke of Grafton as Secretaries of State, the latter for the northern, the former for the southern department. Lord Camden became Chancellor, and Mr. W. Dowdeswell[1] of Pull Court in Worcestershire, was Chancellor of the Exchequer. With the last-named Pownall was, a few years later, intimately associated in Parliament. Lord Rockingham was strong in his principles but not strong as a statesman; in his actions he was advised and prompted by Edmund Burke, who had not then become known to the public,[2] but who usually stood behind Lord Rockingham as we have seen that Pownall sometimes stood behind Mr. Pitt. This administration was supported on occasions by Mr. Pitt, who refused to join it, though pressed to do so. That he ought to have done this and worked for the conciliation of America was the view expressed by Lord John Russell in his book just quoted from. But Mr. Pitt at this time was not his old self at all, he vacillated and blew first hot and then cold on colonial questions. Though he recovered afterwards it is hardly too much to say that for some part of this period he was not fully responsible for his actions; he certainly ought not to be judged by them.

In August 1765, just after this change of ministry

[1] Gt.-gt. grandfather of the present writer.

[2] C. J. Fox, *Memorials and Correspondence*, Lord John Russell, 1853, p. 115.

took place, Pownall married the widow of Sir Everard Fawkener, who had been Ambassador to Constantinople and then Secretary to the Duke of Cumberland whom he had accompanied to Culloden, and after that he had been Postmaster-General. He had died in 1758 leaving his wife with several children and poorly off; she had been born in 1726, the natural daughter of General Charles Churchill. Horace Walpole mentions[1] that she was intimate with the Duchess of Cumberland and Lady Waldegrave,[2] and was sister of his own brother-in-law, Mr. Churchill. It was no doubt through this connection that Horace Walpole and Pownall came in touch with each other, as we shall see that they were. After her second marriage she retained her first husband's name and continued to be addressed as Lady Fawkener; it was through his association with the Duke of Cumberland that Sir Everard had known and married her. It was probably because he was known to, and had been employed by, the Duke that Pownall did the same. He now took a house at Richmond and lived for many years partly there and partly at a town house he had in Albemarle Street; his letters are dated sometimes from the one, sometimes from the other.

But for his marriage he would at this time have left England altogether. He wrote afterwards: "When I returned from America and had occasion to know, not barely to see, the train into which the business and administration of this devoted country were to be led I had determined to retire back to America and live a private character there."[3]

As to his occupation the only one now left to him in which he could attempt to stave off the calamities he saw coming was that of writing. He had quite failed to enlist the sympathies of Mr. Grenville for his opinions, but he had not been unsuccessful in his publication of them. The second edition of the *Administration* had been as much appreciated as the original, and he was now called on to prepare a third.

[1] *Letters of Sir Horace Walpole*, P. Cunningham, 1857, i. p. 83, and *Dict. Nat. Biog.*, "Fawkener."

[2] *The Waldegrave Memoirs*, 1821, p. xvi, notices the combination in opposition at this time of the Duke of Cumberland and Mr. Pitt—Pownall's chief patrons. Lady Waldegrave was the niece of Horace Walpole.

[3] *Three Memorials*, Thomas Pownall, 1784, Preface, p. v.

1766

This was entrusted to the same publishers as its predecessor; the dedication to Mr. Grenville appears again, and to the appendix a third section is added, which brings up the total number of pages to 314.

Here he reaffirms his opinion as to the affection borne by the colonies to England.

> For an hundred years to this time there has not been an American to whom, in the genuine feelings of his heart, the interests, welfare, and happiness of Great Britain was not as dear as that of his own colony, having no other idea but that they were always one and the same. I do not believe that the idea of Great Britain ever heretofore arose in an American breast without the idea of its being called HOME. If of late they have learned to call the British produce and manufactures foreign it is not from an American idea they have learned it.

He proceeds to deal at length with the claim made by Parliament to tax the colonies, and puts forward two propositions:—

(1) Whether that were constitutionally possible,

(2) Or whether it conflicted with the rights of Englishmen to be taxed by legislatures other than their own,—unless they had a due representation in that superior Assembly which imposed the tax.

In his first edition of 1764 he had only stated those questions on which the whole dispute turned, and had given no opinion in favour of either. He now pronounced for the first, he regarded the power of Parliament as paramount, provided that the Acts it passed contained clauses making them applicable to the colonies. He did not know then, as we shall see that he did later, of any precedent conflicting with this doctrine, which he says had been recognised and undisputed when he was in America. But if the people there were to petition Parliament to be allowed to send to it their own representatives

> that would be quite another case, and would become a very serious matter highly worthy of the consideration and deliberation of Parliament. . . . If upon any such application from the colonies to Parliament . . . that for the future the colonies should send

representatives to Parliament I see no danger nor inconvenience that could arise to Great Britain; on the contrary such measures would have a tendency throughout the colonies to extend loyalty towards the Crown and affection towards the mother country.

Pownall knew the difficulty due to the Atlantic from personal experience; he saw another and more serious one in the rapid expansion of colonial population which he was almost, if not quite, alone in predicting, and which soon took place. If the colonies received proportionate representation their members would, before long, exceed those of England and then

the centre of power instead of remaining fixed as it is now in Great Britain will, as the magnitude and interest of the colonies increases, be drawn out from these islands by the same laws of nature, analogous in all cases, by which the centre of gravity, now near the face of the sun, would, by an increase of the quantity of matter in the planets, be drawn out beyond that surface.

Thus, as the colonies developed, a united empire would find its centre moved from the original position to a new one. If that were to be the effect of the continuance of union, for which he was striving his utmost, appropriate measures should be taken, when making this concession to the colonies, to secure that they always sent their members to the English Parliament instead of England sending members to America. By making such suggestions he incurred the reproach of being a visionary. Such a thing could never happen, it was said, as the population of America exceeding that of England, it was absurd to talk of such a possibility. Events have justified the opinion he then expressed, the population of the United States is now more than twice that of England. Having admitted the right and recognised the expediency of the colonies being granted representation at Westminster if they asked for it, he went further and inquired why England should wait for the request to be made? Why should she not face the question unasked and call on the colonies to do what other Englishmen did and send their members to Parliament, just as they would if they were within Great Britain? What he wanted in all this was to see a solid union established between the English at home and the English abroad; in his opinion that would both strengthen the hands of the Government and quiet the minds of the people. He

knew nothing of the spirit of those who have raised, and would direct, the storm in the present wild uproar in America, nor do I believe that they themselves knew what spirit they are of. Frantic, like madmen, they have fallen first upon those who have been hitherto near and dear to them, and then, giddy with the wild outrage they have begun, they have proceeded (I had almost said to take up arms) against the authority of that very constitution to which they owe the rights and privileges they contend for.

He proceeds to point out that the more the colonists had lost temper and patience the more it behoved England to keep cool. He mentions the ruinous effects of violence used by the body politic against its own members, and declares that "those who have known the spirit of the colonies in times prior to these events would hope that there would be no such necessity."

He states the grievances of the colonies as being: taxation without representation; a too rigid enforcement of the Navigation Laws; a lack of currency both in silver and paper due to the way in which the colonies were drained of money by all receipts from taxes being paid into the Exchequer in coin; the excessive amount of the duties levied by the new Revenue Act; the imposition of the new Stamp Act and of internal taxes.

He did not say, but he no doubt thought, that all these matters might be arranged by tact and forbearance. By the exercise of those qualities he had himself stopped a serious crisis in Boston when Lord Loudoun resorted to arbitrary methods about the billeting question. If only the present differences could be dealt with in the same spirit there was nothing in them which seemed to him incapable of friendly adjustment, if all political parties in England would concur in an attempt to make one. He expressed the hope that the existing ministry of Lord Rockingham would co-operate to this end with their predecessors who had served under Mr. Grenville, and with as many as possible of those who had acted with Lord Bute.

The business, he thought, had better be done on the spot where local conditions and circumstances could be investigated. England should, in his opinion, first reconcile her conflicting groups of statesmen and get them to agree on a national policy, and then

matters being thus established at home, send out some very considerable person to America as Commander-in-Chief, both of Army

and Navy, with a Council, under such instructions and with such directions as may and will re-establish the British Government in the American Colonies over a free, loyal and dutiful people. More than this I do not at present think myself at liberty to publish.

His reason for breaking off there was that he was just then engaged in trying to arrange practically for such an expedition as he advocated in theory. The "really considerable person" he had in his mind, for it was no less than a Royal Duke, the King's brother, access to whom would be easily possible for one who knew his uncle the old Duke of Cumberland, and whose wife we have seen described by Walpole as intimate with the Duchess of Cumberland. Writing eight years later Pownall said that he laid these proposals before H.R.H. the Duke of York in 1766, the idea being that the Duke

should go out in his proper line of service as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet in America, that under this character he might be charged with commission and instruction to the purport herein described. His Royal Highness, very fully comprehending the scope of the measure in the whole extent of its operations, thoroughly weighing and convinced of its practicability and utility . . . engaged to undertake it—if the minister should adopt it and His Majesty approve it.[1]

The note here quoted from goes on to say that the Duke referred Pownall to the Minister, who rejected the proposal as soon as it was made. Pownall expresses his belief that the King never heard of it. If this took place, as is probable, in the first half of 1766 the Minister in question must have been either the Premier, Lord Rockingham, or the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, General Conway, a cold frigid man of no force of character. If such a commission had been sent to America nothing would have suited Pownall better than to go with it—perhaps as Secretary—as he had gone with Sir Danvers Osborne years before when still a novice in Colonial affairs. On the other hand nothing was more unlikely than the King would send him, a man who had been publishing opinions utterly at variance with those of the Court, on such an errand, and we have seen that nobody was better aware than himself that, as things stood, he was utterly debarred from employment.

While he was occupied with this negotiation and with

[1] *Administration*, 1774, i. Note, p. 29.

preparing the 1766 edition of the *Administration* news had come in from America of the ferment which the Stamp Act had caused there in the previous autumn.

Parliament met in the middle of January 1766 and proceeded to deal with the colonial remonstrances against the Stamp Act. Mr. Grenville, who had been responsible for it but had since quitted office, was attacked by Mr. Pitt who spoke out strongly

> when therefore in this House we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own. But in an American tax what do we do? We, your Majesty's Commons of Great Britain, give and grant to your Majesty—what? Our own property? No. We give and grant to your Majesty the property of your Majesty's Commons of America. It is an absurdity in terms.

Mr. Grenville was only able to make a lame reply, but in it he quoted the cases of the Counties Palatine of Chester and Durham; the latter had already engaged Pownall's attention, this speech seems to have drawn it to the former—the place of his own origin. The Stamp Act was repealed in March, but when that was done all gratitude on the part of the Colonies for the concession was annulled by a resolution being simultaneously passed which reaffirmed the right of Parliament to impose taxes on the colonies. This was described as "planting a barren tree, which cast a shade indeed over the land but yielded no fruit."[1] The apprehensions of the colonists were not allayed and the unrest among them continued.

In August 1766 Lord Rockingham who had only held office thirteen months had to resign, largely because his own Secretary of State, the Duke of Grafton, turned on him. The Duke had entered political life as a Whig under the wing of Mr. Pitt whom he deserted to take part with Lord Rockingham; tiring of him he now resigned on the plea that he could not act without Mr. Pitt, but with him he would serve in any capacity. This furnished the King with the excuse he was seeking to dismiss Lord Rockingham. Mr. Pitt was sent for and prevailed upon again to take charge of affairs; he had done so with remarkable success when the control rested with himself and he had the Whigs united behind him in the old King's time. But now that the new King had

[1] *Administration*, 1768, Note to p. 164.

assumed control and the Whigs were disorganised, it was quite another matter; he made as great a blunder in consenting to take office on those terms as did Mr. Grenville about the Stamp Act. But to an intensely ambitious man, who had been laid on the shelf for five years, the temptation to resume work was irresistible. As the strain of the House of Commons was more than his health would stand, he became Earl of Chatham and went to the House of Lords holding the Privy Seal. The Duke of Grafton practically led the new administration as First Lord of the Treasury, being succeeded as Secretary of State by Lord Shelburne, who afterwards became Marquis of Lansdowne. Lord Chatham made Charles Townshend, brother of the Brigadier whom we have seen at Quebec with Wolfe, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer.

While Pownall was quietly working with his pen to urge England to unite her parties for a policy of conciliation towards the colonies, he watched the party chiefs, men occupying stations much superior to his own, fighting and scrambling for office at the feet of the King, who had imbibed from Lord Bute the idea that he was hampered in his privileges by the existence of party government and was acting on the old maxim *divide et impera*. That was his fixed purpose, there was no moving him from it. He was quite sure he was right, the results of his action proved that hardly any human being was ever so supremely wrong.[1] As time passed Pownall despaired more and more of making any impression on that obdurate nature or on the self-seeking politicians who surrounded the throne. With them he could do nothing though his books had served to educate public opinion. His attempt to get the Duke of York to put things right had failed. He felt himself powerless, and he was a man in earnest, what else could he do? There was one thing remaining; he could enter Parliament and work within it, as he had hitherto worked outside it, for the Imperial cause he had so much at heart.

[1] The *Road to Ruin* which Hogarth, his subject, depicted was henceforth trodden by King George in his colonial affairs. The supplement to this book is written to shew how we are now treading it ourselves.

CHAPTER IX

FIRST FOUR YEARS IN PARLIAMENT

1767-1770

At a bye-election early in January 1767 Pownall was returned to the House of Commons as one of the members for Tregony, a small town in the south of Cornwall. In the thirteenth century it had been a place of some importance, sending members to Parliament in the reign of Edward I.,[1] but it had long been cast into the shade by Truro, which lies eight miles further west. Cornwall was then so full of these old decayed boroughs that it sent no less than forty-four representatives to Parliament, while Middlesex, together with Westminster, had only eight.

The new member was in no hurry to take part in debate, before he attempted to do so he allowed some months to pass. During this winter and spring the ferment caused in the colonies by the Stamp Act of 1765 had quieted down, but the people there had become keenly apprehensive that some further legislation of the same nature might be attempted. They had by this time realised, as they had not done at first, the significance of the Declaration adopted by Parliament, as to its absolute power to tax the foreign possessions, which had been coupled with the repeal of the Stamp Act. Encouraged by their successful resistance to that measure the Colonies were now refusing to accept the definition which Mr. Pitt had given at the beginning of 1766. He had then denounced the Stamp Act because it sought to impose an internal tax to be levied within the Colonies; but he had

[1] *Recollections*, John Nicholls, 1822, p. 83, where it is said that Westminster was not represented till the time of Edward VI., 250 years later.

said at the same time that there had never been any doubt as to the power of Parliament to enforce external taxation imposed through the Customs, which had always been accepted without question. In the autumn and winter of 1766 the agitation in the colonies had made the existence of the English officials, especially in Massachusetts, so unpleasant that it was desired to give them relief by paying their salaries from home instead of leaving them dependent for their subsistence on colonial grants. This touched another sore point. It will be remembered that the colonists had always regarded it as of the first importance that they should pay the officials so as to keep a hold on them. Whether, as things now stood, Hutchinson, whose house had been looted in the riot, and Oliver, who had been forced to renounce his position as distributer of stamps, would have any subsistence money voted by the colony was doubtful.

Something had to be done for them and for others. As the charge for their maintenance was strictly a local one it appeared fair to the English ministry to raise it from local sources and thence obtain a fund out of which such salaries could be paid. It has been shewn that these were not large, no great sum was required, some £40,000 a year would suffice. It was about sixpence a head on the population of the colonies. In order to raise this small contribution Charles Townshend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, brought a Bill into Parliament in May 1767 for putting a duty on the importation to the colonies of tea, glass, paper, and painters' colours.

So much afterwards depended on the first of those items that it may be worth while to mention that the 3d. a pound which this Act put on it, was not really the imposition of a new charge but the reduction of an old one. Tea for the colonies had never been shipped there direct from China, it had always passed through England where a duty of a shilling a pound was paid on it.[1] This, of course, was added to the price when it was re-exported to America, where the consumer paid the shilling without knowing it was there. England could have continued to take that shilling at her own ports, and nothing would have been heard of it. But when she waived that, and proposed to take 3d. instead of it at the colonial ports,

[1] *History of Massachusetts Bay*, 1828, J. Hutchinson.

it was fiercely resented as a tax; people who had without murmur paid the shilling to the grocer were indignant at paying a quarter of it to the Customs House officer. All the trouble about the Stamp Act broke out afresh. Associations were formed, whose members pledged themselves to abstain not only from tea but from purchasing English goods or manufactures. By these means it was hoped to pinch the merchants, and through them the Government, of England.

Meanwhile another dispute which only slightly touched Boston had assumed serious dimensions in New York; it was the old question of billeting troops, which had caused so much trouble there ten years before in Lord Loudoun's time. Sir H. Moore, now Governor of that province, called on his Assembly to find billets for the regulars; his requirement was only in part fulfilled, but what was granted Moore accepted. For this he was taken to task by Lord Shelburne, the Secretary of State, who told him that he should have insisted on the whole of his original demand. The English Ministry introduced a Bill for suspending the New York Legislature till such time as it repented of its action in this matter, and for settling the billeting question over its head by the superior authority of Parliament. This gave the new Member for Tregony the opportunity he was waiting for; no one in the House was so well qualified as he to discuss this question, which was identically the same at this time as when he had himself had to deal with and settle it in Boston in 1757. He had then reconciled the arbitrary demands and the threats of Lord Loudoun with the rights and the objections of the citizens. What had been done then could be done again. Addressing the House of Commons on May 16, Pownall made the usual plea for indulgence to be shewn to a first speech, but he claimed that his long experience in America gave him a right to be heard, and that he ought not in such a case to be content with giving a silent vote. He mentioned that he had already told the Minister in charge of the Bill that there was a precedent, only ten years old, which could be followed with advantage. He had been asked to call at the Minister's office to explain this and had done so; but it was evident that the people he had there seen had failed to understand what he had told them. There was nothing left to him but

to discuss the Bill as it stood. "I see that this Act of Parliament . . . has mistaken and perverted every means of carrying the measure into execution, and has, from the tenor of it, been the natural occasion of all the misconduct and confusion now complained of." As to execution he proceeded to point out that the Colonial Acts contained provision for making them effective and enforcing them; there was nothing of the kind in the measure before the House, which laid down general rules, but gave no latitude, no elasticity, such as local conditions required. It said, for instance, that the soldiers were to be received in inns, but how would that help them in districts where no inns existed? It said the men were to be put into unoccupied houses; there were but few such houses, and the owners of them could hardly be compelled to place them free of charge at the disposal of the military authorities. Neither as regards these house-owners nor the innkeepers was there any provision made for fair payment. The communities were called on to provide barracks, but there was nothing to compel commanding officers to use them. It was possible that after barracks were built objections might be taken to them, and the troops turned upon private houses after all. As the Bill stood it seemed to him that it would produce nothing but confusion as regards the law, and would probably cause an arbitrary quartering of the troops contrary to law. He told the House that if they chose to pass the Act they ought at all events to make it practicable, which his local knowledge enabled him to say that it was not in its present form.

Having dealt thus severely with this particular measure he went straight to the centre of the whole difficulty. It was all very well for Parliament to pass Bills imposing internal taxes on the colonies, but how were they going to get the money collected? They had no officials in the country districts, there was no organisation within the colonies for collecting dues imposed from without. Parliament only made itself ridiculous if, being entirely without means of getting the sums it demanded, it proceeded to call for them and laid itself open to having to go without them, as had happened with the Stamp Act. He said:—

If it be prudent and advisable that Parliament should charge any expense upon the Colonies by way of tax originated in this House, how shall it direct that charge to be levied and paid? Shall Parliament direct the Assembly of any Province or Colony to make provision and support for it; or shall Parliament, directly and avowedly imposing that sum upon the Province as a tax, settle the ways and means of levying it, and appoint executive officers to collect it? Or shall it direct the usual executive officer of the Colony to levy and collect that tax so imposed? . . . If Parliament, the supreme legislature, shall order and impose a tax on a body of people, and shall order the legislative part of that body to provide for the payment of it, and to see it paid, it must consider the members of that body merely as commissioners of taxes.

This, as he pointed out, was an inferior position, such as representative bodies would assuredly object to be reduced to; the attempt to put them in it savoured too much of the despotic measures of other countries, it was the destruction of political liberty. As duly constituted deliberative bodies, the Assemblies of the colonies had voices of their own and a right to be asked for their assent to what was required of them. How was it possible, he asked, for any such body to be allowed to exert its will only in one prescribed direction? Yet if they did not do that, if they failed to "decide as an Act of Parliament directs and preordains, you consider the colonies as denying the sovereignty of Great Britain." He did not confine himself to merely negative criticism; he proceeded to offer practical advice, saying that if Parliament wished to settle this long-disputed billeting question, it should first of all formulate a scheme that would work, and then invite the co-operation of the local legislatures as to its execution, which they alone could undertake.

Failing that manner of meeting the difficulty there was a way of getting round it. While the authority of Parliament was disputed, the allegiance to the Crown was fully recognised by all the best men in the colonies. Parliament was highly tenacious of its rights, but if it would waive them and consent to stand on one side, letting the order—if there were to be an order—proceed direct from the King to the local legislatures, Pownall could say it would be complied with. That would be granted from the King which would be refused to Parliament. Of the refusal he was certain, if the present course were persisted in. If it were attempted to dictate from the

House of Commons how troops should be quartered in America, and how an internal tax should be levied there to defray the expense, he was sure, from his knowledge of the mind of the people, that every single colony would block the measure as New York had already done. Every local Assembly had shewn itself willing to billet the English troops if called on to do so but not one of them would work under an Act like this.

He exclaimed, "Don't fancy that you can divide the people on this point, and that you need only divide them to govern, you will by this conduct only unite them the more inseparably." As to the measure before the House, the most objectionable clause appeared to him to be that which said that the necessary funds *shall* be raised. That was an order and would be resented as such not only by enthusiasts or demagogues but by the whole people. He reminded the House that the colonists were far from regarding themselves as people who were always subject to take orders from it; on the contrary they considered themselves free men, ready to give gifts in aid but themselves the best and safest judges of the nature and extent of those gifts. "Thus this question is brought in issue and must be decided, however much the policy of ministry may wish and labour to waive it, cases which constantly arise must bring it into discussion, and necessity will force it into decision." It was still possible, he said, to revert to the old plan of applying to the Assemblies, in the manner to which they were accustomed, for such funds as were required for local purposes; but, as to this new idea of Parliament imposing taxation over the heads of the Assemblies, he told the Ministry plainly that if it had ever been possible the time had gone by; if they thought they would get anything by it they were mistaken. The colonies were now too strong to submit to that treatment and would certainly resist.

If only the Cabinet would take another course and bring their methods up to date and endeavour to weave the colonial system as it stood "into the very being of the British Empire," that might be consolidated, but, as he watched events, he was afraid there was little chance of this happening. The point he urged was that Parliament should cease its claim to impose colonial taxation, especially that of an internal nature; he wanted

Parliament kept out of the whole matter. He ended by saying, "This will restore peace, this will effect the business; the contrary measure, this enforcing Bill, will be the beginning of a series of mischiefs, and therefore I shall be against the bringing it in."[1]

It will be admitted that the new Member had spoken his mind pretty plainly, and, as the course of events afterwards shewed, with good reason. It was made on the measure then before the House, which was one only of all the questions now coming into dispute, but it had covered the whole ground. If the policy it urged had been adopted and acted on then, as it was in 1775, when too late, history might have been written differently. But the ideas expressed called on the House—and the King who stood behind it—to renounce their most cherished plans, and those ideas were not likely to be welcomed. Men of high standing—the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. George Grenville, Mr. Secretary Conway—spoke on the other side and the Bill was passed. The Session ended on July 2, 1767, and the House did not meet again till November 24. During those months the agitation in the colonies against the new duties on tea, and the other commodities which had become dutiable, increased steadily.

What happened between 1765 and 1767 was thus expressed by "Junius": "Under one administration the Stamp Act is made; under the second it is repealed; under the third, in spite of all experience, a new mode of taxing the colonies is invented, and a question revived which ought to have been buried in oblivion."[2] The colonies were hardly prepared for resistance at first, the policy of pressing the Stamp Act might have overawed them, but vacillation is always fatal; when firmness was the only chance fear was displayed. Those in America who were hostile to England saw their opportunity and used it. About the Customs duties England was in earnest. To enforce them she appointed Commissioners who were sent out to Boston to take charge of the collection of this revenue; one of them was a Mr. John Temple, of whom more will be heard. They arrived in

[1] This speech is abstracted from Almon's *Parliamentary Debates*, 1765-68, iii. p. 301 *et seq.* As Pownall is known to have corrected his speeches for Almon, who was a friend of his and a publisher of good standing in Piccadilly, the reports of Almon will, whenever possible, be used in preference to others.

[2] Letter No. 1, January 21, 1769.

Boston early in November. The new duties were to come into operation on the 20th of that month, but at that date none of the newly taxable articles had arrived, nor did any reach Boston before December 30. Then the Massachusetts Assembly met, and at once proceeded to draw up petitions demanding the repeal of the Act.

1768

While they were thus occupied the English Government formed a new office to deal with the situation which they at last saw was becoming dangerous. They did what had been suggested four years earlier in the first edition of the *Administration*, and created a new Secretary of State's Office for American affairs. The Earl of Hillsborough was placed at the head of it, next to him as Deputy Secretary of State was John Pownall, who had long been Secretary of the Board of Trade. The office was, however, not organised on the lines which his brother Thomas had desired; it was not entrusted with such full powers as had been claimed for it. The older offices shewed themselves jealous of the new one and, as Lord Hillsborough did not prove a strong man, little good resulted from the measure.

At the beginning of this year we find Pownall writing to Franklin that an objection which he was unable to answer had been made to granting the colonists the full rights of subjects at home. He had been told that if the colonists were to pay the same taxes as people in England and, like them, to send members to Parliament, equal powers of trade must be conceded. When that was done the Atlantic commerce might afterwards centre in New York or Boston, and power be transferred there from England. "Which consequence, however it may suit a citizen of the world, must be folly and madness to a Briton." So exclaimed the Englishman who wrote to his colonial friend for a solution of the difficulty. The American-born Franklin took quite another view. He saw no difficulty at all, he replied that the fallacy lay in supposing that gain to a British Colony was loss to Britain. He maintained that the whole Empire gained if any part of it developed a particular trade, and he

predicted that without a complete union, by which full and equal rights were given, the existing system of government could not long be retained. Assuming Pownall's premises to be correct he inquired, "Which is best—to have a total separation or a change of the seat of government?"[1] Parliament was in session from November 1767 till March 1768, but of what passed there are only scanty records either in Hansard or in Almon. There is no mention by either of them of the American question or of any speech of Pownall's. On March 12, 1768, the House was dissolved, the King's speech was more hopeful about the colonies, he thought they were settling down "to a just sense of what their own interest as well as their duty" required of them.

At the General Election, which then took place, Pownall was re-elected for Tregony; but when the House met again on May 10 only formal business, such as the election of a speaker, was done, and early in June the House was prorogued till November. The conduct of affairs was thus in the hands of the King and his Cabinet, unchecked by Parliamentary criticism, during the greater part of this year. The Cabinet meant the Duke of Grafton, for Lord Chatham was only nominally at the head of it. He was described in January by Lord Chesterfield as being at Hayes and seeing no one. "Some said it was the gout, but many think his worst complaint is in his head, which I am afraid is too true." He refused to be spoken to on business, but till he resigned in October he was in the unfortunate position of being responsible for a policy of which he disapproved; when he rallied, he was displeased with many of the measures taken, especially about American affairs. As Pownall had no part to play in Parliament, he took to his pen again in the spring and summer. Two years had now passed since the third edition of the *Administration* in 1766, and events had moved so fast that in preparing the fourth edition of 1768 much of the book had to be rewritten.

The original pamphlet of 1764 now developed into a substantial octavo book of 422 pages, published by J. Walter at Charing Cross. One of the copies[2] of this revised edition of 1768, now in the Library of the British

[1] *Works of Benjamin Franklin*, Jared Sparks, 1840, iv. pp. 374-375.
[2] *Catalogue No.* C, 60, i.g.

Museum, is of especial interest, because it belonged to Edmund Burke and bears his stamp. He certainly read it very carefully, for the margins of pages 28 to 75, which deal with the constitutional question, are so copiously annotated in his own handwriting that it took two or three hours to transcribe his remarks. That copy gives not only Pownall's opinion on the topic of the day, but Burke's opinion on Pownall, and Burke was one of the deepest thinkers, as well as the greatest orator, of that time. The dedication of the 1765-66 editions to Mr. George Grenville is replaced by a new one to him, which says that when the original was written, Mr. Grenville had been about to act on his belief that England had a right to avail herself, for revenue purposes, of all her resources. The result of the Stamp Act, thus introduced and passed, had been to inspire the colonists, who had no Parliamentary representation, with a fear that they might become victims of arbitrary rule. They admitted that they were subject to the English Government under the fundamental rules of the constitution, but they held that those included the right of tax-payers to representation in Parliament, which right they had not got.

While the colonies had been lately adopting this attitude, that of Parliament had also become more pronounced and in quite a different direction. It had recently declared its right to make laws binding on the colonies as well as Great Britain "in all cases whatsoever." This dedication pointed out that these quite different views must be reconciled or endless trouble would arise; one party to the dispute charging the other with a spirit of tyranny and oppression, only to be accused in return of being a seditious and rebellious people. Frequent acts of violence would embitter feeling on both sides, and only the adoption of prudent measures by Parliament could prevent disaster. The dedication says that though Mr. Grenville was no longer in office his great authority in Parliament continued, his desire to use it for good purposes was recognised by the author, who hoped that his views might meet with Mr. Grenville's support, and be accepted also by the people of America. He described the book as written in the endeavour to promote a settlement fair to both England and her colonies, one not on party but on national lines. As to that the author

exclaims "I am no partisan. I do not palliate the errors of Great Britain. I do not flatter the passions of America. My zeal and many services towards the one have appeared in the effect of these services; and my affection to the other, if it be not already known, will be seen, as under the accident of a certain event I mean to end my days there in a private character." He complains that the colonists, in objecting to taxation without representation, had by many people been considered undutiful and disloyal; more than that, they had been charged with treason itself. Such being the case he thought it his duty to bear testimony "to the affection which the colonists ever bore to the mother country, to their zeal for its welfare, to their sense of government and their loyalty to their Sovereign, as also how much they have merited from this country and how much they deserve to be considered by it." He knew that there was "a certain good temper and right spirit which, if observed on both sides, might bring these matters of dispute to such a settlement as political truth and liberty are best established upon." He wound up this dedication of nineteen pages by the hope that a settlement might be arrived at apart from the state of parties and factions. Events were leading up to one of two things,—either an American or a British union; there must be one or the other. What he wanted to see was the latter—the colonies firmly and permanently united to the mother country. This was the question then before the minds of thoughtful men on both sides of the Atlantic.

At one extreme of opinion stood the King, quite blind to the future, and his Court, who blindly followed him; at the other extreme were those of the colonists who objected to English control of any kind. In an intermediate position, shifting their attitude slightly from time to time as events developed and new arguments were adduced, stood those whose views were best worth consideration. In America it was recognised by such men that there must be some superior authority to deal with large questions, for the laws of each colony only extended to its actual limits, beyond the river, or what else might be the boundary of its territory, no colony had jurisdiction. Many men, such as Franklin, who were quite aware of the value of England's navy, preferred to see the wider power of dealing with international questions remain in the

hands of the English Crown. In England there were some who discriminated, as Lord Chatham did, between external and internal taxation; they asserted the legality of Parliamentary action as to the former, but denied it as to the latter. There were others who believed that in both cases the law was on the side of Parliament, but did not think it politic to press it too far. Their mind was that of St. Paul, "All things are lawful unto me, but all things are not expedient." To that school Lord Rockingham belonged. The Duke of Grafton, at this time the second in command to Lord Chatham, was sometimes in accord with him, sometimes with Lord Rockingham. When the infirmities of Lord Chatham left the ultimate decision with the Duke, he hardened his heart and resolved to back up the King in enforcing an absolute power of taxation.

What passed through Pownall's mind can be seen by following the successive editions of his *Administration*. In 1764, when he first brought it out as an anonymous pamphlet, he expressed no opinion either way; he limited himself to stating the conflicting views as to the supremacy of the English legislature,[1] and shewed that there were no precedents to be found for extra-territorial jurisdiction except in Guernsey and Jersey. In the second edition of 1765 he maintained that neutral position.[2] In 1766, when he added to the third edition a new appendix, he therein stated that, in the absence of other authority, he took what had happened in the colonies themselves as a guide. He pointed out that ever since 1673 the duties levied on colonial commerce had been paid without question, and he observed that the Welsh and the inhabitants of the Counties Palatine of Durham and Chester had always been, in his belief, liable to taxation, though in early days they were under separate jurisdiction and without Parliamentary representation. As to Durham he mentions that it was not till 1685 that members were thence returned to Parliament, and he asks whether any one would assert that previous to that date the people of that county had been exempt from contributing to the subsidies granted by Parliament to the Kings. While he doubted the wisdom of strictly enforcing it, there was in 1766 no doubt in Pownall's mind that previous custom justified

[1] *Administration*, 1764, p. 49. [2] *Ibid.* 1765, p. 53.

the claim of Parliament to levy taxation from the colonies.

It may have been his mention of the Counties Palatine which caused Mr. Grenville, to whom the book had been dedicated, to allude to them, as we have noticed that he did, when at the beginning of 1767 he was on his defence about the Stamp Act. What Mr. Grenville said then appears to have reacted on Pownall's mind and caused him to make further investigations; during that year he was evidently studying the matter more closely.

In the fourth edition of 1768 he produced for the first time a petition which he had found in the works of Daniel King who wrote in 1656. It was addressed in 1450 by the County Palatine of Chester to King Henry VI., and it put forward exactly the same plea for exemption from Parliamentary taxation, because of absence of representation, as was advanced by the colonists at the time here described. We find in this edition not only a copy of the petition of the men of Cheshire but of the reply of Henry VI. who admitted that they were right.[1] We have seen that when Pownall first began to write about this subject in 1764, he was strongly of opinion that it was expedient that the colonies should send their members to Westminster if they were to be taxed from there. The discovery of this Cheshire precedent convinced him that they had an absolute right to do so, and henceforth he was more on their side than he had been before. He had also by this time found another example, which shewed not only that the absence of representation had barred taxation, but that representation had actually been given to men living outside England. He mentioned that when Edward III. added Calais and the surrounding country to his dominions in 1347 he turned out all the French inhabitants, in order to found there a colony of his own countrymen to whom were assigned all the rights of Englishmen who remained on their own side of the Channel. Pownall says this settlement was treated as an English borough, and sent burgesses to Parliament.[2] While he and others were thus trying to trace to its origin the difficult question before them, and digging into the history of the past to find the roots from which it had sprung, the trouble was that when the roots were found

[1] *Administration*, 1768, pp. xviii to xxxi. [2] *Ibid.* p. 147.

no two men could agree as to what conclusion should be drawn from them.

To illustrate this we may put in parallel passages some extracts from what Pownall wrote in this book and of what Mr. Burke noted in the margin of his copy above referred to:—

Pownall	Burke
The Colonists were established in a government conformable to the government of England. They had power of making laws and ordinances and of laying impositions by a General Assembly or Representative Legislature—the power of erecting courts and creating magistrates, of the same power and operations . . . as were used in the government of England; nay, in some cases by a mode adopted to a democratic and even elective government. . . . And upon the same ground those colonies, of whose first settlement the crown took no care or cognisance, the Colony of Plymouth, that of Massachusetts, Providence Plantation and the Colony of Connecticut established among themselves the like power of free government.[1]	All this reasoning about "Elective Government," "democratic executive," "legislative," arises from the author construing these charters by merely general principles of government and not by the same principles as they are particularly modified by the laws of England. These Charters differed in no respect to those then given to all *trading corporations*. They were forfeitable in Westminster by warrant in *quo warranto* carried into the House of Lords in error, were ever subject to the Privy Council as a *tribunal*, and it seems extremely absurd that the Colonies should be subject to the *judicial* but free from the *legislative* authority of their mother country. . . .
They acknowledged themselves to be a government subordinate to the government of England so that they might justly be restrained from doing or becoming anything repugnant to the power, rights, and interest of England but held their allegiance as due only to their sovereign.[2]	By this they no way differed from the other subjects of the realm who owe their allegiance only to the King. If, as the author says, they were so subordinate as to do nothing repugnant to the *power*, rights or *interest* of England and that England is to be the *Judge*, that is all that anybody demands. . . .
They were bodies corporate but certainly not corporations in the sense of such communities within	This is a great mistake. Some of the Patentees had *jura regalia*, others not. Those who had

[1] *Administration*, 1768 (copy C, 60, i.g., British Museum Catalogue).
[2] *Ibid.* p. 54.

Pownall	Burke
the realm. They were erected into provinces, had the *jura regalia* . . . these provinces were all, in the true spirit, intent, and meaning of the thing *Counties Palatine*, and some of them were actually and expressly created such.[1]	contained an express reservation of the authority of Parliament. See that of Pennsylvania.
The point here meant to be stated as in debate is—whether a subordinate legislature can be instructed, restricted and controlled in the very act of legislation? Whether the King's instructions or letters from Secretaries of State and such like significations of His Majesty's will and pleasure is (*sic*) a due and constitutional application of the Governors or of the Royal negative.[2]	It totally depends upon the Constitution of the Legislatures and that of the Act constituting them. All subordinate Legislatures may be modified *ad infinitum*. Therefore, as the case is, such interpositions may be either most constitutional or extremely legal.
The Crown cannot establish any upon, or contract it within, a narrower scale than the subject is entitled to by the Great Charter of England.[3]	The Parliament of England does not hold its powers under the Great Charter.

When we see how Mr. Burke in his own notes, meant for his own eye and hitherto unpublished, differed from Pownall, and remember that they were both of them men free from the domination of authority, who formed independent opinions in favour of the rights of the Colonies, we can understand that the gulf which separated the views of the Court and the colonists was so wide that the ties which bound those extremists together had to be cut by the sword half-a-dozen years later. After Parliament attempted internal taxation the only thing that the colonists were prepared to recognise was the allegiance due to the King. It does not appear to have occurred to any one but Pownall, who suggested it in his first speech, to resort to that in

[1] *Administration*, 1768 (copy C, 60, i.g.), p. 56. [2] *Ibid.* p. 70.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 71.

order to settle the question. While theoretically possible, it was hardly practicable, for it involved going past, and therefore affronting, the English Parliament, which was intent upon its rights. Those rights were disputed by the colonists who would at any time have refused to recognise them unless the legislation which ensued had been approved and endorsed by the King. But did an Act of Parliament thus endorsed by the Sovereign become vested with his authority and proceed from him? If, as happened, the King desired repressive legislation and, having Parliament under his thumb, got that body to pass it, keeping himself in the background, was that Parliamentary interference or was it not?

What Pownall thought about it all appears to have been this: The King's authority was supreme, provided he did not infringe the Charters to the colonies which his predecessors had granted. All the old statutes, dating from before the existence of the colonies, were binding on them as on the mother country; as branches they were parts of the tree as it had originally stood. Also all Acts of Parliament subsequent to the grant of the Charters might be enforced abroad if they contained clauses specially mentioning the colonies, otherwise not. But it was prudent not to press this point, and he preferred to invite the colonies to accept such Acts as precedents for others of their own on the same lines. The right of the colonists to regulate their own domestic affairs by their own Legislatures arose from the Charters and was irrevocable. If it were possible, and he thought it was, direct representation of the colonies in Parliament by their own members was highly desirable; as to this last question Mr. Burke agreed with him but thought it impracticable, owing to the distance at which the colonies lay. It is true that they were then about two months away in time, but in that form of measurement all Members were then far removed from their constituents. Those of Pownall at Tregony were 300 miles away, and it must have taken several days to cover that distance over bad roads with post-horses.

As to the Atlantic he had crossed it six times, and so knew better than most people how far the voyage was a hindrance to representation by Colonial Members. The presence in London of Agents for the conduct of

colonial business, and the representation of the colonists in England and in France by diplomatic agents, such as Franklin, was customary. If Americans could act for those purposes with the Atlantic between them and America they could also appear in the English Parliament. Franklin, who was in Europe from 1765 to 1775, was at this time of opinion that in direct representation of the colonies at Westminster the solution of the existing differences might be found. A very powerful argument for it was written, too late to be of use, by Adam Smith.[1] The fourth edition of the *Administration* must have been published in the late summer or early autumn of 1768. In Chapter XII. of this book will be found a letter from Pownall to Mr. Grenville of July 14 which says the new edition was then in the Press. That letter, and Mr. Grenville's reply which follows it, shews that Pownall was then urging on Mr. Grenville the importance of the above-mentioned question of the colonies sending their representatives to Westminster.

This new and reconstructed edition was the subject of comment that autumn in the *Critical Review*, of which Smollett was then the editor. There it is observed that the conditions of the colonial problem had altered considerably since the appearance of the first edition in 1764; among other changes had been the establishment of a Colonial Office which the author had then advocated. Smollett admits him to be an excellent judge of colonial affairs, but criticises some of his suggestions, and doubts whether if a Commission, such as is proposed, were sent to the colonies to settle matters on the spot it would be met there in the spirit expected. Smollett considers Pownall too sanguine in this view, and points out that of the six million people in England only half a million had votes, while the population of England paid three times as much in taxes as that of America. The relevancy of the Cheshire precedent, as to taxation being coupled with representation, is questioned, but the notice ends by saying of Pownall that

> he possesses qualifications far more valuable to the public than scholarship or classical learning. The proposal drawn up by him and Mr. Franklin about paper currency and the disquisitions on the state of the American trade which, with other articles, are added to

[1] *Wealth of Nations*, 1776, Book IV., Ch. VIII., Part 3.

this edition must be lasting monuments of his abilities as a colonial magistrate and financier.

While Pownall had been busy in the spring of 1768 preparing the fourth edition of the *Administration* the situation in America had been growing worse. In order to prepare the way for joint action against further encroachments an organised system of correspondence between the colonies had already been arranged. That was a more serious matter than local disturbances, but of these there were more in March. In February the Massachusetts Assembly sent a circular to other similar bodies inviting them to unite for the redress of grievances. In June the new Customs Commissioners seized a shipment of wine consigned to Mr. Hancock, a leading merchant, afterwards prominent in the Declaration of Independence. That caused further rioting in Boston. The Commissioners had to seek refuge on H.M.S. *Romney* in the harbour, whence one of them, Charles Paxton, wrote to Mr. Whately, M.P., the private secretary to Mr. Grenville, that if two or three regiments were not sent quickly all friends to Government thought that Boston would soon be in open rebellion. Governor Bernard had meanwhile received instructions from Lord Hillsborough to dissolve the General Court unless it would rescind the circular letter of February to the other colonies, and he did so on August 4.[1] Upon this the Boston merchants agreed to boycott British goods till the new Revenue Act was repealed. On September 22 a convention met at Boston to deliberate on the measures the colonies should adopt, and in the following week seven British warships arrived at Boston escorting three regiments of infantry, which were joined in November by two others sent from Ireland.

Hutchinson wrote to Mr. Whately on October 4, 1768, that the troops had been quietly received when they landed. This correspondence Hutchinson had begun in June, following the example of Oliver who had been in communication with Whately since May of the previous year. The King's speech at the opening of Parliament on November 8 admitted that the views expressed in May had been too sanguine. It mentioned how Boston had broken loose from all obedience to law and Govern-

[1] *Historical Journal of the American War*, 1792, vol. i., *Coll. Mass. Hist. Society.*

ment, and measures had been taken by the people that might manifest a disposition to throw off all dependence on Great Britain.

On December 15 eight resolutions were sent by the Government to the House of Lords to be first dealt with there, and afterwards by the Commons. These denounced the action of the Massachusetts Assembly in passing resolutions condemnatory of the new duties and denying the right of Parliament to impose taxes. They described that town as in a dangerous state, threatening the Revenue Commissioners; they alleged that, as neither the Council nor the magistrates did anything to keep order, the despatch of troops for that purpose was necessary; they spoke of the Boston town meetings which had been held on June 14 and September 12 as illegal. The election and assembly there of a convention of local deputies on September 22 to discuss the state of affairs were described as "daring insults offered to His Majesty's authority, and audacious usurpations of the power of Government." These resolutions were introduced to the Lords by the Duke of Bedford, who moved an address to the King asking that a Commission should be appointed to investigate the charges, and that those guilty of such treasonable practices should be brought to England for trial. This course the House of Lords adopted.

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The resolutions came down in January 1769 to the House of Commons, where they were met by two petitions, one of them from Samuel Danforth the President of the Massachusetts Council and most of the members. It recounted the history of the colony, the loyalty it had always shewn, the sufferings it had undergone, especially in the Seven Years' War, and asked that the Charter rights might be confirmed and that the Acts lately passed by Parliament to tax the colonies might be repealed. The other petition was on behalf of Massachusetts by Mr. Bollan, its agent in London, and asked the Commons not to concur in the Address to the King which the Lords had voted. The question came before the House of Commons on January 26; what passed is described by

Hansard[1] as "The Grand Debate on American affairs." He reports Pownall's speech at much greater length than any other; he mentions that Messrs. Burke, Grenville and Dowdeswell also spoke on the same side, while Lord North, the Attorney- and the Solicitor-General, together with Lord Barrington, defended the Government. Pownall began by challenging the assertions of the resolutions directly; he said that the Massachusetts Assembly had passed no such resolutions in January of the previous year as were alleged. Lord Barrington interposed to support the accuracy of the resolutions and of Bernard's letters on which they were based. He was answered by Mr. Burke and Mr. Grenville, the latter of whom said that Mr. Pownall had stated that there was no record on the Minutes of that Assembly of such resolutions having been passed, and he had been contradicted. Mr. Grenville therefore desired that the Minutes should be at once referred to. This was done, and no such record could be found; great confusion was caused on the Ministerial side by its not being there. Pownall, besides scoring this point, had defended the magistrates against the charge brought against them of condoning the rioting by explaining that it had arisen unexpectedly. He had also shewn that it was absurd to say that delegates had been summoned to the September convention by "issuing writs" which he admitted was illegal. But he said the people who used that expression did not know what a writ was in America, and he produced one to shew what sort of document it was. Letters had been written, but that was quite a different thing; he mentioned that the Selectmen were formally authorised by the Charter to write official letters summoning meetings. In this and in other respects he observed that the resolutions the Government had placed before the House were in conflict with the facts. Those resolutions and the Address to the King were, however, voted. Hansard observes that "no measures were opposed with more firmness than this was through the long debate." We find Pownall's views on the state of affairs at this time in a letter he wrote from Albemarle Street on February 3 to the Honourable James Bowdoin[2] in Boston:—

[1] *Parliamentary History*, xvi. p. 485.

[2] A prominent man in Boston, member of the Council, in 1785 Governor of Massachusetts.

I am sorry to find that the Government here, instead of applying healing measures to the general eruptive case of the colonies, think of nothing nor will suffer Parliament to think of anything except the particular case of Boston, and that only stated as they please to state it. On this particular I am conscious and am satisfied that I have endeavoured to do my duty to the Province and town; but this I had rather you should hear from others than myself. This day is to decide Mr. Wilkes's fate as to Parliament. He is surely a bad man; but that is not the reason of the prosecution of him, and the degree of it may establish modes that may in future become precedents against good men. As I can neither with a good conscience defend the one, nor with a safe conscience approve the other, I take that liberty (which independency alone can give) of taking no part in this business; so do not attend it: which gives me this hour's leisure to write to you.

I have taken great pains with Ministry to explain to them (as far as they will permit a man to explain to them who does not belong to them) the wisdom, and even necessity, of returning to the old ground of distinguishing port-duties, *i.e.* external taxes from internal, and of laying those external only, as has been practised ever since the first establishment of the Colonies, and of making no innovation in the old practice, at the same time abstaining entirely from internal. They seem to fall in with my idea. They adopt my sentiments, and say they would have fallen into this channel even now, were it not for the declarations and riots and tumults set up in opposition to acts of Parliament; that, when this opposition is withdrawn, they will, upon commercial and political grounds, repeal the late revenue-laws, and fall into the old track on the old ground. So that all the mischief which may happen in the meanwhile, even a Disunion, if that should happen, is to depend upon a mere point of honour. I have some thoughts of trying one measure yet before I give up all; which is, to draw up a petition such, and in such form, as they will here receive on this ground, at the same time such as, from what I know of the sentiments of the people of the Province, the Council and House might agree to send to the King, Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled; to understand beforehand that Government here will receive it, and then to send it over to be considered by the people of the Province. This may save all from destruction into which things seem to be running. God forbid it![1]

On February 8, when the report from Committee on the resolutions was brought up, Pownall made a long speech; both in Hansard and in Almon it occupies nearly all the space given to the debate. He said that as he had already spoken of the resolutions he would now speak of the Address. This proposed to bring men for trial to England, notwithstanding an Act of William III., which

[1] *Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings,* v. pp. 237-238.

provided that all trials of the colonists should take place within their province. In face of this he said, "I do now pronounce peremptorily and positively that the Crown neither will nor can issue such commission, and I call upon the Crown lawyers to answer this if they have answer to give." He owns that he dreads the consequences in Massachusetts if the attempt is made there to seize any man or men pointed out by the Governor, and to remove them to England for trial, 3000 miles from their homes, before a tribunal to which witnesses for the defence cannot be brought except at ruinous and prohibitive cost. The position of the Government he describes as having consisted in first sending their laws to America and after that Commissioners to execute the laws; now the military were to follow in order to back the Commissioners.

The position of the colonists, on the other hand, was that they flatly refused to pay any internal taxes without having a voice in the matter. Up to this point they had hardly gone beyond petitions and remonstrances,

but there is something threatening in the bad temper and ill-blood which seems to be forced up so that the issue is well-nigh brought to force. The people of that country and the King's troops are, as it were, set in array against each other. The sword indeed is not drawn but the hand is upon it. The very smallest accident might provoke an explosion. After that the union between Great Britain and North America would be broken for ever.

What, he asked, was the use of trying to coerce people who had all the necessaries of life within reach? Hides, furs, wool, linen, and cotton were theirs, and they could manufacture these things as they did their own iron and copper. As to food they had it in plenty at a third of what it cost in England. All that could be taken from them were a few luxuries which they could perfectly well dispense with, and that they would not hesitate to do. He reminded the House that the forefathers of these men in Massachusetts had left England to seek, in a strange country, and under hard conditions, for freedom, their love of which was hereditary and ingrained.

If you attempt to force taxes against the people you will find, when it is perhaps too late, that they are of a spirit which will resist all force, which will grow stronger by being forced. . . . They are of a spirit to abide, nay to court, persecution . . . this spirit is not dead in them, it is only dormant, the utmost care and skill of those

who lead them, either in civil or religious matters, is employed to restrain and keep it down. If this spirit should ever take fire . . . it will break out into a flame which no reason, no prudence, no force can restrain. . . . The spirit of their religion, or if you please to call it so of fanaticism, will, like Moses's serpent, devour every other passion and affection, their love for the mother country, changing its nature, will turn to the bitterest hate.

As to sending troops, which the Address to the King proposed, Pownall asked what they were to do when they got there; they might raise a contribution by military execution, but that he declared was not government, it was war. A necessary war, no doubt, if subjects were in open rebellion, but these were not so; except for some local riots there had been no opposition of force to force, even on the part of men who had been granted power to govern themselves, and were unanimous against this new taxation from outside authority. Whatever their opinions they would hold to them, and no amount of troops would bring them to any other frame of mind. He quoted what a friend of his who was on the spot had written to him:— "If you mean to govern this country by military force you have not sent a sufficient number of troops, but if you do not mean this you have already sent too many." Fierce as he admitted the people to be when provoked, he described them as naturally industrious and hard-working, occupied in minding their own affairs. This they did to such purpose, that, if the present state of things went on, English manufacturers who found the colonial market closed to them from without might seek their profit in it from within. "The manufacturers with the turn of that tide will go over in shoals to America as they once came over hither from the Netherlands.[1] If it be not the humour of the House to be told that *now* they will remember it hereafter."

Addressed in this vigorous and unpalatable fashion some Members appear to have become restive, but the speaker continued:—

Why do I endeavour, under the discouragement which gentlemen give to my reasoning, any consideration of this matter, why

[1] Exactly what is happening in 1908 when English firms, unable to cope with the competition of protected countries, are establishing works abroad so as to trade within the tariff walls.

should I endeavour to obtrude my poor reasoning so ill received? Why shall I talk of adopting modes of policy when the shorter way of the question and decision, the short way of force, seems already adopted? . . . What I would wish to suggest to the consideration of the House, and what I know would succeed, is this plain and simple advice that you should not stir up but waive all questions which become mere articles of faith . . ., that you should make no innovations in practice nor suffer any encroachments to be made on government . . ., and that government should act upon that ground as it hath done invariably for 160 years since the first establishment of the colonies. . . . This would heal that union between the mother country and her colonies which hath been vitiated . . ., would revive again the spirit of obedience, and re-establish the power of government.

He said he did not wish to occupy time, it was apparent to him that the House was impatient to decide, but it was because he saw the danger of the decision which they seemed likely to arrive at that he insisted on speaking his mind. From the first establishment of the colonies till within the last three or four years the colonists had been suffered, without question, to deal with all their own internal taxation and expenditure. The money had gone either in providing for their own needs and government, or in the form of aid granted to England for purposes common to her and her dependencies. On the other hand, England had always claimed the power of external taxation by Customs dues at the colonial ports, which had been equally free from objection. But now arguments were brought forward in England to shew that there was no difference between the two, that the power of internal taxation followed on that of external. The very attempt to grasp both, on the false ground that they were the same, said Pownall,

has taught the colonies to retort the reverse of the proposition in arguing from internal to external. In this argument they have adopted your own proposition, and, by your help, have reasoned themselves into an opposition to all external taxes which they had hitherto submitted to for a century and a half.

He told the House that they were being fought with their own weapons, but he believed those were not taken up seriously by the other side who, in view of a negotiation, wanted to have something to give up. If only Parliament would drop these new ideas and revert to the methods previously recognised, all would yet be well. He asked

that the House should be satisfied with the declaration it had passed as to its right to tax the people abroad and say no more about it. He had shewn the use of force to be impossible, he assured the House it was so.

> What then remains but that you resume again the spirit of your old policy? I am founded when I say that this would restore again peace, order, and government. I have letters in my pocket from some of the principal, some of the leading, men in that country who say "we do not call upon Great Britain to give up her rights and claims, we only desire to be returned back and set again upon our old safe ground which we understood."

He ended this speech by begging the House to "exert the spirit of policy that you may not ruin the colonies and yourselves by exerting force."[1]

Writing a few days earlier, January 30, to Dr. Cooper whom he had known in Boston, Pownall mentioned that in this debate "it is understood that I am to take the lead and open the debate in opposition."[2] Despite all that could be said against these resolutions and the Address based upon them, the House endorsed the action of the Ministry, but the latter did not venture to attempt the extradition of any colonists for trial in England. In order to allay fears that more duties would be added to those lately imposed, Lord Hillsborough issued an official circular which pledged the Government to go no further in that direction. Townshend's duties, which still remained as the standing grievance of the colonists, were bringing in nothing because, as Pownall had foretold, no money could be collected. Speaking in the House of Commons on March 14, Mr. Beckford said that it did not seem reasonable to spend £500,000 a year, and incur an extra military expenditure of £170,000 in order that the Customs officers might collect £295, which was the whole net gain to England.[3]

Speaking of these debates Mr. Lecky observes that "Pownall who had preceded Bernard as Governor of Massachusetts, strongly urged in Parliament the repeal of the new duties, and a considerable section of the Cabinet supported his view." Thus backed up he had some chance of success, though in the above-quoted letter to

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvi. p. 495; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, iv. p. 99.

[2] Cooper Correspondence, MS. Department, British Museum, *Collected Letters*, vol. ccii.

[3] Almon's *Parl. Debates*, viii. p. 130.

Dr. Cooper he explained how difficult it was for a member who stood outside the organised parties to forward any measure. In a letter of February 25 to the same correspondent he described himself as "determined to remain a single unconnected individual, and to belong to none of these factions, none of these vortices which form the chaos of our present politics."

Though he was quite aware of the impediments thrown in his way by this independent attitude, he was able to write hopefully to Cooper on March 22. "Believe me there are yet many good men who belong to none of the factions, who are serious and grieved, and who will—if it be not the pleasure of the supreme God to put an end to us—who will, I repeat it, get more and more into lead with us." Writing to Mr. Whately from Boston a few weeks earlier, February 13, Oliver was much of the same mind. "It is the determination of some to agree to no terms that shall remove us from our old foundations. . . . I find from the publications both of Governor Pownall and Mr. Bollan, that they each of them adopt the idea of an union and representation, and I think it must more and more prevail. The arguments against it from local inconveniency must, as it appears to me, be more than balanced by greater inconveniences on the other side of the question."[1] While Pownall and Oliver, who looked at matters from quite different standpoints, were thus agreed in the hope of reconciliation, there were difficulties in the way. Those were recognised by Mr. Hildreth who, after speaking of the vigorous manner in which the opposition to Government was conducted in Parliament by Edmund Burke, Thomas Pownall, and Colonel Barré, pointed out that as the ministry had roused the colonists, so the latter in their turn had roused the English, who looked on the riots which had taken place as almost personal insults to each individual at home.[2]

That feeling in England would cease if the colonies could be quieted by the removal of Townshend's unproductive Act, and to this object Pownall addressed himself on April 12 when he moved for its repeal. In the speech he then made[3] he noticed the apprehension of trouble

[1] Letters of T. Hutchinson and A. Oliver, to T. Whately, 1773.

[2] *History of the United States*, 1849, ii. p. 549.

[3] Almon's *Parl. Debates*, viii. p. 151; Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvi. p. 611. Pownall's action on this occasion is mentioned by Horace Walpole, who says the

impending from the colonial situation. That would only be inflamed by the further use of force, to which a general reluctance was apparent. Many men were desirous of discarding this new method in order to revert to the old system of moderate measures and conciliation. "People differ only as to the occasion and the time which may lead to this. They say, 'We will take the proper occasion when we see the proper time comes; when we see the proper ground we will repeal these revenue laws that we may get back to the old ground.'" But, in his opinion, there was no time like the present; if that were allowed to pass there might be no other opportunity for Parliament to "extricate itself with honour and safety." He expressed himself very strongly in favour of maintaining the supreme authority of Parliament. "Great Britain ought never to concede, if by those concessions are meant the giving up of any of their rights or power which are necessary to the supremacy and sovereignty; nor is it what the colonies either wish, desire or expect." All that was wanted on the other side was, he believed, to continue to live under that supremacy in the enjoyment of the rights which had only been recently challenged.

> Although they think themselves aggrieved yet you command their duty in their act and deed, and even despotism itself cannot command the will. . . . If you endeavour to press them down but one hair's-breadth lower, like a spring they will fly all to pieces and they will never be brought to the same point again.

There had, he admitted, been outrages and tumults in America which had caused resentment in England, "but there is a lull at this moment. Now, then, is the moment to refit your rigging, to work out the vessel from among these breakers and to get her under way in her old safe course and you may bring her into the harbour that you wish." As Parliament had asserted its supremacy by rejecting the colonial petitions, it could now afford to be generous: the colonists were waiting to see what it would do. "If this occasion is now lost it is lost for ever. If this session elapses with Parliament's doing nothing, American affairs will perhaps be impracticable for ever after." He referred to an Act of 1675 which said that

American duties were yielding only £270 a year, and that Lord North's refusal to accept Pownall's motion was due to firmness, pride, or jealousy of General Conway (*Memoirs of the Reign of George III.*, iii. p. 359). With Conway Walpole was intimate.

trade and intercourse between the mother countries and her colonies should be based on good feeling and mutual benefit, and inquired whether any one could say that the Revenue Act under discussion conformed to that definition. He asserted that English trade with the colonies, far from deriving any benefit, had been nearly destroyed, both British capital and labour had suffered. He took the articles covered by these new duties one by one, and inquired what was the result in each case. As to painters' colours he asked if anybody supposed that there was no lead, no red or yellow ochre to be found in that great country? It was by nature well supplied with those raw materials, and was perfectly able to make them up and dispense with the English paints. He alluded to "a strange and unintelligible duty" on paper; the only effect of which would be to stimulate the existing local industry at the expense of that of England. As to glass it was the same story; he said that to his knowledge there were already large glass works in Pennsylvania which supplied New York and Boston, and it was the owners of these who were gainers by the extra cost to the colonists of the glass shipped from England. As to the tea, if that which English ships brought from the East was rejected by the colonists they could always purchase, though by contraband trade, that which Dutch ships brought. It could be and would be imported into North America either from Holland or the Dutch West Indies. Merely as a matter of business there was nothing in these taxes to do England any good, but he went further than this and denounced the whole project as an infraction of the colonial right, always recognised till these last years, to raise their own revenue. Therefore, from the point of view of business and equity combined he formally moved the complete repeal of Townshend's Act.[1]

The Ministry did not meet this motion directly, they staved it off by pleading that the session was too far advanced for a matter of such importance to be discussed

[1] A note to p. 90, vol. vi. of Winsor's *History of America*, published in 1887, speaks of Pownall as "one who knew America well from residence and official station, he proved a man of great forecast and a prudent conciliatory friend of both countries. We have his speech in Parliament in 1769, and know how impatient Parliament was of his wisdom."

at sufficient length, and they succeeded in shelving the question till Parliament reassembled. The House rose on May 9 and the opportunity so earnestly desired in this speech was lost. By this time Pownall's strenuous opposition had made him a man marked by the Ministry who, as he complains in a letter to Dr. Cooper of April 27, were tampering with his correspondence addressed to popular leaders in America. To whom, he tells Cooper, they had informed the King that he was writing, he adds:—

> Having heard this I took occasion to tell them in the House of Commons that I did so correspond and would continue to do so. And I have since let them know that if they will be at the trouble of copying my letters they should have copies of all that I have sent. And, to save them the trouble of that infamous breach of trust by which they get at private correspondence, I would, if they desired it send them copies of all that I shall write to America for the future. I am sure if I could hope they would fairly carry to the King I would write all I think and spare not. By which, I will be proud to say, he would have a fairer state of the business and better advice on it than any he gets now.

Writing to Cooper on May 9, Pownall mentions the intention of his youngest brother Edward, a captain in the 34th, to sell out and retire to America. He adds that if circumstances permitted him to do so he should dispose of his estate and emigrate himself.

On May 31, 1769, the Massachusetts Assembly met. The House of Representatives elected a Council, but they refused to vote supplies or consider any question besides that of the redress of grievances; they declared that they could not deliberate when surrounded by an armed force brought into the colony to overawe them. They called on Governor Bernard to remove the troops; he replied that he had no authority to do so, and then made a demand on the Assembly for the cost of the men's quarters. The answer to this was a petition to the Crown, unanimously adopted, for the Governor's removal. This the authorities in England had already decided on. Bernard prorogued the House till January 1770, and in August 1, 1769, he left the colony which nine years before he had found recovering from the strain of the war, and prepared to settle down. Far from having been allowed to do so, it was now seething with discontent to an extent hitherto unknown. Bernard had from the first fallen into the

grasp of Hutchinson and Oliver, as Lord Chatham in 1766 fell into that of the King and Lord Bute. In the local, as in the central authority, disaster ensued when the man nominally at the head of affairs was content to be guided by others. The retiring Governor was rewarded with a baronetcy, a pension for himself, and another for his wife. His predecessor, to whom none of those good things had fallen, though he had extricated the colony from the difficulties in which he had found it in 1757, was meanwhile eating his heart out in London full of wrath and indignation at the men in high places to counteract whose measures he was powerless. He had, however, by this time found a method, never suspected till he had been dead for half a century, for expressing those feelings in a forcible manner.[1]

Though he had carefully studied the history of the past Pownall had not up to this time devoted attention to antiquities, as he did to a large extent in his later years. He now made a beginning; on June 1, 1769, he was elected a Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries, being recommended as "a person duly qualified and likely to become an useful and valuable member." He had already seen something of Ireland when he embarked at Cork for America in May 1757, and he went there again this summer. He wrote on September 25 to Dr. Cooper that he had found the people in Ireland "very curious after the state of things in America, and much interested in the state of the contest between Great Britain and her colonies." In that letter he says that while in Ireland he had several conversations with some of the leading men in their Parliament, but he adds that "the spirit of their politics derives from, and operates by, motives to which corruption, faction and venality have not yet reduced America." He mentions that on his return he visited Birmingham and Wolverhampton, where he found manufacturers complaining bitterly of the colonial refusal to buy their goods, and of the measures in Parliament which had caused that refusal.

From another letter of the same date to Cooper it appears that Pownall had some short time before been offered the position of Agent in London for Massachusetts and had declined it. If it had been offered unanimously

[1] See Chapter XII. *post.*

he might perhaps have accepted, but he says "I never meant that my friends should canvass for me or make it a matter of contest . . . I aimed at no emolument, at no interested view from it." While he recognised that it would have been a great compliment to the way in which an ex-Governor had administered affairs in the colony that he should be asked to take charge of them in England, he preferred to have his hands free from any obligation such as acting under the General Court would have involved. The appointment went to Franklin, already in England as Agent for Pennsylvania.

Writing again to Cooper on December 5, Pownall alludes to what Cooper had told him about the Boston merchants remaining firm to their resolve not to trade with England; he goes on to say "I wish they had remained firm and *not done more.*" He points out that while they had a perfect right to refuse their custom if they chose, they had no right to use compulsion to induce others to follow their action.

> I know that some late steps taken at Boston have hurt our friends there with persons here who, though not professed friends, were yet well disposed to have assisted and befriended them . . . I can only repeat here that advice which I once gave and which is now becoming a mere idle wish—that they had neither written letters nor remonstrances nor appeals—nor suffered themselves to be led into any negotiations whatever either with Ministers or their opponents in this country.

Those words were evidently written in the belief, afterwards expressed by Mr. Hildreth, that the violence with which the colonists had met oppression was a hindrance, and no help, to those in England who wished to see justice done to both sides.

1770

On January 9, 1770, Parliament was opened by the King whose speech from the Throne alluded to the unsatisfactory condition of the colonies, in some of which measures had been taken to destroy all commercial connection with England. At the end of that month the Ministry of the Duke of Grafton came to an end. It had never been more than a remnant of that of Lord

W. Ridley sculp.

Lord North.

Chatham whose infirmities had prevented him from asserting his authority while he was nominally the Duke's chief and who afterwards, when his health improved, used all his great influence to oppose the Cabinet he had left in disgust. To this action of Lord Chatham and to the *Letters of Junius*, which had a great effect on public opinion, the fall of the Duke of Grafton is generally assigned. With the exception of Lord Chatham there had been only one man of marked ability in that group, Charles Townshend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he had died in September 1767. The Duke of Grafton remained in office, holding the Privy Seal under his successor Lord North, the eldest son of the Earl of Guilford.[1]

In the nine years which had passed since George III. came to the throne some of the Whig leaders had died, the dissensions between the others, and especially the long-standing quarrel between Chatham and the Grenvilles, had given the King his opportunity. He need now trouble himself no longer with them nor employ men like Grenville, Rockingham and Chatham, who had always been distasteful to him. He was the better able to take this course, as the "King's Friends" in the House of Commons had now increased in number so much that their master could rely on them to carry out his wishes. All that was wanted was some one to act as their leader. For that purpose Lord North was exactly suited; he came of a Tory house, he had been strong for the Stamp Act, and was keen for the taxation of America. Lord John Russell describes him as an invaluable accession to the Court because he was "a man of firmness sufficient to defend bad measures and not too obstinate in urging his own views."[2] Provided with this convenient instrument the King could now follow his own course. He did so during the eleven years in which he governed through Lord North, with the result that his misguided obstinacy bore its first-fruits in the separation of the American Colonies from England. The War of Independence, in which La Fayette and other Frenchmen

[1] "This graceful minister is oddly constructed. His tongue is a little too big for his mouth, and his eyes a great deal too big for their sockets. Every part of his person sets natural proportion at defiance. At this present writing his head is supposed to be much too heavy for his shoulders."—Note to the *Letter of Junius*, No. xxxviii., April 3, 1770.

[2] *Memorials and Correspondence of Charles James Fox*, 1853, i. p. 120.

who served with him were engaged, was one of the causes which produced the French Revolution, and that again led up to the Napoleonic era and the wars which devastated Europe. Through them England was guided chiefly by the genius of three subjects of the King, who could be described as two boys and a baby[1] in this year 1770, when the King started on the career which was to cause such loss and suffering to his country till he himself died, half a century later, a broken man, whose brain had long given way.

In this month of January 1770 Pownall was working hard at the American question. In the Library of the Massachusetts Historical Society at Boston is a tract of his which covers four pages;[2] it is headed "The State of the Constitution of the Colonies." Mr. Jared Sparks found a copy on which Benjamin Franklin had made marginal notes, just as Edmund Burke did in his copy of the *Administration*, and those notes, with a summary of the original, Mr. Sparks republished.[3] We are thus able to compare the views of Pownall with those of Franklin as we have already done with those of Burke. It will be seen that Pownall stood half-way between them; while he went further than Burke he did not go so far as Franklin in his estimate of the rights of the colonies.

Pownall	Franklin
1. Whenever any Englishmen go forth without the realm . . . these settlements as English settlements, and these Inhabitants, as English subjects, carrying with them the Laws of the Land wherever they form Colonies and receiving H.M. protection by virtue of His Royal Charter have and enjoy all liberties and immunities of Free and Natural subjects . . . as they and every one of them were born without the	The settlers of Colonies in America did not carry with them the Laws of the Land as being bound by them wherever they should settle. They left the realm to avoid the inconveniences and hardships they were under. . . . They carried with them a right to such part of the Laws of the Land as they should judge advantageous.

[1] Horatio Nelson, born September 1758. William Pitt II., born May 1759. Arthur Wellesley, born March 1769.

[2] Catalogue No. 429-32. A note says that it was not published but circulated among friends; this copy is noted as having been sent by William Samuel Johnson to Jonathan Turnbull, February 3, 1770.

[3] *Works of Benjamin Franklin*, 1840, iv. p. 270.

Pownall	Franklin
realm and are bound by the like allegiance as every other subject of the realm.	
2. The common Law of England and all such statutes as were enacted and in force at the time such settlers went forth is . . . the Law of those Colonies and Plantations.	So far as they have accepted it by express laws or by practice.
3. All statutes touching the rights and succession of the Crown . . . the exercise of the jurisdiction thereof . . . declaratory of the rights and liberty of the subject, do extend to all British subjects in the Colonies and Plantations as of common right and as if they and every one of them were born within the realm.	It is doubtful whether any settlement of the Crown by Parliament takes place in the Colonies otherwise than by the consent of the assemblies there.
4. All statutes enacted since the establishment of Colonies and Plantations do extend to and operate within the said Colonies and Plantations in which statutes the same are specially named.	It is doubtful whether any act of Parliament should *of right* operate in the Colonies. *In fact* some of them have and do operate.[1]
5. Statutes and customs which respect only the special and local circumstances of the realm do not extend to and operate . . . where no such special and local circumstances are found. (As such are mentioned the Canon Law, the Game and the Poor Laws.)	
6. No statutes made since the establishment of said Colonies (except as in Nos. 3 and 4) do extend to and operate within said Colonies and Plantations.	British subjects . . . without the realm so long as they are excluded from an entire union with the realm . . . have a right to . . . a distinct entire civil government.

[1] Mr. Sparks observes that Pownall appears to have seen these notes of Franklin's, for a reply to this one bears the initials T. P., and runs thus: "They are bound to the King and his successors, and we know no succession but by Act of Parliament."

From these premises Pownall went on to shew that British subjects residing abroad had a right to their own Civil Government on the spot, so long as they were excluded from representation in the legislature of England. This has since been fully recognised; all the present dominions are in that position, but it was much disputed as regards the original colonies. He said that

> all freeholders within the precincts of these jurisdictions have, as of right they ought to have, a share in the power of making those laws which they are to be governed by, a right to perform and do all the like acts respecting the matters, things and rights within the precincts of their jurisdiction as the Parliament hath respecting the realm and British dominions.

He proceeds to state that a colony had, under the King's seal, which the Governor held, separate jurisdiction in Chancery matters to that of England under the Great Seal held by the Lord Chancellor, and that no colonist could be brought to England for trial there by a tribunal which was other than his own. Several regiments having been sent to Boston in the preceding year, the question of the command of British troops in the colonies was attracting much attention at that time. The supreme command was stated by Pownall in this tract to rest with the Governor under his commission from the King, whose right to grant a separate and independent commission to any military officer Pownall denied. In a note he points out that a parallel case would occur in England if the King, on going abroad for a time, first established a Regency to act in his absence, and then commissioned a military commander-in-chief to command the troops. "If he could—then while openly, by patent according to law, he appeared to establish a free British Constitution—he might, by a fallacy, establish a military power and Government." The question of how they stood *vis-à-vis* to the English legislature and jurisdiction was that which then most occupied the attention of the colonists. A note on this tract made by Mr. W. S. Johnson, who sent it out from England, speaks of it as a "various and complicated subject, upon which hardly any two men in this country think exactly alike." The same note ends by saying "The last point, relative to the military, is of vast importance, but I fear will not bear to be pushed much at present."

Pownall was not a man who let the grass grow under his feet. We find from one of his letters to Dr. Cooper[1] that on the very day, January 28, that Lord North took office Pownall told him in the House that the repeal of Townshend's duties—which Lord North in that interview said the new Ministry would undertake—would be useless unless the whole of them were done away with.

Pownall mentions that Lord North then said he would not do that, he would keep the tea-duty; to this Pownall replied by saying that he should bring in a motion for complete repeal, and he asked the Minister to name a day when it could be introduced. March 5, 1770, was the day appointed, and a strongly worded petition was laid before the House from English merchants engaged in the American trade. They complained that it was they whose business suffered, and who were penalised by Townshend's Act; the colonies were hardly touched, but their refusal to take English goods hit English commerce. In his speech Lord North had to admit that in 1769 the English exports to America had been only of the value of £1,634,000, as compared with £2,378,000 in 1768, and that the value of the tea sent by England to America had fallen as between those two years from £132,000 to £44,000. He said, however, that the tea-tax must continue in order to assert the right of taxation,[2] and he objected to withdrawing it on the ground that the American associations were becoming more violent than ever in their refusal to take English goods, and while this was the case he declined to give way to them.

Pownall followed Lord North in the debate, he pointed out that in the previous session he had tried in vain to get these duties abolished; he disclaimed any intention of imputing blame for them to the present Ministry, who had inherited them from their predecessors, but he did hold Lord North responsible for maintaining them in part. In bringing forward this motion he said he was well aware that he was open to be accused "of stirring up the question of right and taking part with the faction in America," but that he would not have moved further unless there had existed the Act which declared the right of sovereignty of Parliament; this he thought sufficiently

[1] *Cooper Correspondence*, Letter from Pownall, January 29, 1770.
[2] This argument came from the King. See p. 263 *post*.

covered the ground. He said he knew that if that right were pressed it would be decided not by argument but by force. He doubted whether, if it came to that, England would or could exert sufficient of it to be effectual; and on the other hand he saw that the colonies were every day becoming more capable of offering resistance and more determined to do so. He hoped he might not be regarded as asking for the repeal of the tea-duty as a favour to the Americans who had ceased to ask for anything, indeed they had not even lodged any petitions this session. While some of them were much hurt at the indifference with which previous petitions had been received, and therefore sent no more, there were others who acted in the same way from quite different reasons. These were men interested in local industries which they were glad to see rising at the expense of those of England.

"If therefore," said Pownall, "I was (*sic*) sitting here as an American, consulting only their interest I would oppose the repeal. I am sure I would never propose it. But sitting here as a British Member in a British Parliament and seeing the danger, the ruinous effect, of this anti-commercial law and seeing the necessity of repealing it, I rise to argue for that repeal."

In confirmation of this he alluded to the petition of the British merchants which has been mentioned above. Who, he asked, were likely to be better qualified to speak than those men who had signed it. He then quoted the rates of exchange between England and America; he described them as an infallible barometer of the trade, the balance of which was thereby shewn to be going against England. He spoke of the way in which an American would feel about this matter of trade; he would consider that the existing monopoly enabled the British merchant to put on his goods a price, not only for luxuries, but for necessities, which the colonist had to pay. When he had paid it he thought he had done enough for the vendor. The American might very well express himself in such words as these:—

Yet, not content as merchants in thus setting the highest rate upon us which you think we are able and willing to pay, you have of late, as legislators, superadded a further rate, as by a tax. This we cannot, we will not, pay. . . . You set the price of our labour and you set also the price of those supplies which we must purchase with the

fruit of our labour. . . . We can refuse this tax by withholding ourselves from purchasing those articles which you have thus taxed. . . . From various inefficient exertions of your power we have been taught to see your weakness and to feel our own strength,—and by nothing more than by this vain attempt of taxing your own articles of trade.

Having thus stated the American view of English action, Pownall went on to criticise Lord North's intention of maintaining the tax on tea while that on other articles ceased. He declared that no such discrimination was possible, no such half-measure would ensure the re-establishment of commerce. This could only be effected by a complete repeal which would draw the merchants of the two countries together in the first instance, and when that was done the other sections of the two communities would be brought into harmony. "I will speak plain out. It is not so much the value and burden of the taxes raised by these impositions as the preamble[1] itself which gives the offence, which raises the alarm, in America." As to the return from the tea-tax, after all the other duties ended, he doubted whether it would bring in anything, for the Americans were ceasing to use tea,—that from English ships at all events. The utmost that might be expected could not be more than £7000 a year; he therefore moved that the duty on tea as well as that on the other articles in Townshend's act should be repealed. The motion was lost, 142 votes were given for, 204 against it.[2]

On the same day, March 5, 1770, when Pownall was in Westminster urging the English Ministry to concession which would have allayed the colonial bitterness, there occurred in Boston a disturbance which went far to aggravate it. A sentinel of the 29th Regiment was set upon by some roughs and called on the mainguard for assistance. The guard turned out, a sergeant and six men, with them went their officer Captain Preston. They were attacked, one of them was clubbed and fell. As he rose he fired and his comrades did the same. Three of the assailants were killed at once, two were mortally wounded; one of these said before he died that he had

[1] This preamble to Townshend's Act set forth Parliament's right to tax the colonies.

[2] This speech is given in Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvi. p. 855, and also in Almon's *Parl. Debates*, viii. p. 183.

often in Ireland been in mobs of that kind, and had never seen troops undergo so much provocation before taking action.[1] Captain Preston was tried and acquitted, but this affray, which was a very small matter in itself, was made the most of by those hostile to England, who dignified it by the name of the "Boston Massacre," and made a great deal of party capital out of it. The incident suited that purpose very well, the presence of the troops in the town was objected to, and they shared the unpopularity bestowed on Hutchinson, who, as Lieutenant-Governor, had been in charge of the Province since the departure of Sir Francis Bernard in the previous August. This so-called massacre gave a handle against the Lieutenant-Governor as well as the troops, and, thus used, it did a good deal to bring matters to a head.

Two days later, on March 7, Pownall was put on a Committee, which included Mr. Grenville, Mr. Burke and the Solicitor-General, to prepare a Bill proposed by Mr. Grenville for dealing with controverted elections in England. These had previously been decided by the House as a whole, members had voted on party lines, in some cases without troubling to hear the evidence. The Middlesex elections, in the case of Wilkes, had raised disturbances in London for some years, and Mr. Grenville succeeded in having these election questions referred to Committees selected by ballot from the whole body of members. Pownall spoke on the subject; he mentioned that he had himself had the same idea of employing committee men as jurors, but had hesitated to bring it forward. He was glad to see it done by Mr. Grenville, "whose great parliamentary knowledge, supported by the authority and influence which his character, esteemed in all points," gave weight to what he proposed. Pownall proceeded to quote from a statute of 15 Edward III. to prove that the same course had been then taken by the Lords.[2] Mr. Grenville's motion was carried on March 21.

One of Pownall's projects, ten years earlier, when Fort du Quesne (Pittsburg) was taken from the French, was the establishment of an outlying colony in that Ohio

[1] *History of Massachusetts Bay*, 1828, T. Hutchinson, p. 271. What the soldiers underwent is fully described on p. 189 of the *Gentleman's Magazine* of 1770.

[2] Hansard, *Parl. Hist.* xvi. p. 914; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, viii. p. 290.

district. Since then a great tract of territory there had been conceded by the Indians to Great Britain, whose soldiers were to have some 100,000 acres granted to them. In April 1770 we find Pownall writing to his old friend Sir William Johnson[1] to say that he and some others had associated themselves together for the purpose of acquiring and developing that property. He informed Sir William that they had been told by Lord Hillsborough that they ought to apply for a Charter, as it would become a frontier province. The idea was to follow the lines of the Massachusetts Charter; Sir William was asked for his advice, especially as to the way in which the Indians should be dealt with. Thomas Walpole, a banker, was at the head of the scheme, which was called Walpole's grant,[2] the other members of the Board were Pownall, Benjamin Franklin and Samuel Wharton. When the Charter was applied for Lord Hillsborough reported against it, but Franklin answered him so well[3] that the grant was obtained. The whole thing was abandoned in 1776, but all chance of success had previously been destroyed by the outbreak of war.

By the beginning of May 1770, news reached England of the riot which had occurred in Boston in March, and that it had been found necessary to move the troops out of the town to Castle William in the harbour. Except for the debate which Pownall had initiated about the tea-duty, nothing had passed this Session about American affairs. Hansard says in a note that Ministers were becoming very shy of them, and wished to bide their time, making no concession, but hoping that the troubles would blow over. If that was their idea it was shattered by the excitement caused in Boston by the deaths of those five men in March.

On May 8 Pownall brought forward another motion on this subject, messages about which had been received by the House from the Massachusetts Assembly. These he called for and had read, as also the commissions of Sir Francis Bernard, who had till lately been Governor, and of General Gage, the Commander-in-Chief in America.

[1] *Writings of Washington*, 1840, Jared Sparks, ii. p. 483.

[2] A letter of George Washington's, written on June 15, 1771, mentions this concession. See his *Writings*, 1840, Jared Sparks, ii. p. 360.

[3] *Franklin's Works*, iv. p. 250.

Taking these papers as his text, Pownall said that the time had come when Parliament must consider its position towards the English Government and its representatives in the colonies on the one hand, and towards the American people on the other hand. He declared that "so only could the present alienation amongst the Americans towards this country and Government" be understood. He deplored the causes which had led to so great an alteration "in a people once so loyal, so affectionate and so dutiful." Describing the zeal which New England had shewn in the Seven Years' War he said that the colonists were then prepared to go much further than the defence of their own territory against the enemy. There had been some question at that time of a French invasion of England being attempted. He assured the House that in such case "those New England men would have been ready to come over at their own expense to the assistance of their native country—as they always hold England to be." Things, he saw, had sadly changed in the last few years. England had now sent a military force to hold down the men who had been not long ago so well disposed to her; they were now "considered as rebels and upon the point of revolting." He turned to the Governor's commission, and from it shewed that the authority it gave was supreme; under the King the Governor stood in the same position in the colony as the Lord-Lieutenant in Ireland. That civil power, thus formally secured, he said, was unjustifiably overriden by the Commander-in-Chief, whose appointment to America in a time of peace had, he declared, thrown everything into confusion. This subordination of the civil to the military power he described as one of the things most resented in America, and he therefore moved an Address to the King beseeching that this state of things might cease.

Beckford, the Lord Mayor, who was often the mouthpiece of Lord Chatham, spoke next. It seemed to him that "the matter had been so clearly and so demonstrably opened and made out by his worthy friend who moved" that he did not think it necessary to say much in seconding the motion, which he thought so reasonable that debate on it could hardly be prolonged. Next came Governor Johnstone, formerly of West Florida, who entirely agreed with the ex-Governor of Massachusetts. On behalf of

the Government Lord Barrington, the Secretary for War, replied. As to the Courts-Martial which had been held he had to admit "that there was something wrong," and "that there were doubts in point of law as to the nature of the establishment." These matters had, however, been placed before the law officers of the Crown for their consideration and anything they thought irregular would be rectified. Lord Barrington asked the House to be content with this admission and to proceed no further with the motion. Colonel Barré,[1] who had served at Quebec and knew America, was far from satisfied; but he was glad to hear "that the Ministry, after letting this matter of the military commands continue for five years in a state which they confessed to be wrong, had now, within this last month or six weeks, begun to think it was time to reconsider it." In the Colonel's opinion any good which might result would not be attributable to the Ministry, they had lain dormant so long that no one could say how long they might so continue. All credit was due, he said, to the mover of this address. The question for adjournment being put was carried without a division, it being considered that the Ministry had given in.

When the session closed on May 19 the King's speech contained no reference to colonial affairs. Those who belonged to the Whig party were by this time leaving Lord North's Cabinet, and the policy adopted towards the colonies became increasingly harsh. Writing to Dr. Cooper in July Pownall mentioned the difficulties he had in obtaining accurate information as to what was passing in America, those he said were so great that he would have made a trip there this summer, but for family considerations. He hoped, however, to do so in the coming year. It is evident that his wife objected. He says, "If I were single there is nothing that I would not sacrifice to obviate and prevent mischiefs which I think will certainly fall upon both countries but perhaps first on America." He goes on to tell his correspondent that the plan of the Ministry was to let the Governors and Crown officials no

[1] "Colonel Barré is an excellent hand on behalf of our cause, and so is your late Governor, Thomas Pownall, Esq. . . . The last I consider as acting more from principle than the former" (Letter of May 18, 1770, from Rev. W. Gordon, D.D., *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.*, iii. p. 293).

longer depend for their subsistence on the people; it was intended to maintain a standing army in America which would hold all fortified positions, and to attack the Charters and the jurisdictions they established, unless the colonial refusal to buy English goods ceased.

Parliament reassembled on November 13, and on that day Mr. George Grenville died. For some time past he and his brother, Lord Temple, had been reconciled with Lord Chatham, but they had come together too late, their opponents could now shew a solid front. His death deprived the Whigs of their strongest man in the House of Commons, where the leadership of the Opposition now fell to Lord Rockingham, whose adherents were usually supported by those of Lords Chatham and Temple. The King's speech said that the combination in the colonies against English goods had weakened, but unwarrantable practices were still carried on.

Spain had undertaken in 1763 to pay a ransom for Manilla, which had been taken from her by an expedition under Sir William Draper at the end of the war. That she had not paid. Moreover, emboldened by the weak state into which England had been allowed to fall, she had, through her Governor in Buenos Ayres, seized the Falkland Islands, an English possession. This act of aggression formed the chief topic in the King's speech, and a debate upon it took place in Parliament. Hansard does not give a report of Pownall's first speech on November 22, but says, "He entered into the whole argument at large with full knowledge of his subject. He shewed the little utility a settlement upon Falkland's Island was to us, but having been once made it could not be given up."

On November 27 he spoke on another question, that of the Middlesex elections, and the successive rejections of Wilkes by Parliament when he had obtained a majority of votes. This made more stir at the time than the colonial affairs. Wilkes had been charged with libel in the *North Briton*; and Lord Mansfield, the Chief-Justice, had delivered judgment in the case of Woodfall, who was charged with the same offence in the publication of the *Letters of Junius*,[1] a week before Pownall made the follow-

[1] *Letters of Junius*, G. Woodfall, 1814; a note to i. p. 370 gives Lord Mansfield's speech in full.

ing speech. The legality of the action taken by the law officers of the Crown in filling informations *ex officio* was the topic of debate. Mr. Burke spoke with great warmth and made special allusions to the *Junius Letters*, his remarks on that subject will be quoted in a later chapter. The law officers defended their action, and many other members spoke. The last to do so was Pownall, who denied that the power claimed by the Attorney-General was recognised by the House. He would undertake, he said, to shew that it was neither legal nor constitutional. Always diligent in the search for precedents, he referred to the origin of the Star Chamber in the time of Henry VII., and said of the point at issue that "the most learned of the long robe have not proved and cannot prove that any such proceeding ever was admitted as established in the Court of King's Bench." After these words in Hansard's report comes a note in brackets ("Here some gentlemen, in large full bottomed wigs, shook their heads as much as to say—he is wrong, totally wrong.") Of this silent disapproval Pownall took notice and observed "that authoritative shaking of the head may have effect when those wigs have to give effect to judgment, but they give no force nor weight to argument." The debate had been a long one, the House was impatient, and it rejected the motion for censure of the legal officers by 164 to 72.[1]

We may note the effect which his speeches had made before concluding this chapter, which deals with the first four years of Pownall's Parliamentary life, in which he had spoken not very often but with some force on the colonial questions to which he chiefly attended. A man is not of necessity a hero to his biographer any more than to his valet; it must be owned that these speeches read better now than they sounded when they were delivered. We know that he carefully revised them before they were published, but though he could use his pen with effect, he had not been endowed with the rare gift of public speaking.[2] Franklin wrote of him in 1770 that "he is very ill heard

[1] This speech is in Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvi. p. 1173; also in Sir Henry Cavendish's *Parl. Debates*, ii. p. 116.

[2] "I hear frequently now from Pownall, and am much struck by the quiet good sense and terseness of his letters. He writes better than he speaks," wrote Bishop Magee of Peterborough on May 4, 1884, of the Archdeacon of Leicester (*Life of Archbishop Magee*, Dean MacDonell, 1896, ii. p. 201).

at present."[1] Pownall was quite aware that he was deficient in the power of expressing his thoughts in the House, we shall find him alluding to this weakness in subsequent speeches. What with this drawback, and that of being an independent member who could count on no party support, he failed to produce as much effect in Parliament as might have been expected from his great knowledge of colonial topics. His career in Parliament was a disappointing one to him, he had hoped for more result from it. Still there were occasions, such as his motion for the withdrawal of the tea-duty, when the detachment of a few votes from the ministerial majority would have turned the scale in his favour. But the Ministry were by that time too strong for him. The King's accession in 1760 had destroyed Pownall's prospects in official life. His chances of success in the House of Commons, when advocating justice to the colonists, were equally destroyed ten years later when the King obtained the services of Lord North as his instrument in that House. Like many much greater men, Lord Chatham for one, Pownall was crushed, both in his personal and in his public aims, by the weight of that authority which belonged to the King alone.

[1] *Franklin's Works*, letter of February 24, 1770, to Dr. Cooper.

CHAPTER X

SECOND FOUR YEARS IN PARLIAMENT

1771-1774

On January 22, 1771, Lord North informed the House of Commons that the Government had received satisfaction from Spain for the raid on the Falkland Islands and he moved an Address to the King approving of what had been done. On February 13 Mr. Dowdeswell brought forward, on behalf of the Opposition, an amendment to this Address which criticised not only the methods adopted but the results obtained. Pownall's speech in the debate which followed is fully reported by Almon.[1] It may be condensed by saying that it objected to the intervention of France in the dispute with Spain on the ground that England should be able to settle such matters for herself without invoking the aid of a third party. The settlement was described by Pownall as unsatisfactory because Spain only partly restored those Islands to England, complaint was made that of a great portion of them she was allowed to retain possession. Finally a comparison was made between the action which Spain had permitted to her Governor of Buenos Ayres, in organising and carrying out this attack on a friendly power, and the way in which England by the Charters to her colonies prevented their Governors attempting anything of the kind. As the whole negotiation with Spain had been conducted by the King this criticism must have been disagreeable to him. When Pownall brought up the subject again on March 5 we find in the

[1] *Parliamentary Debates*, ix. p. 127.

King's correspondence with Lord North, the Premier, a note of that date which runs thus :[1]—

> Lord North—I am not surprised that Mr. Pownall's absurd motion could not produce a very long debate; indeed it is a convincing proof that the author of it is not calculated to make a figure in foreign affairs.

Hansard makes no mention of this speech, but Almon devotes more than twenty-six pages to the subject; the motion seems hardly so absurd as the King thought it. Ministers could find no reply to Pownall's speech, or to the motion, which was for a vote of censure on them for having neglected to demand from Spain an explanation of the oaths of office taken by her officials in America. It declared that by the omission to have this matter cleared up British possessions all over the world were endangered. Pownall explained this by saying that Spain had justified the Governor's action by appealing to what she described as "the general laws of America." Those appear to have been an *ex-parte* claim on the part of one Power devoid of formal recognition from any other, somewhat similar in fact to the Monroe doctrine which has succeeded them in the same regions. Under those so-called laws Pownall said that Spain claimed the exclusive dominion of all the southern seas with their lands and islands. This covered an enormous area which included not only South America but the East, where Spain in Manila and England in India were in touch with each other. Pownall argued that a recognition, even a tacit one, of such pretensions on the part of Spain might endanger our commerce and possessions all over the world. He complained that Spain, in acknowledging that in this instance she had given her people "particular orders" to withdraw, had maintained the general principle she asserted. "This is the disavowal they have made. And shame to our negotiators this is the disavowal we have accepted. We demanded *Justice*—our negotiation has lowered us to accept a *Favour*, and that favour is both an insult and a snare." He said that the King had in the first instance demanded a repudiation by Spain of the act of her Governor of Buenos Ayres and had declared

[1] *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North*, 1867, W. B. Donne, Letter 80. Pownall had been previously mentioned by the King in a letter to Lord North of February 26, 1771. No. 77 of these papers.

that "he would invariably adhere to that demand." But, far from standing his ground, the King had been content to see the Spaniard justified by his Government on the ground of his commission being in accordance with the general laws of Spanish America. Almon observes that this put the Ministry in a very awkward position. On the one hand they did not wish to say how far they admitted the Spanish claims to such wide-world sovereignty; on the other hand, if they challenged those claims, they reopened with the Court of Madrid the whole question which had nearly led to a war for which England was unprepared. Placed in this dilemma, in which they could not safely say anything, the Ministry took refuge in silence, nobody on their side got up to speak.

In support of Pownall Mr. Dowdeswell rose and said he supposed the complete absence of answer from the Ministry was to be taken as a tacit assent to the motion! If, however, they meant to oppose it he called on them either to deny the facts or to refute the argument they had just listened to. This brought up Charles Fox on the part of the Government. He admitted that "the argument was sound and the conclusion right" if the facts on which it was based were correct; but he denied that the Spanish Government had exonerated their Governor. This was flatly contradicted by Mr. T. Townshend, who maintained that the Court of Madrid, far from disgracing its representative, had approved him, honoured him and rewarded him. This one-sided debate was so inconvenient to the Ministry that they cut it short by offering no further argument, and their numerical force enabled them to dismiss the motion by 130 votes against 43. When the King heard of the poor figure his party had made in the House it was but natural that he, who regarded everybody who disagreed with him as "a bad man," should have sat down to write that sharp note to Lord North about Pownall.

During this Session there was no debate on American affairs, and the King's speech of May 8 when Parliament rose, made no reference to them. Nor were there at this time any fresh outbreaks in America. In their absence Ministers were no doubt glad to escape allusion to the subject in the hope that the fire which Grenville's act had kindled, and subsequent measures had kept alight,

would die out quietly. Nothing would have suited the King so well, it would have maintained the prerogatives of which he was so jealous, and that at no cost. But far from being extinct the fire was only smouldering, ready to break out again at the slightest breath. How deep was the colonial resentment the King never realised till too late, he had never seen the people across the Atlantic, his blood was different from theirs, it came almost wholly from Germany where officialdom is supreme. His were the brow-beating methods of a German bureaucrat, which he tried to enforce on men of English descent who would not submit to them. From their Puritan ancestors those colonists of Massachusetts had derived, in a high degree, that latent force of the English which makes them, while outwardly calm, more stubborn at a pinch than any other race.[1] Foreigners are often surprised when they see this quality appear from below the surface.

While the King, foreign in his ideas if not in his place of birth, did not realise the existence of this force the ex-Governor of Massachusetts, who so vigorously opposed his Sovereign, was perfectly aware of it and of what would happen if men of that breed were pressed too far. He knew the colonists thoroughly after the years he had lived among them; he was of their blood, his stubborn resistance to the Court, in his books and in his speeches in Parliament, shews him to have been of their nature. If in dealing with those colonies the power of this Sovereign and the special knowledge of this subject could have been combined in one person there might have been no frontier between Canada and the United States to-day. For all Pownall desired was that Massachusetts should be treated by England then exactly as England treats Canada now. To his mind the British subject in a British colony was in precisely the same position, as regards both his duties and his rights, as the man who lived in an English county. Since the American War of Independence this has been recognised. Pownall wanted it to be done without a war instead of in consequence of the war which, years before it broke out, he saw was inevitable unless the King could be induced to mend his ways.

In March 1771 Oliver, hitherto Secretary to the province of Massachusetts, became Lieutenant-Governor,

[1] *Junius* noticed this trait in his Letter of Feb. 24, 1768.

succeeding Hutchinson who had been in charge since Bernard's departure and was now promoted to Governor. On June 7 we find Pownall writing from Albemarle Street to Cooper in Boston :—

The session is now over and not one single point, either by Ministry or by those who oppose it, has been brought forward relative to the constitution of the Provinces or to the rights of the Americans. . . . Those who wish best to mankind can only lye by for such events as may present future occasions for serving them. I shall always consider myself as being in this situation, both with regard to the general liberties of mankind, as well as the particular interest of the Province of Massachusetts Bay with whose affairs my administration naturally connected me. . . . There seems just now no great reason to expect any change in *things*, as those who have the forming and direction of *persons* seem thoroughly founded and established in their power.

This last passage is of course an allusion to the supremacy the King had obtained by the employment of Lord North. In another letter to Cooper of July 26 Pownall wrote that

until some new event shall give a new spirit of government to both parties, and that spirit shall actuate an honest people, all is at hazard, I had almost said—at random. Tempted with the glare of false characters too many on your side the water attached themselves to men and the seduction of party, forgetting all the while things—things of the last importance. . . . I do not despair of once more seeing my real friends in America ; it is almost a fixed purport in my mind to make the tour of America once more, to compare on the spot the state and progress of the country. But that must be some years hence—if ever.

He wrote again to Cooper this autumn from Richmond, on September 3. After describing, with minute knowledge of what was passing, how Russia, Turkey and Austria, stood in relation to each other on the Continent he said :—

I am determined to be silent upon, although not forgetting or negligent of, American affairs, I am, at my leisure, putting together some ideas on the right of mankind to colonise and the rights of colonies so emigrant, when settled as distinct and compleat (*sic*) communities. But whether I shall ever finish it, or whether, when finished, I shall ever publish it, is very distant from my present determination. . . . Dr. Franklin is gone on a tour to Ireland. I have been here all summer—am going into Lincolnshire, my usual tour. for the next month, and when I return shall, I fancy, soon after

go to winter residence in town. Parliament does not meet, unless anything extraordinary happens, until after Christmas.

1772

It was not till January 21, 1772, that Parliament met. On February 12, when the report on the Mutiny Bill was brought up, Pownall reminded the House that two years previously he had moved an Address to the Crown, praying that the powers granted by these Acts to military commanders in America might be compared with those long ago conferred on the Governors under the Charters. Between the two, he said Ministers had acknowledged a discrepancy; this they pledged themselves to have looked into and rectified. He complained that, though it was only because of their promise that the motion had been dropped, they had not done what they said they would do. He had ascertained that the Attorney- and the Solicitor-General, had put their views on record. He had been able to see what those views were and in his opinion they made matters worse. He therefore asked that the question might be debated and with that object moved the adjournment of the report. Lord Barrington, the Secretary for War, objected to a debate on the Attorney-General's report, but said that Pownall could originate one himself on a motion of his own. This he refused to do saying,

> I know it is to no purpose to press a motion which a majority is able to refuse. But if those gentlemen who have the power in their hands will let us have the case and opinion, and by that means a proper ground for debate on the question, I am ready to meet them on that ground. But I will not raise and debate speculative questions as if this House were a Robin Hood Society. However, I see in his place one of the learned gentlemen who signed this opinion. If he will rise up and defend the present establishment and practice on that opinion I am ready to meet that argument.[1]

This challenge was not accepted, the report was passed without a division. On April 5 Pownall wrote again to Mr. Bowdoin in Boston that the military power was inseparable from that of the supreme civil magistrate and, though the situation became daily more serious

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvii. p. 299; Almon's *Parl. Debates,* ix. pp. 336-340.

"there are no modes of opposing but those that are constitutional."[1]

The King's brothers, the Dukes of Cumberland and Gloucester were found to have contracted clandestine marriages with subjects of the Crown, and this raised the question of the succession. To provide against future alliances of this kind the Royal Marriage Act was introduced prohibiting the marriage of any prince of the blood under the age of twenty-five, unless the King's consent was given. The Opposition, led by Mr. Dowdeswell, were strong in their objections to the measure. Among those who spoke in the debates about it was Pownall, who, on March 13, moved to omit from the preamble the assertion there made of the Royal prerogative.[2] The King brought his whole influence to bear in favour of the measure which was passed and still remains in force.

The next question to which Pownall gave his attention was that of the supply of corn and the trade in it. Instead of purchasing three-fourths of her wheat abroad as she now does England was in the first half of the eighteenth century a corn-exporting country. That export had been first permitted under Charles II., provided that the price was not more than 53s. 4d. a quarter; when it was less agriculture was protected by the import being prohibited. At the Revolution that figure was altered to 48s., and a 5s. bounty was paid on the quantity exported. The farmer, with this addition, could look for the price he was used to, and on which he could earn a living. During the next fifty years England escaped the ravages of war which fell heavily upon the Continent and checked cultivation there; she was able to export corn in large quantities after her own people were provided for at moderate cost. The January price of wheat from 1742 to 1756 ranged from 17s. to 30s.,[3] after that time it became higher, and export was prohibited. Between 1757 and 1772 the average price at Windsor was 44s. a quarter,[4] most of the advance being in the years after the peace of 1763 which enabled cultivation to be resumed on the Continent. During the previous period England had exported largely and become

[1] *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.* v. p. 239.
[2] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvii. p. 419; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, ix. p. 353.
[3] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1772, p. 170.
[4] *Political Arithmetic*, Arthur Young, 1774, p. 35.

rich in doing so, in one year she sent 400,000 quarters to France at 50s. In considering these figures it must be remembered that the value of money, measured against commodities has changed; 50s. then was probably equal to at least twice that sum now. It was no part of the policy of our ancestors to let the people have food too cheap, that meant the destruction of the farmer, who, if his occupation became unremunerative, would be ruined or let the land go out of cultivation, so that three or four years of very low prices might be followed by a dearth. Unlike Cobden a century later the statesmen of that day considered the producer as well as the consumer, and thought it dangerous for the country to depend on foreign countries for food which war might cut off. After 1765 the population of England increased. Wealth had poured into the country from the successful war and from India, and prices rose so that from that year export had to be checked. That was done irregularly by temporary measures which unsettled the market, dealers began to speculate for a rise and held their stocks while the people were starving. It was to them not the question of the big and the little loaf, of which so much has been heard lately, but whether they had a loaf or no loaf at all. New conditions had arisen since the war, and it was necessary to meet them, for there were bread riots in many parts of the country.

Pownall took the matter in hand by moving on April 3, 1772, for a Committee of the whole House to consider the trade in corn. He proposed a permanent sliding scale to regulate export and import. When the price of home-grown corn was up to 48s. a quarter, the import from abroad was to be permitted at a charge of 6d., making 48s. 6d., thus securing the home-grower, nearer to the market, a price of about 49s. or 50s. He was guarded also by a bounty of 5s. being granted him on what he sent abroad at 44s., this 5s. brought him up to the same figure as the above. At or above 48s. he could not export, the corn was then kept at home for the people. The producer was thus protected by the bounty against an unremunerative selling price, the consumer was guarded by the foreign supply against excessive cost. The limits it fixed checked speculation in the food of the people. When introducing this measure Pownall explained that

though as much corn was grown then as during previous years the increase of population prevented our exporting 3 per cent of it as we had formerly done. While he recognised that the farmer must live he declared that the people must live also, and the time had come when the ports must be opened, introducing a new stream into the supply and keeping the home production equal, but no more than equal, to the consumption.

It is meant by the provisions in the Bill, formed to the carrying of it into execution, that its operations may go on as the state of things do actually and really require, not as the interests of designing men may wish and will them to go; that this commercial circulation of subsistence may flow through pools whose gates are to open and shut as the state of the droughts and floods and tides may require—not to consist of sluice doors which are to be locked up and opened by the partial hands and will of men.[1]

These proposals were accepted by Lord North on behalf of the Government and welcomed by Edmund Burke, who described them as introduced by Pownall in

an excellent speech full of that knowledge which he possesses of these matters, and explained with that distinction of which he is master, both the effect of supply and trade, and shewed the united interests of the landed and commercial parts of this country, that nothing could be more detrimental than their jealousies of each other, and nothing so advantageous as their united efforts for their mutual benefit.

On April 15 the Resolutions were approved, Pownall, with others, was appointed to prepare a Bill which was produced and read a first time the next day. On April 30 it was read a second time, and in May, having passed the Commons, it went up to the Lords. They returned it on June 3 with some alterations which the Commons fiercely resented because it was a money bill. In its altered form they would have nothing to do with it, and Burke made a great speech denouncing the Lords. Hansard says of the unhappy document, "The speaker tossed it over the table, several of the members on both sides of the question kicking it as they went out." In a letter addressed on April 2 to Dr. Cooper in Boston Pownall thus alluded to the early stages of this Bill,

I am now extremely busy trying to bring forward a new system of law for the corn trade. Our circumstances in that article are

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvii. p. 476; Almon's *Parl. Debates,* ix. p. 364.

changed, our system therefore must follow, and adapt itself to those new circumstances. It is a matter of risque, and great hazard, to meddle with the operations of the supply of a country and the commerce of the supply and provisions. It is in any way of almost infinite import, and may draw danger in its consequences. To-morrow I make my motion. I do not know any which I ever engaged in that hung with so much dread upon my head. If my ideas are wrong or dangerous I hope the House will reject them.

In the same letter he mentioned his protest against the application of the Mutiny Act in the colonies—the only measure relating to them in that session—saying "The people may acquiesce but I, as a friend, never will. The matter, under the state of acquiescence with which the people sit down, is every day more and more striking root as a *rooted precedent* which will grow up and bear bitter fruit."

On April 9 he had received the honour of admission to the Royal Society, on whose records his nomination as a Fellow describes him as "of Albemarle Street, a gentleman well versed in polite literature, natural philosophy and other branches of science." The Session of Parliament ended on June 10; during the summer and autumn of 1772 the Annual Register tells us that nothing of importance happened, the Government was so strong that it could do what it liked. The Opposition was weary of fruitless effort; among its members the followers of Lord Rockingham were the most, those of Lord Chatham the least, energetic. After Mr. Grenville's death many of his friends had gone over to the Court, among them Lord Dartmouth, who succeeded Lord Hillsborough as Colonial Secretary.

Parliament met again on November 26, 1772, the King's speech mentioned that the harvest had been a bad one and this made the food question urgent. Pownall resumed his attempt to deal with it, moving on December 3 for a Committee to consider the Corn Laws. He went more into detail than he had done in the spring, proposing that the inquiry should include what was called the assize of bread, which determined the kind, and the amount, of flour to be used for the loaf. While he deprecated any attempt to interfere unduly with natural fluctuations in cost, he argued that if bread varied in price when corn did not there was some injustice to the poor which ought to be remedied. He inquired whether

America could not supply what England required, and stated that the existing law had caused a large consignment of American flour to be re-exported because, though it would make wholesome bread, it was not of the prescribed quality. The assize permitted only the most expensive bread to be made, and this the people could not always afford; more latitude ought, he considered, to be given.

1773

On February 1 Pownall was put on a Committee of the House, together with Lord North, Mr. Dowdeswell and five others, to prepare a Bill to deal with the food question. In his speech introducing it he restated his previous arguments and estimated the number of people in England who then used wheaten bread at $3\frac{3}{4}$ millions, to whom his scheme of giving a wider choice of flour would, he estimated, save nearly a million and a quarter pounds a year. This and his proposals for regulating the import and export of corn, rejected by the House of Lords in the previous summer, now became law,[1] and the measure is described by Mr. Lecky as the most liberal one passed till 1846.

A result of Pownall's studies of the food question for this Bill was a *Memoir on the Corn Trade*, dated at Richmond on July 15 of this year, and containing nine octavo pages. This was published in 1774 as an appendix to the *Political Arithmetic* of Arthur Young, F.R.S., the pioneer of modern agriculture. This contribution of Pownall's is a review of the history of the corn trade which is traced from 1685, it gives particulars of the different Acts passed from that date up to 1729. Young gives in that book an abstract of what he describes as "Governor Pownall's Act," and in his Preface acknowledges the assistance he had received from papers lent him by Pownall, whose "uncommon ability in discussing it," Young recognises. In another passage Young expresses his satisfaction at getting rid of "the abominable system that has disgraced us since 1765; Mr. Pownall's act has great merit,"[2] he adds.

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvii. p. 698, and Almon's *Parl. Debates*, x. p. 192.
[2] P. 42.

This Session of Parliament lasted till July 1, 1773, but there was no discussion on the affairs of the colonies, the House was chiefly occupied with those of India. The British power in Bengal had been grossly abused by the officials on the spot since the victory of Clive at Plassey in 1757. Men who are paid as they were, salaries inadequate to support the positions they hold will often help themselves, especially if they are far from central authority. This had been done in India to such an extent that while the officials made great fortunes in trade, and by receiving gifts from the native princes, money due to the East India Company never reached it. The country was being ruined and the Company so impoverished that it had to seek financial aid from England, where attention was thus drawn to the condition of India. Though Pownall took no part in the debates he was sufficiently interested in the subject to write a small book about it—

THE RIGHT, INTEREST, and DUTY of GOVERNMENT AS CONCERNED IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE EAST INDIES.

This was written and appeared in the spring of 1773;[1] it describes how the East India Company, founded as a trading corporation, had practically become a sovereign power. It quotes a letter written by Lord Clive in 1765, which stated that the country was firmly held and that the revenue, after meeting all expenses, left a great surplus of profit. Yet in spite of this, owing to the misconduct and depredations of its servants, the Company was in difficulties. Those, Pownall said, were best considered by persons who, like himself, were disinterested in the matter: "it is not in the whirlwind of contention, it is not in the thunder of debate that truth is heard; it is in the still small voice, in quiet abstracted deliberation, that it will be found." He traced the origin of the Company, founded in 1600, and referred to the Charter of 1661, which he shewed agreed in its terms with those of the Virginia Company of 1611. In both cases the lands obtained by the adventurers were described by the Sovereign as "to be holden of us, our heirs and successors, as of our Manor of East Greenwich in the County of Kent." He shewed

[1] Republished in 1781, by J. Almon, 39 8vo pages.

that all outlying dominions were ultimately in the hand of the King; with him lay the political property in them, while that of personal property only belonged to the subject. That no subject under any circumstances could exercise sovereign rights, which the East India Company had usurped, he was certain. It had been done none the less effectually because indirectly,

> the affecting to be only the protector of the government as an ally; to be only the steward not the landlord of the dominions of the State; the executing the government of the country under its own laws, so far as despotism admits law and by the ministration of its own offices and officers, was one of those genuine strokes of politics which true and original genius alone always doth at once adopt and execute.

Reference in a footnote to a letter of Lord Clive, dated September 21, 1765, makes clear the person whose genius is here alluded to. He points out that while in official communications the Company wisely took this modest attitude of stewardship in its dominions, in their confidential correspondence between themselves its officials wrote quite differently. As to their army, for instance, they considered what force was necessary "to preserve them sovereigns." He mentions that when the law officers of the Crown were consulted in 1757 they had denied altogether that the Company had been entrusted with any sovereign power whatever. That belonged absolutely to the Crown, "the greatest evil arises when traders become princes and merchants sovereigns." The time had come, he argued, for the Crown to reassert itself and resume control. He was glad to see Government disposed to do this, and thought their appointment of a Governor-General and four Councillors to take charge of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, and to superintend Madras and Bombay, was sound policy. He expressed the hope that those officials would respect the inherited customs and the original laws of the natives, and be content to collect only the surplus of their earnings for their protection and governance. He said of the new Government to be established

> if, while it looks only to the collecting revenue, it suffers the labour of the country to apply its labour in its own way and suffer the bee (if I may so express myself) to collect and possess and store its own honey in its own combs until the State calls for that part which the

hive can spare . . . it will make the community productive in its labour and happy in the fruits of that labour. An ingenious industrious thrifty people . . . will in return be producing . . . a constantly increasing revenue, the source of abundant permanent wealth and power to the State.

For more than three years America had been comparatively quiet; since the riot of March 1770 there had been no great disturbance of the peace in Boston, where Hutchinson and Oliver had now acted as Governor and Lieutenant-Governor for two years. Mention has been made of a correspondence they had long carried on from Boston with Mr. Thomas Whately, M.P. in England. It was intended to influence him, in American affairs, and through him Mr. Grenville whose private secretary he was. Twelve of these letters were afterwards published. These date from 1768, but as Mr. Grenville had left office in 1766 they were probably only the latter part of a series begun while he had power to give effect, if he chose, to the views these letters expressed. As a rule they were moderate in tone, quotations have been made from them here; but in some passages a policy of repression was advocated by the writers who were afraid of what might happen if that were not adopted. Their influence was much increased by Mr. Grenville's death on November 13, 1770, for Mr. Whately then joined the Government Party. He must have taken that step quickly, for within two months—January 9, 1771—*Junius* reproached him for it. When he went over to the Ministry his papers of course went with him, and his change of front placed Hutchinson and Oliver in direct touch with the Cabinet instead of with the Opposition.

Mr. Thomas Whately died in June 1772, his papers then passed into the possession of his brother William, a banker in Lombard Street. Franklin has left it on record[1] that in the following December

he was assured by a gentleman of character and distinction (whom I am not at present permitted to name) that not only the measure I censured so warmly—the sending troops to Boston—but all the other grievances we complained of took their rise not from the Government here, but were projected, proposed to Administration, solicited and obtained, by some of the most respectable among the Americans themselves as necessary measures for the welfare of that

[1] *Works of Franklin*, Jared Sparks, 1840, iv. p. 411.

FRANKLIN.

FROM THE ORIGINAL PICTURE BY D. MARTIN
IN THE POSSESSION OF H. J. WILLIAMS ESQR –
TAKEN AT THE AGE OF SIXTY.

country. . . . He called on me some days later and produced to me those very letters from Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson, Secretary Oliver, and others.

Franklin proceeds to say that he at once thought it his duty, as Agent for the Colony, to transmit the Letters to Boston, but to this their holder objected, he would not even permit copies to be taken for the purpose. Eventually he consented to let Franklin have the originals on the express conditions "that they should not be printed, that no copies should be taken of them, that they should be shewn only to half a dozen of the leading people of the Government, and that they should be carefully returned." In accepting them on those terms Franklin declares that he felt no scruple, for, as he expressed it,

they had been handed about here (in England) to injure that people, why not use them for their advantage? The writers, too, had taken the same liberty with the letters of others, transmitting those of Rosne and Auchmuty in confirmation of their own calumnies against the Americans. Copies of some of mine had been returned by officers of the Government. Why then should theirs be exempt from the same treatment?

Franklin was not alone in knowing his letters were opened and used by the Government, who treated those of Thomas Whately and Hans Stanley to Mr. Grenville in the same way. Stanley was specially hurt on "observing that all my correspondence is opened in a very awkward and bungling manner." The Duke of Bedford had a high official of the Post Office dismissed for meddling with his letters.[1] Edmund Burke in England and Judge Winthrop in America, made similar complaints,[2] of which Pownall's letters to Dr. Cooper are full. Mention of one of them has already been made.

Taking a leaf out of the Government book Franklin sent these Hutchinson letters to Thomas Cushing, Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, with strict injunctions that they were to be seen only by half-a-dozen men, who were named, and that the above conditions must be observed. Cushing weakly let them out of his possession, and could not get them back till their contents made so much stir that he was summoned to

[1] *Grenville Correspondence*, 1853, iii. pp. 312; 99, 311.

[2] *Works of Edmund Burke*, 1818, ix. p. 148; *Works of Franklin*, 1840, iv. p. 425.

produce them to the Assembly and did so. On June 16, 1773, the House of Representatives passed a vote of censure on Hutchinson and Oliver, declaring that their letters were really public, that they "tended to destroy harmony, excite resentment, and introduce force from England." It was complained that the writers of these letters, while professing affection to their neighbours, had been secretly instigating coercion; and their dismissal from the posts of Governor and Lieutenant-Governor was therefore demanded.[1]

On August 21 Franklin received this resolution, he was angry at the publicity given in America despite his stipulations; but when he passed on the official document to Lord Dartmouth he observed that the resentment of the colonists towards England was much abated by finding that their grievances were due to some of their own people. That was the turn he had tried to give to affairs, but he found, on the contrary, that "the very action upon which I valued myself, as it appeared to be a means of lessening our differences, I was unlucky enough to find charged upon me as a wicked attempt to increase them."[2] Through the spring and summer he had kept the secret very close; he said that only two men in England besides himself knew of it, but in the autumn it came out. An unsigned paragraph in the *Public Advertiser* of September 4 threw suspicion of having got the letters from William Whately on John Temple, formerly Commissioner of Customs in Boston. He was said to have called at Whately's bank and asked permission to see some of his own letters to Thomas Whately, the late Secretary, and to have been left alone with the file as no one else had been, after which the letters disappeared. Theft was imputed. In reply to this paragraph there appeared in the same paper on October 25 a letter signed "A Member of Parliament" which taxed Messrs. Bernard,[3] Knox,[4] and Mauduit[5] with having been its authors. It charged them

[1] Copy of Letters sent to Great Britain by Hutchinson and Oliver and others, *British Museum Catalogue*, 8175, a.a. 54.

[2] *Works of Franklin*, Jared Sparks, 1840, iv. p. 433.

[3] Ex-Governor of Massachusetts.

[4] Captain John Knox published in 1769 a journal of the American Campaigns 1757-60.

[5] Mauduit is mentioned on p. 263 of the 1810 edition of Almon's *Anecdotes of the Earl of Chatham*, as engaged by the Tories, like Smollett and Dr. Francis, to write down that statesman in 1761.

with having falsely used the name of Mr. Whately the banker to damage Mr. Temple. It declared that the writer, though not the immediate instrument of bringing the Hutchinson letters to light, was in a position to affirm that those sent to Boston had not been in the possession of the banker since the death of his brother to whom they were addressed. But the opinion was expressed that the disclosure had done good, for now the Americans would see whom they had to thank for their troubles and could be left to deal with Hutchinson and Oliver. Then the three men charged with having written the paragraph are thus addressed—

> These are the consequences of the detection of these letters, consequences which *you* who have laboured equally with their wicked authors to arm the parent hand against the child must cordially lament. The natural union will now be restored. England will return to her old good humour, America to her former reverence and affection. Commerce will again flourish and we shall stand together, the bulwark of religion and liberty against the world in arms.[1]

This fierce denunciation is quite in Pownall's style when he was angry. There was hardly another member of Parliament sufficiently acquainted with men connected with American affairs to point to unimportant individuals like Knox and Mauduit without contradiction. Moreover, it exactly expresses his views about the supreme necessity of removing friction between England and the colonies. The next step taken was an action brought by William Whately against Franklin to recover the letters. Nothing came of it, but Franklin regarded Whately as the instrument of the Court[2] in bringing it. He

[1] This and other correspondence on the subject will be found in *Anecdotes of Eminent Persons*, J. Almon, 1797, iii. p. 236.

[2] *Works of Franklin*, 1840, iv. pp. 437, 439. On p. 436 Franklin says he thought Whately, whom he hardly knew, had been prompted to attack him. He mentions that Whately had wanted to trace some property in America, bought by his grandfather Major Thompson, to which the clue had been lost; he applied to Franklin for help in this matter and got it. As Franklin had thus done Whately a service he thought Whately would not of his own accord have brought the action. In the Record Office (book W.O. 1. 679) is a Treasury letter of December 1, 1763, signed by Thomas Whately. It may have been through his influence that his brother's bank got the Treasury account.

had ascertained that the Treasury account was kept at Whately's bank from seeing a Treasury warrant payable there for £150, the half-year's pension of no less a person than Dr. Samuel Johnson. Whately had also written to the *Public Advertiser* confirming the statement anonymously made therein that Temple had about October 1772 seen the file of American letters, and that those of Hutchinson and Oliver were afterwards missing. Temple then called him out. They fought in the Ring[1] in Hyde Park on December 11 at four in the afternoon, when it must have been almost dark. They had no seconds. Whately had no pistols, he borrowed one of Temple's and each man missed the other; then they drew their swords and fell to. Whately wrote afterwards that he knew nothing of the use of weapons, but he stood up to his adversary till in the scuffle he slipped and fell. Some bystanders who ran up accused Temple of thrusting at him when he was down; he received four or five slight wounds, but Temple was the more hurt of the two, for he was left with a charge of foul play against him. While William Whately was disabled Temple wrote to his brother Joseph,[2] and afterwards to William himself, asking to be exonerated from this. Neither of the brothers would clear him, and it looked as if the duel would be renewed. It had attracted a great deal of attention, partly because it was due to a leakage of public documents, partly because, even when such encounters were frequent, it was unusual to find a Lombard Street banker fighting gallantly in Hyde Park. Franklin was as much surprised as any one. "I never thought the gentlemen would fight," he wrote afterwards. To prevent the matter going further he addressed a letter on December 25 to the *Public Advertiser* to say that he, and he alone, was responsible for sending Hutchinson's letters to Boston. He maintained that—

> they were not private letters between friends, they were written by public officers to persons in public stations on public affairs and intended to produce public measures. They were therefore handed to other public persons who might be influenced by them to produce

[1] This "Ring" was about 300 yards in diameter, and lay on the north of the Serpentine close to the plot now enclosed in the Ranger's private gardens.

[2] Of Nonsuch Park, Surrey, father of Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, great-grandfather of the present writer.

those measures, their tendency was to incense the mother country against her colonies.[1]

He declared that the quarrel between Whately and Temple was all a mistake and ought to cease. Where he had got the letters from he never would say; he did say they were "part of" a correspondence, thus confirming the idea above expressed that those which were in the bank were the earlier, and those Franklin obtained the later ones, of the same series. Franklin said that the latter were brought to him by a member of Parliament, and he has been here quoted as writing that this was "a gentleman of character and distinction" who first mentioned the letters and afterwards produced them, objecting to their publication.

That person was probably Pownall. He had suffered from the Government's interference with his private correspondence; he had for years looked on Hutchinson and Oliver who wrote these documents, which were not private, as men pursuing a dangerous policy. With Thomas Whately, who received them, he had been in close contact during Mr. Grenville's life, but since that statesman's death in 1770 Whately and Pownall had gone different ways, the former had joined the Government Party and thereby given Hutchinson and Oliver much more power. As soon as they discovered this correspondence both Franklin and Pownall would quickly realise this and be stirred to action by it. . . . Temple may or may not have taken the letters which Whately shewed him, it was certainly he who got the others which Franklin used. Not only were the Government so sure of this that they dismissed him, but he himself afterwards owned it to President Adams, though he then denied that he had got them from William Whately.[1] How he got them one cannot tell. Thomas Whately may have lent them to some person, possibly Temple himself, who failed to return them. Mr. Lecky suggests that Whately may have left the packet in some public office where it was picked up. If, in one of those ways Temple had got the later letters about June, when Secretary Whately died, he may have gathered from them that there were earlier ones, and his

[1] *Anecdotes of Eminent Persons*, J. Almon, 1797, iii. p. 247.

[2] *Works of Franklin*, 1840, iv. p. 443, where reference is given to a letter written by Adams on January 28, 1820, which contains this statement.

wish to see them would account for his visit in October to the city where Whately the banker produced the letters he had. As to the other packet Temple had got that and could shew it to any one he chose. If he wanted to bring it to the notice of Franklin, whom he preferred to approach through an intermediary, there was no one who could serve his purpose better than Pownall, whose friendship for Franklin was as well known as his opposition both to the writers of the letters and to the Government. When Franklin said there were but two persons in England besides himself who had knowledge of the matter it is probable that he had Temple and Pownall in his mind. The pledges which Franklin had given to the other two, that the letters should not be copied or publicly divulged in America, he had sought to himself impose on Cushing. Cushing broke faith with him ; he would not break it himself with those to whom he was responsible, and this accounts for the silence he always maintained, and which has never been penetrated, as to who handed him the documents. Pownall's interest in the matter is shewn by the letter, dated October 25, above quoted and ascribed to him, where the "Member of Parliament" said that he knew all about the transaction but was not a principal in it. He probably thought, as Franklin always did, that this correspondence between people in the positions of Hutchinson and Oliver with Mr. Grenville's right-hand man was semi-official if not fully official. Therefore under conditions of the most stringent kind it might with advantage be revealed to a few of the leaders in America in order that the fast-increasing resentment of the colonists against England might be diverted to those on the spot who were really responsible for it.

While this was happening and causing great excitement at home during the December of 1773 still more serious events were taking place in America. In order to ease the financial pressure on the East India Company, which had now been taken under the wing of the Government, that Corporation had been recently permitted to ship tea direct from the East to Boston without its being first brought to England. The duty levied upon it in transit through an English port was remitted. This made the tea so cheap that those of the colonists who were most strongly opposed to its import were afraid that the people

might be induced to break their pledges of abstention and purchase it. That the consignees, appointed by the English Government, were a son and a near relative of Hutchinson, who was more disliked than ever after the publication of his letters, did not make the arrival of the tea on those terms more welcome. On December 16 a party of men disguised as Red Indians stormed the ships which had brought it to Boston and threw their cargo overboard. In face of the hostile feeling displayed by the whole people the Commissioners of Customs were powerless, and at the close of 1773 Boston was in almost open revolt.

1774

William Whately's action against Franklin having come to nothing, the Government took other measures. On the petition of Israel Mauduit, who was mentioned in the previous October, in the letter by a "Member of Parliament," and who was a friend of Hutchinson's, the conduct of Franklin about the Hutchinson-Oliver correspondence was brought before the Privy Council on January 29, 1774. The case was conducted, nominally for Mauduit really for the Crown, by Wedderburn, the Solicitor-General. He began by interrogating Franklin, and then broke into a violent tirade against him, denouncing him for dishonourable conduct in obtaining and publishing what were described as confidential documents by Wedderburn. The scene lasted for more than an hour; it was accentuated by the behaviour of a score of Privy Councillors in the room who, with the honourable exception of Lord North, shewed their loyalty to the King and their animosity to Franklin by applauding each insult. Franklin took it all very quietly; he knew two things which his assailant omitted to mention, one, the notorious fact that it was the constant practice of the Government to obtain from the mails the correspondence of their opponents and use it; the other, that however well qualified the Solicitor-General might be to lay down the law of the land, on the laws of honour he was not entitled to speak. It was but a short time since Wedderburn had been as strong against the Government as he now was for it. To his change of attitude he

owed his office;[1] he was one of those slippery politicians who turn their coats to suit their interests and leave their honour behind in so doing. His example was followed three or four years ago. But that hour with Wedderburn was never forgotten by Franklin who, before it, had striven hard to preserve the union with England, and after it threw his great influence into the other scale. Four years later, when he signed the Treaty between France and the United States, it was observed that he made a point of appearing in the suit of clothes which he had worn on this occasion in Westminster.[2]

This sequence of events, the Whately-Temple duel; the disclosure by Franklin of the part he had played as regards the Hutchinson letters; the Government's attack on Franklin and his consequent alienation from England, did much to precipitate the War of Independence. Franklin was now dismissed from the position he held as Assistant Postmaster in America; the vessel bound there which took out the mail describing the treatment he had received must have passed that which brought to England the news of the tea riots in Boston. When the King heard of these he sent a message to Parliament on March 7, and a week later Lord North made a strong and able speech in the House of Commons, where he introduced a Bill for removing the Customs from Boston and closing the port. In the debate on this subject Pownall spoke on March 23. Hansard's report of his speech runs thus:—

> He had always been of opinion that internal taxes could not legally be laid, but that he agreed in external ones; that these wanted a revision of the laws relating to America; that he wished the tea duty was repealed, but he did not think this the proper time or season to adopt the measure. There ought also to be a review of the Governments. The Americans have a real love for governments, they love peace and order (here the House laughed). He said, "I do aver they love peace, for I look upon this to be the act of the mob and not of the people, and, wait but a little, it will regulate itself."[3]

Dismayed by the violence which Boston had shewn, the Opposition did not contest this Port Bill as they did the next two measures which Government introduced. The first of those was practically a revocation of the

[1] Mr. Lecky alludes to him as "the Belial of politics."
[2] *Franklin's Works*, 1840, iv. p. 453. [3] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvii. p. 1186.

original Charter of the Colony, it proposed to take all executive power from the people and centre it in the Governor, to control the town meetings, to place appointments to the Council of the colony in the hands of the Crown, and to alter the jury system. This was brought in on March 28. The third Bill which Lord North introduced revived the proposal of extraditing colonists, either to other provinces or to England for trial. Parliament had accepted this in 1769, but the Government had never acted on it; they now renewed the scheme because they said it was useless for the local executive to bring offenders before juries of their neighbours, who were always of the same way of thinking and refused to convict. When proposing this measure on April 15 Lord North said that Hutchinson was to come home[1] and be succeeded by General Gage, who was to combine the office of Governor with that he already held as Commander-in-Chief.

On April 15 Pownall took part in the debate on the second of these measures, that for reconstituting the Government of Massachusetts. Hansard's report says, "The House at first did not much attend, but his extensive knowledge in American affairs soon drew that attention to what he said which his abilities so justly deserved." He pointed out that the Ministry were mistaken in thinking that the Council of Massachusetts were elected by the people, on the contrary they were chosen by the legislature from its own members. He explained that the Selectmen who had charge of the town meetings—complained of as centres where appeals to the passions of the people were made—held positions similar to those of Aldermen in an English borough. At those meetings all municipal business was transacted, and as some of them were 300 miles from Boston he inquired how the people were to manage their affairs, if on each occasion they had to send all that distance to get the Governor's permission before they assembled. He concluded by asking that these subjects might be thoroughly investigated before hasty action was taken, and that all the laws and charters which had reference to them might be laid before the House.[2] A week later, on April 22, he

[1] John Pownall had written to Lord Dartmouth on August 5, 1773, suggesting the recall of Hutchinson (*Hist. M.S. Commission Report*, No. 11, p. 388).

[2] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvii. p. 1199; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, xi. p. 129.

renewed his opposition to this Bill, but stated that his object was only to correct some errors in facts.

As to opinions I shall never more trouble the House with mine on this subject. While the affairs of America remained on that ground that opinions might operate on measures of policy I never withheld mine . . . I delivered my sentiments explicitly and directly. It was my duty to do so. . . . I have expressed the same sentiments at all times, and have given the same opinion in what I have written to America. All tended to one point, the pointing out the grounds of conciliation and peace.

He declared that the time for expressing thoughts had gone by, that for action had come. That this, on the part of the colonists, would begin by an appeal to arms he did not anticipate, he thought that their first step would be a system of resistance in which all the colonies would unite; by means of their own courier service, which the Committees of Correspondence had established because they mistrusted the inviolability of the post, they would summon a conference or congress. What that might lead to he left the House to consider.

I told this House (it is now four years past) that the people of America in the troubles which lay then upon them would not oppose power to your power, but that they *would become impracticable*. Have they not been so from that time to this very hour? I tell you *now* that they will resist the measures now proposed in a more vigorous way.

He said that when it came, as it must come if things went on as they were, to a question of fighting, it would not matter which side were the aggressors. "It is of more consequence at this moment so to act—to take such measures—that no such misfortune may come into event. I hope the House will excuse my trespassing on their patience, it is the last time that I shall speak on this subject." He criticised the action of the Ministry in altering the relations between the Colonial Governor and his Council in the belief that, as things stood, the former was powerless without the co-operation of the latter. In some colonies that was so, the executive power resting with Governor and Council, in others with the Governor only, his Council being merely an advising body. Whether a colony were under the first or the second of these forms of rule depended on the terms of its Charter, some Charters were drawn in one of these ways some in another. He

had always regarded the system in which the Council was what he called "a component part of the Governor and so far forth of the Supreme Executive" as a mistake; if the Bill had been limited to altering this he should have hesitated to oppose it. He explained that though the Governor could not act alone in the appointment of Civil officers for which he had to obtain the approval of his nominees by the Council, in all other matters he could take measures on his own responsibility.

> I am sure I can speak from fact. I have, as Governor, done every Civil act of Government which the King, actuating the powers of the Crown, does here within the realm. And, as to the military, if it had been my misfortune to have been Governor in these times, and if the interposition of the military had been necessary, I would not have applied to them for their aid. I would have sent them an order.

He then expressed his confidence that no officer would have been found who ventured to disobey an order given by a Governor who would take that line with the authority of the King's Commission behind him, and the Charter of the colony behind that. What he did not say, though it can be read between the lines of this speech is that both his successors, Bernard and Hutchinson, had been deficient in nerve to meet the conditions which their lack of tact had caused.[1] He described the Council as "highly blameable, indeed inexcusable" if they did not help the Governor with the advice it was their duty to give. As both initiative and power were already conferred on the Governor by the original Charter, he inquired why the Ministry should think it necessary at this critical time not only to alter the terms of that deed (the original basis of the constitution of the colony), but to introduce other wide-reaching measures which would aggravate a situation

[1] Of these speeches Sir G. O. Trevelyan has written as follows: "Thomas Pownall, who had governed Massachusetts strongly and discreetly during Pitt's great war, was earnest in his remonstrances. . . . Governor Pownall, who had learned the institutions and geography of Massachusetts by ruling it, reminded the House that it was not a question of Boston only. If the measure was carried local business could not be transacted in the furthest corner of Maine unless special leave to hold a town meeting had been obtained from a Governor resident at the other end of 300 miles of bad roads and forest tracks (*American Revolution*, 1899, i. pp. 116-196).

already dangerous in the extreme.[1] Mr. Dowdeswell[2] and Mr. Burke were equally strong in their opposition to this Bill in the Commons, Lord Chatham thundered against it in the Lords, but all three Coercion acts were passed by large majorities. So also was an Act establishing in Canada, which had been administered for fourteen years by military authority, a form of modified self-government. This recognised the Roman Catholic religion, and the Puritan element, still strong in Massachusetts, objected to having that form of belief established on the northern boundary of the colony. Parliament rose on June 22; it was thanked in the King's speech for the measures it had taken with regard to the colonies, and His Majesty expressed the hope that he might "see his deluded subjects return to a sense of their duty." While Pownall was expressing his views publicly in his speeches, he was doing the same privately in a letter of April 2 to Dr. Cooper in Boston, to whom he wrote:—

All that I can at present do is to beg for God's sake that the good and prudent of the Province will try their best authority that the good sense, the old good temper and good principles of the Province, may prevail over the passions and party of the violent and heedless, who have well-nigh ruined the town of Boston and will ruin the Province. I know, though the stroke given is heavy and severe, and though the arm of government, raised, threatens more, yet it is the wish of every good man here, both in and out of Ministry, to remove the present grievances and to withhold all further severity. Nothing but imprudence and violence on the part of your present leaders can essentially hurt the Province, such will certainly do so because they give grounds and plausible reasons to justify the measures of such amongst us who mean mischief—and such there are on all sides. Be not made a cat's-paw, either to those in America or to those here whose interest may be served to your ruin. May He who disposes of events dispose your hearts to what is right for peace.

While Pownall was writing thus from England to Cooper, George Washington was addressing himself to Captain Robert Mackenzie, H.M. 43rd Regiment, in the same strain:—

Although you are taught to believe that the people of Massachusetts are rebellious . . . I think I can announce it as a fact that it is not the wish or interest of that Government or any other upon this continent, separately or collectively, to set up for independence. But

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvii. p. 1286; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, xi. p. 205.
[2] Who broke down in health this spring and died in February 1775.

this you may at the same time rely on—that none of them will ever submit to the loss of those valuable rights and privileges which are essential to the happiness of every free state, and without which life, liberty and property are rendered totally insecure.[1]

Moderate men, such as Washington and Pownall shew themselves by these letters to have been, had not even at this time abandoned hope that war might be avoided, but the majority in Massachusetts were as much infuriated by the treatment of Franklin and the passing of the Coercion Acts as the majority in England had been by the Boston tea riot. Another grievance to the colonists was the acceptance by the local officials of salaries paid by England. For this action Oliver, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief-Justice, was impeached in February before his friend the Governor, but the proceedings were stopped by the death of Oliver on March 3. On the 24th of that month Governor Hutchinson prorogued the Assembly, and on June 1, the day when the port of Boston was closed, he departed for England and General Gage took charge. When Hutchinson arrived at home he was received in audience on July 1 by the King, who was then encouraged in the delusion that there was nothing serious in the attitude of the colonists, and wrote to Lord North that he was "now well convinced that they will soon submit."[2] On September 11 another of the King's letters in that series said that "the dye (*sic*) is now cast, the colonies must either submit or triumph. I do not wish to come to severer measures, but we must not retreat. . . . I am clear there must always be one tax to keep up the right, and as such I approve the tea duty." When despatches arrived containing the endorsement of the proceedings in Boston by the Colonial Congress at Philadelphia, the King wrote to Lord North on November 18: "The New England Governments are in a state of rebellion, blows must decide whether they are to be subject to this country or independent." Another letter, written the next day, runs "I return the private letters received from Lieutenant-General Gage. His idea of suspending the Acts seems to me the most absurd that can be suggested. The people are ripe for mischief. . . .

[1] *Writings of G. Washington*, Jared Sparks, 1840, ii. p. 360. Letter of October 9, 1774.

[2] *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North*, W. B. Donne, 1867.

I am not for advising new measures, but I am for supporting those already taken." These passages shew that the King was not the least deterred by what passed that autumn, though Gage, who was on the spot, did not like the prospect and wished to draw back. The colonists had done exactly what Pownall had predicted in his speech of April 22. They had not resorted to arms at once, but they had summoned a Congress which met at Philadelphia early in September and proceeded to draw up resolutions stating their case, and also addresses to the people of England and the King. Unless he gave way war was certain, the colonies were arming and drilling men in anticipation of it.

Pownall's information was always good; he had his own correspondents in America and could learn from them that Gage was weakening; that Lord North would do the same and perhaps bring the King round at the last moment seemed possible to him. If that happened, and he could get the measures of conciliation which he desired passed, it was nothing to him whether they came from Lord North or not. His position had all along been that of an independent member who belonged to no party and was tied to none; while this had diminished his power it had left him his freedom. When he lost his seat for Tregony at the General Election of October 1774 he accepted another for Minehead, which is said to have been obtained for him by the influence of Lord North, whose sudden change of front when the new Parliament opened surprised almost every one but Pownall and shewed how correct his forecast had been. Mention is made of this in a letter written by Franklin in the autumn of 1774. The precise date is not given.

I dined at this time by invitation with Governor Pownall. There was no company but the family, and after dinner we had a *tête-à-tête.* He had been in the Opposition, but was now about making his peace in order to come into Parliament upon Ministerial interest, which I did not then know.[1] He told me, what I had before been told by several of Lord North's friends, that the American measures were not the measures of that Minister or approved by him. That, on the contrary, he was well disposed to promote a reconciliation upon any

[1] See above. Pownall had not been *in* or *of* the Opposition. He had been *with* it but that is quite a different thing. That he had been exchanging views with Lord North, whose mind he knew, appears from what follows.

terms honourable to Government. That I had been looked upon as a great promoter of the Opposition in America and as a great adversary to any accommodation. That he, Governor Pownall, had given a different account of me and had told his Lordship that I was much misunderstood. From the Governor's further discourse I collected that he wished to be employed as an envoy or commissioner to America to settle the differences and to have me with him, but as I apprehended there was little likelihood that either of us would be so employed I did not give much attention to that part of his discourse.[1]

There Franklin was undoubtedly right. He and Pownall would be about the last two men in England to be sent on such an errand to America by the King, who had a few months previously set Wedderburn on to bait the one, and had expressed to Lord North his displeasure with the other. But the idea of personal mediation on the spot had been in Pownall's mind since 1766, when he tried to get the Duke of York to undertake it; and we shall see that after this he attempted to get Lord Chatham to act in that way, and then offered to do so himself without fee or reward.

It will be remembered that, fifteen years earlier, when Pownall was Governor in Boston, he had made a point of recognising in his speeches to the Assembly the services of Hutchinson who was personally opposed to him. Now that Hutchinson's policy had led to his enforced return to England Pownall was still willing to shew civility, though friendship was impossible, so he asked his successor to his house. Hutchinson's diary records that on July 19, 1774, he

dined at Richmond with Governor Pownall[2] and Lady Fawkener his wife. Only two ladies, Lady Shore and Miss Vansittart, a sister to the East India supervisor lost at sea, and my daughter. Governor Pownall shewed me a speech in the *London Evening Post*, . . . in this speech he declared that when he was Governor of the Massachusetts he never made any scruple of acting without the Council in civil as well as military matters of Government—implying blame on me for declining to act in the affair of tea without the advice of the Council.[3]

That diary contains another entry that on September 29, 1774, he

[1] *Works of Franklin*, Jared Sparks, 1840, v. p. 32.

[2] Vol. i. p. 481 of this diary mentions that he also dined this month with John Pownall, who lived in Vanburgh Fields at Blackheath, now a suburb but then in the country, and, like Richmond, within an easy drive of London.

[3] *Diary of Thomas Hutchinson*, P. O. Hutchinson, 1883, p. 194.

waited upon Lord Dartmouth (Secretary for the Colonies) where I found Mr. Pownall; he proposed that after the result of the present Congress[1] the King should appoint a Congress of deputies to be regularly chosen by the Assemblies, and a Moderator or person to preside should be appointed by the King. I asked Mr. Pownall what was to be expected. He supposed a general government might be formed like that of Ireland, and many other advantages might arise. I asked whether they would make any concession as to Parliamentary authority. He said—not the least. That, I told him, was the only point which caused any difficulty in the government of the colonies. He thought that ought to be buried. I thought they would not suffer it. If they would forbear denying it things would come right without a Congress. If they were determined to persist in the denial of it a Congress would do no good but would really increase the difficulty, and the Government could with better grace enforce obedience, if it must come to force, before such a Congress than after. Besides, I did not believe that they would do anything more at this Congress than declare to the world their independency of Parliament and wait to see how it was received after, that I thought could not be. This, he said, would be treason. Lord Dartmouth said, Parliament can do nothing which will so much as carry any appearance of conceding to such a claim. Mr. Pownall said he and his brother[2] seldom thought alike but they were agreed in this point of a Congress of the colonies. Knowing in that way what would satisfy them, Lord Dartmouth said pleasantly that Mr. Pownall had a mind to go to America and be the King's representative and preside over all the colonies. I answered him that I knew no better person.

With which last remark Hutchinson appears to have been pleased; he knew, as Lord Dartmouth evidently did, that Pownall was a man who loved authority and responsibility, and felt the miss of them, so on that weak point Hutchinson was glad to touch him. The two men had held opposite views almost ever since they first met at the Congress of Albany twenty years before. Each looked on the other as a misguided man, they could not pass that July evening at Richmond without sparring; neither of them ever missed a chance of putting a spoke in the other's wheel, and Hutchinson never lost an opportunity of entering some reflection on Pownall in his diary. Under the date of October 15 Hutchinson noted Pownall's failure to secure re-election at Tregony,

[1] In Philadelphia, above mentioned as being held in this month.

[2] John Pownall, who took his seat for St. Germains in the new Parliament and now ceased to be Deputy-Secretary of State under Lord Dartmouth on becoming a Commissioner of Excise. The two brothers had certainly not "thought alike" in 1760, when one was the permanent official of the Lords of Trade who recalled the other from Massachusetts.

and on November 24 he made another entry: "Mr. Cornwall called upon me. . . . He says Governor Pownall may probably come in when the vacancies appear. He had reason to believe that he (Pownall) had let Lord North know he would be a friend to Government."[1] Though Pownall was at this time quite ready to support his own opinions when Lord North advocated them, his whole conduct afterwards shewed how wide of the mark was Hutchinson's assumption that he would accept office if Lord North offered it him, and of any such offer there is no trace.

In this month of November he brought out the fifth edition of the *Administration of the Colonies*. It was published, like its immediate predecessor, the fourth edition of 1768, by J. Walter of Charing Cross, in two volumes which contain 610 octavo pages. Though Mr. Grenville had now been dead four years the dedication to him of the fourth edition is continued, and in the Appendix is a letter of his, dated July 17, 1768, to Pownall in acknowledgment of it. Other new features of the Appendix are a letter of December 22, 1754, from Franklin to Governor Shirley, expressing the opinion that it would be very desirable for the colonies to send representatives to Westminster, and that they would be glad to do so; and Franklin's proposal at Albany in 1754 for the union of the American colonies. Chapter VII. is devoted to a consideration of the relations between the European settlers in America and the Red Indians, on whom Pownall was a recognised authority.[2] He had dealt briefly with this topic in the 1768 edition of this book,[3] where he gave the Treaty of 1726 between the English and the Chiefs of the Five Nations and the signatures of the latter. These reappear in this 1774 edition, which is in the main an enlargement of its predecessor. A Preface to the second volume is new, and deserves special attention; it says that many of the author's friends, while they agreed with his views in favour of pacification and conciliation, thought that the time had gone by for publishing them. They doubted "whether this species of reasoning, coming from

[1] *Diary of Thomas Hutchinson*, P. O. Hutchinson, 1883, p. 303.

[2] *Writings of Washington*, Jared Sparks, 1840, v. p. 276. A note says that Pownall "had resided long in America, and understood the Indian character perfectly."

[3] Pages 257 to 279.

a Briton at the moment when the American hath advanced upon us, may not tend to encourage that spirit which has already gone too far by seeming to cast a doubt on the justice of the British cause." He himself did not agree with this opinion, and meant to express his own, though he expected to meet with but little approval in England and a great deal of disapproval in America. It appeared to him that neither side to the impending quarrel knew exactly what it wanted, So far as England was concerned "if we are to treat there must be some line to which our negotiations must have reference; if we are to fight there must be some line which shall bound and be the end of our victories." After all the years that had passed, and the discussions which had taken place, men in England had not arrived at any agreement as to a line of action on which they could unite.

Those in America who have held the language and the doctrines that there is no line between sovereign power, . . . and no power at all . . . have driven a people already half mad to utter desperation and have given source to all the evils which Great Britain and America must experience. . . . I wish the Government of this country to define its own rights and, standing on that sure ground, to acknowledge those of others. I wish the people of America, as they love liberty, so to honour true government, which is the only basis on which real liberty can stand *and in that line to see peace.* In support of this, and to that cause is the following tract, written in this dreadful crisis, dedicated.

Having recognised that the time had gone by when friction might have been removed by the colonists sending members to Parliament he proceeds to explain the distinction between national and provincial government;[1] he expresses his disbelief that the colonists as yet intended to aim at independence by establishing the former for themselves, and he denied that Great Britain desired to interfere with the provincial government of the colonies by their inhabitants. But so much jealousy and suspicion had arisen that each party to the dispute had put forward arguments beyond what was really intended. Those he called "advanced fortified posts beyond the boundary," when that was determined such posts could be withdrawn. Where was the boundary to be? The colonists, he thought, should perform their duty of "aid and service"

[1] Vol. ii. p. 34.

to the supreme Government in return for the protection they receive from and within its empire. They should be free to act and trade within it, and they had a right to be governed in domestic affairs by their own laws and to raise their own internal taxes which went to meet local expenses. But he emphasises "an essential difference between internal and external taxes," the latter being levied, in the form of Customs duties, as the colonial contribution for Imperial purposes and defence. From them the "colonists never did, in form and as of right, till the year 1768 claim such exemption." Their doing it then was ascribed by Pownall, in a speech already quoted from,[1] to the desire to retaliate on England for Townshend's Act of 1767. When Parliament sought to overstep the line between the two kinds of taxation and prescribe both as of its own authority, the colonists drew back and refused to pay either, and thus things came first to a deadlock and eventually to separation. Pownall's hope was that compromise and agreement might be reached by England abandoning the claim to internal taxation, and by the colonies withdrawing their objection to the Customs. That would bring both parties back to the positions they had occupied in peace for over a century "the old boundaries are known and are those of peace,—any new ones must be set in blood."

A postscript mentions that he had just received documents relating to the proceedings at the Philadelphia Congress in September; he found that there too it had been desired to draw a line of demarcation, but it was a very different one to his. It required England to waive all power of punishing treason even if it were condoned locally. The colonists claimed what they described as "an exclusive right of internal legislation." Pownall did not object to the expression, but he did deny that it excluded the power of Parliament in all cases whatsoever. Next came a colonial demand that England should renounce all power of taxation both *internal and external.* That he would not admit for a moment. England was further called on to cease the regulation of the colonial trade, though it was admitted by her opponents that "this power of regulation is the only bond that can hold us together." Parliament, he said, could not renounce this

[1] See *ante*, p. 215.

power without risking the dissolution of the Empire. He would be no party to it. But he repeated what he had often said before that the colonial statutes of trade needed revision and that the colonies ought to be represented in Parliament. Great Britain was also told that she *must* repeal several of her Acts, especially those about the troops in America. Pownall said that he, "almost alone and unsupported," had endeavoured in Parliament to modify those Acts, but he declared that where the defence of the whole Empire against hostile attacks from without, or against subversion from within, was concerned, the King's right to supreme military control was absolute and necessary. "Any requisition, therefore, of repeal, in such case of repeal, becomes a demand on Great Britain to lay down her arms, to surrender at discretion, to receive such terms as shall be dictated to her."

The colonists had found no better friend in Parliament than this man, but these demands by the Philadelphia Congress went far beyond anything he thought they were entitled to and made him angry. It was evident to him that the extreme men on the other side had captured what is now called in that country "the machine," and were bent on running it off the rails.

The new Parliament met on November 30, 1774; the King's speech mentioned "that a most daring spirit of resistance and disobedience to the law still prevails in the Province of Massachusetts Bay," but the question was not discussed till after the close of the year.

CHAPTER XI

LAST SIX YEARS IN PARLIAMENT

1775–1780

On January 19, 1775, a number of despatches from the English Governors in America were laid before Parliament, each man's report to the home Administration was that his Province was out of hand. There were several to this effect from General Gage in Boston, and the latest received from him, dated November 2, 1774, said of Massachusetts "The whole country is in a ferment, many parts of it, I may say, actually in arms and ready to unite. . . . Great Britain had never more occasion for wisdom, firmness and unanimity."[1]

On the next day Lord Chatham made a strong speech in the Lords denouncing the Government, which he said had falsely charged the Americans with desiring independence when all they sought was the enjoyment of liberty and the security of property. He moved that, as a measure of conciliation, the British troops should be forthwith removed from Boston. During the next month there were long and frequent debates both in the Lords and in the Commons on the crisis in America. A letter from Gage, written on January 18, arrived on February 20, and gave a better account; he thought the people were quieting down after the excitement caused by the Congress in Philadelphia. When this letter was laid before the House on the day it was received, Lord North rose and announced that "if the Americans would propose to Parliament any mode by which they would engage to raise, in their own way and by their own grants, their share of contribution to the common defence," there would

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xviii. 105.

be an end of the whole dispute. This he put in the form of a resolution, and he announced that if this were carried by the House, and agreed to by the colonies as furnishing a settlement, England would refund to each colony the net sums received in the past from the new taxes which would be dropped in the future. This announcement came as a bolt from the blue; it was utterly unexpected, no one appears to have had any idea it was coming except Pownall. The conversation with him which Franklin recorded after that dinner at Richmond which was mentioned in the last chapter shews that he had rightly gauged Lord North, had known how the Prime Minister's mind was influenced by Gage's despatches, and had only made terms for supporting the Government when he was supporting his own opinions in so doing.

So soon as Lord North sat down after giving this shock to the House, Pownall rose. He described himself as having been a steady advocate for the rights of British subjects in America ever since the Congress at Albany twenty years before this time. He had there seen, being on the spot, the origin of this crisis in colonial affairs; he had since then watched its growth till the present situation had arisen. This ought to have been dealt with long ago, but he disclaimed any desire to recall the neglect of Ministries in the past, men with whom he had never had any connection, "having stood and being determined to remain unconnected with all parties. Speaking my own private sentiments, looking to things and not to men, I act from my own principles." Those he claimed that he had fully made known, both by his speeches within the House and by his publications outside it. He said he had thought his labour vain and all to no purpose; in the last Session he had expressed his intention of taking no further part in debate. But he now did so because "on the point of taxation this resolution goes to everything that can, or ought to be, proposed, and is, if rightly understood and accepted as it ought to be, a fair and just preliminary that must lead to peace." He believed that men of influence and property would see that this measure was the only one by which the safety of both countries could be firmly and permanently established. He considered that this action of Government was all that could be expected, and he ended by hoping that these resolutions

"would open the way to reconciliation and peace, and as such I have given my support and do give my most hearty consent to them."[1]

For the last eight years, since he made this very proposal of obtaining the necessary funds from taxation levied by the colonial assemblies instead of by the House of Commons, he had been working steadily with this object. He was now in the position of the jockey who may win his race, not by leading the field but by other horses coming back to him. If the Ministry had come back to Pownall when he moved the repeal of the tax on tea in 1770, all might have been well. When, at the eleventh hour, they did so he could heartily support them, the proposition is described by Mr. Lecky as "a real and considerable step towards conciliation. It was accepted as such by Governor Pownall, who was one of the ablest and most moderate of the defenders of the colonies in Parliament."[2] But if he was content hardly anybody else was; the Tories, and especially the "King's Friends," considered that North had given their whole case away, the Opposition were astonished but not satisfied. Pownall's speech was immediately followed by one from Charles Fox, who taunted Lord North with surrendering, and said no one in America would believe that he was sincere. Edmund Burke spoke next to the same effect. The proposal of Lord North was carried by a great majority—274 to 88.

Worse and worse news arrived from America. On February 24 Lord North introduced a Bill for restraining to Great Britain the trade and commerce of the New England colonies, and for prohibiting their inhabitants from fishing on the Banks of Newfoundland, because the right to do so was an Imperial one and was not covered by the colonial Charters. This Lord North described as a temporary measure intended only to operate till the colonies would resume the trade with England, and to shew them that they on their part had something to lose. He explained that it differed from the Boston Port Bill, which transferred the trade from that place but did not prevent it. That, he said, had caused the adoption by the Americans of very violent action which called for reply. To this measure both Burke and Fox offered strong

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xviii. p. 322; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, i. (1775), p. 198.
[2] *History of the Eighteenth Century*, 1906, iv. p. 200.

opposition, describing it as a policy of seeking to obtain submission by imposing starvation.

Pownall followed Fox in this debate on March 6, he said that "if the Bill proceeded from any such hard-heartedness, or if he could see any such cruel effects in it as had been stated, he would have opposed it instead of acquiescing in it." He denied that there was any question of starving people who, on their own soil, had all they wanted to eat. He described New England as consisting of great grazing settlements, colonies producing more food than their people needed, not only meat but corn, though there was not yet much land under tillage. He looked on the Bill as no more than a commercial regulation, withholding favours till such time as the usual intercourse in commerce was restored. That the extreme action taken at Philadelphia in September by the Congress, just when Lord North was arranging for conciliation, had upset Pownall we have seen. With this in his mind he said that people who urged war, as the colonists were now doing, must be prepared to forego luxuries from abroad; it was those, and not necessary subsistence, which this measure would check, and he thought it ought to pass.[1] By a majority of 188 to 58 it did so.

Till this Session ended on May 26, Pownall did not speak again, though American affairs occupied a large part of the time of Parliament and had entered upon a new phase in the colonies. For their appeasement Lord North's renunciation of internal taxation in January had come too late, and on April 19 the first shots of the war were fired at Lexington, a village ten miles north-west of Boston. There a body of provincials opposed the march of a column sent out by Gage to destroy a magazine at Concord and, though a volley from the regulars cleared a passage, the whole country rose on them. They made their way back to Boston with difficulty, suffering more loss than they inflicted. Gage, with six regiments behind him, could hold Boston, but more than that was impossible to him till reinforcements arrived late in May. On June 17 he attacked entrenchments thrown up by the Americans on Breed's Hill,[2] and after two attempts had failed those

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xviii. p. 398; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, i. (1775), p. 305.

[2] The Americans who held "Breed's" hill disputed the possession by the English of "Bunker's" hill which was near it.

works were carried. Another Congress summoned to meet at Philadelphia rejected Lord North's proposals, and the War of Independence had begun.

What this must have meant to Pownall, who had fought for over ten years with his pen and his tongue to prevent the use of other weapons in warfare, will be understood by those who have followed the description of his action in these pages. During the course of the war he reconciled his good will to his friends in the colonies with perfect loyalty to his country. No one had been more outspoken than he in expressing the opinion that England had been misled by the Government to which he offered no factious opposition. He criticised its methods when he thought necessary to do so, and he strove for peace whenever occasion arose. As he was no partisan the idea of subordinating the welfare of his country to the interests of his party did not commend itself to him as it did to Burke and Fox.[1] When his efforts to maintain good relations with America failed Pownall's political activity diminished, and from this time onward he chiefly occupied himself with writing. In this spring and summer he was busy with a small book of fifty-one octavo pages headed

DRAINAGE AND NAVIGATION BUT ONE UNITED WORK.

He signed it at Richmond on July 27, 1775, and it was published by Almon. The contents are chiefly devoted to the navigation and drainage of the river Ouse which joins the sea at King's Lynn in Norfolk, where Pownall had landed property and owned the advowson of the living. All the district was therefore familiar to him, and though he had no technical knowledge of hydraulic engineering, he wrote clearly and sensibly of its application to local conditions. His object was to urge the importance of attending to the main channel and outlet of the Ouse, thereby preserving Lynn as a deep-water port, supplied with canals which could take produce to and from the inland counties.

Parliament met on October 26, the King's speech declared that in America "The rebellious war now levied is become more general, and is manifestly carried on for

[1] We have seen their conduct repeated during the South African War.

the purpose of establishing an independent Empire." The colonists had succeeded in capturing Crown Point and Ticonderoga, positions so long disputed with the French in the previous war, and they had placed Washington in command of their troops which he was organising in Massachusetts. England had now to make her preparations for a great war, and on November 8 Lord Barrington introduced the Army Estimates which allotted 25,000 men to service in America. On this subject Pownall spoke. He declared that though he had always been and still was an advocate for liberty, and ever since 1769 had opposed measures of force, he must admit that he could do so no longer. The House had ceased to debate whether it should sanction warlike measures or not, a state of war existed. "He wished any ground might be found to give an actual suspension of arms, but he could not, as a Briton and in a British House of Commons, entertain the idea in the face of the enemy of our laying down our arms and surrendering at discretion."

The recent demands of the Americans required as much as this in his opinion from England; they wanted to go back to the end of the last war in 1763 and start negotiation from that standpoint. To repeal all statutes from that date would, he thought, cut the ground from under the feet of England, and only lead to further demands. As to a republic he quoted their own words, "necessity had not yet driven them to that desperate measure." He believed that they still wished to continue their connection with England, and that the sovereignty might be retained, and a revenue raised, by compact. He did not abandon hopes of peace, for the Ministry had made advances to the colonists at the beginning of the year. He hoped that during the winter Government would do everything possible to restore peace before another campaign opened in the spring but, as things were, the question should be left in their hands. Till he saw what they proposed he would support their preparations, for war if it were unavoidable and for peace if it were possible, meanwhile he would do his best to block the interference of others. There had been mention, he noticed, of Commissioners being sent to America to negotiate, and he had been told that his name had been

mentioned as one of them. He denied that any such proposal had been made to him by the government.[1]

This idea of settling the dispute where it had arisen was very much in his mind. Among the Chatham Correspondence in the Record Office is a long letter, dated November 14, 1775, of ten carefully composed and neatly written quarto pages, the authorship of which has never been known. There is no signature. It has never hitherto been placed alongside of any of the great number of letters there preserved which Pownall had written to Lord Chatham (then Mr. Pitt) from Boston fifteen years earlier. When that is done the handwriting is seen to be exactly the same in each case, and this unsigned letter was undoubtedly written by Pownall. As it has been reprinted in full,[2] it is only necessary to say that in terms of great respect it implores Lord Chatham to intervene.

> Be then, my Lord, the guardian angel of this great Empire, decline not the honourable office of mediator between Great Britain and America, unite the two countries upon a basis of permanent friendship without regard to the internal factions of either; leaving administrations and oppositions undisturbed to fight, as they have fought before, their little battles upon ground less perilous to this great community.

The limits of space prevent further quotation, but the whole letter is as strong as this and in the same tone. It ends by a promise that the writer will reveal himself if required. The Editors of the *Chatham Correspondence* append to this a note that "it is evident that Lord Chatham returned an answer to the above remarkable letter." There follows another letter of a page and a half in the same handwriting, dated November 17, which acknowledges one written on the previous day by Lord Chatham who, it appears, declined to act on the ground of his health which had again failed him. Apart from that there was no possibility of Chatham being employed. He had used very strong language—stronger than ever came from Pownall—a year before about the treatment of America, and the King was so incensed that, when he wrote on August 9, 1775, to Lord North about the pension which went with the Chatham peerage, he had

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xviii. p. 890.

[2] *Chatham Correspondence*, 1840, iv. The original is in Packet IV., Chatham MSS.

used these words. "When decrepitude or death puts an end to him as a trumpet of sedition I shall make no difficulty."[1] Nearly a century passed before this private opinion of Chatham, then entertained by the King, was published, but taken in connection with Pownall's invocation of Chatham's help it shews how hopeless was this attempt by Pownall, each of whose efforts was blocked by the King.

On November 29 there was a debate in Parliament on the petition from Nova Scotia by which the Assembly of that Province sought to compound for all other taxation by granting the Crown 8 per cent on their imports. Pownall spoke again on this subject, he wished to have it made clear that this money should be ear-marked for the defence of the colony, and also that it was not a final arrangement. He wanted the terms made more elastic, the Crown to be allowed to make special demands on special occasions or the colony to make extra grants when it thought fit. He said that people in other American colonies were afraid that if they committed themselves to giving a fixed revenue to support the expenses of Government and of defence the Assemblies would be ignored and set on one side as useless, thus losing all their authority. The insertion in the Bill of provisions to this effect met with Lord North's approval.

1776

The Session continued till May 23, 1776, but all through the first months of the year there is no mention of Pownall as taking any part in debate. He was occupied with other matters, one of them

A TOPOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF SUCH PARTS OF NORTH AMERICA AS ARE CONTAINED IN THE ANNEXED MAP OF THE MIDDLE BRITISH COLONIES.

By T. Pownall, M.P.

(Printed for J. Almon, 1776.)

The map here referred to was produced by Lewis Evans, a surveyor of Philadelphia, and a friend of

[1] *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North*, W. B. Donne, 1867, Letter No. 308.

Franklin, in 1754. It will be remembered that after the Congress at Albany in that year Pownall retired with Franklin to Philadelphia, where Franklin no doubt introduced him, as a man interested in American topography, to Evans who was the pioneer in that subject. And not in that only, for Pownall mentions in this book that Franklin's discovery of the nature of electricity was based on the observations of Evans, who in 1749 had published in his notes that a thunderstorm always came up from the leeward, and that thunder was caused by "sea clouds coming freighted with electricity and meeting with others less so, the equilibrium is restored by *snaps of lightning*." As early as 1743 Evans had kept a topographical journal, printed in appendix No. v. of Pownall's work, which describes Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, and was first published in 1749. To that he afterwards added other regions so that the map of 1755 extends from the Atlantic nearly as far as the Mississippi, and from the St. Lawrence in the north to the southern boundaries of Virginia and Kentucky. This map is 26 × 19 inches, it bears a dedication to Thomas Pownall who is spoken of as being, in Evans's opinion, the best judge of a map in America. The scale is small, but there was nothing larger at that time, and through the Seven Years' War this was the guide to military operations.[1] Twenty years had passed since Pownall first made acquaintance with Evans, who meanwhile had died leaving his family badly off. Mr. Stevens believes that Pownall had by him in England the original plate which he used as the basis of the improved map which he brought out in 1776, for the benefit of the daughter and grandchildren of Evans, slightly enlarged and accompanied by a detailed description of the country. This description, which is Pownall's work, covers sixty-eight large folio pages. The Preface speaks of the more remote districts, such as that of the Ohio, as being still a wilderness chiefly accessible by following up the streams and rivers, to the nature of which special attention had therefore been given. Pownall observes that "it will be curious in a few years as the face

[1] The history of the plate from which it was engraved is a remarkable one, and has been lucidly described by Mr. Henry N. Stevens, F.R.G.S., in a treatise published in 1905.

of the country changes and is totally altered, to view this map and to read in this description what it was in its natural state and how the Settlements began to expand and had extended themselves in twenty years." In 1758 Thomas Jeffreys, a well-known publisher of Charing Cross, had pirated the original map, and his doing so brought Pownall down upon him. "This plagiarism was falsely sold as Evans's map improved, by which that very laborious and ingenious but poor man was deprived of the benefit of his work. . . . So far as respects the face of the country this thing of Jeffreys might as well be a map of the face of the moon." When he was moved to anger no one could express his feelings more forcibly than Pownall, who deals severely with Jeffreys, denouncing him as "a blundering copyist." The "Description," which follows this Preface consists of forty-six large pages, it speaks of America as "a country of woods, and lakes, or rivers" in which every portion of the soil

> Even the poorest hath its peculiar cloathing of trees and shrubs. . . . If here I should attempt to describe the colouring of these woods I should be at a loss which season of the year to choose—whether the sober harmony of greens that the woods in all their various tints give in summer, or whether the flaunting blush of spring when the woods glow with a thousand tints. . . . If I should persuade the painter to attempt the giving a real and strict portrait of these woods in autumn he must mix in upon his canvas all the colours of the rainbow in order to copy the various and varied dyes which the leaves at the Fall assume, the Red, the Scarlet, the bright and the deep Yellow, the warm Brown, the White, which he must use would give a prismatic motley patchwork that the eye would turn away from, and that the judgment would not bear, and yet the woods in this embroidered garb have in real Nature a richness of appearance beyond conception.

While he was not blind to the beauties of the country when he travelled through it as a young man he kept a very watchful eye on practical matters,—the conformation of the ground, the natural vegetation, the capacity of various districts for tillage with imported seed, the nature of the soil and the ores to be found beneath it, the fisheries,—all these are fully noticed.

> When I first went to America the subject and the object were both new to the Europeans. I thought the situation in which I was employed required attention to this point. I never travelled without a compass and a little level, of my own contrivance, for taking

elevations; besides that, from an habit of drawing from nature, my eye could mark an angle with exactness sufficient for practice. I was very particular in observing and noting . . . the ranges of the hills and mountains . . . the courses and nature of the currents of the several rivers, their falls and fords wherever I had opportunity. The passes and gaps in the mountains, and especially the places where posts fixed might give a command in the country. The reader may see a very early use which I made of this knowledge (such as it was) in the "State of the Service which I drew up for the late Duke of Cumberland in the year 1756.[1]

From this he proceeds to say how at a later period, when he was Governor in Massachusetts, he had employed scouts whom he trained to do this kind of work, making each man keep a regular journal, the notes in each of which were summarised when the men got back to headquarters.

I can speak from experience of the use of this. I experienced it in my own province, such classed and posted accounts would have proved a good check on the unfaithfulness of many an artificial journal cooked up by the scouting parties. Moreover, the habit of keeping such journals and making such remarks would have trained many a good regimental officer to become a real general. Without this knowledge, and practical readiness in applying it, no officer ought to be trusted with the command of a body of men.[2]

As might be expected the courses of the Kennebec and Penobscot rivers, which Pownall had personally investigated in 1758-59, are minutely described. All the mountain ranges, all the rivers which flow eastward to the Atlantic, the seaboard and the whole produce of the country receive attention in this treatise in which the account of this land the writer loved ends by an allusion to its condition when he wrote. He says that he had intended to add from his journals

a portrayed description of the country as one sees it in travelling through it. The wretched state of confusion and ruin into which it has fallen compared with the happy state in which I saw it. It is, I own, a view that my eye and heart turn away from; nor can I bear the retrospect which the very reading over my journal opens to me. If I live and have leisure, when I see their happier days of peace and

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[1] This memorandum to the Duke of Cumberland has been mentioned in Chapter III. *ante*, p. 61.

[2] Should this opinion, so early expressed, meet the eye of General Baden-Powell who is doing so much to spread a knowledge of scouting, it will probably receive his approval.

good government return again, most likely I shall insert these matters in some future edition of this work.[1]

The other task which Pownall took in hand this year was a careful study of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, then newly published. This was defined by its author as an attempt to ascertain "the general principles which ought to run through and lay the foundation of the laws of all Nations." It was a pioneer book; on the principles there laid down the whole structure of modern political economy has been built. Smith is believed to have devoted nearly ten years to its preparation, and he included a vast number of topics, the price of food and commodities, the wages of labour and their relation to capital, the commercial or mercantile system and its value to a country as compared with agriculture, the attitude of the colonies to the mother country and their trade with it, the rates of exchange, the effect of a paper currency, the corn laws. All these difficult questions were exhaustively treated by Smith, and few men had then followed these lines of thought. Among those men however Pownall was one, while Smith had studied the theory only he had been able to watch the operation of theory when reduced to practice, and it is only when this is done successfully that theory is proved to be sound. In that respect Pownall's life as an active man of affairs in America and in Parliament had given him some advantage over Smith, whose great work he was therefore not content only to read. He made his notes on it, and those he published under the heading of—

[1] Pownall's geographical studies bore fruit in another form this year. Messrs. Sayer and Bennett, of 53 Fleet Street, dedicated to him an octavo volume, a *Military Pocket Atlas* containing six very well-executed maps of North America, the West Indies, the Lake Champlain district, and the northern, the middle, and the southern colonies. These were intended for the use of officers engaged in the war, and as they are on a much larger scale than the map by Evans which had been used in the previous campaigns against the French, they give a much better idea of the country. The dedication describes them as based on the maps of Governor Pownall, whom it credits with "a particular knowledge of North America," and it thanks him for having enabled the authors to rectify former mistakes, and to offer details hitherto unknown. Though this very useful volume cannot be included in the list of his works, because it did not appear with his name, it is evident that Pownall not only furnished much of the material but contributed largely to the production of this Atlas. The original owner of the copy in the present writer's possession was some officer employed in the Virginian campaigns; the maps of that country are much worn, while those of New England are in good condition, despite their age.

A LETTER FROM GOVERNOR POWNALL TO ADAM SMITH, LL.D., F.R.S., BEING AN EXAMINATION OF SEVERAL POINTS OF DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN HIS ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS.

This treatise was brought out by Almon, and is of considerable size, containing 48 large quarto pages. As the first reasoned argument, partly against and partly in support of, the opinions of Smith it attracted a good deal of attention, both at the time and afterwards.[1] Pownall dates this from Richmond on September 25, 1776, and mentions that he had spent the summer in studying the work of Mr. Smith. The great value of it he fully recognises; and he adds that if he did not in every point concur in the opinions he found expressed "it is not in the spirit of controversy, which I both detest and despise, but in that of fair discussion that I address this to you."[2]

Pownall begins by stating that nearly thirty years previously he had himself taken up the questions in Mr. Smith's book, and that in 1752 he had written his *Principles of Polity* which discussed some of them. He adds that in the years that had since elapsed the pressure of active life, though it had distracted his attention, had not diminished his interest, and he therefore claimed some right to speak.

He deals first with Mr. Smith's assertion that human beings had, as other creatures had not, an inherent propensity to barter, which caused some men to devote themselves to one class of labour, some to another, in order that each might obtain a surplus, the barter of which in each case became the origin of trade. This, said Pownall, was not the motive, it was not the ultimate idea of obtaining a surplus to barter with which made men specialise in different callings. It was the immediate intention of doing what each felt himself most fitted for which led individuals to devote their labour to what they could do best. From this assumed tendency to barter Smith deduced the origin and use of money, and also the price of

[1] It is still in much request, because those who possess the original edition of the *Wealth of Nations* wish to have this contemporary critique on it also. It is not easy to get a copy for less than £5.

[2] This naïve disclaimer provokes the remark that though Pownall was often in controversy he never knew it. His attitude to himself always was, "I am not arguing, I never argue. I am only stating facts."

commodities, and what they represented, either in labour or in money. He said that when labour had obtained its result "the commodity is then sold precisely for what it is worth, or for what it really costs the person who brings it to market." Pownall observes that this was a fallacy because it omitted the human element in the transaction. When two men met to exchange the surplus of their respective labour, the terms on which it changed hands depended, according to Pownall, not only on the nature of the property but on how each man was

> by nature formed to make a good bargain in the common adjustment of the barter. He who has not an impatience in his desire on one hand, or a soon alarmed fear on the other of losing his market; who has a certain firmness, perseverance, and coldness in barter, will take the lead in setting the price upon the meek and poor in spirit.

Smith asserted that values found their own level, a "natural price" being formed from the "ordinary or average rate both of wages and profit," and this Pownall accepted as a theory; but he was doubtful whether it would be universally true in practice, because here again human nature came in to disturb that equilibrium which Smith thought arose and was maintained by the balance of supply and demand. It was with clear perception of how Trades Unions might force the pay of an inefficient man to the level of that of a skilled man, and of how manufacturers and merchants, combining in that most untrustworthy arrangement called a "Trust," might raise prices, that Pownall wrote.

> If any one who has got a lead in business should adopt your distinction of *natural* and *market* price . . . he may, through a confusion and reverse of all order, so perplex the supply of the community as totally to ruin those who are concerned in it, and entirely to obliterate it. He may render trade almost impracticable, and annihilate commerce.

A considerable part[1] of the *Wealth of Nations* is assigned to the colonies and their commerce. It is there said that no progress had been more rapid than that of the English in North America; another passage states that all other home countries, Spain and France for instance, had imposed commercial restrictions on their

[1] Book IV. Chap. VI.

colonies, but that the system of England had been upon the whole less ill-liberal and oppressive than any other.

Smith gave the cost to England of the Seven Years' War as ninety millions sterling, and that outlay he regarded as chargeable to the colonial account, because the war, though carried out in Europe and India as well as on the Canadian frontier, had arisen from the defence of the colonies. If, on occasion, so heavy a charge was to be borne by the English taxpayer and he had always to defray the cost of affording ordinary naval and military protection to his fellow-subjects over seas, it was, in Smith's opinion, only right that England should have the monopoly of trade with the colonies in order to recoup herself. There was no other source from which she could do so, if she were deprived of this the connection was a pure loss to her. In speaking of this he asserted that "the European colonies of America have never yet furnished any military force for the defence of the mother country. Their military force has never yet been sufficient for their own defence." So far as Massachusetts was concerned Pownall was able to challenge this statement; he wrote in reply that the military power of that colony had "not only defended the dominions of the mother country in that province, but for many years exerted itself in defending Acadia or Nova Scotia." He alludes to the capture of Louisburg by the colonists under Sir William Pepperell, and adds that

> so far as my assertion may go in proof I will venture to assert that had France during the last war effectuated a landing in Great Britain, and had been able to maintain themselves there until an account of it should have arrived in New England, I should have been able to have brought over or sent from the province of Massachusetts Bay (perhaps joined by Connecticut also) a military force for the defence of the mother country.

We come next to the question of the Corn Laws and the grant by the State of a bounty or premium to the producer of a necessary article in order to enable him to live. Smith approved of such action, saying

> when the merchant is obliged to sell his goods for a price which does not replace to him his capital together with the ordinary profit . . . if the bounty did not repay to the merchant what he would

otherwise lose upon the price of his goods his own interest would soon oblige him to employ his stock in another way.[1]

"No trade deserves more the full protection of the law and no trade requires it so much," is his remark on dealings in corn.[1] With his usual thoroughness Smith traces the history of the old corn laws from the time of Edward VI. down to the then recent Act of 1773, which he approves of on the import, but not on the export, side of the question. As Pownall had proposed this Bill and had been responsible for its progress through the Commons he naturally argues in favour of its provisions, designed as they were to automatically benefit the producer as well as the consumer.

On the subject of currency Smith and Pownall differed most widely. The former spoke of the cost of labour as the first unit of cost, "the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities."[2] He looked on money as merely a measure of this value; he wrote that "the substitution of paper in the room of gold and silver money replaces a very expensive instrument of commerce with one much less costly and sometimes equally convenient." In another passage he maintained that "a paper money consisting in bank notes, issued by people of undoubted credit . . . is in every respect equal in value to gold and silver money."[3] Pownall replied that it was nothing of the kind, that metallic currency was not only a circulating medium but a national asset which he called a deposit. He had seen in America how a paper currency worked in practice. "With a fund of £20,000 a banker or the Treasury of a Government may circulate £100,000, yet whenever . . . it becomes necessary to take that £100,000 out of circulation, the banker or the Treasury can pay but £20,000, or four shillings in the pound, that circulation must end in a fraud." He said that

> many years' experience in a country of paper hath convinced me that if any instrument of the exchange of commodities other than that which is called a deposit . . . shall be introduced, it will be a source of fraud which, leading by an unnatural influx of riches to luxury without bounds, and to enterprise without foundation, will derange all industry and, instead of substantial wealth, end by bankruptcies in distress and poverty.

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[1] Book IV. Chap. V. *Digression concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws.*
[2] *Wealth of Nations,* Book I. Chap. V. [3] *Ibid.* Book II. Chap. II.


NEW-YORK
FIVE POUNDS. No. 45213
By a LAW of the Colony of NEW-YORK, this Bill shall be received in all Payments in the Treasury, for Five Pounds. NEW-YORK, February 16, 1771.
Walter Franklin V.L
SIGILL. CIVITAT. NOV. EBORAC.
'Tis Death to counterfeit.


Continental Currency
Sixty Dollars. No. 260011
This Bill entitles the Bearer to receive Sixty Spanish milled DOLLARS, or the Value thereof in Gold or Silver, according to a Resolution passed by Congress at Philadelphia, Sept. 26th, 1778.
DEUS REGNAT EXULTET TERRA.
LX DOLLARS.
Jacob Masonor

He referred to what he had himself published two years previously on the currency question;[1] there he had alluded to the difficulties some American colonies had got into by the issue of a local currency beyond their power of redemption, and had suggested that paper money should only be used in the colonies[2] under strict regulations framed by England and with English credit behind it. How great is the temptation to an impecunious state to flood the market with paper money, obtaining temporary relief but destroying financial confidence and stability, has often since been demonstrated. Smith's life in England had not taught him that lesson, but Pownall had learned it in America when the resources of his colony were strained by war, and he had written to Pitt of the shifts the people were put to, the depreciation of paper among them. He strongly opposed Smith's willingness to recognise paper as money unless sufficient real money stood behind it. He succeeded in quoting Smith against himself because he had admitted that, during an unsuccessful war, much greater trouble would be caused if the enemy got possession of the Capital, and the treasure which supported the paper issue, than if the coin were distributed in the pockets of the people instead of being centred in one place.[3] Pownall ended this treatise by saying that so far as colonial questions were concerned he was afraid that he and Smith were "reasoning here about events which once were, and were most dear, but are no more." It seemed to him that, now war had broken out, there was no further room for discussion as to the conduct of England in economic questions towards her colonies, "the fate of this country is now at the hazard of events which force, and not reason, is to decide."

When these words were written in September 1776 not many weeks had passed since the old colonies of England took the decisive step of declaring their independence on July 4. During the first year of the war, from the spring of 1775 to that of 1776, it had been a drawn game in Massachusetts, neither side could gain any advantage over the other. Washington had always against him a powerful

[1] *Administration*, 1774, i. Chap. VI. pp. 180-221.

[2] In the facsimiles of this which are here reproduced it will be observed that the earlier one—before the rupture—is in sterling, the later one is in dollars.

[3] *Wealth of Nations*, Book II. Chap. II.

minority averse to the severance from England, and by the majority he was but poorly supported. His raw levies, ill-drilled and ill-armed, at times actually short of ammunition, were no match for the well-supplied British regulars. They, on the other hand, were strong enough to hold Boston, but unable to act at any distance from their headquarters there. In their command General Gage had been succeeded by Sir William Howe, brother of the Lord Howe who had fallen before Ticonderoga nearly twenty years earlier. In March 1776 Sir William resolved to abandon Boston and transfer his base of operations to New York, of which he took possession in September. He had inflicted on Washington a defeat at Brooklyn which disorganised the American army so much that it appeared for a time to have no prospect of recovery or success. The English spent the winter in New York and its vicinity. Parliament met on October 31, but some months passed during which there is no mention of Pownall taking part in the proceedings.

1777

Pownall's absence from the House of Commons at the beginning of this year was probably due to the illness of his wife, who died on February 6, 1777. On the north side of the Lady Chapel in Lincoln Cathedral there is a monument to her memory, which bears an inscription recounting her appearance and her virtues. At such times of trial men's expressions are liable to be dominated by their emotions, and they very usually express their feelings in a more exaggerated style than they use when untouched by grief. In almost all obituary notices written by those nearly related to the dead this tendency may be observed; it is specially noticeable on the tombstones and monumental tablets of that period, which are usually worded in terms which appear to us high-flown and stilted. To that rule this one is no exception. While it leaves no doubt of Pownall's sincere attachment to the companion who had been taken from him it expresses that feeling in a manner very different to the style which the many extracts here given from his speeches and writings shew to have been habitual to him. In the spring of this

year a portrait of Pownall by Cotes was engraved by Earlom, whose work has been reproduced, on a much smaller scale,[1] to form the frontispiece of this book.

In the House of Commons Pownall did not speak till April 18, when Government applied to the House for a sum of £618,340 to discharge debts incurred by the King, and also for an addition of £100,000 to the annual sum of £800,000, which had been granted at the beginning of the reign. Pownall's speech referred to the previous payment of the King's debts in 1769; he explained that he had then voted against their being defrayed by the country because no accounts of them were rendered and had indeed been refused when asked for. Parliament had thus been left to vote in ignorance of what had caused the extra expenditure it was asked to provide for. But when the accounts were produced a year later they were found to be quite in order, and it appeared from them that the deficiency had been due to necessary and unforeseen expenses. On this occasion the accounts were produced in the first instance, and as nobody challenged them he intended to vote for the grant. During this Session, which ended on June 6, no other speech of his is reported. In previous years he had spoken frequently in the hope of preventing the war, but that had now been going on for two years and he kept silence, waiting for an opportunity to advocate peace.

During the winter Howe had been reinforced, but when the spring came he was slow to take the offensive from his headquarters at New York. The scheme of operations for the year was that he was to do this with the bulk of his forces, while a portion of them were to march northwards to meet a separate expedition under General Burgoyne which was to come southwards from Canada down Lakes Champlain and George. This was a precise revival of the French idea in previous wars of using the waterways of those Lakes in order to run a cordon behind New England. If the troops from New York could join hands with those whom Burgoyne led from Canada, and a communication be thus opened

[1] The original engraving is 18″×13″. The picture is mentioned in the *Dictionary of National Biography* and also in *Smith's Portraits*, i. p. 255. Another portrait is in the Hall of the Mass. Hist. Society, and one by Henry C. Pratt of Boston was exhibited there in 1861 (Allibone's *Dict. of Authors*, p. 1658).

between the British there and those who held New York, the isolation of New England and the hemming in of her people would be effected. For this purpose Burgoyne was provided with only 8000 regulars, a number which appears small to first penetrate and then hold a line of country 200 miles long. No margin was left for the inevitable wastage of men in war, and to that insufficiency of force was due the eventual failure of the scheme. But during the first part of the year the occupation of New York in the previous autumn, and the reverses Washington had suffered then and in the winter at the hands of Howe, made the position of the Americans appear desperate. As the year advanced and the possibility of Burgoyne coming down from Canada was known all hope for them seemed lost. In the autumn of 1776 they had seen that unless some Foreign Power came to their aid it was all over with them, and they had then despatched Franklin to join their Commissioners in Paris and seek the aid of France. Whether he obtained it or not depended on the fate of Burgoyne, who began his march from Canada in June. By July 1 he arrived before Ticonderoga, which Amherst, in command of English and colonial troops acting together, had taken from the French just eighteen years before this time. The place had been refortified; it was now held by colonials against English, but the former were so weak that they had to abandon it. Burgoyne moved further south to the Hudson river, expecting to meet the auxiliary expedition from New York which was to reinforce him, but in that he was disappointed. His original number of 8000 men was reduced by every engagement. The whole militia of the country — which meant all men capable of bearing arms—rose against him, and by September 19, when he fought the indecisive battle of Stillwater which cost him another 500 men, he was as inferior in numbers to the Americans as he had been superior to them at Ticonderoga in July. By the middle of October he had retreated from the Hudson as far north as Saratoga where he was surrounded; he had lost more than half his force and the remainder had to lay down their arms. Though Howe had again defeated Washington at Brandywine, and had occupied Philadelphia in September the capitulation of Burgoyne was the decisive event of the

war; it not only put new heart into the Americans but caused France to intervene on their behalf.

Franklin had meanwhile spent the first part of the year in vain attempts to induce the French Ministry to join America in the war, as autumn drew on he was still without success. He found them quite willing to help in a quiet way those who had become England's enemies; if they could have seen a prospect of re-establishing themselves in Canada they would have been delighted, but they had not forgotten how disastrous for their country had been the wars which ended in 1713 and 1763. To formally commit themselves to America by a treaty meant another war with England, and for that they were not prepared. They preferred to play a waiting game in the hope that the war might continue indefinitely and weaken England without any risk being incurred by France. While this policy suited the French it meant ruin to the colonists who were in sore need of immediate help. Their Commissioners, headed by Franklin, at the end of August addressed a very strong memorial to the French Ministry in the hope of stimulating them to action. This paper,[1] written when it was known that Burgoyne had started on his march from Canada, pointed out that it was a mistake to suppose that the war would last long. It predicted that as England knew that if she were to win it must be in the campaign of the next year, 1778; that she would at once make a great effort to overcome the resistance of the colonies and, as things stood, she would probably succeed. That the colonists were becoming exhausted and might be compelled, if not to resume their position as subjects of England, to enter into a steady alliance with her, was admitted. The French were asked how far it would suit them in the future to see the power of England supplemented by that of the colonists, who had shewn themselves to be strong if not strong enough to win in the present struggle. Their first object, it was stated, had been the redress of grievances, a strong minority of the colonists would be content to take that now and indeed had never sought more. They had been overruled by those who had embarked on the larger programme of independence, but many of them, if they found this unattainable, would

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xix. p. 931; Almon's *Parl. Debates,* ix. p. 51.

abandon the hope of it, and by going over to the minority would give it a preponderating influence in making peace with England. It was argued that if France ever meant to give help she had no time to lose; she was told that she had already done either too much or too little, enough to incense England, not enough to turn the scale in favour of the colonists. If they had to accept defeat France might expect England to seek revenge on her as soon as the colonists were conquered, by moving the victorious fleet and troops from North America to capture the French islands in the West Indies. Even this strong appeal did not convince the French Ministers. When they heard of Burgoyne's initial success at Ticonderoga they thought the colonists would be reduced from proposing terms to accepting whatever they could get, they might even accept the supremacy of France in lieu of that of England.

Through the autumn of 1777, Franklin was in despair, so much so that as he could do nothing with the French he was minded to turn to England. It will be seen that the Englishman he turned to in this crisis of his country's fate was his old friend Thomas Pownall. No one else in England knew exactly what was passing in Paris at this time. In his correspondence with Lord North it is seen that the King himself did not know what France would do, but he expected her to side with America. All depended on the news about Burgoyne. His surrender at Saratoga, which delighted France and decided her action, while it filled England with despair, was known in London on the night of December 2.[1] On that afternoon Mr. Fox had brought forward in the House of Commons a demand for an inquiry into the state of the nation. The colonial trade was gone, other trade was suffering, it was difficult to get men for the war and the expenditure it entailed was enormous and increasing. Fox moved for papers, for the repeal of the coercive Act of 1774, which had closed the port of Boston and for that of two other Acts in restraint of colonial trade.

This brought Pownall up, he inquired whether recent negotiations for peace, which had been carried out by Admiral Lord Howe, had failed because the Admiral had not been permitted to deal with the Americans on

[1] *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North,* W. B. Donne, 1867, ii. p. 92.

the only ground they would accept—that of their independence which they had formally proclaimed a year and a half before, and had since then further committed themselves to by declarations to foreign Powers. He asked also what terms either Government or Opposition were prepared to offer, and if either party had a definite programme to offer.

I know that what I have said, and what I shall say further, will displease gentlemen on both sides, but I have no managements to keep either with individuals or parties of men. I have none to oblige, I have none to fear. . . . I will beg to remind them that nine years ago, in the year 1768 and 1769, when we were beginning the quarrel which has brought on this horrid and destructive war, I did explain to the House, not in general words, but by a particular detail, the state and circumstances of America and its inhabitants, and from then described the issue of this business literally and precisely as it has turned out in every event. . . . The House did not care to believe it, and were less willing to hear it. I was not well received but it was true, it has proved true in almost every iota. When upon your first sending troops to Boston the Americans were driven to war I first informed the House and, I believe, Government also, that the Americans were not unprepared to meet any event, that they had foreseen what must come . . . I then informed the House of their having planned and modelled an army. The House did not care to understand though they did not disbelieve me. I now tell this House and Government that the Americans never will return again to their subjection to the Government of this country . . . I now take upon me to assert directly and in terms that your sovereignty over America is abolished and gone for ever. . . . Until you shall be convinced that you are no longer Sovereigns over America, but that the United States are an independent Sovereign people—until you are prepared to treat with them as such, it is of no consequence at all what schemes or plans this side the House or that may adopt. I have at this time told ye the fact which I have just declared in order that ye may no longer amuse and abuse yourselves with impracticable ideas.

In his wrath he told the House—which has seldom been thus addressed as a whole—that he noticed they did not appear to appreciate what he said, but he hoped they would afterwards remember it. What, he asked, was the use of all this party formality and parliamentary routine, one side issuing instructions, the other side moving for papers? Different parties might waste their time in bandying argument, but it was no use whatever, it had no effect in England, and the Americans had long ceased to take any interest in it. So far as they were concerned,

he declared further discussion of the Navigation Act and the Laws of Trade to be equally futile. Everything of that kind had been swept away by the war. The Americans would never again be bound by laws of that kind, nor would the Powers of Europe be shut out by them from the American trade. As to France, she had long been hoping to get a share in that business, England's quarrel with America had given France her opportunity, and she had taken it. On what terms France and America stood to each other just then few people knew; they have been above described as uncertain during the summer and early autumn, but it was now December. If news of Saratoga had not arrived it must have been known that Burgoyne was in difficulties, and to France it was becoming worth while to intervene. Pownall knew what was going on; he announced that, "to speak precisely they (the Americans) have not as yet any definite treaty with France, but the two powers are under stipulations and conventions in which they perfectly understand each other." That being the case he declared that, for the future, England could never expect more than a commercial alliance, possibly a friendly one, with America, therefore attention had better be given to arranging for that, a practical matter, than to treading in vain this old ground of controversy which had so often been trodden before. Why, he asked, could not people recognise facts and act on them instead of continuing to wrangle about details of theory? "As for the papers asked for they are of no more consequence than so much waste paper. Nothing can have been done, nothing ever will be done in that line, so I care not whether the House grants the motion or no."[1] This fierce denunciation bears a striking resemblance to similar outbreaks of pent-up wrath and disgust with the authorities which had come from the pen of Junius ten years earlier. Another speech of his, made three months later, will explain how on this occasion Pownall was upset by the recent failure of an appeal he had made to the supreme authority of the King who had refused to deal, through him, with Franklin before the news came of Saratoga. To a man who had just found that the King again blocked the way to peace, a motion for papers in the House might well appear trivial and useless.

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xix. p. 525; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, 1778, viii. p. 87.

1778

On February 6, 1778, Pownall spoke again on a motion made by Mr. Burke as to the employment of Red Indians in the war. Burke spoke of their horrible savagery, of their having no distinction among themselves but the number of scalps they could collect, and the inducement this gave them to slaughter. He recognised that Burgoyne and other generals had endeavoured to check their barbarous habit, and regretted that they were permitted to take part in the war. Pownall replied that this was unavoidable, though deplorable. If there were fighting going on within reach of Red Indians, their nature was such that they would certainly join in. If England and America agreed not to employ Indians on either side, the Indians would fight and scalp both sides unless force were used to prevent them. "No war can be carried on in that country in which the Indians will not mix. That belligerent power which hath not them with it will have them against it. The idea of a neutrality is a delusive notion, and impracticable in fact." This he could say from personal knowledge; he had himself seen war in which Indians were engaged; both England and France had tried to utilise them, when England succeeded in doing so France protested against her action. Exactly the same thing had happened now. "The same spirit of politics, on the same ground, led the Congress in this war (after they had failed in their attempt to engage confederated Indians) to follow the plausible line of neutrality in a temper of moderation and humanity." Congress knew the value of the Indians and had tried,[1] as France had tried twenty years before, to obtain their co-operation. If that attempt had succeeded it would have been the English who were scalped instead of the Americans. As to the use of Indians by the English the Americans had nothing to say; as to the abuse of them, the condoning their savage habits, that Pownall admitted was another question. He referred to the methods of Sir William

[1] In May 1776 Congress passed a resolution in favour of engaging the Indians, and in June they authorised General Schuyler to raise 2000 Indians for service in Canada. In July Washington begged for 500 of them (*England in the XVIIIth Century*, W. E. H. Lecky, 1906, iv. p. 370).

Johnson for keeping the Indians in hand in the last war. Inquiry had satisfied him that Sir William's regulations were still in force; if any British commander allowed them to be infringed he deserved the severest punishment. Beyond that nothing could be done unless the white men would waive their quarrel with each other for a time to act together in the suppression of the red man. This might open the way to peace, if Parliament would propose he was sure that Congress would accept it.

> Government will not commit any of its rights or interests in making the proposal, the very making of it would lay the grounds of agreement. (Here a mark of almost general approbation shewed itself by "Hear him" from all sides of the House.) I hail the happy omen. I think I see the spirit of peace arising in the House, and may it animate all our breasts.

He proceeded to say that if only Government would adopt the suggestion,

> I will without commission, without pay or the expectation of any reward whatsoever, go myself to the Congress and make the proposal. And though I take with me no commission by which Government may be committed . . . I will find a way to give assurance to the Congress that they may act on my proposal. I will put myself as a hostage into their hands for the truth of what I propose and for the good faith of Government. On this ground I am ready to set out this moment. I feel not a little happy that what I have said is well received by the House. Whether it will be accepted and adopted by Government I know not, I feel I have done my duty.[1]

Government took no notice of this offer. On the very day Pownall made it in Westminster, Franklin was signing the treaty in Paris between France and America which the news of Saratoga had at last enabled him to conclude. Eleven days later, when this all-important fact was still unknown, Lord North announced the intention of the English Government to withdraw the Tea Duty, to restore the Charter of Massachusetts, to suspend all the legislation of Parliament which affected the colonies, to send Commissioners from England to treat with them. Government was at last willing to give them everything they had originally asked, all that Chatham, Burke, and Pownall had asked for them. The last-named item in that procedure, the negotiation on the spot, was what Pownall had tried twelve years previously,

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xix. p. 701; Almon's *Parl. Debates,* viii. pp. 354-358.

in 1766, to get the Duke of York to undertake. From his conversation in 1774 Franklin had gathered that Pownall desired to be sent himself, in 1775 he had written to Lord Chatham on the subject, in his speech last quoted he had offered to go to America even if he bore no credentials. The belated concessions of Lord North were exactly what Pownall had spent years in demanding, but they came too late, the French Treaty was an accomplished fact. The English Cabinet was informed of it by the French Ambassador on March 13. On the 16th Burke and Fox complained in the House of Commons that Government had been so ignorant of what was passing that they had actually proposed to send Commissioners and to make concessions to what were still considered as colonies after their complete independence had been recognised by France.

Pownall took part on the 17th in the debate on an Address which was moved to support the King, who had withdrawn his Ambassador from Paris. He said that though people thought this alliance between France and America had been contemplated for the last two years that was a mistake; it had never been seriously considered by France till within the last six months. That had been the crucial time, and the American Agents had to his knowledge experienced great difficulty in getting the French to move. He then produced and read to the House the above-mentioned Memorial[1] drawn up at the end of August to incite the French; he described how it failed to convince them and how the negotiation had been nearly broken off.

> In this moment communications of this state of things came to a very private and very inconsiderable individual. They were made to me with direct explanations that the Americans were willing to open a treaty with this country for reconciliation and the re-establishment of peace, and that, although the acknowledgment of their independency was *causa sine qua non*, yet on that point, and on all such points with which the affairs of America and this country were entangled, they would do everything to save the honour of their parent country. In what I now disclose I betray no confidences. I discover no man's secrets. I am authorised and at liberty for all I say.

The letter which put the case before him was, he said, dated from Paris on September 11, 1777; he did not say

[1] See p. 291, *ante*.

by whom it was written, but there can be no doubt that it was Franklin, who had been intimate with Pownall for five-and-twenty years, and knew him to be very well able to draw attention to the proposal, though looked on with great disfavour by the King. That letter had described how the French were in September still keeping the Americans at arm's-length, it had said that England could have good terms if she would only forestall the French and act promptly. Pownall continued his speech "Overtures of such a nature coming thus to me, an unconnected individual, who had no communications with Ministers as such nor any right to such communications what was I to do or not to do?" He had felt that a great responsibility was cast on him, to have ignored the letter would have been criminal to his country; at the same time he did not feel bound to commit himself personally to any one short of the supreme authority, the King. Without mentioning that name he said

> I did communicate this matter where I thought it most proper so to do, and by means of which I knew I should have an authentic answer . . . thus far I went in what I communicated and said I was ready to go into a full explanation of the whole, but would make that only to Cabinet Council. I had my answer—that the ground was inadmissible in the first instance—and there this matter dropped and this one opportunity, such as can never happen twice, was lost for ever.

Pownall proceeded to inform the House exactly what had happened in Paris during that critical autumn, how at the end of September or beginning of October (by which time the English King's rejection of the proposal in the letter of September 11 would be known to the American Commissioners) new proposals were put before the French Ministry; during November[1] 1777 these were discussed and some agreement was reached. Pownall reminded the House of his speech of December 2, and explained that when he made it in strong terms he had all this in his mind. The news of Saratoga and the knowledge that Lord North was going to propose conciliation after Christmas, had finally forced the hand of the French. On December 27 the Americans in Paris had been able to write and inform Congress that they had won France over.

[1] By this time Burgoyne was known to be in difficulties on the Hudson.

That Spain and Holland would follow suit Pownall declared was certain. He traced the proceedings of the last ten years, and shewed how England had over and over again refused a concession to the colonists when it would have satisfied them, and had afterwards been willing to make it when, in consequence of the previous refusal, their terms had been raised and the concession first asked for ceased to meet the case as it stood. This process had been carried on till the only terms which the colonists would accept was the recognition of their independence. Supported as they now were by a foreign Power, he argued that this independence would have to be acknowledged sooner or later; and it had better be done at once. As to sending Commissioners, he thought that useless, though he wished them well. "I hope nobody in the House will think I am acting this part as though I was to be one of them. I most certainly shall not be one of them.[1] Yet I wish the business to have a good issue, such as we may have. We may have peace with America if we will but once quit the ground of theory and take that which lies open to us in fact." He pointed out that the Treaty was not yet ratified by Congress, and some months must pass before that could be done; meanwhile it was inoperative, England could, in the interval, still forestall France if she chose.[2] He expressed the hope that negotiations might be immediately entrusted to Lord Chatham,[3] whose great services in the past had endeared him to the Americans. Recognising their independence and withdrawing our troops to Nova Scotia and Canada, we could hold these provinces securely against the French if necessary, and we should only have lost what it was evident we could not keep.[4] The address in support of the King was carried by 253 votes against 113. This speech appears to have escaped notice except in a recent work;[5] it explains the situation in the autumn of 1777, and shews that while Lord North was willing to make terms it was the King

[1] The Commissioners were Lord Carlisle, Mr. Eden, and Governor Johnstone, the latter tried to bribe members of Congress, the two former were hostile to the colonists who refused to have anything to do with the mission.

[2] Franklin wrote to James Hutton on January 1, 1778, that England could still have peace on good terms if she would abandon her pretensions.

[3] This confirms the view above expressed that it was Pownall who wrote the unsigned letter of November 14, 1775, to Lord Chatham asking him to intervene.

[4] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xix. pp. 930-948; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, ix. p. 50.

[5] *England and America, 1763-83*, M. A. M. Marks, 1907.

who refused concession. Even when Franklin's overtures, made in his extremity through Pownall, had shewn that England must expect to be confronted by France as well as America, which unaided had been able to dispose of Burgoyne, the King would not give way. A letter addressed by Pownall on April 19 to Mr. Bowdoin of Boston shews what was then in his mind :—

In hopes that succeeding events may call back the different branches of the same nation and family, now separated in all political connection, to fraternal amity, or at least to such *family compact*, that individuals who were old friends, and who, in their individual capacity, never felt their friendship broken, though necessarily interrupted, may again recommence that intercourse of their friendships which mutual good offices and habits had cemented, I write this to you, to beg you to be assured, that the moment in which the situation of the two countries permits it, I shall hope to revive our correspondence. I have a still further, though a more distant hope, which is, that of seeing you and all my old friends again. I had always an idea of returning to America. The event of my marrying fixed me here: every other consideration would have sent me back. Providence has at last mixed in with the present series of events one respecting myself (the loss of the partner of my life here), that has dissolved every tie and broken every tendril by which my heart held to this country. An unrelenting, unremitted course of ingratitude, positive injustice, and ill-treatment, from the Government of it, although I have invariably continued, not only a conscientious faithful subject, but an actively zealous laborer for it, has so alienated from all wishes of continuing longer here than duty holds me, that I have very seriously of late renewed my thoughts, and have in actual contemplation the idea of coming and settling in a country that understood, acknowledged, and remembers my services, and where I hope to meet with many personal and private friends. If I do, my plan is to purchase a house in town, and a little farm in the country. I mean to spend my income amongst you; and, if things answer, then to vest my little property there.

These ideas, now in contemplation, I mean to carry into execution, when I can do it without offence to the Government or laws of this country, of which I am a subject, under whose protection I live, and hold my rights and property, and to which my allegiance is due. I shall expect to hear from you in explanation of these points.[1]

Pownall was not alone in hoping that Lord Chatham might be employed in the crisis caused by the accession of France to America. Lord Mansfield and Lord Bute, Chatham's persistent enemies, thought the only hope for England lay in him. Lord North begged to be allowed

[1] *Proc. Mass. Hist. Society*, v. pp. 240, 241.

to resign in his favour, but the King absolutely refused his assent.

Lord Chatham collapsed in the House of Lords[1] on April 7, 1778, and died on May 11. His career, like that here described of his former subordinate, had been completely blocked since the accession of the King seventeen years before. On the day after his death the King wrote to Lord North that the vote for a public funeral and a monument in Westminster Abbey to his greatest subject was "if payed to his general conduct rather an offensive measure to me personally."[2]

On May 4 the American Congress ratified the Treaty with France; between which country and England war had been declared in March. On May 6 Pownall spoke again in the House of Commons on a message from the Crown asking for a vote of credit. He criticised the instructions given to the Commissioners who were about to leave for America and said that their journey would be futile, and so it proved to be.

Parliament rose on June 3 and met again on November 28, 1778, but Pownall is not reported as having taken any part in debate through the winter.

1779

The affairs of Ireland seem always to have interested Pownall, and when the state of the Linen Trade came before Parliament on March 10 and May 17, 1774,[3] he had spoken on that subject, giving information he had received from Irish friends. It has been shewn from his letters that he certainly visited Ireland once, and he wrote so much about Irish antiquities that it is probable he crossed the Channel on more than one occasion. On March 10, 1779, when a Committee of the whole House was moved for, to consider the trade of Ireland which was described as falling off both in imports and exports,

[1] Archbishop Temple did the same on December 4, 1902, as strong a man, as English a man as Chatham, a man more loved than most men.

[2] *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North*, W. B. Donne, 1867, Letter No. 498.

[3] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xvii. pp. 1110 and 1146.

Pownall interposed, objecting to the proposal. He said that if there were to be such an inquiry it should be held by the responsible authorities who could deal with the whole Irish question. Homely, and somewhat quaint, illustrations are not unfrequently used in his speeches; in the report of this one we find that to describe his dissent from considering Ireland's trade apart from other similar questions, he said "it was like pulling a horse's tail to pieces hair by hair instead of cutting it off at once." To this he added that the existing industrial distresses of Ireland, like those of England, were all due to the American War.[1]

The alliance of America with France had now made it possible for a French invasion of England to be attempted. On June 22, 1779, Lord North brought in a Bill to guard against this danger by doubling the militia.

For the second, and last, time this session Pownall joined in the debate. There were, he said, two things which required consideration; one was the Government Bill, the other arose from the remarks of Members on it. Of the Bill itself he approved, but what had been said about it was of more interest to him, because it consisted of the opinions of "gentlemen who from an experience of several defects in the present plan of militia have thrown out their ideas of forming this country into some permanent form of defence."

Whether the militia were doubled or not, the defect appeared to him to be that it applied only to a part, not to the whole, of the able-bodied population. Moreover, if a man of means were drawn in the ballot for service he could, and usually did, pay a substitute to go in his stead. This caused the ranks to be filled by the poorer classes only. Pownall maintained that this was all wrong; the defence of his country was a duty, common to every man physically capable of it.

> Let every man without distinction, the rich as well as the poor—nay rather the rich than the poor—stand forth. . . . Let the man of property stand in the ranks by the side of the poor man and the poor man will fight by his side.

He declared that in such a matter he himself cared nothing for social distinctions; he was ready to join the

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xx. p. 248.

ranks of such a militia as a private so soon as it was formed. But if others of his class thought differently he thought they might associate themselves into separate companies in the regiments, and to those companies should be assigned the first place in action so that by their example they might encourage the others. "If this country does really see their danger and, believing it to be actual, is in earnest to form an efficient national defence, one that will be real and stand them in stead, let them not run after theories and speculation." No paper schemes, no skeleton forces, no organisation to be hurriedly filled up by untrained men in the hour of danger would serve his purpose. He had seen several campaigns, and had bought his experience which taught him that in universal liability to service, inexorably enforced on all men, they being previously trained in drill and knowledge of their weapons, lay the only real safety for the country against attack from without. If England, then under threat of invasion, would form a territorial army, something much greater than the militia, because it would include every able-bodied man, she would have nothing to fear, "even though the French had forced their way through our marine force and were actually landing." The whole country, already prepared and able to act, would fall on the invaders before they could make good their foothold. In support of this he instanced Massachusetts Bay where, with a population of about 200,000,[1] a law passed in 1756 had produced a militia of 48,000 men who had been under his orders when he became Governor in the following year. About half of them were on the list for first employment, called out as soon as danger threatened. The remainder joined when the danger actually came. He mentioned how in 1759 he had himself reinforced the fleet in America with Massachusetts fishermen drawn from these levies, and he suggested that this precedent might be followed in England. He hoped that it might be part of the scheme that the Navy as well as the Army should be considered; seafaring men being formed into a naval reserve and joining that at a moment's notice while all others went to the territorial depots to take their places in the ranks when the summons reached them. He told the House that he put before them

[1] Preface to the *Three Memorials*, Thomas Pownall, 1784, p. 59.

the plan and system of a militia in actual existence, in actual operation, an effective one and which has produced the effect which we are looking to. I mean the plan of the New England Militia, a militia which has not only resisted an invasion, but sorry I am to add in proof, has taken prisoners the army which invaded it.

He argued that the system which had just served New England so well against England was equally desirable for England herself against any invasion from abroad. In his opinion there was no fear of that if it were known that an expeditionary force would not only be liable to have its retreat cut off by the English fleet, but would be met at once by all the manhood of England ready trained to arms. For the immediate adoption of that universal training he pleaded fervently, and ended by saying, "if you are in earnest think something of this."[1]

No other speech of Pownall's is recorded in this Session, which ended on July 3.

1780

For all practical purposes the North American colonies had gone by this time, the office which had been created to deal with them by a Secretary of State had been put back to its former position as a Board of Trade and Plantations. This Mr. Burke proposed to abolish also, and he brought in a Bill for that purpose in March 1780. On the 13th and 20th of that month Pownall spoke on this subject, with which his early service under the old Board had made him well acquainted. He said the Members of the Board had never done much. Most of their work they had delegated to others, and the result of what they had attended to, the relations between the colonists and the colonial officials had been only this, that they "had created a dispute with the colonies in which the authority

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xx. p. 955; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, xiii. p. 511. England has never thought seriously of this vital question in the 130 years which have passed since this speech, so applicable to present conditions, was made. Although she has just copied the Swiss Militia, as Pownall suggested she might long ago copy that of America, she has left out the one indispensable feature of both, the universal training of men, and those who do join are to be supported by Field Artillery so lacking in the necessary experience, that our greatest soldier declares they will be annihilated as soon as they go into action against regulars. Why should we, from generation to generation, be the only people to act without forethought, and to leave its destiny to chance?

of the Crown, being unequally committed, was always impaired."[1]

On April 6 he spoke briefly on the abuses in public expenditure,[2] and again on May 5, on a Bill for quieting the troubles with America brought in by General Conway, a former Secretary of State, who deplored "the fatal idea of obtaining a revenue from the colonies by taxing in that House those who were not represented in it."

It is evident that in this his fourteenth Session Pownall was becoming more than impatient of perpetual discussion in Parliament which led to no practical result. He brusquely observed that he would rather not have seen Conway's Bill at all, there was nothing in it; to send more Commissioners to America after those of 1778 had been rebuffed was useless. It was as absurd, he declared, to talk about the former statutes of America as about those which had affected Gascony and Poictou in the Middle Ages. But as the Bill had been brought in it would be better to pass it, for he had it on official authority that the Americans were tired of their French Allies, and would be glad to make terms which would end the war. Therefore he should vote for Conway's Bill which restored to the Americans the power of taxing themselves, repealed all legislation to the contrary, and put the Admiralty power of levying the customs duties on the old footing. This Bill was thrown out by 123 votes to 81.[3]

On May 24, 1780 Pownall brought in a Bill of his own[4] for enabling His Majesty to make peace with America. It is much shorter than that of Conway; it prescribes no terms, but by it the King could recognise and treat with the Americans. He repeated what he had said three weeks earlier that there were now two parties in America, one for France the other for England, the latter was the more powerful; an opportunity had come to make terms. His speech is reported in very few lines. He was opposed by Lord North and Lord George Germaine, and the Bill was rejected by 113 votes to 50.[5] This was his last effort. Parliament adjourned on July 8, 1780, and at the General Election in the autumn Pownall did not seek re-election. As one reads in Hansard and in Almon

[1] Hansard, *Parl. Hist.* xxi. pp. 1, 249.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 302.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 582.
[4] The text of this will be found in the Appendix.
[5] Hansard, *Parl. Hist.* xxi. p. 627; Almon's *Parl. Debates*, xvii. p. 716.

his speeches which are here summarised it is evident that since the War of Independence had begun he had exerted himself much less in Parliament than in the period from 1767 to 1774. Only twice, in attempting to stop the Franco-American Treaty and on the question of national defence, had he spoken during the last five years with his first energy. The outbreak of the war had destroyed the hope of preventing it with which he had entered the House; his failure there was brought home to him, and he quitted Parliamentary life with but a poor opinion of it. In the Preface he now wrote to his Treatise on the East Indies, already mentioned, he says that he had been asked

> to republish what I published in 1773 as, by not now being in Parliament I was supposed to have leisure to revise it. As to my leisure I have much less now than I had, as I think I can dispose of my time much more profitably as a man than I ever did in Parliament as a politician. Nor do I feel myself disposed to take up again matters of politics which are but matters of cabal amongst individuals, of faction amongst parties; and absolutely the meanwhile decided upon and decreed, through a *peculiar operation of predestination* by Ministers.

In those words in italics we may no doubt see a quiet hit at the destiny which had placed King George on the throne and caused the many troubles from which the country was suffering.

However active a man may have been in his day, by the time he is on the verge of sixty his vigour has gone; his turn has come to be "dusted and put on the shelf"; he has to make way for his juniors who are quite aware of the fact whether he realises it himself or not. Pownall did realise it; the last twenty years of his life had brought him one disappointment after another. After recognising his exertions Professor Egerton remarks "Pownall was however a voice crying in the wilderness, and the course of English history went on unheeding."[1] He had sought no office or preferment for himself and, except by a few specialists in the history of that period, the work he did under his own name has been so completely forgotten that no one has hitherto troubled to describe it.

Before we follow him into the retirement which he

[1] *Short History of British Colonial Policy*, Reissue, p. 183.

himself described as "a kind of political suicide,"[1] the attempt will be made in the next chapter to shew that it was he who did some other work, for which his previous experience and his position in the House of Commons specially qualified him, under another name which has become a household word.

[1] *Three Memorials*, 1784, Thomas Pownall, Preface, p. vi.

CHAPTER XII

PART I

'THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS'—POWNALL THEIR AUTHOR

1767–1772

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THE heading of this chapter will probably be received in different ways. Those who are well-informed on the subject will be startled, and say that, when authorities such as Macaulay have laid it down positively that Sir Philip Francis was the author, it is waste of time to suggest, as it is here intended to do, that his was merely the subordinate part of an agent, and behind his hand was the guiding brain of an older and more experienced, therefore better-qualified man, who was the real author.

Others may say, to themselves, if not aloud—Who was Junius and what were his Letters about? And indeed so long a time has passed since the Letters were written, burying them, and the keenly debated literary controversy about their authorship, out of sight and mind, that there is some justification for the question being thus put and a brief answer being first given to it.

The King's Policy

The preceding chapters have shewn that soon after George III. came to the throne he made it his business to stifle the House of Commons. His policy of securing votes there to support his aims had been successfully followed since the beginning of the reign. Mention has been made of the party formed for this purpose; it was each year increasing in numbers as the unprecedented corruption which Lord Bute had introduced shewed its effect. Of those who composed it the Author of the Letters, which are the subject of this chapter, scornfully observed that "one particular class of men are permitted to call themselves the *King's friends*, as if the body of the people were the King's enemies."[1] As to the methods by which their friendship was obtained they were described by the same writer when he addressed the King, "Is it not notorious that the vast revenues extorted from the labour and industry of your subjects, and given to you to do honour to yourself and to the nation are dissipated in corrupting their representatives."[2] By these means the King had obtained a casting vote in Parliament by which he could decide the fate of any Ministry. Since his accession those of Mr. Pitt, Lord Bute, Mr. Grenville, Lord Rockingham and Lord Chatham had fallen, that of Lord Bute alone because public opinion was against it. The instability of Cabinets is shewn by the fact that the Duke of Grafton, who was Premier when Junius began the Letters above that signature, was the sixth holder of that office within seven years and a quarter. Parliament was reduced to the condition of a packed jury, and became an engine of oppression, a tool in the King's hand, it was utterly diverted from its constitutional position as the mouthpiece of the electors. Their voice had to make itself heard through some other channel and found utterance in the Press, then in its infancy, and unable to report debates with the names of the speakers lest it should commit a breach of privilege and incur grave risks if it ventured to criticise those in authority.

[1] *Letters of Junius*, G. Woodfall's edition, 1812 and 1814 (hereafter referred to as Woodfall), May 28, 1770, ii. p. 151.

[2] *Ibid.* i. p. 383, Preface of 1772.

Wilkes

But public opinion was too strong to be held down; it rallied to the support of Wilkes who for some years from 1763 fought a hard battle, nominally with the House of Commons, really with those who stood behind it. He was sent to prison in 1764, to be released on a writ of Habeas Corpus, prosecuted for libel and expelled the House. He fled to France, but returned in 1768, and his fourfold elections to the House, and rejections from it fill a large place in the history of those years. Meanwhile the Press was flooded by pamphlets and articles written by men who, deterred by what they saw Wilkes passing through, preserved their incognito and wrote above assumed names.

Junius

Prominent among them were the *Letters of Junius* whose fame eclipsed and has survived that of all similar productions. They throw a light, more searching than any other, not only on the main policy but on the working in details of the Duke of Grafton's administration, and on the five years, 1767-72, which had so great an influence on the destinies of England and of the United States.

Before entering on the subjects they dealt with we may glance at the name and inquire why that of "Junius" was selected. The series began with a letter of April 28, 1767, signed "Poplicola." This, and others which followed, appeared to the publisher, who was best entitled to judge of the source from which he received them, to come from the same hand as those afterwards signed "Junius." The "Poplicola" Letter was succeeded in 1767-68 by more with varying names, chiefly of Latin origin. At that time when the classics were regarded as all-important in education anonymous writers often chose Greek or Latin sobriquets. The Hon. E. Twisleton has pointed out that in August and September 1768 there were eight of these letters, recognised by the publisher as coming from the same person, signed "Lucius." In October there were two signed "Brutus." From this Mr. Twisleton inferred

that "Junius" was finally adopted so as to complete the name of "Lucius Junius Brutus."[1]

Junius covered Ministers with scorn and contempt, and did not hesitate to play the candid friend to the King himself. If he had been identified his lot would have been harder far than that of Wilkes, for he was a more powerful, therefore a more dangerous, critic. So it was of the utmost importance to him to remain undiscovered and keep his secret; wonderful to relate, it was kept perfectly. Secrecy heightened the effect. Junius wrote to Wilkes on September 18, 1771, "I speak from a recess which no human curiosity can penetrate; and darkness, we are told, is one source of the sublime. The mystery of Junius increases his importance."

He and his generation passed away without a clue to his identity being discovered; in its absence a prosecution against him broke down, for it is impossible to punish a person unknown.[2] The prosecution of Woodfall, the printer of the letters, resulted in a nominal verdict without penalty.[3] Quietly watching the excitement about him, Junius wrote, in one of his letters to Mr. George Grenville, "The town is curious to know the author. Everybody guesses; some are quite certain, and all are mistaken. Mr. Burke denies it—as he would a fact which he wishes to be believed." While no one was prepared to acknowledge the authorship and take the punishment sure to follow, men of the highest distinction were proud to have attributed to them a correspondence which took permanent rank as a classic of the English language, while the futile prosecution of its author freed the Press from the muzzle of the Government and shook a rotten administration to the base. In a careful review of the subject Mr. Lecky remarks, "Probably no English book, except the

[1] *Handwriting of Junius*, Hon. E. Twisleton, 1871, Preface, p. xv. Mr. Twisleton was a Fellow of Balliol, afterwards a Poor Law, and a Civil Service, Commissioner. Unlike Brougham, Macaulay, Hayward, Merivale and others, who only touched the outside of the Junius question with their essays, Mr. Twisleton went to the root of it and spared no expense in doing so. This book of his was the first practical effort to ascertain how the Junius Letters were produced.

[2] "The Ministry are sick of prosecutions. Those against Junius cost the Treasury above six thousand pounds, and after all they got nothing but disgrace" (Junius to Woodfall, Feb. 21, 1771).

[3] See note to Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 62, for full particulars.

plays of Shakespeare has been submitted to such a minute and exhaustive criticism as the *Letters of Junius*."[1] It is said of the great Chatham himself that he was behind the scenes. He regarded these Letters as models of style, and for that reason directed his children's attention to them.[2] Expressing his policy they certainly came from one of his adherents. At the end of this chapter will be found a list of no less than forty men whose names have been suggested as that of the author. About so many claimants, or rather people on whose behalf claims were subsequently made, a great mass of literature gathered; if all the books and articles on the subject were collected they would fill a fair-sized library. The catalogue of the British Museum contains the names of about 200 books placed under this heading, numbers of others deal with it, while pamphlets and articles about it are beyond counting. To take one instance, the third volume of the *Grenville Correspondence*, published in 1853, opens with 223 pages of small type—half as much matter as this book contains—about this riddle of the authorship which it seeks to solve in favour of Lord Temple. Those who have hitherto investigated the subject have endeavoured to find out who Junius was. This chapter will be summarised by an attempt to find out who he was *not*, once that is ascertained his identity is disclosed. But before we arrive at that stage the evidence must be gone through in detail. There are three sets of papers:—

(1) The *Miscellaneous Letters* which appeared in the *Public Advertiser* at intervals of about a month, between April 28, 1767, and May 12, 1772, above such varying signatures as Mnemon, Atticus, Cleophas, etc. No. 7 of this series, dated October 7, 1767, was announced by Woodfall as coming from "C," the private mark of Junius, to whom he ascribed them all. He destroyed[3] all the original MSS. of these and of

(2) The *Letters of Junius*, the first of which was published on January 21, 1769, the last on January 21, 1772, in the same paper as the above set No 1. The Author's edition of these was republished by Woodfall in 1772.

[1] *England in the XVIIIth Century*, 1882, W. E. H. Lecky, iii. p. 246.
[2] *William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*, 1907, A. Von. Ruville, iii. p. 309.
[3] Woodfall, 1814, i., note to p. 10.

(3) The private letters of Junius to Woodfall. These, and proofs of the others, Woodfall kept; they are in the British Museum dated between April 20, 1769, and May 10, 1772. The whole of the above were republished by Woodfall's son in 1812 and 1814.[1] There are also private letters of Junius to Mr. Wilkes, Mr. Grenville and Lord Chatham.[2]

Great pains and ingenuity have been devoted to the attempt to discover from this group the source from which they came.

Hon. E. Twisleton—Mr. Chabot

Finally the question was submitted by the Hon. E. Twisleton to Mr. Chabot, the famous expert of forty years ago, that he might professionally investigate it. Chabot's report on his comparison of the handwriting of Junius with that of Francis and others is plentifully illustrated by facsimile reproductions, and was published by Mr. Twisleton in 1871. It says without hesitation that the pen which wrote the Junius Letters was held by the hand of Francis. They are not in his natural writing which is carefully disguised, but it was found behind erasures, made when he had slipped back into himself. The shape of individual letters picked out from the words corresponds with that habitually made by Francis. Moreover, the first letter Junius wrote to Grenville, dated February 6, 1768, was found to be written on paper which was identical with that on which a letter of Francis had been written two months before. As regards the colour, the texture and the thickness, the one was the precise counterpart of the other. The device of the water-mark and the initials are the same, so is the colour of the ink, so is the punctuation, a thing most carefully studied in that research. From measurements, Mr. Chabot was able to

[1] These two editions are the best, their copious notes enable one to follow the topical and personal allusions in the letters. They cost about 30s. A cheap reprint of them, published by Routledge and Sons in 1875, 1339, and 1890 also contains the notes.

[2] Besides these there is a letter addressed in August 1760 to "An Honourable Brigadier General," *i.e.* Charles Townshend, which Mr. Simons of the British Museum in 1841 attributed to Junius. Mr. Simons wrote a book on the subject, and in it makes out a strong case for this having been the first letter of Junius.

prove that the two sheets had been made in the same form or mould; more than that, while exactly corresponding in size and shape, they were both cut slightly (and to the same extent) out of truth, the top edge not absolutely parallel with the bottom one. From this the investigator was able to declare that the two sheets actually came out of the same quire. No one who has studied Mr. Chabot's very clear and exhaustive report, in which he was able to substantiate such minute details as the above, can hesitate to accept his conclusion that the handwriting was that of Francis. The Letters of Junius are so numerous and the handwriting used varies so much—as if pleasure were taken in the variations by some one who enjoyed shewing how he could alter his hand at will—that it is possible in some odd instances, the real author, when pressed for time in an emergency, may have ventured to use his own pen. But, taking them in bulk, Mr. Chabot's verdict is indisputable. Mr. Twisleton carefully limited himself, in writing of the results of the investigation he had set on foot, to the question of who had been the writer; as to whether the writer was also the author he gave no opinion.[1] But he did say that Chabot's work had proved Francis to have been the author as well as the writer, in the absence of any candidate, "in regard to whom it cannot be shewn that he was more competent and more likely than Francis to have composed the Junius Letters, and that he might possibly have made use of Francis as his amanuensis." It is here proposed to push Mr. Twisleton's research a stage further, and, accepting the foundation he laid as to the handwork, to build on it a structure of evidence as to the headwork of the Letters. If that can be done it will complete Mr. Twisleton's task and settle the whole question.

Amanuensis

Several people have been credited with the authorship of the Letters, using an amanuensis as a screen. It has been suggested by a Mr. Jacques[2] that Francis acted in that capacity for Lord George Sackville. He was exactly the man for any one to engage for work of that kind. He was so skilful with his pen that he could disguise

[1] *Handwriting of Junius*, 1871, Preface, pp. xvi, xvii.
[2] *History of Junius and his Works*, 1843, p. 48.

its action. He was known in the Chatham party as having done confidential writing for that statesman himself. Therefore his name would at once occur to any one of that group who wanted the services of some person from whom silence, as well as competence, could be expected. That there were two men concerned,[1] the author and the scribe, conflicts, it must be admitted, with what Junius wrote in his private letter No. 10 of October 5, 1769, to Woodfall, "Be assured that it is not in the nature of things that they, or you, or any one else, should ever know me unless I make myself known"; and in the dedication of his own edition of the Letters published in 1772, he declared that he was "the sole depository of his own secret." On the other hand, the existence of an intermediary between the author and the publisher is expressly stated in the private letter, No. 51 of January 18, 1772, where Junius writes to Woodfall, "The gentleman who transacts the conveyancing part of our correspondence tells me there was much difficulty last night." Such flat contradiction as exists between that passage and the two which precede it is probably due to the fact that in making the former Junius was emphasising the incognito which lent much force to his attacks, and, at the same time giving his enemies a false clue in the hope that it would mislead them. We shall find, in his relations with Mr. Grenville, another instance of the same policy, which was no doubt adopted, like the disguising of the handwriting, as a measure of precaution.

Francis

It is only because there has hitherto been more proof for him than for any one else that general opinion has inclined to the belief that Sir Philip Francis was the man who took so much finding; but while many eminent men held that view others, no less competent, held another. Mr. Wentworth Dilke, a high authority, wrote a series of articles in the *Athenæum* and *Notes and Queries*, coming finally to the conclusion that all the

[1] Perhaps more. Junius wrote privately to Woodfall on Sept. 10, 1769: "The last letter you printed was idle and improper, and I assure you printed against my own opinion. The truth is there are people about me whom I would wish not to contradict." He wrote privately to Woodfall on July 17, 1769, that "*we* did constantly correct errors in proofs." The italic is not his.

claims were weak, and that of Francis he described as unproven.[1] As to Francis there is not only difference of opinion but absolute contradiction by those best qualified to speak. In its notice of him the *Dictionary of National Biography* says that both Lord Chatham, and Woodfall who published the Letters, agreed in saying that Francis was not the author. Chatham perhaps knew all about it at the time, as Lord Shelburne knew afterwards, his remarkable statement will be found later on. It has been recorded by George Woodfall, the printer's son, that "to his father's certain knowledge Francis never wrote a line of Junius."[2] Woodfall may have known eventually who Junius was, but that he was in the dark at first appears in many passages of the correspondence. In its earlier stages Junius wrote to him, "Tell me candidly whether you know or suspect who I am."[3] Lord Campbell, in his *Lives of the Chancellors*, declared that there was *overwhelming evidence* to prove that Francis delivered the MS. to Woodfall. As the belief that Francis was the author was strong fifty years after the Letters appeared, and has become stronger since that time, we may consider who and what he was. The account of him which follows is chiefly taken from his memoir written by Mr. Merivale. He was an Irishman born in Dublin on October 22, 1740. His father was the Rev. Philip Francis, D.D.,[4] who came to England, and was living about London where his pen, like that of Smollett was engaged by Lord Chatham's enemies to decry that statesman. Philip was sent to St. Paul's school, where one of the other boys was Woodfall, and this accounts for the subsequent connection between them. In 1756 he left school to take a junior clerkship in the Secretary of State's office, the first step on the official ladder, but with a salary of only from £40 to £60 a year. He was a clever fellow, and made his way. In 1758 he went as Secretary to General Bligh in the expedition against Cherbourg, and in 1760 he was sent, in the same capacity, with Lord Kinnoull on that nobleman's mission to Portugal.[5] Those employments gave him some view of the world outside his office, but they were only for a few months and in a

[1] He did not know of that which is here put forward. His papers were written 1848-50, republished 1875. [2] *Dict. of Nat. Biog.*, "Francis."
[3] Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 175, date, July 15, 1769.
[4] *Dict. of Nat. Biog.* [5] *Anecdotes of the Earl of Chatham*, 1793.

subordinate capacity as a youngster. He was but twenty when he returned to England and the office, from which he was again selected to act in 1761-62 as an occasional amanuensis to Lord Chatham, with whom he had no subsequent connection. His qualifications for that post were his knowledge of French and Latin, and his fine and correct penmanship. The stress laid on the latter is especially noteworthy as affecting what follows. In the spring of 1762, being then twenty-one, he married a Miss MacRabie, whose father had retired from the City on very small means, so she can have brought him no fortune, but she did bring him children in rapid succession—by 1770 there were five of them. From 1763 to 1772 he had a place at the War Office,[1] which brought him in £300 or £400 a year. So, in April 1767, when the first miscellaneous Letter of Junius appeared, Francis was a man of twenty-six, with an official position to live up to and a rapidly increasing family to support, a needy man in fact. In March 1772 his connection with the War Office ceased, the last Junius Letter had been published in January. The cessation of the series coincided with the departure of Francis from London, where he had been during the time of their publication from November 1768 to January 1772. The Letters appeared while he was there, and ended two months before his leaving town for a tour on the Continent. A poor man who had five children and whose salary had ceased, Francis must have been very short of money that spring. Junius, however, had plenty, for on March 5 he refused Woodfall's offer of a half share in the profits of the collected Letters.[2]

In the following August the luck of Francis turned, his friend and patron Calcraft,[3] who had made a fortune as an Army Contractor and was a very well-known man, died and left him a legacy of £1000 and the nomination of the borough of Wareham. With some money in his pocket and a seat in the House, Francis had got on quite a different plane to that of the War Office clerkship, and it did not take him many years to improve on the altered

[1] *Grenville Correspondence*, 1853, iii. p. xxii.

[2] "My rank and fortune place me above a common bribe" wrote Junius on April 12, 1769 (Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 202). "I should have hoped that even *my* name might carry some authority with it" (Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 411).

[3] Described by Junius in Letter LIX. as a man who "riots in the plunder of the army." Mr. Lecky points out that Francis could not decently have written this.

position in which he found himself. On the recommendation of Lord Barrington, the Secretary of War, he was appointed a Member of Council in India at a salary of £10,000 a year, and he reached Calcutta in 1774 to find himself a colleague of Warren Hastings with whom he quarrelled. They fought a duel in 1779, and Francis was wounded; in that year he had an intrigue with Madame Grand, a young Frenchwoman of sixteen, who, later in life, was first the mistress and afterwards the wife of Talleyrand. For this adventure Francis had to pay 50,000 rupees to her then husband, M. Grand. He left India, which he seems to have made exceptionally hot for himself, in 1780, and arrived in England in the following year. In 1784 he returned to Parliament, from which he retired in 1807, having taken a prominent part in the impeachment of his old enemy Warren Hastings in 1786, but otherwise made no figure in the House where he was known as a poor speaker. "He was the convivial companion of Fox, and during the short administration of that statesman was made a Knight of the Bath."[1] He died in 1818. In his latter days he so coveted the fame of Junius that he did not disclaim it when attributed to him, indeed, he allowed his second wife, whom he married in 1814, more than forty years after this time, to think him entitled to it. It was observed, however, that he never committed himself to a definite statement on the subject, or attempted to furnish any proof, which he might safely have done after forty years, when the storm caused by the Letters had blown over. Taxed with their authorship by Lady Holland, in the presence of Rogers the poet, he turned off the question by saying, "Madam, do you mean to insult me."[2] Nor did he, even in after life, write anything worthy of comparison with those Letters.[3] In stronger terms than are used here, Mr. Dilke pointed out the pitiful condition Francis was in when a young man, soon after his marriage;[4] this may be seen from a letter he wrote to his brother-in-law MacRabie, then in America, to whom he could shew the inner life of the household. The letter is dated War Office, June 11, 1768. In it Francis says:—

[1] *The Clubs of London*, 1828, l. p. 201. Published by Henry Colbourne.
[2] *Table-Talk of Samuel Rogers*, 1856, p. 271.
[3] *Dictionary of National Biography*, "Francis."
[4] *Papers of a Critic*, 1875, p. 74.

Domestic news is as insipid as usual. Children howling, servants fighting, my wife scolding, your father and mother weeping, and Patty raving mad. These . . . make up the perpetual history of my family.[1]

That differs a good deal from the picture one would expect to find, drawn by himself, of the surroundings of the cultured leisured man who wrote as Junius. Looking at the record of Francis's career as a whole, it appears to be that of the typical Irish adventurer, a good deal out at elbows, who lived on his wits by his sword or his pen. Dean Swift used the pen; Francis both pen and sword. Then came Sir Lucius O'Trigger and his creator. Most people know Captain Costigan, out-manœuvred by Major Pendennis. Some will remember Phineas Finn, the Irish Member. The latter's successors, who misrepresent all that is best in Ireland, are a too-present, and too-prominent object-lesson. Francis, in the House of Commons, attacked the empire-builder of India (against whom he had an outstanding personal grudge) during the six years' impeachment which ended in acquittal. So have they of late years barked at the heels of the empire-builder of South Africa and of the reconstructor of Egypt. Though Francis, more fortunate than most of his kind, managed to obtain a considerable and highly paid position afterwards, he was in 1768 the very man to whom some extra work bringing grist to the mill would be welcome. At that time something happened to him which burnt into his brain certain expressions and phrases used by Junius in his Letters with such peculiar force that his mind unconsciously reproduced them years afterwards when he was dealing with topics quite separate from those in connection with which Junius had originally used them.

In 1818 there appeared a book called *The Identity of Junius Established*, which was written by a Mr. Taylor to prove that Francis had been Junius; among other evidence he stated the existence, in the Letters of Junius, and in the writings and speeches of Francis, of identical phrases. From these Mr. Taylor sought to prove that the ideas of each clothed themselves in the same language, and therefore that the two men were one personality.

[1] *Handwriting of Junius*, Hon. E. Twisleton, 1871. Facsimile No. 9, Francis to MacRabie.

To establish such coincidence of thought, on behalf of Francis or of any one else, would be a long step towards proof; but to be of any value the coincidence must be in time as well as in words, the repetition of the latter long afterwards is merely memory asserting itself.

This appears to be the flaw in Mr. Taylor's argument. It was pointed out later in the *Grenville Correspondence*, where in vol. iii. such passages are quoted and compared as follows :—

In 1769 Junius wrote :

"Laws, you know, are intended to guard against what men *may* do, not to trust to what they *will* do." [1]

In 1785 Francis said in a speech :

"Laws are made to guard against what men *may* do, not to trust to what they *will* do."

In 1769 Junius wrote :

"We are governed by a set of drivellers whose *folly takes away all dignity from distress and makes even calamity ridiculous.*[2]

In 1809 Francis wrote :

"Such authors of such ruin *take away all dignity from distress and make calamity ridiculous.*

In 1768 Junius wrote :

"A great poet says with a singular emphasis: *Beware the fury of a patient man.*" [3]

In 1817 Francis wrote in a pamphlet on reform :

"Look to the proverb for instruction before it is too late. *Beware the fury of a patient man.*"

In those passages we have from Francis an exact and literal reproduction of the words of Junius. But, in the first instance, sixteen years, in the second forty years, in the third forty-nine years had passed since Junius used them. Far from proving simultaneous identity of thought between him and Francis they prove something quite different, namely that Francis, of all men of his day, had had driven into him, in most minute detail, the words Junius had used; so much so that many years later they recurred naturally to his memory. There must have been some cause for this, what it was will be explained when we come back to this branch of the subject. Merivale, in his

[1] Woodfall, 1814, i. 539. [2] *Ibid.* i. 570. [3] *Ibid.* iii. 8.

preface to the *Life of Francis*,[1] says of the work of Junius :—

> It was patent that the superior force and style of the letters were those of a long-practised pen. . . . The undisputed, unquestionable productions of his pen were stamped with personal knowledge of the English War and Commissariat Offices, and denoted, not only an intimate acquaintance with the names and duties of those departments, but of the secondary Civil Service of our other public offices.

On his having that knowledge much of the claim made for Francis has rested. A few pages later on it will be shewn that this was not confined to him, but was possessed in a much larger sense by some one else.

In 1768 Junius wrote three remarkable letters, reproduced in Mr. Twisleton's book, to Mr. George Grenville which claim the authorship of letters written publicly in defence of his policy, and criticise the Commission of Trade. Those letters are in a tone impossible from a War Office clerk to a Cabinet Minister. They are written as between equals in a tone of independence. Of them, as of all the other writings of Junius, it may be safely said that, as brain products, they could not possibly have come from a young fellow of eight-and-twenty, whose life, with the exception of two short trips abroad when a mere lad, had been passed within the limited horizon of a Government office. That fact appears to have been sometimes overlooked, but it alone clearly disqualifies Francis from having written what Junius wrote as the author and originator. It goes far, however, to qualify him for having written it in another capacity, that of the skilled penman who transcribed the Letters—after they had first been produced and written as drafts by their author—into the feigned, very upright, very carefully produced handwriting in which they passed to Woodfall, the publisher. The transcribing must have been a very critical and anxious business. Every letter of every word, every little bit of punctuation had to be made in a form unusual to the writer. He had to dot his *i* and cross his *t* in an unaccustomed manner. It is easy to see that he would long remember the words before him then. It was absolutely necessary for the safety of their originator, that the handwriting should furnish no clue to the

[1] Pp. xviii, xx.

authorities,[1] who were so infuriated that they might raid the premises of Woodfall in search of the papers as they had raided the house of Wilkes in 1763 for the same purpose.

The employment of Francis, of course, increased the possibility of leakage; the fewer the people in a secret the less likely it is to get out. When once Francis was admitted he shared the risk. The same pains and penalties, which awaited the principal, if discovered, were there for the agent; discovery for whom meant the destruction of his official prospects, which afterwards were realised in a remarkable degree. It was not only his interest to keep quiet, but he was a man in the position of a gentleman, and, as such, could not turn common informer and betray his employer.

Pownall

There is a story of a French chef who was reproached by his master for sending up an indifferent dinner, and inquired if the seventh course had been found satisfactory. The master owned that he had not tasted it, and was then told by the Frenchman that to understand his scheme of a dinner it was necessary to eat it all. No course could, in justice to the cook, be picked out or omitted; when the seventh was untouched the sixth and the eighth were ruined. May the reader whose curiosity has led him to turn first to this chapter be asked to remember that it is but one out of several, and that those which precede, and those which follow, claim consideration before judgment is finally pronounced on the whole subject.

The view here advanced is that Governor Pownall was the real man, the author behind the scenes, and that Francis was his subordinate, who lived near the rose but was not the rose. Francis was quite unqualified to write as Junius did: "After long experience of the world I affirm before God I never knew a rogue who was not unhappy."[2] Pownall was forty-six and could use those words, for his had been a wide experience abroad in America and in Germany. At home, as a Member of Parliament in good society, he had the opportunity of meeting and knowing the most eminent

[1] "I would avoid having this hand too commonly seen. Oblige me therefore by having it copied in any hand, and sent by the penny post" (*Junius to Woodfall*, Nov. 10, 1771).

[2] Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 237.

men of the time. With many of them such as Lord Chatham, Lord Loudoun, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Sir William Johnson, Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Young, Adam Smith, Horace Walpole, Edmund Burke, Mr. Dowdeswell, Mr. Grenville, this book shews him in close contact. By his opponents he was recognised as a man who could hit hard. Hutchinson, who followed Bernard, Pownall's successor, as Governor of Massachusetts, after mentioning Bernard, wrote, "My other predecessor has been printing again, and has given me two or three severe lashes."[1] He had served his apprenticeship in the art of governing, and had practised it with success, under circumstances of exceptional difficulty, in Massachusetts. Since the accession of George III. a sufficient number of years had passed to shew that the King knew nothing and wished to learn nothing of governing in that sense. His idea of it was playing off one party faction against another in order to get his own way. That meant the subjugation of the colonies to the Royal will, which Pownall did not regard as superior to every other consideration. On the contrary, he spent fourteen years in Parliament in opposing the King just as Junius did while he wrote. His career, which had opened successfully, was suddenly checked when Lord Chatham left office in 1761. Seeing public affairs utterly mismanaged, feeling himself reduced to impotence and inaction, while aware that he had it in him to be of some use, he had tried to get a hearing by entering Parliament. There he had realised, as others have done since, that a private member, lost in the crowd, has next to no influence unless he happens to possess the rare gift of eloquence. That had not been given to this man. But if he had not the power of the tongue he had that of the pen. The success of his recent book on the colonies[2] gave him confidence in his pen, and it was natural he should betake himself to it above the signature of Junius when he was longing to make known the counsels and the indignation of which he was full.

A man in that frame of mind, full of wrath and despair for which he could find no outlet, was exactly in the humour to pour out the fierce invective which marked the Junius Letters. We can see their production was not with

[1] *Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson*, i. p. 313.
[2] *Administration of the Colonies.* Editions of 1764, 1765, 1766, and 1768.

him, as it might have been with another man, due to some sudden unaccountable freak or impulse. On the contrary, his whole previous experience had led up to it, and his writing as Junius just at this time was the obvious thing for him to do. If this summary of the foregoing chapters be accepted as correct it becomes possible to assign to Pownall the sufficient motive for that particular action at that particular time which has never been suggested for any one else. In the case of others it is hardly too much to say that though the motive which caused such writing must have been a strong one none has ever been adduced. The suggestion that Pownall was Junius is not a new one, but it was not made till long after the former had passed away, and the excitement of the conundrum left by the latter to succeeding generations had abated.

Mr. Frederick Griffin, resident at Montreal in 1852, had read much of the literature on this subject. From it he drew his own conclusions, which were aided by his knowledge of Pownall's career and of the reputation he had left behind him on the other side of the Atlantic. The result was a book published in 1854 by Messrs. Little, Brown and Co. of Boston, with the title of *Junius Discovered*; it was written with the object of establishing the identity of Pownall with Junius. Coming from an unknown hand, published abroad (though Messrs. Trübner were the agents in London), it attracted but little attention; so little that when the present writer lately asked for the copy in the British Museum Library, it was handed to him with its pages still uncut, though it had been in the reading-room more than half a century. Some portion of what follows is based upon it; but researches easy to one living within reach of London, impossible to anybody in Montreal, have largely augmented the evidence, and in some respects led to different conclusions. For instance, Mr. Griffin considered that Pownall's hand might have actually written the Junius Letters, but that opinion has been rendered untenable by Chabot's subsequent inquiry.

A great deal of Governor Pownall's handwriting remains in the Record Office now. There must have been so much of it in the Government offices then, that he might well be doubtful of his power to alter what was familiar to very many people so effectually as to escape recognition. Therefore it was safer, more safe if less

convenient, to employ Francis, who was also well known to Junius, the Miscellaneous Letter CX. of March 13, 1772, alludes in strong terms to the way in which Lord Barrington, as head of the War Office, dealt with him. It may well be asked whether Pownall as well as Junius can be shewn to have been acquainted with Francis. The answer to this is that Pownall had long been on friendly terms with the Francis family. When in America he had received from Philip's uncle, Mr. Tench Francis, the Attorney-General of Pennsylvania, a treatise on the American paper currency which he regarded as the best exposition of that subject, and incorporated in his book on the *Administration of the Colonies*. In doing so he mentions that he had sought and obtained the permission of Dr. Francis, the brother of its author and father of Philip, for this republication. We there have it from Pownall himself that he knew the two seniors of the Francis family. Philip, of the next generation, would be to him "young Francis," a civil servant as he had himself been, employed in the War Office, under which he too had served as Commissary-General in Germany.

It thus appears from the writings of Junius and of Pownall that each knew the Francis connection and affairs, and the former, in the letter above referred to, mentioned Francis, saying, "Men of their unblemished character do not resign lucrative employments without some sufficient reasons. The conduct of these gentlemen has always been approved of. . . . Again, I wish that Mr. Francis and Mr. D'Oyly would give the public some account of what is going forward in the War Office."[1] Francis could not well have written that of himself, but he could copy it when written by somebody else to whom he had stated his grievance against Lord Barrington, and thus if Pownall, as Junius, wrote it he was speaking up for his own amanuensis. When Mr. Lecky wrote in 1882 about this matter he had before him the evidence then available, but as he knew nothing of the claim for Pownall he was unable to understand why Junius, who till February 1772 had hardly noticed Lord Barrington, then denounced him in the fiercest terms, which were applied also to Mr. Chamier, whose promotion coincided with the dismissal of Francis. This sudden explosion was unintelli-

[1] Woodfall, 1814, iii. pp. 445-446.

gible to Mr. Lecky unless Junius and Francis were one and the same. But it is intelligible at once if we approach the question with the idea that Pownall was Junius and had arranged with Francis to transcribe the Letters and take them to Woodfall. If this had gone on till Lord Barrington discharged Francis who was about to leave London Pownall would naturally be upset because this branch of his work must cease when Francis was no longer available. When Lord Barrington sent that particular clerk away from the War Office he had, by pure accident, done what the Government had long desired, he had stopped the publication of the *Letters of Junius*, and it is no wonder that their Author was furious. It is probable that when Pownall began to dictate, and Francis to write, the first letter of April 1767, which was signed "*Poplicola*," neither of them had any idea of what they were undertaking would develop into. It was not till nearly two years later that the first letter signed Junius attracted attention.

If we assign to Pownall the chief, and to Francis the subordinate part, the whole thing dovetails together perfectly. We see why the latter so long remembered those phrases which he had copied under conditions of such difficulty and danger. The suspicion of complicity which, at the time, and afterwards, attached to him is not ignored, but justified. Lord Campbell's positive assertion that it was Francis who took the letters to Woodfall is quite in order; though he was not their author he did take them, it would fall to him and not to his principal to do that; it was as the above-quoted "gentleman who transacts the conveyancing part of our correspondence" that he was acting. As an implicated subordinate it was just as natural and obvious that he should prefer to take them to Woodfall, his old school-fellow, as it would have been if doing so on his own account. Chatham and Woodfall were, in this aspect of the matter, perfectly correct in declaring that Francis was not the writer. In the sense of being the author he was not.

On the other hand, the statement of Chabot, otherwise in flat contradiction to theirs, that Francis was the writer is equally correct, for it was he who guided the pen. On no other lines can these conflicting statements, each with the weight of authority behind it, be reconciled. Much has been made of the ascertained fact that gaps in the

Junius correspondence were found to coincide with known absences of Francis from town. It was inferred from this that their temporary cessation was due to his not being on the spot to compose them. That inference equally holds good if his presence was necessary in order that he might transcribe them into the disguised hand and then take them to their destination. His absence blocked their appearance in the newspaper just as much in this way as in the other. Mr. Dilke, weary of the vagueness of the Francis claim, expressed a hope that he might never again hear that name coupled with Junius till "some one fact shall have been established shewing a connection between them."[1] Not one fact only but two pages summarising facts which connect Pownall and Junius, in their circumstances and opinions, will be found later in this chapter.

Personal Appearance

That Junius was a corpulent man, no longer young in 1771, may be inferred from the words he used when he declined the offer of ball tickets made to him by Mr. Wilkes, "Alas my age and figure would do but little credit to my partner."[2] It has been mentioned that when he was in Boston Pownall was described as a thick-set man of medium height, when he was under forty. A dozen years had passed, just those in which, as a man becomes middle-aged, any tendency to corpulence shews itself. By 1771 it is probable that he would answer very well to the description Junius then gave of himself, and that idea is confirmed by looking at the frontispiece of this book.

Practised Writer

To Pownall belonged the long-practised pen which the biographer of Francis recognised as essential. His *Principles of Polity* of 1752; the four editions of his *Administration*, 1764, 1765, 1766, 1768 have been mentioned. The topic of his first book, *The Principles of Polity*, which preceded the Junius Letters by seventeen years

[1] *Athenæum*, 1850, p. 996. [2] Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 325.

is noticeable. Like them it dealt with constitutional questions. Page 106 contains this passage:—

> Although I do from my conscience venerate the sacred powers and majesty of Government, yet have I so established a persuasion that there are some liberties, some rights so peculiarly the individual's own that no government can have any right to extend itself over, or have any claim upon, them. And where governments are such as to interfere with them I think such governments worse than none.

The first *Letter of Junius* opens in the same strain:—

> Loyalty, in the heart and understanding of an Englishman is a rational attachment to the guardian of the laws.

From this it proceeds to criticise the manner in which the laws had been tampered with, and it may not be too much to say that the *Principles of Polity* was a stepping-stone to the *Letters of Junius*. When we are noticing how much and how long Pownall wrote before and after the Junius period it is worth observing that in the years it covered he published nothing. In 1768 he had brought out the fourth edition of the *Administration*, a book that was in demand and selling well. Yet he put it aside altogether, and the fifth edition did not appear till 1774. Reference to the list of his works in the Appendix[1] shews a blank in the dates between 1768 and 1771. That was exactly the time when the Letters, signed Junius, were being written. It may be inferred that they occupied so much of his time that he was unable to produce anything else then. While Junius was writing in 1771 Pownall had not even time for his private correspondence with Dr. Cooper, which will be noticed later. He got others to write this for him and only signed his name. When Junius disappeared Pownall wrote his own letters to Cooper, and the stream of his writing for publication began again and continued to the end of his life. There must have been some reason for its abrupt cessation in those three years.

Anonymous Writings

Though it was Pownall's habit to sign his name to what he wrote he never did so when he thought his work had better appear on its merits. His name was associ-

[1] Which may be turned to for this purpose.

ated with such fierce opposition to the Government that he not infrequently withheld it in order that his views might be regarded apart from the prejudice which he knew that he had himself incurred. Sometimes he avowed the authorship in a second edition when the first one had appeared anonymously in order to produce more effect. This happened with his *Administration*, which was published without his name in the first edition of 1764, but with it in the second edition of 1765. He wrote to Mr. Grenville that he doubted whether to publish the Dedication to the third edition of 1768 as his own. His *Memorial to the Sovereigns of Europe* in 1780 was anonymous,[1] but when he republished this as part of the *Three Memorials* in 1784 he avowed the authorship saying: "I wished that the world should receive the state of the case solely on the authority of the facts and not on the authority of any name. . . . I therefore withheld my name." His book called *Live and let Live* of 1787 was anonymous first, and afterwards acknowledged. An unsigned letter of considerable importance, which was addressed to Lord Chatham in November 1775, has been here identified as in the handwriting of Pownall, and another in the *Public Advertiser* of October 25, 1773 has been attributed to him.[2] This last-named letter was signed "A Member of Parliament." To those words are added "in mourning for the honour of his country" in the Miscellaneous Letter of Junius which is dated February 13, 1771. We have here a letter of Junius with a signature corresponding to that of one by Pownall, who not infrequently wrote anonymously when there was reason for so doing. The view here expressed is that the whole of the Junius correspondence was a branch of precisely similar work which Pownall was doing in Parliament while Junius wrote. With that work Pownall had been busy since 1764, writing in his own name before he went into Parliament. It is suggested that he then began to write under an assumed name these letters which were his second line of attack on the Government.

[1] Rich's *Bibl. Amor.* 1835, i. p. 284, speaks of this as "written with so much clearness of information and strength of argument that it is probably the work of some great master, who chooses to conceal himself behind a peculiar style and a fictitious tale." See p. 396, *post.*

[2] See *ante*, pp. 277, 252.

This theory of duplex action on Pownall's part conforms exactly to what we know was the method of Junius. Some of his letters were above that signature, some others, intended to elucidate them, were signed "Philo Junius." Those he afterwards acknowledged and published with the others in collected form saying in his Preface "the fraud was innocent and I always intended to explain it." This is just what Pownall did with the first edition of the *Administration* and the *Memorial to the Sovereigns* above alluded to in this connection. In the case of Pownall and of Junius we find the same policy of auxiliary writing which may reasonably be ascribed to the same person.

Well Informed

Nothing was more remarkable about Junius than the early and accurate information he obtained on all current topics and put into his Letters. It was one of his strongest claims to attention. He must have been indeed a man very well placed, and in close touch with the Government offices, to know as much as he did of what passed in their inner circles.

No man of that day had better opportunities than Pownall of hearing in advance of others what was happening. An old Civil servant he would have access to officials. The names of many distinguished men with whom he was on friendly terms have been mentioned above, and the last three chapters have shewn that he was not only in the House of Commons but playing a prominent part there during the period covered by the *Junius Letters*.

French

In those days, when the two countries were so much at war, there were but few Englishmen proficient in the French language. That Junius was one of them appears from the note to his Letter of January 30, 1771,[1] where he comments on Lord Rochford having made seven false concords in three lines of a despatch. Pownall knew French well, and Paris was familiar to him. In

[1] Woodfall, 1814, ii. note to p. 191.

his Memorial of 1756 to the Duke of Cumberland he referred to the width of the Seine to illustrate that of a reach of the St. Lawrence above Quebec.

An Early Letter of Junius

In a footnote to the list of the Junius writings mention has been made of an early pamphlet which was not regarded as part of the series till after that had been collected by Woodfall in 1812-1814. A writer in the *Gentleman's Magazine* of 1817 was the first to suggest that Junius might have also written this pamphlet of 1760. Mr. Simons in 1841 followed up the idea and wrote a book which goes far to substantiate it.

The paper is a short one headed "A Letter to an Honourable Brigadier General, Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Forces in Canada."

The officer referred to is Brigadier George Townshend, who succeeded to the command when Wolfe fell, and is in this paper charged with not being sufficiently vigorous in carrying out the policy of Wolfe and Pitt. In that policy Pownall was a firm believer, he was even able to claim a share in its initiation; any departure from it he would be likely to resent. From the detailed knowledge this Letter shews of what passed at Quebec in 1759 it must have been written by some one who was either himself there at the time or was in touch with those who were. Pownall comes under the latter category. In 1759 and the early part of 1760 he was in Boston and so in the way of meeting several officers who were sent south after the fall of Quebec to recover from their wounds. His correspondent, Brigadier Monckton, was one of them. He would thus be able to obtain knowledge of the circumstances related in the pamphlet, which was published soon after August 2, 1760. A quotation from the *London Gazette* of that date appears in it. Pownall had left Boston on June 3, so he would be in London, fresh from the scene of operations, by August; it is not impossible that he drafted the Letter on the voyage and revised and published it on his arrival. If Junius wrote this paper, as Mr. Simons contended, he must have been a man with intimate knowledge of what passed in

America after Wolfe's death. There were not many such men, and Pownall was one of them.

No Partisan

Though deeply interested in politics Junius was no party man, his attitude was a detached one, and he spoke of himself as "disowned as a dangerous auxiliary by every Party in the Kingdom."[1] This position of interest, combined with detachment, is one seldom occupied, few people could have claimed it. Reference to Pownall's career in the foregoing chapters will shew that it exactly described him. A letter of his to Dr. Cooper, written on February 25, 1769,[2] stated very distinctly that he had then made up his mind to have no connection with either Whigs or Tories, and to that intention he adhered. In his writings we find his independence asserted constantly. After he had retired he wrote in the Preface to the *Memorial to the King* that he was known "never to have written, spoken in Parliament, or acted, in any one instance on party grounds."

Garrick—Proximity to London

That the authorities were very much in earnest in their search for him Junius was well aware. His letter to Woodfall of November 8, 1771, ends with a postscript: "Beware of David Garrick; he was sent to pump you, and went directly to Richmond to tell the King I should write no more." The next Letter of this series[3] contains a message to Garrick about his inquiries and his report to the King. "I knew every particular of it next day," says Junius. He must have been in or close to Richmond to get his information so quickly, for in those days there was no post as there is now. This gives a clue to the situation of Junius, and it will be remembered that Pownall had a house at Richmond.[4] It is pointed out in

[1] Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 205.
[2] See *ante*, p. 217.
[3] Facsimile in Appendix.
[4] Garrick also lived there; the old theatre in which he played stood between the Green and the old Palace, some portions of which remain. The Court was frequently there and Lord Bute was at Sudbrook Court, now a Golf Club, about two miles off.

the *Grenville Correspondence*[1] that the Address to the King appeared in print on Tuesday, December 19, 1769, and that Junius must have been then in London or close to it, for he wrote on that day to Woodfall[2] to correct a clerical error which was put right on the Wednesday. Pownall was close to London that December; on the 5th he wrote to Cooper from Richmond the letter quoted above on page 222.

Anxiety of Junius

Reference to his Letter of November 10, 1771, will shew how Junius warned Woodfall, saying:—

> I must be more cautious than ever. I am sure I should not survive a discovery three days: or, if I did they would attack me by Bill. Change to the Somerset Coffee House and let no mortal know the alteration. I am persuaded you are too honest a man to contribute in any way to my destruction.[3] Act honourably by me, and at a proper time you shall know me.

This was written four years after Junius had begun dealings with Woodfall, to whom it shews that he was still unknown. But Woodfall did know his old schoolfellow Francis; and if the authorities got a hint to follow him up that clue would have led straight to Junius,[4] whose anxiety is thus intelligible, though quite needless, for Woodfall was an upright man, incapable of treachery.

Sir Robert Walpole

In his Letters of July 19, August 8 and 14, 1769, Junius wrote of the circumstances under which Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Walpole was expelled the House of Commons in 1711 with an intimate knowledge which shews that he had specially studied this statesman's career.

It had also been the subject of Pownall's special study. He wrote and published a Memoir of Sir Robert; notice of this will be found in the next chapter, together with

[1] 1853, iv. p. 491. See also Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 145.

[2] Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 205.

[3] Dr. Shebbeare, who had condemned the conduct of the Ministry ten years earlier in letters much less effective, and therefore less provocative, than those of Junius, had been sentenced to stand in the pillory, to pay a fine, and to be imprisoned for three years (*History of England*, 1825, T. Smollett).

[4] "It is by no means necessary that I should be exposed to the resentment of the worst and most powerful men in this country" (Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 7).

extracts from letters written to Pownall by Horace Walpole acknowledging the manner in which his father's services had been recognised. In this Memoir of Sir Robert the same distinction was drawn by Pownall between the Saxon customs—the basis of the Constitution —and the Norman laws and rule superimposed on them, as we find in Junius, who wrote, "By such treacherous acts the noble simplicity and free spirit of our Saxon laws were first corrupted. The Norman Conquest was not complete until Norman lawyers had introduced their laws and reduced slavery to a system."[1]

Dr. Swinney, F.R.S.

On July 21, 1769, Junius wrote to Woodfall "that Swinney is a wretched but dangerous fool. He had the impudence to go to Lord George Sackville, whom he had never spoken to, and to ask him whether or no he was the author of Junius."[2] Mr. Dilke was much exercised in his mind about this;[3] he wanted to ascertain who Swinney was, and how Junius came to know all this; he thought the person referred to was the Rev. Dr. Swinney, F.R.S., who had been chaplain to the British forces in Germany. This conjecture is believed to be correct, and if so it is easy to see how Pownall, who had himself been with the army in Germany, where Lord George commanded the cavalry, knew exactly the terms on which Swinney, the chaplain, had stood with the cavalry general.

John Wilkes, M.P.

John Wilkes, the oft-elected and oft-rejected Member for Middlesex, fills a large place in most histories of the early years of George III., to whom he was very much a thorn in the flesh before Junius became a more deeply penetrating one. Both these men fought against the supremacy of the new King and his Court. Wilkes endured persecution for so doing, and Junius risked the same treatment or worse; his above-quoted letter to Woodfall, in which he said he should not survive discovery

[1] Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 163.
[2] *Ibid.* i. p. 174.
[3] *Papers of a Critic*, C. Wentworth Dilke, 1875, p. 53.

three days, will be remembered in this connection. This being in the mind of Junius, it is natural to find sympathy with Wilkes frequently expressed in the Letters; but while the two men were alike in their action they differed absolutely in their methods. Wilkes inflamed the passions of the mob, but Junius stood on a higher plane, because he carefully avoided doing so and made his appeal to educated opinion. This distinction is manifest in a correspondence[1] between them, which began on August 21, 1771, and ended on January 15, 1772. During those five months each wrote seven letters to the other. Junius addressed Wilkes in the tone of a man giving good advice — mixed with reproach when necessary — to one who seemed to need it. Wilkes replied in a deferential spirit; he speaks of himself as honoured by the first letter he had from Junius; he declares that he does not

> mean to indulge the impertinent curiosity of finding out the most important secret of our times, the Author of Junius. I will not attempt with profane hands to lift the sacred veil of sanctuary. I am disposed with the inhabitants of Attica to erect *an altar to the unknown god* of our political idolatry, and will be content to worship him in clouds and darkness. . . . I wish to comply with every direction of Junius, to profit by his hints, and to have the permission of writing to him on any important occasion.[2]

Junius drily replied that he was much flattered "with the worship you are pleased to pay to the unknown god of politics. I find I am treated as other gods are by their votaries, with sacrifice and ceremony in abundance, and very little obedience." Wilkes was of evil countenance[3] and bad character; Junius did not take him too seriously. "I know *that man* much better than any of you. Nature intended him only for a good-humoured fool. A systematical education, with long practice, has made him a consummate hypocrite."[4] But while Junius thus shewed his opinion of Wilkes there was nothing sanctimonious about him.[5] He wrote to Wilkes on September 18, 1771, "I too

[1] This was not republished by Junius in his collected Letters of 1772, but George Woodfall gives it in his editions of 1812 and 1814.

[2] Woodfall, 1814, i. pp. 297, 303.

[3] His picture, which faces p. 263, vol. i. of Woodfall's edition of 1812, shews protruding teeth and a horrid leer accentuated by a squint.

[4] Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 265.

[5] But he was by no means an irreligious man. Writing in his second character as "Philo-Junius" he declared Junius to be "a Christian upon the most sincere conviction" (Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 317).

am no enemy to good fellowship, and have often cursed that canting parson for wishing to deny you your claret."

We have seen indications that when he was a young man in Boston Pownall had made the pace a little faster than the local Puritans thought seemly in their Governor. In 1780, when he was looking back on his youth in America, he wrote that "his life was a compound of business and frivolity abroad."[1] Since then he had settled down, but he had no doubt heard the chimes at midnight in his day, and when that was over he was not, any more than Junius, the man to grudge a bottle of claret to his neighbour.

As a man of the world Junius was able to distinguish between the personal attributes and the public utility of Wilkes, to whom, when on the right track, he wished success and shewed sympathy, especially in matters relating to America and Ireland. In 1769, two years before this private correspondence of Junius with Wilkes, Pownall had spent some time in Ireland. That country thenceforth had a share in his thoughts which were chiefly occupied with America; in the capacity of Junius it would be natural for him to approve, as Junius did, of the attention given by Wilkes to Ireland and America.

But when it came to public affairs Pownall was as far removed as Junius from having any sympathy with such disturbance of order as Wilkes caused. A letter of his, dated February 3, 1769, has been quoted,[2] in which he described Wilkes as a bad man, but objected to the grounds on which the prosecution was based. Seventeen years earlier he had written that

> it were endless to observe how many free people have lost their liberty by their leaders using the principles of liberty to the base purposes of party and faction. For where these friends have once insinuated themselves, or been imposed upon a people under this fair disguise, they have never failed to break all that order and harmony, and to dissolve that communion by which alone a Government can subsist.[3]

It has been mentioned[4] that in 1765 Pownall had described Otis and the other demagogues, who were then disturbing Boston, much in the same way and from the same cause as Wilkes disturbed London, as being "perhaps

[1] *Memorial to the Sovereigns of Europe*, Preface, p. v.
[2] See *ante*, p. 212.
[3] *Principles of Polity*, 1752, p. 15.
[4] See *ante*, p. 182.

the worst as well as the lowest part of the people." A man holding those views was not to be run away with by a demagogue. But to try to put a bridle on the enthusiast, and then use his force to carry his rider to the goal of liberty which both were seeking, was another matter. That is what Junius tried to do with Wilkes, and it is also what Pownall desired to see done with Otis, whose action is deplored in the letters addressed to Cooper by Pownall from London.[1] In his dealings with Wilkes Junius appears as a friend to liberty but an enemy to license, and that is precisely the attitude which Pownall took up with regard to Otis, the American counterpart and contemporary of Wilkes.

The Townshend Brothers

The Miscellaneous Letter of August 25, 1767, contains a passage which reads :—

> I find you and your brother-printers have got greatly into a sort of knack of stuffing your papers with flummery upon two certain brothers. . . . I am not a stranger to this *par nobile fratrum*. I have served under the one and have been forty times promised to be served by the other.

A footnote[2] explains that these two were Lord Townshend and his brother Charles, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.[3] As the former had been a soldier serving abroad, and the latter a Parliament man living at home, none of the early commentators on Junius could understand how he or any one else could have been connected with two men who lived such very different lives. This mystery was solved by Mr. Griffin who pointed out that before Lord Townshend succeeded to the title he had been the Brigadier-General of that name who had taken over the command at Quebec on Wolfe's death, and afterwards served in Germany with the army of Prince Ferdinand. There Townshend was a general officer and Pownall ranked as a colonel. It was

[1] See *ante*, pp. 222, 268.

[2] Woodfall, 1814, ii. pp. 468-469.

[3] To whom was addressed the anonymous Letter of 1760 "to an Honourable Brigadier General" which has been before mentioned as ascribed by Mr. Simons to Junius in 1841.

therefore quite in order for him, in the capacity of Junius, to say he had served under this brother.

As to Charles Townshend, before he went to the Exchequer he had been Secretary at War, therefore at the head of the office which included the Commissary-General's Department; as Pownall had been high up in that he must have been brought in contact with its Chief who had not improbably made promises which were never fulfilled. Very few men could say that they had been brought in touch with both brothers, but Pownall could say it. When Junius said the same Mr. Griffin was confirmed in the opinion that he did so because he was Pownall.

Thomas Whately, M.P.

Mr. Thomas Whately, M.P., has been already mentioned as the recipient of the correspondence from Hutchinson and Oliver (the disclosure of which caused the celebrated duel) when he was Secretary to Mr. George Grenville. Deeply attached as he was to Grenville, Junius bitterly resented the action of Whately in abandoning the Opposition on Grenville's death and at once going over to the Government. Writing to Lord Suffolk on April 15, 1771, Junius says his conduct would be excusable "had you, like poor Whately, been reduced from a state of independence to the humiliating necessity of soliciting your support from administration."[1] Three months earlier, on January 9, Junius made a very fierce attack on Whately which ended with the words, "Tom Whately, take care of yourself."[2]

This Thomas Whately, like his nephew of the same name,[3] was generally known to his intimates and family as "Tom" Whately. No stranger to him would, however, address him thus; it was just what Junius would not know how to do if he were a stranger to Whately. But Pownall did know; during Mr. Grenville's lifetime his secretary must have been a good deal thrown with Pownall, who was working with Grenville, and moreover Whately and Pownall were on the same committee

[1] Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 398. [2] *Ibid.* p. 311.
[3] Grandfather of the present writer.



W. Ridley sculp.

Duke of Grafton

of the House of Commons in the previous year. We find here that Junius was addressing Whately exactly as Pownall had heard him spoken to in that committee-room.

Duke of Grafton

Staunch as Junius was to a man like Grenville whom he respected there was no such fierce enemy of those he despised; for them their rank and station only emphasised the terms in which they were addressed. Nobody suffered more than the Duke of Grafton, who had begun life as a strong Whig under Chatham, whom he deserted to take office under Lord Rockingham of whom he tired. Chatham again received the Duke into favour and, on resuming office in 1766, made him First Lord of the Treasury. When Chatham resigned the Duke, instead of following his leader, remained behind and succeeded to the Premiership. The Duke's private life did not look well in the fierce light thrown upon it by Junius who regarded him as a turncoat, and wrote on August 13, 1771: "My abhorrence of the Duke arises from an intimate knowledge of his character and from a thorough conviction that his baseness has been the cause of greater mischief to England than even the unfortunate ambition of Lord Bute." To Pownall, who had been the trusted subordinate of Lord Chatham when Mr. Pitt, the manner in which his old chief was treated by the Duke must have been specially obnoxious.

The Cabinet

Not only the Premier did Junius hold up to contempt, but the rest of the Ministry, and they were the men whom Pownall was fighting in the House of Commons. Among them were Lord Bute who was regarded as the King's evil genius; the Duke of Bedford who had been Lord Bute's agent in negotiating the Treaty of Paris in 1763 and was held responsible for not getting better terms; Lord North who became the King's instrument in oppression when he succeeded the Duke of Grafton as Premier, and Chief-Justice Lord Mansfield who was

a nominee of Lord Bute. It mattered nothing to Junius what station a man held. How the man attained his station and what use he made of it when he got it, what he himself was apart from the trappings of office were the questions which determined how each individual was treated in these Letters. From this rule there was an exception.

Lord Holland

The one man whom Junius let off lightly was Lord Holland, whose dealing, as Paymaster-General, with public funds laid him open to censure. That it did not fall on him from the pen of Junius, so alert in dealing with others, was quickly noticed. A writer to the *Public Advertiser* of October 16, 1771 said:[1] "I know nothing of Junius, but I see plainly that he has designedly spared Lord Holland and his family." So marked was this exception in favour of Lord Holland that some connection between him and Junius was inferred to explain his exemption from the lash which fell so heavily on others. This has been brought forward in support of the idea that Francis was the author, for it would have been impossible for him as Junius to place his early benefactor in the pillory.

But it also applies to Pownall, who as Commissary-General in Germany, had served in the department of which Lord Holland was the head, and therefore in a position to earn the gratitude of the anonymous publicist.

Their Royal Highnesses the Dukes of Cumberland

The elder of the two Royal Princes who bore this title was the uncle of George III. His name is associated with Culloden and he was Commander-in-Chief in the latter years of his father George II. Of him Junius wrote with respect; he says, of General Amherst: "It was not forgot that he was one of the many public benefits

[1] Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 410.

desired to this country from that great school of military knowledge and loyal sentiments, the family of the late Duke of Cumberland."[1] Such a remark would come quite naturally from Pownall. He had been treated with marked favour by the Duke who had honoured him with orders to attend the Conference at Alexandria, in Virginia, in 1755, and had specially commanded him to draw up a scheme for operations in America in 1756.[2] As Pownall's wife was a friend of the Duchess of Cumberland it is evident that he had been admitted not only to the military school—of which Junius speaks—but to the family circle of the Duke, at whose death in October 1765 the title was conferred on his nephew, the King's brother.

On October 2, 1771, this second Duke was privately married to Mrs. Horton, sister to the Colonel Luttrell, whose return for Middlesex to the House of Commons the Court had arranged in place of Wilkes the demagogue who had obtained a majority of votes. A note to Woodfall,[3] says that the marriage was first made known to the public by a caustic Letter from Junius, one of the Miscellaneous Series, which is dated November 13. The agitation which followed led to the introduction by the King's command of the Royal Marriage Act on February 21, 1772. On the next day Junius wrote to Woodfall that "the intended Bill, in consequence of the message, will be a most dangerous innovation in the internal policy of this country." Reference to this period in Chapter X. will shew that three weeks after Junius had expressed in writing his objection to this Bill Pownall spoke against it in the Commons. On March 13 he followed Mr. Dowdeswell in debate, and moved to omit a clause in the preamble. Nor did his opposition stop there. He wrote and published a pamphlet called "Considerations on the Indignity suffered by the Crown and Dishonour brought upon the Nation by the marriage of H.R.H. the Duke of Cumberland with an English subject."[4] Here we have Junius writing, and Pownall both writing

[1] Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 101.
[2] See *ante*, pp. 55 and 61.
[3] Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 415.
[4] This is mentioned in Watt's *Bibl. Brit.*, but there is no copy of it in the British Museum, and it has not been possible to obtain one. The title, however, shews the mind of the writer.

and speaking, on the same subject in the same spirit and at the same time.

Right Hon. George Grenville

The character of Mr. George Grenville has already been noticed in connection with his tenure of office from 1763 to 1765, and with the Stamp Act for which he became responsible. Though he made that mistake he did so in the belief that he was acting rightly, and he stood out in marked contrast to his elder brother Lord Temple, who was one of the most mischievous schemers of a scheming age. While Grenville lacked the genius which distinguished his brother-in-law, Mr. Pitt, he was a good administrator, a well-read, hard-working and intensely painstaking man. Those qualities may be assigned to Junius also. A town-bred man, Mr. Grenville had none of the personal knowledge of the outside world which Junius shewed so markedly in respect of America. That, however, was a difference in experience. So far as character was concerned they resembled each other in some respects. Living among mercenary men Mr. Grenville was not greedy for money, Junius declined to accept it when offered to him by Woodfall. Though he held the highest offices Mr. Grenville did not intrigue to get them; to him Junius wrote three letters directly and personally, they are dated February 6, September 3 and October 20, 1768.[1]

The fact that they were both disinterested men when others were the reverse was probably the cause of that thorough-going attachment which Junius shewed to Grenville. That there were few political characters of the day who were more entitled to it was recognised in his Preface[2] to Woodfall's edition of the Letters by Dr. Mason Good, who elsewhere gave a detailed account of Mr. Grenville's habits of life.[3] The opinion Junius held of Mr. Grenville has often been noticed; so much so that it has been generally considered indispensable to the claim for any one alleged to have played the part of

[1] These letters are reproduced in facsimile by Mr. Twisleton in his *Handwriting of Junius*, Plates 1, 3, 5.

[2] Woodfall, 1814, i. note to p. 81.

[3] *Ibid.* iii. p. 196.



W. Ridley sculp.t

The Right Hon.ble George Grenville

Junius that he should be shewn to have been on good terms with this statesman. We find this forcibly expressed by the *Edinburgh Review*. "Whoever revives the inquiry into the authorship of Junius, unless he discovers positive and irresistible evidence in favour of his claimant should shew him to be politically attached to the Grenville party which Junius certainly was."[1]

More than eighty years have passed since that requirement was made; we have now to see how it can be met in the case of Pownall[2] whose name was never mentioned in this connection till long after these words were written. We have just seen Wilkes describe Junius in fulsome terms as his political idol. It is no exaggeration to say that Grenville literally stood in that position to Pownall, who, when he brought out in his own name the second edition of his most important work the *Administration* in 1765, dedicated it to Mr. George Grenville. He said that he

> must congratulate the public upon having a Minister who will take pains to understand the commerce and interests of the colonies . . ., who is equal in firmness to pursue those interests. . . . The truly great and wise man will not judge of the people from their passions. . . . While such is the temper of the great Minister, etc.

We may compare with this what Junius wrote to Mr. Grenville on October 20, 1768: "I have no connection with any party except a voluntary attachment to *your* cause and person. It began with amusement, grew into habit, was confirmed by a closer attention to your principles and conduct and is now heated into passion."[3] The Miscellaneous Letter of the following 15th of December is to Mr. Grenville who is asked to excuse being addressed. But he is told that his

> conduct attracts the attention because it is highly interesting to the welfare of the public. . . . Your weight and authority in Parliament are acknowledged by the submission of your opponents. . . . You have invariably adhered to one cause, one language. . . . They who

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[1] Vol. xliv. p. 6, 1826.

[2] *Literary Anecdotes*, 1814. John Almon (viii. note to p. 65), says that though Pownall believed in Mr. Grenville personally he did not think the Whig leader wise in trusting those men in Boston whom he himself had mistrusted when Governor there, and whom he regarded as enemies of both England and America.

[3] The *Handwriting of Junius*, 1871, Hon. E. Twisleton, facsimile No. 3.

dispute the rectitude of your opinions admit that your conduct has been uniform, manly and consistent.[1]

In that year 1768 Pownall published his fourth edition of the *Administration*, in which he replaced the previous dedication to Mr. Grenville by a new one which speaks of him as

one who hath and alway will have great interest, lead and authority in Parliament. . . . So is he equally by principle determined, as by abilities able, to guard the civil rights of the subjects.

Not only do the last-quoted Junius Letter and this dedication[2] coincide in their simultaneous appreciation of Mr. Grenville, but they do so in almost the same form of expression. In the one we find mention of "his weight and authority"; in the latter of "his interest, lead and authority" in Parliament. Pownall's dedication is dated in June and the Letter of Junius not till December. The same thought would hardly be conveyed in words practically the same by two different men. Either Junius was not Pownall but had read his dedication and from it was interpolating words written six months earlier; or else Junius was Pownall and was unconsciously repeating above the assumed signature in December what he had written in his own name in June. In the month after he wrote the dedication Pownall wrote thus to Grenville to whom he had become known, and with whom he was now acting in Parliament:—

Westhorp, Marlow, *July* 14, 1768.

Dear Sir—The fourth edition of the *Administration of the Colonies* is in the press. . . . I have continued the dedication of it to you by a new and particular address . . ., also pointing out a measure[3] which I am, from conviction, persuaded ought to be taken up, not on the grounds of policy but from necessity. . . . As the tenor of this address may carry with it suggestions that may, or may not, be proper; as it may, or may not, be found expedient; as it *may, or may not, be proper to avow it.*[4] I have taken the liberty to send a draught of it to you before it goes to the press. . . . I sincerely

[1] Woodfall, 1814, iii. pp. 192-195.

[2] Mr. Grenville died in 1770, but when Pownall published his fifth edition of the *Administration* in 1774 he reproduced this dedication of 1768. Such a posthumous mark of regard is evidence of very strong attachment.

[3] "A General and Entire Union of the British Dominions," so described on p. xiii of the Dedication.

[4] The words here placed in italics shew that Pownall was doubtful whether this paper should appear anonymously like the writings of Junius.

mean, to the best of my abilities, to aid those whom this country must look up to if it ever again returns, or is forced, into a spirit and temper of doing business.[1] . . . If you conceive that any proper use may be made of bringing forward the proposal referred to in Parliament, I shall be very glad to communicate with you upon it. I am very shy of obtruding myself or my views upon any one, especially on such as I conceive have sentiments of friendship towards me, and that is the reason why I did not take a ride over on this errand myself, but, if you wish to have conversation on these American matters, either as to facts or opinions, I think I can now point out how they might be taken up. . . . There is now open to you, and to you alone with consistency, a noble track in politics. I am an enthusiast for your striking into it; it would do you honour and establish you as a Minister of this country, and what is more it would lead to the establishing the peace and prosperity of the country. I have a thousand things to say that I neither can nor will write about. As to the part I shall myself take, both here and in America, I have upon a very serious and deliberate solution determined unalterably. In one thing I am unalterable, my regard and attachment to you, and I have the honour to be, etc. T. Pownall.[2]

In this we can see several things. The writer, like Junius, considered the kingdom in a parlous state, which he meant to do his best to remedy; he appealed to Grenville for help in linking up the mother country with the outraged and discontented colonies, first for the sake of his own career, secondly in the name of patriotism. There he struck the note which ran all through the Junius Letters—the note to which the country vibrated, and whence came the distinctive character of the writings of Junius. But when Pownall was anxious to obtain Grenville's co-operation in the cause he was advocating, and he was within riding distance of Grenville, of whose friendship he was assured, he abstained from going over to see him lest he should obtrude.[3]

To that letter, three days afterwards, on July 17, 1768, Grenville replied:[4]—

I am very sensible of the honour you do me, both in this and in the Address prefixed to the former Editions of your treatise upon the

[1] This view of the state of affairs corresponds with what Junius expressed on May 30, 1769: "The condition of the present times is desperate indeed" (Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 492).

[2] *Grenville Correspondence*, 1853, iv. p. 312.

[3] Pownall used Marlow as a summer resort, we shall see that he was there again in the next summer. Junius also went to that district at the same season. He wrote on May 17, 1772, "I am just returned from a visit in a certain part of Berkshire" (Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 451).

[4] *Administration of the Colonies*, 1774, ii. p. 113.

Administration of the Colonies, and am much obliged to you for the expressions of your regard and good opinion. . . . We agree entirely in our wishes that the constitutional powers of this Kingdom and the fixed government of the laws may prevail, and the rights of the people be established upon true political liberty. As to the question of our Parliament granting to America a competent number of representatives to sit in our House of Commons . . . if such an application should be made by the Colonies to Parliament, in the same manner as those which were made from Chester and Durham and probably from Wales, it would, in my opinion, be entitled to the most serious and favourable consideration. . . . I am much afraid that neither the people of Great Britain nor those of America are sufficiently apprised of the danger which threatens both from the present state of things to adopt a measure to which both one and the other seem indisposed. . . . For my own part I shall await the event with concern, and shall be ready to give any assistance I can whenever I see any practicable road opened to our safety.

This exchange of letters between Grenville and Pownall is sufficient to shew the terms they were on. In perfect sympathy with each other on main principles: the former disposed to take time for consideration and act later; the latter quick, impetuous, and wishful that his views should be acted on forthwith. The "deliberate resolution" he mentions in his letter was no doubt that of making an appeal to the public, both in America and England, through the Press. It is significant that exactly six months after this correspondence between Grenville and Pownall the regular campaign of the Junius Letters was opened, supplementing and over-riding the guerilla warfare of the Miscellaneous Letters which had begun in April 1767.

Grenville and Pownall took part in what Hansard calls[1] "the grand debate on North American affairs" on January 26, 1769. Pownall spoke at length; Grenville's speech is mentioned though not reported, but he is referred to in the report as supporting Pownall. In March of the next year, 1770, they, with seven others, among whom were Mr. Thomas Whately[2] and the Right Hon. W. Dowdeswell,[3] served on the same Committee of the

[1] Hansard, *Parl. Hist.* xvi. pp. 485-487.

[2] Elder brother of Joseph Whately of Nonsuch Park, Surrey, 1761-68, M.P. for Ludgershall, 1767, to death in 1772, M.P. for Castle Rising. He has been already mentioned in connection with the Hutchinson-Oliver Correspondence.

[3] Of Pull Court, Worcester, 1747, M.P. for Tewkesbury; 1765, Chancellor of the Exchequer. His granddaughter, Isabella Sophia Pepys, sister of Charles Pepys, first Earl of Cottenham, married the nephew of this Thomas Whately,

House to prepare a Bill brought forward by Mr. Grenville to regulate the trials of disputed elections. In November of that year Mr. Grenville died. His intimate relations with Governor Pownall, during the Junius period, have been made manifest.

With him is connected the second, and the last, discrepancy which can be found in the theory that Pownall and Junius were one and the same. Pownall not only knew Grenville at this time but knew him very well. Yet Junius, in one passage, says he did not know Grenville; after mentioning him in his letter of July 29, 1769, he goes on to say, "I have neither the honour of being personally known to him nor. . . ." A note of the 1814 edition of Junius[1] calls this "A truly singular assertion." So indeed it is. It has already been observed that when writing anonymously to Lord Chatham in 1775 Pownall, in order to efface himself, did exactly the same thing. If correct it rules Pownall out; but it goes much further, for it rules out, at the same time, every other man of mark of that day. No one who was of any political importance could have failed to be acquainted with Mr. Grenville, whom not to know was to be a man unknown, for he was one of the great party leaders of that day. If Junius did not know him, he was outside the inner circle of politicians. Yet he was well within it, otherwise he could never have obtained the early information on political questions which was one of the most remarkable features of his letters. He cannot have been an outsider and an insider simultaneously, the two things contradict each other. We are left to assume that this sentence, like his saying there was but one person concerned in the production of the letters, was a false clue, purposely intended to baffle his pursuers. Thus regarded, the "singular assertion" was a *ruse de guerre* used by a man who was waging war. As has been already mentioned, Junius wrote to Mr. Grenville on February 6, September 3 and October 20, 1768, and in each of these Letters he addresses Mr. Grenville personally, and seeks his co-operation just as Pownall did in his above-

M.P. He was the Rev. Thomas Whately, Vicar of Cookham, Rector of Chetwynd. His daughter, Sophia Jane, married the Ven. Assheton Pownall, Archdeacon of Leicester, who was of kin to Thomas Pownall. The Archdeacon's descendants are therefore related to three members of this Committee of nine in 1770.

[1] Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 533.

quoted letter of July 14. As in the case of Lord Chatham we find both Pownall and Junius writing in the same way to the same statesman, but here it is all done in the same year.

Lord Chatham

Junius is only known to have corresponded privately with four persons, Wilkes, Woodfall, Lord Chatham and Mr. Grenville. The letters to Wilkes and to H. S. Woodfall were published by George Woodfall in 1812 and 1814. Those to Lord Chatham, like those to Mr. Grenville, were reproduced by Mr. Twisleton.

As to Lord Chatham, Pownall had been his representative in Boston, and by carrying out his policy, one favourable to the colonies, had incurred the displeasure of the Lords of Trade, which Chatham does not appear to have done anything to temper or avert. There was no obligation such as is sometimes recognised from subordinate to chief after those relations have ceased. Pownall could act with or against the Earl as he thought fit, it has been seen that, as a rule, his action in the Commons and that of Chatham in the Lords coincided. But that was when Chatham had reverted to his first opinions about the colonies. As Pownall never altered his he was opposed to Chatham when the latter was, from August 1766 to December 1767 the nominal but responsible head of a Cabinet which acted on lines different from what his own had been. He would then appear in Pownall's eyes a man false to his own principles. So we find Junius in his first Miscellaneous Letter of April 28, 1767—written during the above-mentioned period — making a fierce attack on Chatham. Dr. Mason Good speaks in a note of the "utter aversion which Junius at first felt for this nobleman on various political accounts and especially on the subject of the American dispute. His aversion, however, softened as their political views approximated and was at length converted into approbation and eulogy."[1]

The quite different tone in which Junius addressed Lord Chatham at the beginning and at the end of the

[1] Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 453.

period of the Letters has been found difficult to reconcile by many commentators. But if we regard Pownall as Junius it is explained at once; it was not he who changed his mind as time passed, it was Lord Chatham, who, as he came back from a state which Junius described as that of a lunatic,[1] restored himself to the place in Pownall's opinion which he had originally held. When that happened Junius ceased to think, as he had done in 1767, that Lord Chatham was becoming subservient to Lord Bute, and again addressed him in respectful terms which were never altered afterwards. The two letters which Junius wrote direct to Lord Chatham were dated January 2, 1768, and January 14, 1772.[2] The first covered an enclosure which does not appear to have survived; in the second the writer says of himself, "Retired and unknown I live in the shade and have only a speculative ambition." In the letter which has been already mentioned,[3] as written by Pownall to Lord Chatham on November 14, 1775, we find him describing himself as "equally below connection with any party and above dependence upon any." He then not only refrained from any signature, but spoke of himself as unknown to Lord Chatham who knew him, his opinions and his handwriting so well that there was nothing in that to blind the Earl as to who his correspondent was; especially as the letter ended with a promise that the writer would disclose himself if required. But it did enable Chatham, if he wished to do so, to shew the letter to any other person as one received from a stranger. Junius was therefore writing anonymously to Lord Chatham in 1768 and 1772, and Pownall was doing the same in 1775, each of them defining his position in much the same terms.

Lord Shelburne

Lord Shelburne, afterwards Marquis of Lansdowne, was in 1767 Secretary of State for the Southern Department; as such he caught the eye of Junius, who described

[1] Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 512. Date, December 19, 1767.

[2] These are reproduced in facsimile, Plates 13 and 14, by Mr. Twisleton in the *Handwriting of Junius*.

[3] See p. 277, *ante*.

him on October 19, 1768,[1] in terms not flattering, but a good deal milder than those applied to most of his colleagues. As Lord Lansdowne, he died on May 7, 1805. Mr. Britton records that only a week before his death he was appealed to by Sir Richard Phillips on the subject of Junius and asked what he knew about it. The Marquis replied :—

> The grounds of secrecy are now so far removed *by death* and change of circumstances that it is unnecessary the author of Junius should much longer be unknown. The world are curious about him, and I could make a very interesting publication on the subject. *I knew Junius and I knew all about the writing and production of those letters.* . . . I'll tell you this for your guide generally; Junius has *never yet* been publicly named. *None of the parties ever guessed at as Junius was the true Junius.* Nobody has ever suspected him.[2]

That Lord Lansdowne had no one who had been in his own immediate circle—*e.g.* Colonel Barré—in his mind when he spoke is clear from the Preface to his life, written by Lord E. Fitzmaurice in 1876.

Coming from a man who had, when the Letters were published, held so great a position as the speaker, that is a very strong statement. He probably had his information after he had left office. If he had known, while Secretary, all he knew after he would no doubt have acted to the discomfiture of Junius. But he definitely asserted that he knew; that every name mentioned during the five-and-thirty years which had passed was wrong; and, as the death of Junius had at last occurred, he unsealed his lips to say as much as he did. That death was recent, or the same thing might have been said earlier to some one else than Sir Richard Phillips. The position exactly describes Governor Pownall, who had escaped suspicion and mention, and who had died on February 25, about two months before Lord Lansdowne spoke. It would be more than extraordinary if any other of the small group of men, capable of writing those Letters thirty-five years previously, had also happened to die a few weeks before Lord Lansdowne passed away.

[1] Woodfall, 1814, iii. pp. 165-167.

[2] Britton, *Authorship of the Letters of Junius*, 1848, p. 20, of the preliminary address; *Life of William Earl of Shelburne*, Lord E. Fitzmaurice, 1876, Preface, p. ix.

CHAPTER XII

PART II

'THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS'—POWNALL THEIR AUTHOR

1767–1772

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Junius in Parliament

That Junius, like Pownall, was a member of Parliament appears from various passages. In his Letter of August 13, 1771, he wrote of Lord Chatham :—

> *My vote* will hardly recommend him to an increase of his pension or a seat in the Cabinet.

From this it seems that he had a vote to give, but either he was not prepared to give it, or, more probably, he knew it would be of little service to Chatham with whom he was then acting, because it was that of a strong opponent of the Government and might do more harm than good.

The two following extracts, when read together, confirm the view that Junius was in the House; they are dated five days apart.

A few days ago I was in a *large public company*, where there happened some curious conversation; the Secretary at War[1] was pleased to express himself with unusual simplicity and candour, he assured *us* he did not know a single general officer. . . .

The second passage runs :—

I have never joined in the severe censures which have lately been thrown on Lord Barrington. The formal declaration he was pleased to make, for the information of the *House of Commons* and of this country, with respect to the shameful ignorance and incapacity of all the General Officers. . . .[2]

In the first of these passages Lord Barrington's speech is mentioned as addressed to a "large public company" in which Junius was present.

In the second passage the same speech is described as addressed to the House of Commons. That was therefore the same "large public company," and in it also Junius was included among the audience. If he had been in the House as a visitor, not as a Member, he would probably have said so, for it would have made him more difficult to trace.

The Falkland Islands

In his Letter of January 30, 1771, Junius strongly condemned the weak policy of the Government about the Falkland Islands, lately seized by Spain, with which Power, in the absence of suitable reparation, he advocated war, before "the collected strength of the House of Bourbon attacks us at once."[3] The Miscellaneous Letter of the following 13th of February signed "A Member of one House of Parliament in mourning for the honour of his King and Country," says that its writer had derived his information from papers laid by administration before both Houses. Unless, as an outsider, he had

[1] Lord Barrington.

[2] Miscellaneous Letters, November 19, 1770; November 24, 1770.

[3] Woodfall, ii. 191. An editor's note there says, "This prediction was but too fatally verified in the aid subsequently afforded by those Powers to America." Woodfall gives in a note, ii. p. 194, the letter which Dr. Samuel Johnson was employed by the Government to write in answer to this of Junius. It has been shewn how mistrustful Pownall was of the action of Spain.

received some very exceptional privilege Junius must have been either a Peer or a Member of the House of Commons to have the opportunity of seeing such papers.

Pownall, like Junius, was furious with the action of the Government in this matter. On November 22 he had seconded a motion by Mr. Dowdeswell for papers about the Falkland Islands. "He entered into the whole argument at large with full knowledge of the subject. He shewed the little utility a settlement upon Falkland Islands was to us, but having been once made it could not be given up."[1] This motion for papers was defeated, but they were produced on February 13 when Mr. Dowdeswell moved an amendment, criticising the action of the Government, which was seconded by Governor Pownall in a speech which occupies nine columns of Hansard.[2] This date will be observed to be identical with that of the Miscellaneous Letter above referred to which followed on that of January 30, exactly as the second speech by Pownall followed on his first.

On February 13, 1771, we find Junius writing in his Letter and Pownall speaking in the House of Commons on the same subject and in exactly the same spirit. A stronger case of parallel and identical action could hardly be found.

Three weeks later, on March 5, the action of the King in this matter was denounced by Pownall in the House of Commons.[3] "Shame to our negotiators, this is the disavowal we have accepted. We demanded *Justice*, our negotiation has lowered us to accept a Favour, and that favour is both an insult and a snare."[3] On the next day, March 6, the Miscellaneous Letter of Junius, No. XCI., signed Vindex, contained this passage: "Falkland Island is one of my possessions, and yet I allow the King of Spain to serve a claim of prior right, and I declare myself *satisfied* with that reservation."[4]

Opinions about the Colonies

While both Junius and Pownall were working for the same object,—the discomfiture of the Court party and the destruction of the Ministry,—the former dealt chiefly with

[1] Hansard, *Parl. Hist.* xvi. p. 1120.
[2] *Ibid.* xvi. p. 1363.
[3] Speech already quoted from on p. 238.
[4] Woodfall, iii. p. 344.

domestic, the latter with colonial topics. If their lines of action had been exactly alike, identification would have been swift and certain. So it is not often that Junius alludes to the question of the colonies.[1] When he does his tone is that of Pownall[2] and his sympathy with the North American colonists is especially plain in the famous letter of December 19, 1769, which is addressed to the King and tells him that

> if ever you retire to America be assured they will give you such a Covenant to digest as the presbytery of Scotland would have been ashamed to offer to Charles the Second. They left their native land in search of freedom and found it in a desert. Divided as they are into a thousand forms of policy and religion, there is one point on which they all agree—they equally detest the pageantry of a King and the supercilious hypocrisy of a Bishop.

On the previous 8th of February Governor Pownall had made a long speech in the House of Commons on behalf of the colonists in which he said:—

> The spirit which led their ancestors to break off from everything which is near and dear to the human heart . . . which led them to quit every comfort that a settled and civilised country—their own native country—could afford, and to encounter every difficulty and distress which a wild wilderness of savages could oppose to them . . . has but a slight and trifling sacrifice to make at this time; they have not to quit their native country but to defend it.[3]

Here we have a Letter from Junius exactly corresponding with a speech from Pownall in the advocacy of colonial rights and the description of early colonial conditions. The Letter describes the first state of the new country as a desert, the speech calls it a wilderness. The meaning conveyed is exactly the same. Pownall was then, from his colonial experience, one of the few specialists in London on such matters; it has been shewn how he steadily upheld the interests of the colonists till some years later when he, like Chatham, thought they were unduly pushing matters to extremes.

[1] He only did so on December 19, 1767; September 15, October 6, 19, 27, November 14, 1768; January 21, May 30, December 19, 1769; May 28, 1770; November 2, 1771.

[2] His position was thus defined: "Junius considers the right of taxing the colonies by an Act of the British legislature as a speculative right only never to be *exerted* nor ever to be *renounced*" (Woodfall, ii. p. 393, date November 2, 1771). For Pownall's identical opinions see pp. 218, 227, *ante*. An exception is the Miscellaneous Letter of December 19, 1767, written when Junius was upset by the aberration of Lord Chatham, which must have greatly distressed Pownall.

[3] Hansard, *Parl. Hist.* xvi. p. 496.

Colonial Office

In the first Letter of Junius, that of January 21, 1769, the methods of the newly established office of the Secretary of State for the Colonies is criticised severely. The action of Lord Hillsborough, who had been appointed to that office is described as giving "as humble an opinion of his Lordship's capacity as it does of his temper and moderation." It has been already mentioned that in the autumn before Junius wrote this, Smollett in commenting on Pownall's first edition of the *Administration* had ascribed the intended expansion of the old Board of Trade into a Secretary of State's Office to a suggestion first made in that book. No one would watch the working of the new office more closely than he who had urged its necessity. During the latter part of 1768 this must have been a matter foremost in Pownall's mind, and there is a marked coincidence in the prominence it held in the mind of Junius who dealt with the subject in the first Letter he signed with that name. At that time Pownall was not writing on political matters, but when he began to do so again in 1774 he at once expressed his dissatisfaction with the Colonial Office much as Junius had done:

> The resistance of Cabinet faction obstructed it at home and nursed up opposition to it abroad. To this an impracticable line of conduct, mistaken for system, and an unhappy tone of government, misunderstood for firmness, gave ample scope, etc.[1]

The Stamp Act

In his first Letter, January 21, 1769, Junius defended Mr. Grenville's action about the Stamp Act. Strongly opposed as Pownall was to the taxation of the colonies by Parliament, when they were neither represented in nor consulted by it, he was then quite of opinion that it had the power. In the year the Stamp Act was passed he wrote: "It is not, nor ever was or could be, in the power of the Crown to exempt any persons or communities within the dominions of Great Britain from

[1] This from a note written in 1772, published in *Administration* of 1774, i. p. 16.

being subject and liable to be taxed by Parliament."[1] As to the right he agreed with Mr. Grenville, as to the method only he disagreed with him.

The Tea Duty

The retention of the duty on tea in America when other similar charges on imports were withdrawn by Lord North, was strongly opposed by Pownall in Parliament. On March 5, 1770, he divided the House by an amendment he brought forward which would have made the tea free. The Government policy was endorsed by 204 votes to 142, and the amendment was lost. On the previous 29th of January, Pownall had mentioned in a letter to Dr. Cooper that he had told Lord North personally that the concessions would be unavailing unless they repealed all the duties, the tea among them.[2] On September 7, 1771, Junius wrote to Mr. Wilkes :—

> Since the repeal of the Stamp Act I know of no acts tending to tax the Americans except that which creates the Tea Duty, and even that can hardly be called internal. Yet it ought to be repealed, as an impolitic act, not as an oppressive one.[3]

Trials by Jury

In his Preface[3] to the Letters Junius shews that his mind was much exercised about the liberty of the Press, and, in that connection, with the powers of the juries before whom those charged with libel were brought. He admits the excellence of the laws, but points out that if judges followed the examples of Lord Mansfield in the trial of Wilkes, and required from their jury a verdict based on a false issue, the system of trial by jury broke down. With the behaviour of the juries, if left to themselves, he was satisfied. He wrote :—

> The numerous instances in our State trials, by verdicts recovered for the King, sufficiently refute the false and scandalous imputations thrown by the abettors upon the integrity of juries.[4]

This Preface was written in 1772. The extract above quoted will be found to agree almost precisely with that

[1] *Administration*, 1765, p. 89.
[2] P. 227, *ante*.
[3] Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 294.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 378.

which follows, taken from a speech of Pownall's in the Commons in 1770.[1] He said that

> even in the most luxurious, unprincipled, profligate age, even in the very crisis, in the delirium of the fever of party rage, juries had preserved their faith and honour.

Parliamentary Elections

As to the freedom of election to Parliament and the manner in which election disputes should be dealt with Junius felt strongly. On April 24, 1769, he wrote to the Duke of Grafton: "You cannot but know that the right of the freeholders to adhere to their choice . . . was as clear as that of the House of Commons to exclude one of their own Members. . . . The right of election is the very essence of the constitution." In that strain he proceeds at length; he had evidently studied the question carefully and was much in earnest about it.

Pownall had also studied it. We have seen [2] that in the following year he was chosen to serve on a Committee of the House of Commons which dealt with the matter.

Jesuit Books

Among the Miscellaneous Letters attributed by Woodfall to Junius is one signed "Bifrons" dated April 23, 1768, containing a passage which reads:

> I remember seeing Bassenbaum, Suarez, Molina and a score of other Jesuitical books, burnt at Paris for their sound casuistry by the hands of the common hangman.

Several commentators, among them Messrs. Dilke and Merivale, have considered that, provided Woodfall was correct in regarding Bifrons and Junius as the same person, they had here a definite clue to the identity of the latter. If they could ascertain two things, viz., first the date when such books were publicly burnt, and secondly who were the Englishmen in Paris on the occasion, the search for Junius would be narrowed down to picking him out of that group which must have been a small one.

[1] Hansard, *Parl. Hist.* xvi. p. 903, March 21, 1770. [2] P. 230, *ante*.

These Jesuit books were burnt by order of the Parlement de Paris on August 7, 1761. A Paris newspaper[1] preserved in the Record Office fixes that date. The question as to who were the Englishmen then in Paris is much more difficult to answer. They can only have been those attached to the special mission of Mr. Hans Stanley who had been sent to Paris in May to negotiate peace. England and France were then at war, and therefore no subjects of the former country could have been in Paris who were not included in the safe-conduct pass granted by the French Ministers to Mr. Stanley and his suite. This would probably consist of six or eight officials, secretaries and technical advisers to be employed in the negotiations. Having Philip Francis in their minds both Mr. Dilke and Mr. Merivale sought to discover whether he had been sent to Paris with Stanley, and they both had to own that they were unable to find proof of this. The same admission must be made about Pownall; careful search in the British Museum and the Record Office has failed to discover among either the Foreign Office or the Treasury papers any list of the staff of this mission. Nor is anything of the kind among the papers of Mr. Hans Stanley which are preserved at his seat at Paultons in Hampshire.

One of the most important matters which the British Envoy would have to discuss was the delimitation of the boundaries between England and France in America when the Seven Years' War came to an end. On the subject of American topography Pownall was the best-informed Englishman of his day. Mr. Pitt was well aware of this and had in preceding years frequently asked for his opinions on such matters, but the Prime Minister had omitted to do so now, and he had not instructed Pownall to accompany Stanley in the first instance. Stanley left for Paris on May 24, Pownall did not accompany him. We know that from a letter above referred to,[2] written in London by Pownall on June 24, in which he asks Mr. Pitt if he may "hope to be employed on this occasion?" It has been mentioned as probable that when Mr. Pitt received this he sent at once for Pownall to discuss the future boundaries, and that two days later he wrote a long despatch to Stanley

[1] Foreign Office Papers, France, vol. 252. [2] *Ante*, p. 165.

in which he expressed his views about them in detail. That would be the natural outcome of a conversation on the subject between the Premier and the expert. It would be natural also for the former, after such an interview, to order the latter to go and assist Stanley in this important question on the spot, taking Paris on his way to Germany. Early in September Pownall was in Germany as Commissary-General. A letter to him of the 10th of that month has been referred to above[1] as written by a Mr. Dundas, an army contractor, who replied to complaints previously made by Pownall. Between his ascertained presence in London at the end of June and in Germany in the beginning of September, there remain July and August. While there is no proof that he was in Paris during those months, which cover the time when the Jesuit books were condemned and burnt, there is a very strong presumption of his being there. And in the case of no other candidate has any such proof been found which would outweigh this theory.

Ireland

His studies of Irish antiquities, which will be hereafter referred to, took Pownall to that country. On September 25, 1769, he wrote to Dr. Cooper: "I found people in Ireland very curious after the state of things in America. . . . The spirit of their Politics derives from and operates by motives to which corruption, faction and venality have not yet reduced those of America." On December 19 of that year Junius wrote in Letter XXXV.—the Address to the King:—"The people of Ireland have been uniformly plundered and oppressed." In connection with Ireland it may be observed that Lord Macaulay noticed the intimate knowledge shewn by Junius of the Luttrell family, and thought it was due to the author (Francis) having lived near Luttrellstown, not far from Dublin. But if Francis were writing from Pownall's dictation, and the Luttrells were mentioned, he might very well say what he knew himself and it would go into the letter.

[1] *Ante*, p. 167.

The King's Debts

On the subject of the payment of the King's debts by Parliament in 1769 Junius wrote in Letter LIX. of October 5, 1771 :—

> The same House of Commons . . . who paid our good King's debts without once enquiring how they were incurred.

Hansard reports Pownall as saying in the House on April 18, 1777 :—

> As on a late application to Parliament for payment of the King's debts in 1769 I voted against the paying of them without account . . . it was impossible such arrears could have been incurred if . . ."[1]

The Game Laws

As to the Game Laws Junius and Pownall held the same opinions expressed in the same language. The former, in his Letter of November 2, 1771, wrote of them that

> They are a species of Forest Laws, that they are oppressive to the subject, and that the spirit of them is incompatible with legal liberty.

Pownall wrote to the same effect :—

> There are not, nor ever were in America any of those Forest Laws, if laws they can be called, which were the mere denunciations of tyranny and domination, regulations that ruined the poor subjects of the monarchs of Europe in order to ensure the preservation of their beasts of the chase.[2]

Money Matters

In his dealings with Woodfall, Junius shewed that he was entirely above all money considerations. The circulation of the *Public Advertiser* must have been largely increased by the appearance of the Letters, the rush for them was so great that they were copied into other papers. Woodfall's gains must have been considerable. He very handsomely offered his correspondent a half share of what came in from the republication of

[1] Hansard's *Parl. Hist.* xix. p. 157. See *ante*, p. 289.
[2] *Memorial to the Sovereigns of America*, 1783, p. 122.

the Letters in book form,[1] or if there was hesitation about accepting money he undertook to give the sum to any charity designated for its reception. Junius replied in private Letter 59 of March 5, 1772: "What you say about the profits is very handsome. I like to deal with such men—as for myself, be assured that I am far above all pecuniary views, and no other person, I think, has any claim to share with you. Make the best of it therefore."[2] Junius would only accept three copies of the book, one bound in vellum. Where a considerable amount of money must have been involved that was a high line to take, one much more possible to a man in the position of Pownall than to Francis, with his family on his hands. Junius confirmed this renunciation in the Author's edition of 1772[3]: "I give to Mr. Henry Sampson Woodfall and to him alone my right interest and property in these Letters as fully and compleatly as an author can possibly convey his own property or his own works to another."

"I never take any money from a bookseller,"[4] wrote Pownall in 1782, when he had produced more than twenty books or pamphlets.

In 1776 the behaviour of Junius to Woodfall was exactly followed by Pownall as regards another publisher's family. In the account already given, under that date, of his *Topographical Description of North America* it has been mentioned that Pownall wrote this treatise for the benefit of Lewis Evans, a surveyor and printer of Philadelphia, with whom both Franklin and Pownall had been connected since 1754. Pownall ended the Preface to that work with the announcement that "neither this improved map nor the following sheets are published with any view of profit to the Editor, if any such should accrue, it will be given to Mr. Evans's daughter or her children."

Nor did he let the matter rest there. He wrote, nine years afterwards, to Franklin that because the work was

[1] Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 32.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 253. "He appears to have been a man of a bold and ardent spirit, tenaciously honourable in his personal connections, but vehement and inveterate in his enmities, and quick and irritable in conceiving them," wrote Dr. Mason Good in his Preliminary Essay to Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 66. This description fits Pownall exactly.

[3] Preface, p. xi. (in Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 349).

[4] *Treatise on the Study of Antiquities*, Preface, p. xxvii.

for the benefit of Evans's descendants he had taken more pains than usual with it; he had prepared another edition which he would publish in France if he could get it translated "and give the whole profit to Evans's daughter."[1] It is not often that an author intentionally sacrifices his own gains to his publisher, but Junius did it for Woodfall and Pownall acted in the same way to benefit the family of Evans who had published, as well as produced, the first standard map of the American Colonies.

Missed Success

Though in good circumstances and so able to act in this way, Junius was a disappointed man. It is not those with whom all goes well but those who suffer who cry out. He cried out bitterly and furiously. Where did he suffer? Not in money matters, not in health; he must have had that to stand the strain he went through,—the labour of writing and the danger of detection. If his trouble was not in those directions it was probably the failure of his career which hurt him. We have seen that this was precisely the position in which Pownall found himself during the Junius period.

Not a Lawyer

Notwithstanding his power to quote precedents and to cross swords with Chief-Justice Mansfield on legal points, Junius said in his Preface:

> I am no lawyer by profession, nor do I pretend to be more deeply read than every English gentleman should be in the laws of his country.[2]

Seven years earlier Pownall had written "*I am no lawyer*, and do not therefore presume to give an opinion of decision."[3] Much of his book in which that passage occurs had been occupied with the discussion of legal and constitutional questions which he always approached

[1] *Works of Benjamin Franklin*, Jared Sparks, 1840, x. p. 199.

[2] Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 351. See also *Ibid.* pp. 312, 498. In the former he says, "Do not injure me so much as to suspect I am a lawyer, I had as lief be a Scotchman." In the latter, "As to lawyers their profession is supported by the indiscriminate defence of right and wrong."

[3] *Administration*, 1765, p. 61.

exactly as Junius did from carefully studied precedents. His knowledge of those is further shewn by the copious marginal notes in his own handwriting which are on the Massachusetts Acts of his day now preserved in the Record Office. At no time are there many men outside the legal profession who know so much of law as Junius did, and it is noticeable how both he and Pownall built up the structure of their thoughts in exactly the same way, not only on legal but on other matters. Each writer sought facts and precedents, often from distant times, on which deduction and argument were based.

Not a Soldier

Nor are there many civilians who know so much of military affairs as Junius did, criticising military operations with understanding, but who expressly disclaim belonging to the Service. "I am not a soldier, my Lord," occurs in a letter to Lord Hillsborough.[1] In his Memorial to the King of 1782 Pownall pointed out that it had formerly been "his duty to give his opinion on military operations wherein his opinions were formerly adopted." The preceding chapters have shewn that he drew up plans of American campaigns for Mr. Pitt at that statesman's request, and among them that of 1756, which it is believed led to the subsequent despatch of Wolfe to Quebec.

General Lord Amherst

Junius felt great bitterness as to the treatment which the Government had meted out to General Sir Jeffrey (afterwards Lord) Amherst who had turned the scale of war in America. A letter to Lord Hillsborough of September 15, 1768, gives in such minute detail who called, on which day of the week, at Amherst's house that the writer must have been some one who, like Pownall, knew Amherst and could get these particulars at first hand.[2] Drake's *History of Boston*[3] says that

[1] Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 154. Of the corporal punishment then relied on to maintain discipline Junius wrote: "The private men have four pence a day to subsist on, and five hundred lashes if they desert. Under this punishment they frequently expire" (author's note to Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 80. For Pownall's precisely similar objection, see *ante*, p. 149).

[2] Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 147.

[3] Note to p. 645.

"Amherst was requited by the pen of Junius," for the behaviour of the Ministry. If we are to consider that pen in Pownall's hands this is exactly the use he would put it to. He and Amherst had worked together in America under Mr. Pitt's orders, it has been shewn [1] that on one occasion at least the General had been staying at the house of the Governor who, being on the spot, had watched Amherst's proceedings and knew better than almost any one else how Amherst's successes, coming after the failures of Braddock, Loudoun and others, had saved the situation in America. The disgust which Junius expressed when Amherst was superseded by Lord Boutetort in the sinecure Government of Virginia was exactly what would be in the mind of Amherst's friend and former colleague, Pownall.[2]

Admiral Holbourne

This officer was also picked out by Junius for kindly mention in the Letter of March 5, 1770, which says that "his services in America have also been very properly considered." [3] Such recognition might naturally be expected from Pownall who had sailed for Boston with Holbourne in 1757 and, when Governor, had acted with Holbourne who was Admiral commanding on the North American Station.[4]

War and Commissariat Offices

Now that Pownall has appeared upon the scene it can be pointed out that the knowledge of the routine of these offices, which Mr. Merrivale regarded as necessary for the production of the Junius Letters, was not confined to Francis, but belonged in a much higher degree to the older and more experienced man. Pownall had been very much more than a War Office clerk. After serving for some years in a Government Office at home he had, as

[1] *Ante*, p. 113.

[2] In connection with this appointment the Miscellaneous Letter of Junius, written on September 9, 1768, says of John Pownall, Secretary to the Board of Trade, who had been compelled to act on the instructions of his superiors, "Poor Pownall hangs his head in perfect modesty." A letter of John Pownall of August 2, 1769, is printed in the notes to Woodfall, i. p. 195.

[3] Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 251.

[4] See *ante*, pp. 75, 95.

Governor of Massachusetts, organised and commanded an expedition himself. Before that he had been on Lord Loudoun's staff in America, and afterwards he had been Commissary-General with Prince Ferdinand in Germany for a year and a half. That branch of the service must have been specially familiar to him. Extracts quoted from his letters have shewn how sharply he wrote to the army contractors in Germany. It was quite in that spirit that Junius described Calcraft the Contractor "as rioting in the plunder of the army," and that expression would come naturally from one who had seen on the spot how some army contractors made their money.

Literary Style

We now come to a most important point, that of literary style. It is possible to shew a close relation both in method of production and in result between Junius and Pownall. Some men write as fluently as they speak; the words so come from their pens as to need no subsequent correction, they fall into their proper places at once. That is a gift necessary to those who write fiction in large quantities, *e.g.* Dumas or Sir Walter Scott; without it the volume of matter such men leave behind them cannot possibly be produced in the working years of a lifetime. Others, who have to deal with polemical or technical matters requiring closely reasoned argument, built up step by step, as a mason lays the courses of stone in a wall, cannot work so fast. They are often troubled by finding as they read over what they have written that some link in the chain of thought has been omitted and must be inserted to give proper continuity of expression. It becomes necessary to rewrite the entire page. What with that and the seeking that "nice derangement of epitaphs," so much prized by a lady who has passed from the stage to immortality, a sheet may be written not once or twice, but half-a-dozen times before it is finally found satisfactory. In its earlier versions it will become covered with erasures due to the subsequent discovery, in one passage or another, of a word more effective than that first used. A man intent on the producing of his very best will make fair copy after fair copy till he at last feels

that he has done himself and his subject justice. It is, as a rule, only thus that such terse, pithy, well-balanced expression of thought as that in the Junius Letters can be produced. It is fine steel brought by infinite labour, in grinding and sharpening, to a keen blade. The metal must be good in the first instance, but its temper depends on the extent and degree of manipulation. The same man, dealing with a subject of less importance, which he is not so anxious to elaborate, will write well, his education secures that; but he will not trouble to put so much polish on his work. When he is writing a note on business or to a friend it will naturally be well expressed. It will be the same kind of thing he can put out at his best, though not at the level of his best because it has not been necessary to him to take the pains to make it of that quality. It is said that Kinglake wrote *Eothen* nine times before he made it what he desired.

Let those general principles be applied, first to the writings of Junius and then to those of Pownall. In the private correspondence with Woodfall we have the notes Junius dashed off in a hurry. They are quick and sharp in their expression; they go straight to the point, and say clearly what has to be said; they are the raw material from which the published Letters were produced by the infinite labour of which their writer so often complained. But the actual bulk of them is small when the time over which they were spread is considered. The original edition of 1772, bound in two small volumes, consists of 600 pages. There are 69 Letters, six of which are written not by but to Junius; that leaves him sixty-three letters to his share, and in them there are not more than 100,000 words. Allowing as much again for the Miscellaneous Letters and also for the Private Letters, we have 300,000 words written in five years. His output, as Junius, was therefore about 60,000 words a year, apart from what he may have written otherwise. In this chapter there are about 30,000 words, twice that for a year's work is but a very moderate amount. So it was not the quantity but the obtaining the high standard of quality desired, the unending revising and rewriting, the repeated scrubbing of the raw material to put the desired polish upon it which occupied so much time and work. In the private note to Woodfall which

accompanied the first Letter to Lord Mansfield he says, "The enclosed, though begun within these few days, has been greatly laboured."[1] From this it may be inferred that each public Letter occupied, as a rule, several days in its production. The note which went to Woodfall with his last public letter remarks, "At last I have concluded my great work, and I assure you with no small labour." More emphatic still was his observation when he sent Woodfall the additional papers for the collected edition of 1772. "I weigh every word, and every alteration in my eyes at least, is a blemish." He wrote to Wilkes, "I am overcome with the slavery of writing."[2]

In his Letter No. LIV. he asks, "Is there no labour in the production of those letters. . . . Mr. Horne measures the facility of my writing by the fluency of his own." In such strong terms did he describe the process by which he built up from his first drafts, corresponding to his private letters to Woodfall, that powerful style which has been described as distinguished by

> ardour, spirit, perspicuity, classical correctness, sententious epigrammatic compression; his characteristic ornaments—keen, indignant invective, audacious interrogation, shrewd, severe, antithetic retort, proud, presumptuous disdain of the powers of his adversary, pointed and appropriate allusions that can never be mistaken.[3]

The class of writing of which that can be said is utterly different from the output of the novelist or the hurried paragraphist. It was the unsparing labour on blade and point of the weapon which gave it the keen edge with which this man cut and thrust so sharply at his opponents. And the greater the labour the keener the blade. It was specially polished up for use in the Address to the King, some passages of which may be quoted to shew the finished article. He is writing on December 19, 1769, about Wilkes, then in prison.

> You have still an honourable part to act. The affection of your subjects may still be recovered. But before you subdue their hearts you must gain a noble victory over your own. Discard those little personal resentments which have too long directed your public conduct. Pardon this man the remainder of his punishment; and if resentment still prevails, make it, what it should have been long since, an act not of mercy but contempt. He will soon fall back into his natural

[1] Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 214. [2] *Ibid.* p. 335.
[3] *Ibid.*; Preliminary Essay, p. 39.

station, a silent senator and hardly supporting the weakly eloquence of a newspaper. The gentle breath of peace would leave him on the surface. It is only the tempest that lifts him from his place. Without consulting your Minister call together your whole Council. Let it appear to the public that you can determine and act for yourself. Come forward to your people. Lay aside the wretched formalities of a king, and speak to your subjects with the spirit of a man and in the language of a gentleman.[1]

Add to this a passage from the Letter of January 30, 1771 :—

The King's honour is that of his people. Their real honour and real interest are the same. I am not contending for a vain punctilio. A clear unblemished character comprehends not only the integrity that will not offer, but the spirit that will not submit to an injury; and, whether it belongs to an individual or to a community, it is the foundation of peace, of independence, and of safety. Private credit is wealth—public honour is security. The feather that adorns the royal bird supports his flight. Strip him of his plumage and you fix him to the earth.

Having seen his views of the Sovereign's position and action we will now shew how faithfully he dealt with the Duke of Grafton, then at the head of the Ministry. We take the following from the Letter dated May 30, 1769 :—

The character of the reputed ancestors of some men has made it possible for their descendants to be vicious in the extreme, without being degenerate. Those of your Grace, for instance, left no distressing examples of virtue, even to their legitimate posterity, and you may look back with pleasure to an illustrious pedigree, in which heraldry has not left a single good quality upon record to insult or upbraid you.[2] You have better proofs of your descent, my Lord, than the register of a marriage or any troublesome inheritance of reputation. There are some hereditary strokes of character, by which a man may be as clearly distinguished as by the blackest features of the human face. Charles the First lived and died a hypocrite. Charles the Second was a hypocrite of another sort and should have died upon the same scaffold. At the distance of a century we see their different characters happily revived, and blended in your Grace. Sullen, and severe without religion, profligate without gaiety you live like Charles II. without being an amiable companion, and, for aught I know, may die as his father did, without the reputation of a martyr. . . . Lord Chatham

[1] Mr. Griffin observes that the germ of these Letters from Junius to the King may be found in the wish expressed to Dr. Cooper that spring, April 27, 1769, by Pownall, that his letters purloined in the post office might be shewn by Ministers to the King. See *ante*, p. 220. These direct appeals to the throne by Junius correspond to Pownall's action described on p. 298, *ante*, and to his *Memorial to the King*, p. 407, *post*.

[2] The first Duke was a natural son of Charles II.; at the Revolution he abandoned the Stuarts for William and Mary.

was the earliest object of your political wonder and attachment. Yet you deserted him upon the first hopes that offered of an equal share of power with Lord Rockingham. When the Duke of Cumberland's first negotiation failed, and when the favourite was pushed to the last extremity, you saved him, by joining with an administration in which Lord Chatham had refused to engage. Still, however, he was your friend, you are yet to explain to the world why you consented to act without him, or why, after uniting with Lord Rockingham, you deserted and betrayed him. . . . Your Grace, little anxious perhaps either for present or future reputation, will not desire to be handed down in these colours to posterity. You have reason to flatter yourself that the memory of your administration will survive even the forms of a constitution which our ancestors vainly hoped would be immortal; and, as for your personal character, I will not, for the honour of human nature, suppose that you can wish to have it remembered.

So much for the style and method of Junius. His writing was built up and elaborated by degrees from first drafts. To shew what it was in its original form, before that process was gone through, it may be well to give one of his private letters to Woodfall; No. 7 will answer our purpose:—

Wednesday Night, *August* 16, 1769.

Sir—I have been some days in the country, and could not conveniently send for your letter until this night. Your correction was perfectly right. The sense required it, and I am much obliged to you. When I spoke of *innumerable blunders*, I meant Newberry's pamphlet, for I must confess that, upon the whole, your papers are very correctly printed. Do with my letters exactly what you please. I should think that, to make a better figure than Newberry, some others of my letters may be added, and so throw out a hint that you have reason to suspect they are by the same author. If you adopt this plan I shall point out those which I would recommend: for you know I do not, nor indeed have I time to, give an equal care to them all. I know Mr. Onslow perfectly.[1] He is a false, silly fellow. Depend upon it he will get nothing but shame by contending with Horne. I believe I need not assure you that I have never written in any other paper since I began with yours. As to Junius, I must wait for fresh matter as this is a character which must be kept up with credit. Avoid prosecutions if you can, but, above all things, avoid the Houses of Parliament—there is no contending with them. At present you are safe, for this House of Commons has lost all dignity, and dare not do anything.—Adieu, C.

The above is what Junius put into a note, written offhand; Junius, it says, "was a character to be kept up with credit," which meant that "weighing every word"

[1] The Rt. Hon. George Onslow.

which has been already quoted. We have in the above a sample of how his publisher was addressed by Junius, from whose style we now turn to consider, and to compare with it, that of Pownall.

How did he address Mr. Dodsley who was publishing his *Treatise on the Study of Antiquities*, a few years later? We have an answer to this question, derived from Nichols's *Literary Anecdotes of the Eighteenth Century*.[1]

June 30, 1782.

Mr. Dodsley—The person who corrects the press is so perfect a scholar and so accurate in his attentions that I not only think myself obliged to him, but shall take it as a particular favour if, where he sees any *inaccuracy in the orthography or stopping* or any intricacy in the *diction* of the sentences he will be so good as to put, at least, his mark against such; or even correct them. T. Pownall.

Compare those two. They are both very courteous; they are written, as from the same plane, to men in exactly similar positions. The writer of the first says he cannot give an equal care to all he sends in for publication; he is grateful for corrections made. The writer of the second is conscious that in the process of elaboration he may have allowed some errors of orthography, punctuation or diction, to pass notice, and requests they may be corrected. There is more than a family likeness between them, they coincide in thought and habit of mind.

Another specimen of Pownall's unelaborated style can now be given. It is placed in facsimile opposite. On the back it is addressed to his solicitor, Mr. Sharpe of Lincoln's Inn. It is a very usual unstudied note on a subject not infrequently dealt with in that quarter,—how some person too keenly desirous of payment should be managed — so much a matter of everyday life that it seems curious the document should have been kept so long. But it was included in that packet of the Governor's letters which the present writer inherited, and owes its preservation to having been kept with the others, some of which have also been here reproduced in facsimile so that they may give further examples of how Pownall turned out his letters. Copied from originals, they are now published for the first time. This one is dated from the same address at Marlow as that to Grenville of July 14, 1768[2] but a

[1] 1814, vol. viii., note to p. iii.

[2] See *ante*, p. 344.

Westhorp
July 10 67

Sir.

As it draws near ye fourteen daies since ye Prorogation - I must expect I suppose to be plagued by that Cracroft - but to prevent any Summons or anything of that sort being sent after me here, Be so good to take such measures as you best know to be Proper - about my answer - I wish to God you could gett Brown to say to you what he said to me, as I own I am afraid of people who begin to shuffle

Shall you be ready for Lady Fawkener & I by ye latter end of next week - as to ye money which ye House sold for - pray give us five daies or weeks notice that we may gett My Brother Colonel & Mr Fawkener ready - We shall not be able to come to town 'till ye latter End of next week - & that time wd be most convenient to us. as to my answer in Chancery

I will come myself any day at a moments warning — Yr most Obliged

hble Servt

J Howard

year earlier, it is dashed off in a hurry; but there is a strong ring in it, the sentences are sharp and crisp: "I wish to God you could get Brown to say to you what he said to me." "I am afraid of people who begin to shuffle." "I will come myself any day at a moment's warning."

Those words express the mind of a man prompt to act, one who stood no nonsense, and was utterly impatient of any attempt to fool him. The same impatience which appears in the private letters of Junius, the same scorn is displayed of the behaviour of the lowly Brown who had taken to shuffling. Brown inspires Pownall with all that large contempt which Junius expressed with such perfect candour of the Duke of Grafton and others, but they were worth some pains and trouble to expose as Brown was not; all the rudiments of the Junius Letter are to be seen in this, just as they are in the private correspondence with Woodfall.

To Pownall, as to Junius, the production of a finished document was a thing demanding great labour, he worked and worked until he got the exact expression he desired. His great assiduity was noticed by one who knew him well when he first went to America, and it continued all through life. To the correct and clear rendering of his speeches in Parliament he grudged no pains; those published by Almon in his Parliamentary Register were all printed from Pownall's own carefully prepared manuscripts.[1] As in the case of Junius, the more important the subject the more attention it received. Pownall's above-mentioned letter to Grenville, written to a statesman of the first rank, is naturally a more carefully-thought-out and balanced production than what he wrote to his solicitor and publisher. It stands in an intermediate position. If it had been taken and worked up still further it would have been on the plane of the Junius Letters and quite equal in style to the anonymous letter to Lord Chatham, already mentioned[2] as in the Record Office and ascribed to Pownall.[2] We have, in fact, four stages:—

1. The ordinary letter, Junius to Woodfall or Pownall to Sharpe and Dodsley.

[1] Nichols's *Literary Anecdotes of the Eighteenth Century*, 1814, viii. p. 62 *et seq.*
[2] See *ante*, p. 277.

2. The partly elaborated letter—Pownall to Grenville.
3. Pownall in his writings and his revised speeches in Parliament which are not quite brought up to the Junius standard.
4. The Junius Letter, or the Letter of November 14, 1775, to Lord Chatham in Pownall's handwriting.

Give more time however, as much time as Junius took, recognise that speeches in the House, addressed to a select and limited audience, did not require so much elaboration as letters addressed through the Press to the public (an infinitely larger mass requiring more effort to move), and the fact that No. 3 does not express itself in such loud and emphatic tones as No. 4 is explained. But No. 3 had in it the making of No. 4.

Having examined the leading features in the writings of Junius and of Pownall, we may now look at some minor defects and peculiarities which they had in common. *Sommers*, or alternatively *Somers*, was the Lord Chancellor of England in Queen Anne's time,[1] to whom Pownall referred in the *Administration*,[2] using the double "m." Philo-Junius—admitted by Junius to be himself—in his Letter of May 22, 1771,[3] twice mentions that judge, giving him but one "m"—Somers. It so appears in the Letters as first published. But when Junius had himself looked over the proofs for his authorised collected edition of 1772 we find that he altered the original spelling and gave the second "m," writing *Sommers* as Pownall had done.

In the Miscellaneous Letters Nos. XLVIII. and LI. Junius uses the expression "throwing them into a flame" when speaking of the colonies. This is exactly what Pownall wrote from Boston to Mr. Pitt of the results of Shirley's action in retaining the Provincials when their term had expired.[4] It was observed by Mr. George Chalmers in 1817[5] that Junius was liable to use the indicative instead of the subjunctive mood, *e.g.* "If I am (be) not grossly mistaken." "If public credit is (be) threatened." "If he has (have) any regard for his honour."

[1] Quoted with respect by Junius, see Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 558, ii. p. 226. Respected by Pownall as the founder of the Board under which he began life (see *ante*, p. 4), and frequently quoted in Pownall's *Administration*.

[2] 1765, p. 20.

[3] Woodfall, 1814, ii. 226.

[4] See *ante*, p. 145, end of first paragraph.

[5] *Biographical Tracts*, George Chalmers, 1817.

That confusion of mood is also to be found occasionally in Pownall's writing. Another flaw noticed by Mr. Chalmers is that Junius would sometimes use a verb in the singular instead of in the plural, or *vice versa*. "Both ministers and magistrate is (are) compelled." "With which a certain part of your subjects have (has) been, etc." "But calumny and sedition is (are) the characteristics." From these lapses Pownall was not exempt. After a colon Junius would follow the unusual practice of beginning again with a capital letter as is done after a full stop. This was a constant habit of Pownall's. On several occasions Junius called upon the person he was addressing to "stand forth" as representing a cause or an opinion.[1] It is an unusual expression which, curiously enough, is constantly found both in the speeches and writings of Pownall. The same may be said of "so far forth."[2] As evidences of identity in thought and expression we may place these two passages opposite each other.

Junius	Pownall
But it has pleased God to give us a Ministry and a Parliament who are neither to be persuaded by argument nor instructed by experience.[3]	This corruption sunk to ignorance, and inspired with insolence, the nation and Providence gave it leaders and governors exactly suited to lead it to its just punishment.[4]

The following extract from p. iii of Pownall's *Memorial to the Sovereigns of America*, of 1783, is very much in the vein of Junius, who delighted in biting and unexpected illustrations of his meaning.

If he could flatter himself that the statesmen and politicians of Great Britain would descend from their superior regions and condescend to cast an eye, or rather a thought, on such a trifling paper of such an unexperienced theorist as the memorialist, he has only to caution them against *patching* their politics with the only *remnant rag* of their folly that sticks to their backs.

In the same book Pownall thus describes how English parties were controlled by the King:—

[1] See Woodfall, 1814, i. pp. 403, 506; ii. pp. 143, 358, 441. For Pownall see *ante*, p. 302, fifth line from bottom.

[2] For Junius see Woodfall, i. p. 476. For Pownall see Hansard, xvi. pp. 495, 868, xvii. 1285.

[3] See Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 148.

[4] *Works of Franklin*, Jared Sparks, 1840, x. p. 199; Governor Pownall's letter to Franklin of July 3, 1785.

In Great Britain, where the members of Parliament do not come together as representing the sense and reasoning power of the people at large they must have some time to form *their own* opinion. A certain Leading Judgment does this for them; and as often as this Leading Judgment changes *its* opinions these Members, or a majority of them, will be found to have changed their opinion in all extreme of contraries.

The system of Government against which both Junius and Pownall had fought a dozen years before this was written is here denounced by Pownall in words as direct and forcible as those to be found in the *Letters of Junius*. It is the same kind of thought, expressed in the same way, as what Junius addressed to the King when he complained of the subservience of Parliament and the Ministry to the Throne.

So much for style in each case. As to that of Pownall it is hoped that the many extracts within these covers from his speeches and writings will enable an opinion to be formed of it. If more material for the purpose is wanted it can be found in his published works. Most of them can be seen in the British Museum Library, and a list of them is given in the Appendix. The Record Office contains a great quantity of his autograph writings, and the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston possesses several examples. A MS. folio, with copies of all his official letters as Governor of Massachusetts, was disposed of at Bang's sale, 1854, in New York, and was afterwards the property of Mr. G. W. Pratt of that city.

Cooper and Francis Letters

Besides all this there is in the MS. Department of the British Museum, as part of the King's Library,[1] a large volume bound handsomely in red leather and stamped

ORIGINAL LETTERS FROM GOVERNOR POWNALL TO THE REV. DR. COOPER, WRITTEN IN THE YEARS 1769-74 *ON AMERICAN POLITICS.*

Some of these letters have been quoted from in preceding pages, where it has been said that with Cooper, as with Franklin, Pownall formed one of his earliest friendships in America. The doctor was for years afterwards in correspondence with both Franklin and Pownall, what he

[1] Catalogue No. 202.

wrote to them, and Franklin's letters to him, form other volumes of this series. From them it appears that these letters, so carefully bound and preserved, have had a curious history. When Boston was surrounded by British troops after the affair of Lexington on April 19, 1775, Dr. Cooper fled. All his correspondence fell into the hands of the invaders, by whom they were sent to the King, who was much pleased at receiving them, and this accounts for their being in the King's Library at the Museum. We are only concerned with the volume which contains Pownall's letters to Cooper. There are twenty-seven of them, chiefly in his own hand. Except that of April 11, 1770, where the words "your affectionate friend and faithful servant" are followed by two dashes instead of the name, they are all signed by Pownall. The first letter of January 30, 1769, begins with five foolscap pages in a clerk's hand, followed by a supplement, dated February 6, in Pownall's hand which finishes the letter, explains why he kept it back, and adds later news. Further on sixteen pages of foolscap are in the clerk's hand, and are marked as being a speech delivered by Pownall in Parliament on Wednesday, April 19, 1769. In that hand again, a small and clear one, are other letters of January 7 and June 7, 1771. Next comes an autograph of Pownall's, headed "Richmond, July 26, 1771," and all the letters that follow are also in his writing.

So it appears that, in the production of the earlier of these documents, he relieved himself by getting some one else to do the bulk of the manual labour,[1] to which he added his signature with the usual preliminaries of courtesy. He did this in two other of the Cooper Letters; the second dated "Albemarle Street, London, February 13, 1769, and the fourth dated London, March 19, 1769. These are in another handwriting, neither that of Pownall himself, nor of the clerk who was employed for the others. The extraordinary thing is that from internal evidence there is good reason for believing them to be in the natural handwriting of Francis. The first is of four pages, the second more than a page of foolscap. Putting these two from this red leather volume of Cooper letters side by side with Chabot's reproduction of the Junius

[1] It has been pointed out on p. 328 that this was only during the Junius period.

hand and with the natural hand of Francis in Mr. Twisleton's book, as, by the courtesy of the officials of different departments of the Museum it is possible to do, we have four things :—

1. The handwriting of Governor Pownall, as in the bulk of the Cooper letters.
2. Facsimiles of the disguised hand of Junius, as in Mr. Twisleton's book.
3. Facsimiles of the natural hand of Francis, as in the same book.
4. The handwriting of these two letters, the second and fourth of the Cooper series.

Reproductions of each of these will be found in the Appendix,[1] in order to assist the reader in forming his own opinion on what follows. They will serve to give a general idea, but space prevents their being of such length as is necessary for full comparison to be made. From short passages it is not possible to pick out sufficient characters for a complete examination on Chabot's system. In the Museum, with his book before one, this can be made; as he compared No. 2 with No. 3, so No. 3 can be compared with No. 4, and the latter is by far an easier task than the former, which involved penetrating a disguise. Here we have only, in No. 3 and No. 4, two natural hands to examine. Proceeding to do so on the lines of Chabot, we find

(*a*) The habit of Francis was, according to Chabot, to form "f" without a loop. Junius, as part of the disguise, put in a loop over the centre of the letter when he drew up his pen from the bottom. In the Cooper letters there is no loop, the cross over the stem of the character is the natural one of Francis.

(*b*) Chabot notices that a difference was introduced by Francis between himself and Junius in the initial "e" of words like "either." In such initials, or in that word as a whole, there is no difference at all between the natural hand of Francis and the Cooper letters. The word in them is precisely the same.

(*c*) Chabot found that "I" was formed in the same way,

[1] To which it is suggested that the reader may now turn to verify the particulars which follow.

but at a different slope, in the writings of Junius and Francis. In these Cooper letters both the letter and the slope of it correspond with the habit of Francis.

(*d*) The same letter, when not a capital, was noticed by Chabot as often diminished in size, compared to those which preceded and followed it, both by Junius and Francis. The same peculiarity is noticeable here.

(*e*) Chabot points out that a final "d" was often elaborated by Junius, but in Francis's own hand it had no flourish and was quite plain. So it is, exactly the same in form, in these two Cooper documents.

(*f*) Capital "A" is simply an enlargement of "a" in both Junius and Francis. It is made in just the same way here.

(*g*) Chabot notes that "a," when part of a word, was frequently lifted from the line of writing, by the letter preceding it, in both Junius and Francis. That happens also in these two Cooper letters.

(*h*) "K" at the end of a word is mentioned by Chabot as well and carefully formed in the upright hand of Junius; sometimes so by Francis when he took pains. When he wrote hurriedly he was liable to slur the final loop as in "think." In these Cooper letters that final stroke of the "k," and indeed the whole word, corresponds absolutely with what Francis usually wrote.

(*i*) The second "l" in words like "will" or "shall" was dwarfed by both Junius and Francis. So it also is here.

(*j*) Chabot observes that the abbreviation "&" was not altered by Francis from his usual form when he wrote as Junius. In these Cooper letters it is exactly the same as in those of Francis.

(*k*) It is noticed by Chabot that both Junius and Francis were apt to end a period with a dash "—". The same thing is observable here.

Many more such points of resemblance could be adduced if necessary, but enough have perhaps been given to shew the method of procedure which Chabot used to

identify Francis as the man who held the pen of Junius. By the same method it has now been attempted to shew that he also held the pen of Pownall, whose amanuensis he appears to have been for these private letters. If it be granted that on these occasions Francis was employed to write for Pownall as Pownall, it may be considered a fair inference that he was also, at the same period, writing for Pownall as Junius, and therefore that Pownall and Junius were one.

If this evidence be regarded as sufficient proof that Pownall employed Francis to write the Junius Letters it may also cover similar employment in another matter. Mr. Lecky mentions[1] that Francis reported some speeches of Lord Chatham, one of which had not been printed elsewhere when it was quoted by Junius. His doing this, from a report believed to be only in the possession of the person who had made it, seemed to Mr. Lecky to point to Francis as the author. Mr. Dilke and Sir Leslie Stephen were of the same mind. But is it certain that Francis reported the speech in question for himself and so was the only person who could use it? Pownall would be in a position to know when Chatham was going to speak. Because his action in the Commons was on the same lines as that of Chatham in the Lords, he would want a copy of the speech for his own purposes. It would be very natural for him to send Francis, who wrote for him, to also make a report for him, which would thus be as much at his disposal for a Junius Letter as at the disposal of the man who actually made it.

Character

We have now to consider what kind of man Junius was. From the preceding pages, which have briefly described how he dealt with between thirty and forty different subjects, some idea may be formed of how he thought and wrote. For full understanding of him it is of course necessary to read carefully through the whole of his letters. As that is a large undertaking it may be convenient to give here a summary of the conclusions arrived at from a careful study of his works which was made nearly a hundred years ago. To the Woodfalls

[1] *History of England in the XVIIIth Century*, 1905, iii. p. 465.

their association as publishers with the *Letters of Junius* was always a source of pride. After the death of H. S. Woodfall, who had dealt with Junius, his son, George Woodfall, brought out the two editions of 1812 and 1814 which have here been quoted from, and to what had appeared in the Author's edition of 1772 he added the Miscellaneous Letters, and the Letters of Junius to H. S. Woodfall and to Wilkes. He placed the editing of the whole in the hands of Dr. Mason Good, who must have been specially qualified for the task or it would not have been entrusted to him by George Woodfall, to whom it was a matter of great importance that the work should be done well. In order to supplement the idea of Junius which we have gathered directly we can hardly turn to a better authority than Dr. Mason Good, whose preliminary Essay to the editions of 1812 and 1814 says

it would seem to follow unquestionably that the author of the *Letters of Junius* was an Englishman of highly cultivated education, deeply versed in the language, the laws, the constitution and history of his native country: that he was a man of easy if not of affluent circumstances, of unsullied honour and generosity who had it equally in his heart and in his power to contribute to the necessities of other persons, and especially of those who were exposed to troubles of any kind on his account: that he was in habits of confidential intercourse, if not with different members of the Cabinet with politicians who were most intimately familiar with the Court and entrusted with all its secrets: that he had attained an age which would allow him, without vanity, to boast of an ample knowledge and experience of the world: that during the years 1767, 1768, 1769, 1770, 1771, and part of 1772 he resided almost constantly in London or its vicinity, devoting a very large portion of his time to political concerns and publishing his political lucubrations, under different signatures, in the *Public Advertiser*: that in his natural temper he was quick, irritable and impetuous; subject to political prejudices and strong personal animosities: but possessed of a high independent spirit: honestly attached to the principles of the constitution and fearless and indefatigable in maintaining them: that he was strict in his moral conduct and in his attention to public decorum; an avowed member of the established Church and, though acquainted with English judicature, not a lawyer by profession. What other characteristics he may have possessed we know not, but these are sufficient; and the claimant who cannot produce them conjointly is in vain brought forward as the author of the *Letters of Junius*.[1]

[1] Woodfall, 1812 and 1814, i. pp. 97-99. This analysis of the character of Junius, written without thought of any other person, will be seen to represent very accurately Pownall's habits of thought and action as described throughout this book.

As we add this passage to what we have already gathered we should remember that it was written before anything had appeared in print about Francis or most of the other men whose names have since been suggested. Mason Good held no brief for anybody, his opinion is quite unbiassed, in this respect it differs from most others, and for this reason it is all the more valuable. He tells us that any claimant who cannot answer to the description he gives was not Junius, this statement only needs to be strengthened by the addition to it of other matter, much of it discovered since his time, which is in the preceding pages.

Analysis

We now begin to look, not for the man who wrote Junius, but at every candidate who fails to comply in any important particular with the conditions we have arrived at, there is a flaw in his claim at once, the more the discrepancies the less the claim, and he must stand aside. Watch a man screening sand to get the finer stuff; he does not try to pick out each small particle from the mass with his fingers. He has a series of screens with meshes decreasing in size. From his heap he throws shovelfuls on the sieve with the largest mesh. What passes through that he then casts on the mesh next in size, and this process he continues till he arrives at the degree of fineness he requires. It is not by choosing what he wants but by rejecting what he does not want that he arrives at his result. Scotland Yard has borrowed from Paris the same idea of dealing with human beings, whose thumb and finger-tip markings of the skin are recorded and sorted according to their curves, under different headings and groups. The markings of an individual are tested for their resemblance with group No. 1, those in it who do not correspond to the case under investigation are set aside; so with group No. 2 and the rest, till at last one small batch is found which closely corresponds with the subject of the search. Out of that the one man sought for is ultimately fixed on by some minute difference between him and the others who have stood all tests till this final one.

It is a scientific method of analysis by elimination, repeated again and again, until, in the course of this process of rejecting all who do not comply with the standard test—which varies each time—he who can alone continue to do so is eventually picked out. At each test multitudes drop out, few, in comparison, remain. So to double the number of tests is to multiply, in a far higher ratio than that of two to one, the certainty of the result which can be absolutely relied on provided a sufficient number of tests are made. By them it is brought down to such a fine point that final identification is certain; it is accepted as evidence in courts of law; juries convict and judges pass sentence on it. The burglar who has the misfortune to have his finger-marks recorded has only to leave other impressions of them on a window-pane, and the comparison of those with the record shews exactly who has been tampering with the window to get into the house. It is a negative mode of obtaining proof, and we will apply it here, using it as regards personal characteristics and circumstances, which are just as variable in every human being as the finger-markings. The procedure is thoroughly established, there is nothing novel in what follows except the form of application to mental instead of physical differences. We begin with the well-ascertained fact that Junius was a well-to-do if not a wealthy man. Then we set aside all the bulk of the population; for they do not answer to that description.

Junius was very highly educated. We reject all of inferior education, and are left with only well-off and well-educated people.

Junius must have lived in or near London between 1767 and 1772. Throw out everybody then living more than, say, ten miles from London. There remain to us only those living within that radius who were both well-off and well-educated.

Junius had special knowledge and experience of the North American colonies. Reject those without it. We are reduced to the well-off, well-educated residents of London, who had previously been in, or knew well, those colonies.

Junius was friendly to Mr. Grenville, so those who were not his friends must go. There remain only those well-off, well-educated residents of London and its neigh-

bourhood who had previous experience of the colonies, and were adherents of Mr. Grenville. There were probably not a score of men in England who could answer to that description.

We have had but five tests so far; they have reduced to very small dimensions the circle which surrounds the object of our search, soon it will so shrink up that he alone will be contained in it. For we are not limited to five tests, the material at our command, drawn from what Junius himself wrote, suffices for many more; each is separate, and deals with the human being in question from a different point of view. We may summarise them in the following table, which contains no less than thirty-four such tests collected from the preceding pages, to which marginal references are given.

Two items, which have been dealt with as they arose, are purposely omitted:—

(*a*) The question whether more than one person was concerned in the production of the Letters.

(*b*) The knowledge of Mr. George Grenville which Junius in one sentence disclaimed.

Summary

We have ascertained that Junius was some one

SEE PAGE	
333 379	I. Of English birth. Living between 1767 and 1772, in or near London, where his presence was essential for communication with the publisher.
321 327 379	II. Who was neither a young man lacking experience nor an old man lacking strength for arduous and anxious work. By his own shewing a man of middle age who had lost his figure.
323 330 379	III. With access to the best political society in London, and acquainted with all its closest secrets.
332 351	IV. Who was probably a Member of Parliament, certainly a keen politician but not a party man.
379	V. With plenty of leisure, able and accus-

SEE PAGE

tomed to give much time to public affairs.

314, 324, 379 — VI. Possessing ample means, which enabled him to employ an amanuensis. Having reasons for resenting the dismissal from the War Office of Francis, in whose ears the phrases of Junius sounded to the end of his life.

362 — VII. Who with all these advantages was an injured, probably a disappointed man.

330, 379 — VIII. Who had education of a high order which embraced many subjects, among them the French language, then much less known than now.

342, 344 — IX. In close personal association and friendship with Mr. George Grenville, to whom he wrote in December 1768 as Pownall had written in June.

345, 349 — X. Who picked out Mr. Grenville and Lord Chatham from the statesmen of that day in order to address letters to them personally on public questions.

363 — XI. Who had his reasons, probably based on previous association and friendship, for resenting the way in which General Amherst was treated by the Government.

340 — XII. Presumably under some obligation to Lord Holland, who was spared when others were attacked with less cause.

321, 340, 364 — XIII. Who possessed specially accurate information about the working of the Colonial Office, the War Office, and the Commissariat. Well acquainted with departmental matters.

337 — XIV. Who was able to say that he had served under one of the Townshends, and had been disappointed by the other.

379 — XV. Who had a full and complete acquaintance with the history and the constitution of his country.

SEE PAGE

341 XVI. Who strongly objected to the marriage of H.R.H. the Duke of Cumberland with a British subject.

321, 327, 328 XVII. Having long experience in writing for publication, who dealt chiefly with the art of government and constitutional questions.

365 to 372 XVIII. Whose style was not fluent or produced without much labour and effort such as he acknowledged. But if sufficient pains were taken with it he could turn out work equal in quality to the Junius Letters.

353, 354 XIX. Specially well acquainted, probably from residence there for a considerable time, with the North American Colonies, understanding the conditions of life there and the mind of the colonists so intimately that he could write to the King as in their name to say what they thought.

354, 388 XX. Bitterly opposed to the Court influences which caused the breach with America, and therefore likely to end his career without any mark of royal favour or rank.

355, 356 XXI. Who was opposed to the Tea Duty, but regarded the Stamp Act as legally justified.

379 XXII. Thoroughly loyal to the welfare of England combined with that of her colonies, an Imperialist in advance of his age in desiring federation.

360 XXIII. Who differed from the average Englishman of means in that he was opposed to the Game Laws.

360, 379 XXIV. Generous to the publisher Woodfall as Pownall was to the printer, Lewis Evans. A man who attached no value to money for money's sake.

SEE PAGE

379 XXV. By no means free from political prejudices and strong animosities, in his personal temper quick, irritable, impetuous, of a high independent spirit.

363 XXVI. Not a soldier, yet qualified to discuss military operations with knowledge, a man who had seen something of war and objected to flogging in the army.

362 XXVII. Not a lawyer, but well able to hold his own on legal points with Chief-Justice Mansfield; he had read law though not of the profession.

350 XXVIII. Never suspected of having anything to do with the authorship of *Junius*.

350 XXIX. Whose desire for secrecy Lord Lansdowne (formerly Shelburne) respected till a death, recent in the spring of 1805, enabled him to draw aside a corner of the curtain before he died himself. Therefore Junius was not a man who died much before that date or who lived after it.

359 XXX. Able to speak with some knowledge of the state of Ireland.

360 XXXI. Opposed to the payment in 1769 of the King's debts by the nation which Pownall then voted against in Parliament.

323 XXXII. Who must have had some motive, hitherto undiscovered, for action which exposed him to such extreme danger.

354 XXXIII. Who wrote about America on December 19, 1769, what Pownall had said in Parliament on the previous 8th of February.

353 XXXIV. Who wrote in Letter LXXXVIII. of February 13, 1771, about the Falkland Islands question exactly what Pownall said on that day on that subject in the House of Commons.

This summary of the ascertained attributes of Junius is a much longer and therefore far more searching investigation than that in use for finger-marks at Scotland Yard. By the courtesy of the authorities there it is possible to state that they find fourteen tests,[1] on an average, sufficient to pick out from the records of the whole criminal population that of the individual they seek. When it is remembered that each successive test intensifies in a high degree the process of elimination, and therefore the force of proof, it will be seen that the construction of a standard containing no less than twenty tests more than the number found reliable for the purposes of justice is to make this investigation far more exhaustive. Now for its application. There will be found at the end of this chapter the names of forty candidates whom the researches of many learned writers, working for more than a century, have suggested as possible authors of the Junius Letters. It is hardly conceivable that, after all this labour, any one who lived at that period and who was capable of writing the letters has escaped notice. Any one conversant with the character and career of each or all of those forty men, to whose names brief notes are appended in order to aid this process, can take him or them and see how far there is coincidence or otherwise with the successive tests. He who passes through most of them, or all of them, was Junius; those who fail in any important particular are thereby rejected and weeded out. As an example we may take Sir Philip Francis, hitherto regarded as the author. He passes Nos. I. and VI. partly. He has some claim to pass No. III. He passes No. XII. because Lord Holland was his benefactor. He passes No. XIII. and No. XXX. Six points only are marked in his favour, on the remaining twenty-eight he has no qualification; for No. XVII. it has never been claimed. With No. XIX. test he does not comply; No. XXIX. puts him aside altogether, for he did not die till 1818.

Any of the others can be treated in the same way. It will be found that they all break down before they have got as far as Francis. Then let the record of Pownall be taken, and let attention be paid to the marked coincidence between him and Junius on Tests Nos. II., IV., VI., IX., XIII., XVII., XX., XXV.,

[1] From a single digit-mark the number of tests is from ten to eighteen.

XXVIII. As to XVII. it has been mentioned that he had in 1752 written a book on constitutional questions. Specially noticeable are XXXI., XXXII., XXXIII., XXXIV. It will probably be then conceded that he, and he alone, can pass through this process of sifting. If this be so the long-sought man has been found and Junius was the alter-ego of Thomas Pownall, established as such by a more severe analysis than that of Scotland Yard. We are still left to wonder how it was that when the authorities were so anxious to find Junius, who wrote on the principles and practice of Government, they never thought of looking for him in the person of one who had written both formerly and recently on the same subject, who had been employed and was addressed as Governor. The trout which lies near the surface is often overlooked. In the character of Junius Pownall kept chiefly to home topics; in his own character he was almost entirely known at this time as a man interested in colonial affairs.[1] No one imagined that he could attack the Government from both directions at the same time. To an exceedingly hard-working man such as he was the thing was possible so long as he could use the feigned hand-writing of another person. But when Francis was taken from him he had to drop the Junius part of his procedure and confine himself to working on his own account.

Pepys

There is a striking resemblance between the disinterment of Pownall the political writer and that of Samuel Pepys the diarist, who came out from the multitude of the long-forgotten 122 years after his death. Pepys died in 1703. In 1825 Lord Braybrooke unravelled and published the cypher in which he and the record of his life lay hidden at Magdalen College, Cambridge. In that case the writer and the writings emerged together, in this case the writings have been open to all men; they were topics of universal discussion at the time and have been a household word ever since. It has been only the author who has been so long and so much sought after. It is 140 years since Pownall was compelled, for

[1] See the lists of his speeches and of his publications in Appendix.

safety's sake, to hide himself behind the mask of Junius.[1] It has thus taken just eighteen years longer to find him than it did to discover Pepys.

Review

We see, in the thoughts and utterances expressed above, the well-known pseudonym, a man very intense, very forceful, a master man, with a wide knowledge and firm grasp of imperial and national questions, as to which he was in most absolute earnest; the exact opposite of the Court parasites or the party-hacks who are often the people whom kings delight to honour: one who preferred the apparent obscurity of anonymous writing to the more outward and visible signs of distinction. By the irony of fate he is as perfectly remembered under the name of Junius as he is forgotten under his own name to all but a few students of the period in which he lived. He took no rank or preferment from his Parliamentary career, distinguished as that was; he carried his secret to the grave thirty-five years afterwards; and the only title he bore was the courtesy one which he had earned in America before he entered Parliament. He was a man who could not only do his work but hold his tongue to the end. Had he left children to whom he could impart his secret it might have been known a hundred years ago. In his lifetime he could not speak, after his death there was no one to speak for him.

Those Letters shew us a very fierce opponent, a hard man who said hard things, but his animosity was not personal to the statesman he denounced, he attacked their actions, not themselves. If they had abstained from the shabby selfish things they did, to their own benefit but to the detriment of others, they would have escaped the pillory in which he placed them. Of one who was a rogue in public affairs he said: "I would pursue him through life and try the last exertion of my abilities to preserve the perishable infamy of his name and make it immortal":—[2]

[1] It is a further coincidence that he who here submits that he has shewn Pownall to be Junius is collaterally related to Pepys also.

[2] Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 91.

Though a severe satirist he was not, in his general temper, a malevolent writer, nor an ungenerous man . . . that he was quick and irritable in conceiving disgust, and vehement, and even at times malignant in his enmities, we may equally ascertain from his private and his public communications. In the violence of his hatreds almost every one whom he attacks is guilty in the extreme; there are no degrees of comparison either in their criminality or in his own destestation, the whole is equally superlative. . . . Of his personal and private honour we can only judge from his connection with Mr. Woodfall. Yet this connection is perhaps sufficient; for throughout the whole of it he appears in a light truly ingenuous and liberal.[1]

It was not only in his dealings with Woodfall that he acted generously; he did the same in restraining himself from taking further notice of General Gansel who, arrested for debt by Sheriff's officers, had been rescued by a party of the Guards. Junius took the matter up,[2] but he let it drop, writing privately to Woodfall: "The only thing that hinders the pushing the subject of my last letter is really the fear of injuring that poor devil, Gansel." Another instance of his generosity is seen in his private letter to Wilkes of October 21, 1771, where he wrote: "Feeling as I really do for others where my own safety is provided for, the danger to which I expose a simple printer afflicts and distresses me. It lowers me to myself to draw another into a hazardous situation which I cannot partake of with him." He was absolutely disinterested; with his proved abilities he could have made his own terms with the Government, which would have been delighted to buy off such a formidable adversary. Governments have bought many people then and since; at no time were such purchases more frequent than in his day. Well aware of the risks he ran, he faced them steadily for several years in the pursuit of what he believed to be a public duty. A very loyal man to those whom, like Mr. George Grenville and Lord Camden, he respected, he was loyal above all to England at home and overseas, while for those false to her he had an instinctive aversion.

[1] Woodfall, 1814, Preliminary Essay, i. pp. 27, 71, 66. [2] *Ibid.* ii. p. 37.

Effect

The effect of the writings of Junius may be judged from a passage in a speech by Mr. Edmund Burke:—

> How comes this Junius to have broke through the cobwebs of the law and to range uncontrolled, unpunished through the land? The myrmidons of the law have been long, and are still, pursuing him in vain. They will not spend their time upon me, or you, or you. No, they disdain such vermin when the mighty boar of the forest that has broke through all their toils is before them. But what will all their efforts avail? No sooner has he wounded one than he lays down another dead at his feet. For my part, when I saw his attack upon the King I own my blood ran cold. I thought he had ventured too far, not that he had not asserted many truths. Yes, sir, there are in that composition many truths by which a wise prince might profit. . . . In short, after carrying away our Royal Eagle in his pounces and dashing him against a rock he has laid you prostrate. Kings, Lords, and Commons are but the sport of his fury. Were he a member of this House what might not be expected from his knowledge, his firmness, and integrity.[1]

While Mr. Burke was thus describing Junius that much unknown person was—if the foregoing evidence be accepted—actually listening to him! Pownall was not only present in the House that night, but he was the last speaker in the Debate.[2] To take part in it required nerve, but coming last he had had time to pull himself together, and it was probably the best way to disarm suspicion. We may now see how the letters were regarded by other men competent to judge, who lived then and afterwards. Chief Baron Macdonald, who had been Attorney-General in Lord Chatham's time, said

> As regards those famous letters one point should never be forgotten. Junius unquestionably wrote the Duke of Grafton's administration out of office. No anonymous letters ever have produced, or ever will produce, an equally striking result.[3]

Sir Harris Nicholas, the distinguished antiquary, wrote in 1843 that after many years' study of the subject he was entirely without a clue to the author, and "had indeed a strong impression that Junius was not any one of the numerous persons so confidently brought forward." This

[1] *Speeches of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, 1816, i. p. 63. Date, November 27, 1770. See *ante*, p. 235.

[2] Cavendish's *Parliamentary Debates*, ii. p. 116; Hansard's *Parliamentary History*, xvi. p. 1173.

[3] *Old Times and Distant Places*, 1875, Archdeacon Sinclair, p. 143.

remark coincides exactly with what Lord Lansdowne said in 1805 that the author had never been suspected. It will be observed that it was made eleven years before Pownall's name was first brought forward, and with that claim Sir Harris was therefore unacquainted. Lord Jeffrey, in the *Edinburgh Review* of 1852, gave it as his opinion that

> Adam Smith was nearly the first who made deeper reasoning and more exact knowledge popular among us, and Johnson and Junius, who again familiarised us with more glowing and sonorous diction, made us feel the barrenness and poorness of the serious style of Addison and Swift.

Mr. Lecky has written that "the writings of Junius have a great importance in the history of the growing influence of newspapers," and there is no doubt that the futile prosecution of Woodfall for publishing what Junius wrote established the liberty of the Press.

Conclusion

Junius wrote anonymously. People do so no longer; it is regarded as a sign that the writer lacks the courage of his opinions. But times are changed, a man can now freely address himself to his public. It was otherwise then. Outside Parliament the slightest reflection on the authorities or their proceedings was treated as a libel, criminal, not civil. Wilkes spent two years in prison, and Lord North said in one of his speeches "lawyers could hardly be brought to plead" for the accused. So the political writing of that day was largely anonymous, and the country was flooded with tracts and pamphlets thus produced. It was not because they appeared above a pseudonym, but because they far excelled all others that the Junius Letters were remarkable. Within the walls of Parliament the same privilege which covered the speeches of members prevented full reports being given of what they said, any expression of opinion in the House could only influence the limited audience present on the occasion, and, whatever the effect on the minds of the hearers, their votes were, in many cases, already pledged to the Government, so any attempt to guide or control their action was foredoomed to failure. It was probably this knowledge of how futile it was to appeal to his fellow-

members in Parliament which made Pownall decide, when he was writing to Mr. Grenville in July 1768, on appealing over their heads to the general public through the Press,[1] and this resulted in the appearance, six months later, of the *Letters of Junius*.

This chapter will have been written in vain if it does not do something to dispel the idea that Junius was not only a needlessly anonymous but an unduly rancorous person. The attempt has been made to shew that he was something much more; a man furiously indignant, who for years had to watch the affairs of the nation go from good to bad and from bad to worse, who had attempted without success to obtain a hearing for his opinions when expressed in moderate terms above his own name, and who was thus driven to state them in a form no longer moderate above an assumed name. It has already been pointed out that he only became anonymous and furious when other methods had been tried without result. If men so powerful as the Duke of Grafton and his Cabinet were to be prevented from ruining the country, it had become useless to paint them in half-tones, nothing but glowing colours could be relied on to produce the effect.

Junius himself, in the Preface to the author's edition of 1772, claimed that

> a considerable latitude must be allowed in the discussion of public affairs, or the liberty of the Press will be of no benefit to society. As the indulgence of private malice and personal slander should be checked and resisted by every legal means, so a constant examination into the characters and conduct of ministers and magistrates should be equally promoted and encouraged.

Pownall kept well within the limits there defined. Nobody had done him more harm than the Lords of Trade who had removed him from Boston; he criticised their Board when he afterwards wrote his book on *Administration*, but we do not find Lord Halifax singled out for attack by Junius, who only mentions him incidentally.[2] The King lay not only at the root of his personal troubles but at those of the nation; it was

[1] "I do not presume to instruct the learned, but simply to inform the body of the people; and I prefer that channel of conveyance which is likely to spread farthest among them" (Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 553).

[2] Woodfall, 1814, iii. p. 320. Junius wrote to Blackstone, the Solicitor-General, that he had "no private resentments to gratify" (Woodfall, 1814, i. p. 540).

impossible to attack the ministers and spare their master. What he wrote as Junius in his Letter of December 19, 1769, about Wilkes is no doubt applicable to himself, "in the earnestness of his zeal he suffered some unwarrantable expressions to escape him." His language was very fierce. But here again, as with anonymous writing, we should remember the saying *autres temps autres mœurs*. As they fought harder and drank harder, so those who lived then wrote harder than is now the custom. It was a rougher age than this, perhaps not a worse one; if there was more corruption there was less cant in politics than there is now.

If we put aside all he wrote about such men as King George, the Dukes of Grafton and Bedford, Lords North, Bute, Shelburne and Mansfield, and turn to other sources to see what verdict history has passed upon their motives and actions, we find that the motives were selfish and bad and the actions disastrous. The whole group were malefactors, in that they were "doers of evil," to the country which owes the reverse of thanks to them; they deserved censure, and that which these Letters gave them was not misapplied.

If a man thoroughly and disinterestedly believes that people in high station are using their great power to do harm to the community, may it not be more beneficial for him to say so without regard to their personal feelings than to be content with terms of courteous disagreement which produce no impression? In such a case duty to the public stands on one side, charity to the individual on the other. The two obligations are irreconcilable, the writer has to choose between them. Most people prefer charity, it is the easier course, it gives less offence. This man took the other line of action, and by grasping his nettles he effected his purpose, if he did not free England from the Duke of Grafton he largely contributed to that object. If Francis had been left to Junius, to do the writing and the "conveyancing part of the business" till Lord North came in, the continuation of the Letters might have dislodged that Premier also and saved the colonies to England, as Pownall almost did in his own person when he won Lord North over to his views in 1774.

He was not a man who fought for fighting's sake, we have seen that he made many friends and few enemies,

and was not lukewarm in his dealings with either. In America he stood up to Lord Loudoun, the Commander-in-Chief, and fought the official class in Boston from Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson downwards. Except with them he had been on better terms with the colonists than any other Governor of his time, and years after he came home he helped the family of Lewis Evans, the poor surveyor and printer of Philadelphia, who had been his friend. Whom he fought as Junius—the King and the "King's friends"—and to whom he was loyal, Grenville, Amherst, Lord Camden, we also know, and we have seen how he championed Francis, who was writing for him, against Lord Barrington. In estimating the vehemence of the way in which he wrote as Junius it is only fair that we should remember how easy it is to be cool in another's quarrel, and what his quarrel was. Up to the time of the King's accession he had been a prosperous man, he had then refused further employment under the Crown because he disapproved of the policy adopted in the new reign. Others had been less scrupulous, he had been compelled to stand aside for years and watch them mismanage colonial affairs which he had shewn himself competent to manage. All that time he had worked hard, at first out of Parliament, afterwards within it, to prevent the disaster he foresaw and was right in foreseeing. When he had lived for four years, 1763-67, on these terms he could stand it no longer. He broke out, first in the Miscellaneous Letters under different signatures, and then as Junius with an explosive force so great that it has compelled attention from all those who have dealt with the history of that period.

We may sum up by referring to one of those expressions which dwelt so many years in the mind of Francis on whom it was probably specially impressed by his seeing the apt way in which it described the attitude of the person whom he heard use it :—

BEWARE THE FURY OF A PATIENT MAN.

A LIST OF PERSONS TO WHOM THE AUTHORSHIP OF 'THE JUNIUS LETTERS' HAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED

Mentioned in 1812 and 1814 by Dr. Mason Good, Editor of Woodfall Editions.

NAME.	REMARKS.
Charles Lloyd, Treasury Clerk	Could write, but was in bad health and living abroad. J. A.
John Roberts, Treasury Clerk	An old man; no literary talent whatever. J. A.
Dr. Butler, Bishop of Hereford	One of the King's Chaplains when the Letters attacked the King. *D.N.B.*
Rev. Philip Rosenhagen . .	Ex-army chaplain. Could not write well. J. A.
John Wilkes	In the King's Bench prison from April 1768 for two years. J. A.
John Dunning, Lord Ashburton	Solicitor-General 1769, so he could not attack ministry. J. A.
Lord George Sackville . .	Favourite of George III. Junius accused him of cowardice at the battle of Minden.
Samuel Dyer	A confirmed invalid when the Letters appeared. J. A.
William Gerard Hamilton .	Assured Lord Temple he was not Junius. J. A.
Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke .	Declared on his honour that it was not he. J. A.
Major-General Charles Lee .	Was in Poland, Italy and Austria at the time. J. A.
Hugh Macaulay Boyd . .	Was only twenty-two when Junius began to write. J. A.
Henry Flood	In Ireland in 1768, when Junius was near Woodfall the publisher in London. M. G.

MENTIONED IN 1867 IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE IN ALLIBONE'S 'DICTIONARY OF AUTHORS' AND BY MR. HERMAN MERIVALE IN 'MEMOIRS OF SIR PHILIP FRANCIS.'

NAME.	REMARKS.
The Earl of Chatham .	Attacked in the early Letters. Both rank and gout make it impossible.
Colonel Barrè . . .	Dependent on Lord Shelburne who was attacked.
The Earl of Chesterfield .	The dates of Letters to his godson shew that he was at Bath between October 17 and November 27, 1768. Also between October 10 and November 24, 1769. During those periods Junius was in or near London, and wrote six Letters (Nos. XXVII. to XXXII.), also eight of the Miscellaneous series (Nos. XLVI. to LII. and No. LXI.), and three Private Letters to Woodfall (Nos. 11 to 13).
William Burke . . .	A needy man. Ruined in 1769 when the Letters began. Junius was comfortably off. *D.N.B.*
Rt. Hon. George Grenville	Was not the man to praise himself, and was written to by Junius.
Lord Temple . . .	Spent much time at Stowe. Wrote of himself to Lord Suffolk on January 24, 1771, that he was a retired man.
William Greatrakes . .	Claim pronounced absurd by the *D.N.B.*
Sir William Jones . .	Only twenty-three when the Letters began. On the Continent while they appeared.
Laughlin Maclean . .	Secretary to Lord Shelburne who was attacked. Criticised himself in Miscellaneous Letter of March 6, 1771. J. A.
John Kent . . .	Never made any mark as a writer.
Daniel Wray . . .	Held a Government position as Teller of the Exchequer, so could not attack his employers. *D.N.B.*
Alex. Wedderburn— Lord Loughborough .	Tory up to 1769. Scotchman. Junius was hard on the Scotch, and spoke ill of Wedderburn. *D.N.B.*

NAME.	REMARKS.
Sir Philip Francis . .	Has been discussed fully in foregoing pages.
Dr. Francis . . .	He wrote as a party hack, and was a man of no means such as Junius had.
Mrs. Macaulay . . .	Born 1733. A good writer, but Junius was not feminine.
Edward Gibbon . .	Busy with his *History* from 1768 onwards.
The Duke of Portland .	3rd Duke, born 1738, under thirty and without experience when Junius began to write.
James Grenville . . .	Not mentioned in Allibone's *Dictionary* as having written anything.
Richard Glover . . .	A poet. Not a prose writer or a critic. *D.N.B.*
James Hollis . . .	Same as James Grenville.
John Horne Tooke . .	Till 1782 he was the Rev. Mr. Horne, and wrote against Junius.
Henry Grattan . . .	In a letter of November 4, 1805, he denied it, saying he was a boy at the time. J. A.
Horace Walpole . .	Was not sufficiently in earnest to have done this work.
Lt.-Gen. Sir Robert Rich .	Was commanding troops at Londonderry and broken in health. *D.N.B.*
Governor Pownall . .	Is here described.
Lord Littleton . . .	At Maestricht, November 1771, when Junius was watching Garrick at Richmond. T.
Wolfram Cornwall . .	Not a man of ability. *D.N.B.*

NOTE.

J. A.—John Almon. Preface to his edition of *Junius*, 1805.
M. G.—Dr. Mason Good. Preface to Woodfall, 1812-1814.
T.—Hon. E. Twisleton. Preface to *Handwriting of Junius*.
D.N.B.—Dictionary of National Biography.

CHAPTER XIII

LITERATURE—ANTIQUARIAN STUDIES—SECOND MARRIAGE

1780–1785

In 1780 Almon published for Pownall two editions of a book of 127 octavo pages called

A MEMORIAL MOST HUMBLY ADDRESSED TO THE SOVEREIGNS OF EUROPE ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS BETWEEN THE OLD AND NEW WORLD[1]

It draws the attention of Europe to the fact that in America a new and independent power had arisen which would have to be reckoned with in all international questions. It foretells that unless

> the Powers of Europe will view the state of things as they do really exist . . . they will be plunged into a sea of troubles, a sea of blood fathomless and boundless. The war that has begun to rage betwixt Britain, France and Spain, which is almost gorged betwixt Britain and America, will extend itself to all the maritime, and most likely to all the inland powers of Europe.[2]

He saw coming an era of strife on a larger scale than that of the Thirty Years' War of the seventeenth century,

[1] This appeared anonymously in the first instance. When it was included by Pownall in the *Three Memorials* of 1784 the preface he then wrote explained his having originally withheld his name from this one, "I wished that the world might receive the state of the case solely on the authority of the facts and not on the testimony of any name."

[2] It will be observed that this was written just nine years before the outbreak of the French Revolution, led by men encouraged in their action in 1789 by the success of the Revolutionary Party in America whose independence had been obtained six years earlier by the support afforded to them by the rulers of France. They, when they entered into the Treaty with America in 1778, placed themselves on the side of the governed against the governing classes. By so doing they established a precedent for successful insurrection which led to their own destruction, and to the Napoleonic Wars which followed, exactly as Pownall here predicted.

and was aware that it had lain in the power of England to prevent this in its origin. It would, he knew, all arise from and follow the breach with the English colonies.

> The basis of a *Great Marine Dominion* was laid by nature, and the God of Nature offered that dominion to the only Power with which the spirit of liberty then dwelt. But the Government of that State being wise in its own conceit, not only above but against those things which existed, rejected nature and would have none of her ways.

Pownall hits out here at the British Ministry, and the Sovereign whose puppets they had been, quite in the same tone and almost as fiercely as Junius had done ten years before. Junius had written anonymously, Pownall was writing in his own name and had to be more guarded, for the King's hand was a heavy one. Allowing for this difference it may be said that Pownall shewed as little appreciation of the authorities as Junius had done. He describes the British as half-ruined by its being

> unfortunately for them a principal part of the miserable baseless plan of their inexperienced advisers . . . to reform the constitutions of their American establishments. Although they could not be ignorant, although they were not uninformed, that the course of this reform must lead to war,

they had rashly precipitated the appeal to arms.

> But, alas, when they were so ready for war they little thought, or could be made to understand, what sort of a war it would turn out.

In another passage he declares that

> they have not only lost for ever the dominion which they might have wrought their nation up to, but the external parts of the Empire are, one after another, falling off and it will be once more reduced to its insular existence.

Pownall was sure that the English, who had already paid dearly for the quarrel caused by their King and by those who were nominally his Ministers, really his creatures, would have to pay still more in the future. He was sure also that the position of the United States would keep them out of the impending troubles, whatever might result from "the present war between Britain and the House of Bourbon." Destruction to one or other of those two combatants was foretold. He spoke of the comparison he was about to make of the old and the new

continents as one only just called for by the sudden appearance of a new World Power beyond the Atlantic. What he said then might be applied to the British Empire now :—

> Greatness without connection of parts is expanse not greatness, natural connection of parts without an actuating intercommunication of those parts is encumbered bulk not strength.

This power of communication he regarded as given to England by her use of the sea, to America partly by the great rivers, partly by her being self-contained, and thus able to produce within her own wide territory all that she required. He recognises that Spain had dealt wisely with her colonies in South America, giving them more latitude than England had conceded to North America. "South America is not yet, on its natural course, ripe for falling off, nor is it likely . . . to be forced before its time and season to a premature revolt as North America has been." But he was quite aware that "South America is growing too much for Spain to manage"; it would not, however, become, like North America, a democratic republic; "the falling off of South America will be conducted . . . by the spirit of some injured enterprising genius."[1]

As to Europe he traced its condition at that time to the continuance in power of the descendants of those who, as warriors, had reduced the rest of the population to a dependent position. That the latter would shortly assert themselves against the former he was sure, the rapid advent of democracy in Europe as well as in America was plain to him. In America, he observed, there was no old system to be removed in order to make way for the new one.

> America is peculiarly a poor man's country. . . . Free of all restraints which take the property of themselves out of their own hands their souls are their own, and their reason ; they are their own masters and they act, their labour is employed on their own property and what they produce is their own.

He describes the American character as formed by these circumstances.

> An unabated application of the powers of individuals and a perpetual struggle of their spirits sharpens their wits and gives

[1] Some forty years were to pass before Bolivar justified this remark.

constant training to the mind. . . . This turn of character, which in the ordinary occurrences of life is called *inquisitiveness*, and which, when exerted about trifles goes even to a degree of ridicule in many instances, is yet, in matters of business and commerce, a most useful and efficient talent.

He explains how the many shifts to which the early settlers had been put had led to the development of mechanical ingenuity. "More new tools, implements and machines, or rather more new forms of such, have been thus invented in this new world than were ever yet invented in the old within the like extent of country in the like space of time." Pownall was sure that owing to this inherent and inherited faculty he had noticed

when the field of agriculture shall be filled up . . . the moment that the progress of civilisation, carried thus on its natural course, is ripe for it, the branch of manufactures will take its shoot and will grow and increase with an astonishing exuberancy.

One of the industries which already flourished in America was that of shipbuilding which enabled the colonists to send abroad in their own vessels their surplus produce of fish, wheat, tobacco, indigo and salted meats. True wealth, according to Pownall, rested on the possession in abundance of these necessaries of life, not on having much minted money. For this reason he did not consider that the great depreciation in the value of the American paper currency which the war had caused was a true index of the credit of the country—on the contrary he declared that "North America has advanced, and is every day advancing, to growth of state with a steady and continually accelerating motion of which there has never yet been any example in Europe." From the growth of agriculture, industries and commerce, he passed to that of population which he described as equally marvellous; he attributed it to the healthy lives led by the people and to the superabundance of food making a large family a source of prosperity to parents instead of a burden as it was in Europe.

He gives statistics of the growth of population in different provinces, saying that Massachusetts Bay had 94,000 inhabitants in 1722; 300,000 in 1773; Connecticut between 1756 and 1774 had just doubled the number of its people in eighteen years, rising from 129,994 to

257,356. A special case of fecundity is quoted in the case of Mary Loomis who was born at Windsor in that colony in 1680. She married at sixteen, and when she died at the age of eighty-eight her great-great-grandchildren were beginning to arrive. Of the descendants of her marriage 74 had died during her lifetime, but there were alive at her death no less than 336. Between 1756 and 1774 New York and Virginia had doubled their numbers, rising respectively from 96,776 to 182,251, and from 173,316 to 300,000. There was no regular census till long after this time, but estimates which Pownall believed to be reliable placed the total population of the colonies at a million and a quarter, or a million and a half, in 1754-55. Then came the Seven Years' War, which checked the increase; but by 1774, when the War of Independence began, the estimate of Congress which Pownall quoted made the population rather more than three millions. This he himself considered excessive, he thought the figure should be slightly less than two and a quarter millions, which he observes meant that the population had, without much immigration, nearly doubled itself in twenty years. About one-fourth of the whole community, to be exact 525,326 men, were trained to the actual use of arms. They were what he called "the national picquet guard, always prepared for defence. Members of the body of the community they became a real and effective national defence." He quotes the authority of Lord Verulam to the effect that "every common subject by the poll is fit to make a soldier, and not certain conditions and degrees of men only."

He then reverts to the question of commerce and describes America as the "natural source of supply to Europe in general. Her true interest therefore is that of being a free port to all Europe at large, and that all Europe at large should be the common market for American exports." That England had been altogether misled he was certain; she ought to have known that it was not by the conquest of America, which she had attempted, but by the commerce with America which she had sacrificed, that she could benefit. Her opportunity of monopoly or preference in that market was gone now that the trade with America was thrown open to other countries which would be eager to take advantage of it.

This trade would, he predicted, become so great that in consequence of it America would become more and more bound up with European affairs and interests.

> The passage will be better understood and become every day shorter, America will seem every day to approach nearer and nearer to Europe. . . . A thousand attractive motives respecting the settlement which they will look to in America will raise a spirit of adventure and become the irresistible cause of an *almost general emigration to that New World.*

The Sovereigns of Europe, to whom this Memorial is addressed, were called on to study these new problems. If, instead of doing so, they continued "to be led by the office-systems and worldly wisdom of their Ministers who . . . have despised the unfashioned awkward youth of America," they would find out when it was too late that their ignorance had got them into difficulties. To England especially was this appeal addressed; he prints in a separate line what he calls the

Magni nominis umbra,[1]

which she had, and calls on her to act up to the substance of the shadow. "She might even yet have an active leading interest amongst the Powers of Europe. But she will not. As though the hand of judgment was upon her England would not see the things which make for her peace." On the contrary she had deliberately alienated her colonies by ignoring their petitions and by forgetting that she and her offspring had in common "similar modes of living and thinking, the same manners and the same fashions, the same language and old habits of national love, impressed in the heart and not yet effaced." Rejected by their mother country the colonists had turned elsewhere and made an alliance with France, whose rulers had been glad to give the "terms of perfect equality and reciprocity" which England had refused.[2]

When Pownall wrote thus in 1780 there were two things, already mentioned, chiefly in his mind—a great

[1] "*Stat Nominis Umbra,*" was the motto of the *Junius Letters.*

[2] It is within recent memory that when England refused the preference asked by the present colonies at the London Conference of 1907, Sir Wilfrid Laurier went straight to Paris, where his proposals for a commercial treaty between France and Canada were gladly accepted.

acceleration, coupled with expansion, of the intercourse between Europe and America, and great wars impending in the near future. Those he thought so near that he suggested that so far as America was concerned they might be provided for in advance. He therefore suggested that as soon as the then existing war came to an end, and peace was restored, steps should be taken to neutralise for the future the commerce of Europe with America. That might be done in two ways. On the conclusion of peace a Congress of the European Powers might be held at which they could arrange that when, on any future occasion, war broke out between them each combatant should pledge itself not to interfere with the American trade of its adversary. Or each European Power might on its own account engage with the United States that they should keep their market open and preserve neutrality. Unless something of this kind was done Pownall was afraid that the United States might have the opportunity of playing the part of *tertius gaudens*. It would then be found that they had profited by their immunity from attack, and while other nations were fighting and exhausting each other in Europe they might succeed to the supremacy in commerce and sea power which had belonged to England. "The American will come to market in his own shipping and will claim the Ocean as common." He would probably do more than that, he would naturally attempt to obtain the command of it, for he was even then, to Pownall's knowledge, a very keen man of business. He was able to say that before the war then existing began American firms had sent their own agents to Birmingham, Sheffield and Bradford, to buy direct from manufacturers and save the intermediate profit of the British exporter. A fear is expressed that the British merchants had not been alive to this, that they were inclined to rest on their oars and fail to develop the commerce of the country.

> While trade is solely in the hands of the merchant he . . . bears hard on the purchaser by his high rate of profit and oppresses the manufacturer by the bare living share of profit he allows him; the merchant grows rich and magnificent, makes a great bustle and a great figure.

This excessive accumulation of wealth by individuals was not, to Pownall's mind, a desirable object. A general

diffusion of prosperity by a large commerce supported by industries which gave much employment to labour appeared to him more beneficial to the country. "The merchant must make his way by being content with small profits and by doing a deal of business on those small profits." Such questions as these are described as deserving the most careful attention of Sovereigns. They are warned that they could no longer follow the example of England in founding colonies with the intention of deriving revenue from taxation of the labour of emigrants. It is pointed out that the time had gone by when a colony could be compelled by navigation laws to trade only with the mother country. That system would have to be replaced by one which, through open and unrestricted commerce, coupled when necessary with preferential arrangements, would make the colonial trade profitable as much to the man who went abroad as to the man who stayed at home.

> The Sovereigns of Europe should, in this view of things, conceive that the commercial system of Europe is changing in fact, and in wisdom the policy should be changed. That the great commerce of North America, emancipated from its provincial state, not only coincides with but is the cause of this change . . . there is nothing so absurd as warring with each other about an object which, as it is separated from Europe, will have nothing to do with its embroils and will not belong exclusively to any of them.

He went on to argue that, however long the existing war might continue, it would eventually be necessary, for the conclusion of peace, to convene a Congress to which, among other questions, might be entrusted the settlement of the future commercial relations of Europe to America.

> Such a Council might not only prevent a most dreadful general war, which seems to be coming on in Europe but . . . might, for ever after, be the means to prevent all future occasions of war arising from commercial quarrels.

In preceding passages he had alluded to the down-trodden condition of the bulk of the European population, "this miserable race of men were precluded all vent and market except such wherein their Lords were to absorb the chief profits." This state of things, he knew, could not be permanent; in no country was it worse than in France, where a few years later the Revolution began that series of wars which Pownall saw on the horizon when he wrote this book.

1781

Little trace remains of Pownall's work during this year, but on June 22, 1781, he addressed from Richmond a letter to the Antiquarian Society of Dublin on

THE SHIP TEMPLE NEAR DUNDALK[1]

This is described as a legacy from the Picts, who were the first of the northern peoples to check the conquests of the Roman Empire, and "who paid divine honours to the form of a ship as the symbol, idol, or temple of the divinity whom they worshipped." Tacitus is quoted as expressing the opinion that this divinity was Isis, and that the ship in question was supposed to represent the ship of Isis. It is mentioned that inquiries had been made as to how this Egyptian cult of Isis reached the Picts in North Germany. It was not, in Pownall's opinion, necessary to go so far afield. He thought that the Picts had not borrowed the idea of using a ship as a temple from Egypt, but had originated it themselves. They believed that their god Thor used a ship, if so,

> what form of temple could more conform to these divine mysteries or become a more proper symbol of the dwelling of the gods, to which their presence might be invoked than that of a ship? . . . I submit to the learning of your Society that this Ship Temple is the symbol of the sacred Skidblander built by the Nani, and which, therefore, I should call a Nanic temple, founded and built on the institution of those mysteries in Ireland when first these northern people established themselves there.

This suggestion gave rise to several other papers, which are bound in the volume below referred to, and with it are drawings which shew the Ship Temple in question to have been a masonry structure placed on a mound, the height of the walls was 11 ft. and the area enclosed was 44′ 9″ × 21′ 0″. Although this was a subject very far removed from the politics and political economy to which Pownall had long devoted his chief attention he does not appear to have neglected his original pursuits, for soon afterwards he wrote

[1] Printed in *Collectanea de Rebus Hibernicis*, pp. 199-204.

A MEMORIAL IN TWO PARTS ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO BE PRESENTED TO THE KING.

As a note to the Preface says that the draft of this book was submitted to the Ministry on December 25, 1781, it must have been written in that year though not printed till afterwards. It consists of 58 octavo pages, and does not bear the name of any publisher.

The first part is signed by Pownall at Richmond on January 1, 1782, and deals with the position created by the readiness of England, France, and the United States, recently expressed officially by each of those Powers, to end the war. By a declaration dated November 23, 1781, which Pownall quotes, the Americans had declared themselves willing to treat for peace "whenever Great Britain should be disposed to it." This document must have been prepared in Paris, for a footnote says that Pownall received it on December 5, and that he placed it before the English Ministry the next day. He had thereupon drawn up this commentary upon it as

> an old servant of the Crown in this line of American service practised and experienced in these affairs . . . as the last and only effort which Providence hath left in his power of doing his duty to your Majesty and his country.

He observes that before any Conference of the two Powers chiefly concerned took place, each of them must separately make up its own mind. To the mind of the King the Americans were still subjects in revolt, with whom it was beneath his dignity to treat; a precedent is quoted in order to make it easier to waive this point. This refers to the action of Queen Elizabeth, who in 1576 sent an embassy to Spain to intervene in the quarrel between King Philip and his Dutch subjects whose independence that King was afterwards compelled to recognise. It is pointed out that if King George still demurred to concluding peace he could at all events put an end to hostilities by granting a truce which, it is urged, might be an indefinite one and lead to final terms being arranged. Pownall says that he "presumed to offer his services to undertake a negotiation for the purpose only of settling a truce with the Americans as a preliminary measure, in order the better to treat of peace in future." It is evident that he was trying to

coax the King, whose obstinacy was now the obstacle to peace as it had originally been the cause of war. He goes on to say that each people has some dominant note of character. "The peculiar characteristic of the Americans is jealousy to the extreme. Great Britain hath not been without her jealousies, as unfounded as the other. . . . The same spirit is now fermenting in America to jealousy of their great and good ally the French King." He proceeds to describe how the Americans had been jealous of the distant power of England, but were now still more so of the power of the French army quartered among them; how they grudged the pay and the billeting of the French troops and resented "the manner in which the poor wretches of an American army have been treated, the provoking insolence which the Americans must experience from the French." Welcomed in the first instance as friends and guests, the French troops had become a source of annoyance and anxiety to their hosts, who now wanted "to get rid of this army of allies when they want their service no longer and desire their departure."

In their eagerness to emancipate themselves from the rulers of England the Americans had turned to those of France, in whose hands they had to a large extent placed themselves. They were beginning to realise that they might have gone too far. Weakened as they were by war they might ultimately fail to induce the French to leave; in that case their new-born independence would quickly perish, and they would have rather lost than gained if the only result of shaking off the supremacy of England were the acceptance of that of France. They were becoming afraid that they had only exchanged the rule of King Log for that of King Stork. Pownall pointed out that now, while they were in this humour, was the time to deal with them "before they are more entangled and involved with these suspected allies. If this crisis be neglected they may, however, be so entangled that their endeavours to emancipate themselves, although conspiring with the efforts of Great Britain, may not hereafter be able to co-operate to any effectual purpose." Previous negotiations he described as having failed, not from want of goodwill on either side, but because of difficulties in the

method of procedure. England had addressed herself to the provincial assemblies as if those bodies still existed; they had, however, been absorbed in Congress and were no longer capable of action. The power which had been theirs had passed to Congress, which however could do nothing so long as it remained unapproached and unrecognised by England.

This deadlock Pownall thought might be removed by a truce, such as he now suggested because he believed the time for it had come. Under cover of this truce terms might be arranged on which Parliament and Congress could discuss arrangements for peace. Those, he said, must be matter of bargain, for the Americans could not have it both ways. When they declared their independence of England they ceased to have any claim to share in the rights of British subjects. Those he described as very valuable; they included the use of the Newfoundland fisheries, and the privileges held for the Baltic and the Mediterranean trade, under treaties made at the end of former wars, in which England had been engaged on behalf of her own people. All these things were English property; while the colonists were English they had always shared in it, but now they had ceased to occupy that position and had become foreigners. Therefore if they wished for readmission to their former rights, that of the fisheries for instance, they would have to offer some equivalent as other foreign countries did when they wanted a concession.

While the first part of this double Memorial dealt with the method of making peace if possible, the second described a scheme for prosecuting the war if it proved necessary to continue military operations. The English are described as being at that time in undisturbed possession of Canada and Nova Scotia, as holding New York and some considerable portion of Staten and Long Island. Charlestown in Virginia was theirs, and in Georgia and East Florida they were stronger than their opponents.

This account of the situation must have been written by Pownall in the course of December 1781, for it has been mentioned that on the 5th of that month he received from Paris the American proposal for peace, and that he handed his draft of this Memorial to the Cabinet on the 25th. At the end of November news had been received

in England of the surrender at Yorktown on October 9th of the army of General Cornwallis which had been occupied through the autumn with operations in Virginia. The crushing disaster of Yorktown was therefore in Pownall's mind when he wrote this Memorial, the object of which was to urge the immediate withdrawal of all the English troops from the south in order that they might be concentrated in the north. In such detached operations as Cornwallis had been engaged in to the south Pownall here expresses his total disbelief.

He doubted the value of Charlestown in Virginia and also of New York, unless the latter had carried with it, as was not the case, the command of the Hudson River whose upper waters were accessible from the English zone. He explained that there was then a neutral region "lately called Vermont" which projected southward from Canada, and was occupied by "a number of people who, having withdrawn themselves from the revolted provinces and taken as yet no part in the war, have fortified themselves in a state of neutrality." Many of them were loyalists; others of the same way of thinking could be settled among them, and this district could then be held by these planters supported by a portion of the army brought up from the south. This Province would have Quebec and Montreal in its rear, and communication could be maintained with it by the St. Lawrence.

The remainder of the English army, then at New York and further south, he wished to see stationed in that north-eastern portion of Maine, the Penobscot country, which he knew the value of because he had himself opened it to settlement twenty years before. This province would be an outpost from New Brunswick, just as Vermont would be from Canada; the naval station at Halifax, covered by a strong fleet, would give access to it.

A glance at the map will shew that if this policy had been adopted and carried out the boundary between the United States and Canada would have been very different from what it is. In advocating these measures Pownall wrote that he "would betray his duty if he did not here mention the necessity which will arise of establishing a free colonial constitution of government in these provinces." As to the south, England had just been defeated at Yorktown in her attempts to hold it, and he considered that it

was of little use to her, the climate of Georgia and Florida was less suited to Englishmen than to Spaniards. The latter had been first in occupation, he was willing to see them return there. He suggested that at the peace these provinces, which were far from Boston or even from New York, should be ceded by England to Spain as her share in the war. The Americans had accepted her as an ally, they could hardly refuse her as a neighbour. With Spain on the south and France, still in possession of Louisiana and the Mississippi valley, to the west, while England had strengthened her position in the north, the continent would be equally divided, and the United States would be but one Power out of four who held shares of it.

Pownall ended this Memorial by saying that, if these views were accepted,

> the troops, instead of remaining posted in stations that give no protection, that give no co-operation, will . . . form a conspiring united system of that command throughout your Majesty's dominions in America connected with Great Britain. . . . By these means your Majesty would soon find yourself holding the balance of power between these new allies of that country, a power that would carry command wherever it was called upon to interfere.

The Preface to this Memorial explains that the Secretary of State (Lord George Sackville Germaine), to whom it was handed on January 18, 1782, undertook to present the papers to the King. He was, however, over-ruled by his colleagues in Lord North's ministry, who refused to open negotiations with those Americans whom Pownall had mentioned as prepared to meet them. The papers were therefore handed back to Pownall, who, having failed in his attempt to bring them to the King's notice, kept them by him for some time, and eventually published them in 1784. In the Preface he then wrote to them he explains that the object of publication was to shew that peace might have been had on good terms a full year before the war actually ended had the Ministry chosen to negotiate. He accuses them of having needlessly expended fifty millions on the war, which had become hopeless after France joined the United States, and of having under-rated the resources of that combination, while they had over-rated the resources of England which the struggle had exhausted. The whole war had been a mistake in his opinion, but the prolongation of it through 1782, when

he had told the Ministry at the beginning of the year that the Americans were desirous of getting rid of the French and making terms with England, had, he thought, been absolutely criminal because it was needless.

1782

The year 1782 opened for Pownall with the disappointment caused by the failure of this effort he had made to promote peace. There was nothing more possible for him in that direction, so he turned to other subjects and produced

A TREATISE ON THE STUDY OF ANTIQUITIES AS THE COMMENTARY TO HISTORICAL LEARNING,

a book of 320 octavo pages, with many illustrations made by himself, published by Dodsley of Pall Mall. The Preface tells us that

this course of study was recurred to at a period when the Author, sinking under the misfortune of a loss in life which he had sustained,[1] sought consolation, not by arguments against grief which nature must feel, but in an endeavour to prevent the mind from dwelling upon and listening too much to its own feelings by diverting it into a course of study which had formerly amused it.

Some of the papers here reproduced are stated to have been originally read at meetings of the Society of Antiquaries to whom the book is dedicated. Of that Society Pownall speaks as one of the most learned and useful bodies in the country, but he warns it "that all the learning in the world, if it stops short and rests on particulars, never will become knowledge." Such "particulars" as old monuments and curiosities, the preservation of the one and the collection of the other, he regarded as possessing value, not on their own account but because of the light they threw on the manners, the customs and the habit of thought, which had existed among previous generations, especially among the bolder spirits, the pioneer men, whom those generations had produced. As a young man he had been something of a pioneer himself, he had held Massachusetts as an outpost of England, he had seen war and had made voyages unusual to men of his day. He was interested

[1] His wife's death has been mentioned on p. 288 *ante*.

in those who go down to the sea in ships. Whether they were the legendary Argonauts of the Mediterranean, the Greeks and Egyptians who followed them there, or the Portuguese in the Far East or Columbus in the Far West, they all seemed to him to be men of the same type.

When I read of the travels and conquests of Osiris, Bacchus, Sesostris and the various Hercules, and such like personified characters, and compare this with similar travels, voyages, adventures, and conquests of Cortes, Pizarro and other Spaniards, how is it possible not to see the real history through the veil of metaphors and allegories which have transformed it into fable ?

It was the human element, and the light thrown on it by the relics of the past, rather than the relics themselves, which attracted Pownall to these studies. The first topic he deals with is that of the elements of speech. "Various as all the languages of the world may seem, and infinite as the words of those languages may be, yet they are all compounded of and resolvable into a very defined and small number of acts of the voice." He proceeds to examine in detail how these vocal sounds, which he found to be no more than sixteen in number, are formed by the action of the mouth. Incidentally he throws some light on his own disposition by observing that

this mode of analysing requires perfect liberation from all prejudged system, and more quiet patience than many, who think they know me, will give me credit for.

He traces the origin of all the civilisation and languages of Europe to "a colony of adventurers first settled in Phrygia amongst a people then living the sylvan-hunting or roving pastoral life." Whence these adventurers came, whether they were a migrant Tartar tribe whose origin was the same as that of China, or whether they were an offshoot from some Syrian or Egyptian colony, he did not attempt to determine. But they possessed more knowledge than the original inhabitants of that region in Asia Minor, to whom they taught agriculture, and who looked up to them enough to dignify them by the name of "Theoi," the gods. The community of which they were the head existed and had become legendary long before the time of Homer,[1] whom Pownall quotes to

[1] About 1000 B.C.

shew that the language used by these so-called gods differed from that of the commonalty. He believed that those whom Homer had in his mind when he wrote of the words used by "the gods" were not mythical creatures but actual human beings living in Asia Minor long before the siege of Troy. He found instances in Homer to shew that this superior race used different terms for the same persons, things, and some animals, to those employed by the ordinary folk. There were, therefore, either two languages in general use or a separate one employed by the literate class for official purposes. This Pownall says that the Red Indians had, and they called it a "council language."[1] From this Phrygian source Pownall believed that the ancient Greeks took their forms of expression, which he found to correspond in many instances with the terms used for the same things by the Gaelic of Ireland and Wales in the extreme West, and by the Tartars of Eastern Asia and by the Red Indians in the opposite direction.[2] In the prefixes and suffixes applied to words for purposes of discrimination Pownall found a marked resemblance between the speech of the Tartars and that of the Red Indians. For instance, the Tartars used the prefix "Ma" or "Mai" to indicate remoteness. The Red Indians did the same. "Watchuset" in their language meant "a great mountain"; those tribes who lived inland and were far from the coast prefixed the Mai to this word and so, according to Pownall, arrived at Mai-Watchuset or Massachusetts—to denote the land which lay beyond the mountains which separated them from it. He observes that when he had been present at conferences with the Red Indians he had noticed how each of the European interpreters employed gathered a different impression of the sound of the words which fell from the Indians, who used their lips very little when they spoke but "express a greater variety in the digamma and in the aspirates than the Europeans know." Thus

[1] With the Japanese of to-day this difference is observed, they use their own written characters for ordinary purposes, but all official documents are in the Chinese characters which every educated Japanese has to know.

[2] This analogy may have been suggested by two papers published in 1782, when the Chinese and Japanese languages were scarcely known in Europe, which have many terms the same as in Irish. This will be found in *Collectanea de Rebus Hibernicis*, vol. iii. Mr. Basil Hall Chamberlain, formerly Professor of the Japanese language in the Tokio University, has written that it possibly came from a Mongol source.

"the same name or word becomes, when transferred from one language to another, quite a different thing." In Pownall's opinion such differences had become intensified and crystallised in substance when the art of writing was invented. "My idea is that the diverging of human speech into various languages hath arisen more often and gone into greater diversities since the invention of elementary writing than from any other cause whatever."

With this subject of picture-writing or hieroglyphics Pownall deals in the next paper in this volume;[1] he describes them as "the first efforts of a rude, not the studied devices of a learned people," and as not intended to convey any cryptic ideas, but rather to popularise and commemorate the ideas prevalent when they were produced. For those in Egypt he refers to Herodotus;[2] he illustrates them by specimens which Niebuhr had selected for this purpose from his own records, and he gives others from Kircher and Pocock. What had resulted from their labours we find clearly summarised here, but so much work has since then been done in that field that we may leave it, noting how Pownall pointed out that sign-writing was not confined to Egypt and the adjoining countries but was world-wide. He quotes Von Strahlenberg to shew that there existed among the Tartars "picture-writing of the same nature and some seemingly to the very same purport. . . . These Tartar inscriptions are also so exactly similar to some found in Arabia (as given by Niebuhr) that one might almost say they were drawn by the same hand." In the picture-history of the Indians of Mexico, published by Purchas, he found that those people used the symbol of an untouched tree to denote a free community; a tree cut half through meant a subject state, an uprooted tree a conquered country. This mythic tree, it is mentioned, had also been found by Norden to express the same idea in Egypt. In this connection he alludes to the "Tree of Knowledge" in the Garden of Eden.

From the picture-writing of Mexico it is but a short step to that of the Red Indians, with which Pownall was

[1] A note says that it was read at the Society of Antiquaries on January 18, 1781.

[2] 484 B.C.

familiar from his early intercourse with them. As they expressed all their ideas in symbols, he had himself designed the great belt of wampum, nearly six feet long and a hand's breadth in width, which was given to them to commemorate the agreement made at Albany before the Seven Years' War. At one end were the figures of eleven men hand in hand to represent the Commissioners of the eleven English Provinces who took part in the negotiation. At the other end of the belt were five men, also hand in hand, who stood for the confederacy of the Five Nations. Between the two groups was a line to mark the tie formed by the Treaty. This belt, he says, was much appreciated and valued by the Indians, because it was a recognition of their own way of expressing thought by symbols. To them the hatchet was the emblem of war, the tree was that of peace, the chain was that of alliance. They looked on fire as a pervading spirit; the use of it in smoking tobacco alternately from the same pipe was one of their most solemn means of pledging faith. This pipe or calumet was specially prepared, ornamented with feathers and symbolic embroidery of porcupine quills, and after peace was made it was lodged by those who had proposed with those who had accepted the terms. The latter, if they were the Indians, preserved it most carefully, and so did those white men who, like Sir William Johnson, had learnt the value of the calumet. Pownall mentions that one of these calumets, specially valuable because it recorded an important treaty, had been given to him after the death of Sir William. "Esteeming it a singular curiosity, perhaps unique in this country, I gave it to Mr. Horace Walpole, and I suppose it is in his cabinet at Strawberry Hill." Such picture-writing as that of the Egyptians, the Peruvians, the Tartars and the Red Indians, was also to be found nearer home. Pownall thought that the Druids who came to Great Britain were missionaries who brought with them the cult and the picture-writing which had arisen to the east of the Mediterranean. He describes himself as having been, so far as he knew, the first person to discover an inscription in the "Irish pyramid or barrow at New Grange."[1] That inscription he believed to be on a fragment of something much older than the barrow;

[1] A note here refers to p. 258, vol. ii. of the *Archæologia*.

after careful study of it he wrote that he was convinced "the characters were numerals in Phœnician or Ethiopian elements."

Besides these papers on primitive speech and writing, there is in this volume another on the chariots of the ancients.[1] By collation of passages in Homer a distinct idea is obtained and a drawing is given, of these chariots, used as cavalry weapons at the siege of Troy much as Norman Ramsay charged with his Horse Battery in the last extremity at Fuentes d'Onoro in 1811. The manner in which the horses were harnessed is also illustrated. Xenophon[2] is quoted to shew how they were bitted and driven.

As the British island was, in the very early ages of antiquity, planted by colonies from the great commercial nations in the eastern parts of the Mediterranean sea, so the learning and arts of this polished people were planted in this land. The astonishing monuments of the Druids, who were the priests of those colonies, are proofs of a knowledge in mechanics which we of this enlightened day only wonder at but are at a loss to account for.

Diodorus[3] is quoted as having said expressly that the Britons used chariots exactly in the old manner of the Trojan war, and reference is made to a passage in Cæsar to the same effect.[4] Mention is made of the manège by which the yoked horses and their drivers were practised in wheeling, like cavalry in fours, to deliver a flank attack on a line of spearmen formed to receive the enemy in front. Stonehenge is said to have had near it a tract of ground laid out for the chariot races in which these evolutions were practised; other similar courses or hippodromes are said to have been at that time traceable at Royston, at Dorchester, on the banks of the river Lowther in Cumberland, and at Rawdikes (a corruption of the old word Rheaaqua), a mile south of Leicester.

While Pownall was occupied with these antiquarian pursuits the King had at last been compelled to part with Lord North, whose administration was succeeded in March 1782 by a new one under Lord Rockingham. In May

[1] A note mentions that in 1771 this treatise was communicated by Pownall to R. Berenger, Gentleman of the Horse to the King, by whom it was first published in his *History and Art of Horsemanship*.

[2] 444 B.C. [3] 8 B.C.

[4] The 4th Book, 24th Chapter of the *Gallic War*, "concilio Romanorum cognito," etc.

the independence of the United States was recognised by England, and the rest of the year was occupied in negotiations for peace. While these were going on Pownall wrote to Franklin from Richmond on July 5, forwarding copies of the memorials already described as written in 1780 and 1782. The parcel was taken by a Mr. Hobart, who appears to have been charged with negotiations. Of him Pownall spoke highly, "he will do everything a man of honour ought to do and nothing a man of honour ought not to do." To Franklin Mr. Hobart would convey as much of Pownall's thoughts as could properly be imparted to one who, though an old friend, was the Minister of a people still at war with England. "May God send peace on earth; I hope among the general blessings it may bring it will restore me to the communication and enjoyment of my old and valued friendship with you. May you live to see and have health to enjoy the blessings which I hope it may please God to make you the instrument of communicating to mankind."[1] The Americans proved as tired of their French allies as Pownall had said they were in that Memorial to the King which had been rejected at the end of the previous year; they made terms on their own account with England, and left France and Spain to follow suit.

1783

By January 1783 all the countries which had taken part in the war were agreed. The peace then made established the place of the United States among the nations. Having already addressed a treatise to the Sovereigns of Europe, and another to the King of England under the title of *Memorials*, Pownall celebrated the end of the war by using the same term again for

A MEMORIAL ADDRESSED TO THE SOVEREIGNS OF AMERICA.

This consists of 143 octavo pages addressed to the people of the United States. He who had struggled so long to defend his countrymen abroad against oppression, who had so many friends among them, and who had been

[1] *Works of Benjamin Franklin*, 1840, Jared Sparks, ix. p. 355.

almost alone in announcing their future importance, may well have been pleased at seeing his predictions verified. And this all the more because the line he had taken for the last twenty years had not only ruined his career, but exposed him to ridicule from the English authorities. He takes occasion to mention here that the speeches he made on December 2, 1777, when he attacked the whole House of Commons, and on March 17 of the next year, when he explained why he had done so and that the King would not accept Franklin's overtures, had resulted in his being "called by the Wise Men of the British Cabinet a *Wild Man* unfit to be employed." He adds that this impression of him had been deepened by the publication of his first Memorial, that to the Sovereigns of Europe in 1780, which set forth the necessity of reckoning in future with the United States as a Great Power.

> This truth was at first treated as unintelligible speculation, it was neglected where it was not rejected, but in general it was rejected as inadmissible. By degrees it entered into the reasoning of many an individual, and when it was in various translations expanded in Europe, it was found insensibly to have mixed itself with the sentiments of many a statesman, and at length reached the ear and penetrated the heart of some sovereigns—lastly those of the Ministers and Sovereign of Great Britain.

When a man has had to spend twenty years in watching his opinions derided, and at last events prove that he had all along been on the right track, he would be more than human if he did not give way to some degree of excitement. This Treatise shews marks of that feeling. The title appears too high flown, to address the farmer or fisherman of New England as a "Sovereign" is more than he would look for. The greater part of the book is aimed far over the heads and beyond the comprehension of the bulk of the people for whom it was written. It is overloaded with long Latin quotations, and a note says that the author came very near giving two pages from Dionysius in Greek. These, however, he translates. Frequent references are made to the early Greek and Roman republics and their constitutions, with which the new one of the United States is compared to its advantage. This is treated in a quite utopian manner on the assumption that every American is and will be a perfectly

disinterested person, who will always consider the interests of the commonwealth in preference to his own, and that American politics will be absolutely pure. That they have not proved so is shewn by the great number of Americans of the upper classes who stand aloof from public affairs, because they object to being bracketed with the professional politician whose calling and methods they do not admire. Though allowance must be made for the above-mentioned disturbing influences under which it was written, and also for the fact that hardly any writer of many books maintains the same standard throughout, it must be admitted that this one is disappointing. If Pownall had followed his usual custom, and taken time to overhaul his manuscript thoroughly before he sent it to the printers, he might have brought it up to his average level. The same idea is often repeated, and redundant forms of expression are used, all of which he could have put right if he had not been over eager to publish. But while this book appears to have been hurriedly, and therefore imperfectly written, some points in it are worth notice.

As to the United States some apprehension is shewn lest trouble should arise from conflict between the interests of an individual State and those of the whole community as represented in Congress. It is asked what would happen

> if on any occasion the Delegates of a particular State, being in a minority on any question, the State who sent those Delegates should think that Congress had exceeded the powers with which it is invested, or had mistaken and not acted conform to them, and should therefore withhold the *consensus obedientum*?

The flaw here noticed immediately on the promulgation of the American Constitution has already caused some international complications, and may hereafter cause more.[1]

[1] Any other Power is bound by a treaty it makes with Congress, and is entitled to consider the obligation thus formed equally binding on the whole of the United States. But if any individual State refuses to recognise locally what Congress has accepted generally, not only is Congress, the supreme authority, set at nought, but the foreign Power has a *casus belli* if it chooses to press for fulfilment of the treaty.

The recent refusal of California to carry out the terms of a treaty respecting immigration to the Pacific Coast from the Far East is a case in point: one that has required very careful handling and that is not finished with yet. To the same insistence on State rights as opposed to those of the whole country was due the American Civil War, which broke out some eighty years after Pownall had here pointed out that something of the kind might happen.

The possibility of other trouble befalling the new country from another cause he was also aware of. "The slaves whom Providence hath suffered to come under their dominion may work out, by proper means and in suitable time, their liberty." He was not in favour of any sudden measure of emancipation such as that by which England afterwards ruined her West India Islands, or the decree of Congress which five-and-forty years ago placed the "coloured man" legally on a footing of equality with the white man, though the former has never since then had it accorded to him in daily life. But it is urged in this paper that each State by its own legislation, adapted to its own conditions, might gradually deal with the problem. That while it might be proper "to exclude the coloured Liberti from a capacity of holding any landed property other than as tenants," they might gradually be allowed to work out their freedom and become paid labourers and mechanics, or men renting farms. Some scheme of this kind he hoped to see carried out, and he appeals to the Americans that

> if it should please God to put it into their hearts to reason that, while they feel their obligation to His Providence for establishment of their own liberty they ought to think it a duty required of them to open and extend this blessing to their fellow-creatures.

His intention to write this book Pownall announced to Franklin in a letter dated from Richmond on February 28, 1783. With it was enclosed a power of attorney to his friends Mr. Bowdoin and Dr. Cooper, to make a gift from the writer to Harvard College of 500 acres of land which he owned in the township of Pownall borough near the mouth of the Kennebec river. He congratulates Franklin on the successful issue of the negotiations which had ended the war, but remarks that "our politicians are quarrelling, in their scrambles, with the peace, and the House of Commons are declaring themselves dissatisfied with the line which divides the two empires."

He mentions that he had not abandoned the idea of revisiting America now that it had become possible for him to do so, but that he was about to sail on a voyage to the Azores.[1] He was also in France this year.

[1] Works of Benjamin Franklin, 1840, Jared Sparks, ix. 491. In his Preface of 1784 to the *Three Memorials* Pownall mentions that on his voyage from America to Europe in February 1756 his ship had called at the Azores.

President Adams mentions that though he had not known Pownall when Governor of Massachusetts, he saw a good deal of him at Auteuil near Paris in 1783, and afterwards in London, going out to Richmond to dine with him.

> He was very reserved on all the events of his administration and on all the characters of his friends and enemies. Though manifestly a disappointed man he was less dejected and disappointed than most men I have known in such circumstances. The loss of his wife affected him most.[1]

Before we leave 1783 one more short piece of Pownall's literary work claims notice.

THE CONDUCT AND PRINCIPLES OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.[2]

This occupies six large quarto pages, into which small compass an outline of the early constitutional history of England, and the part which Walpole played in his day, are condensed. It traces the origin of elected popular Assemblies, expressing and acting on the will of the people, to the Saxons. They wished, it is said, to be governed constitutionally instead of being ruled legally. The Norman Kings, who came in as chiefs of a conquering race, brought with them the method of personal rule which they are described as having enforced more and more rigidly till they were forced to concede Magna Charta. That is defined as formulating the restoration of old rights—not as the grant of new ones as it was usually supposed to be. Against its terms, and the power it vested in the people, successive Sovereigns struggled till the contest ended with the Civil War. For a time the democracy became dominant. Then came a reaction. But Charles II. and James II. pushed the monarchical principle too far, and the latter was driven out to be succeeded by William of Orange. The Tory and Roman Catholic elements which supported James had to give way to the beginning of Whiggism under William. He and Queen Anne both died without issue; it appeared that the Tories might bring back the Stuarts with all they

[1] Works of John Adams, second President of the United States, 1856, x. p. 244.

[2] This will be found separately printed, under Pownall's name, in the *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, 1798, William Coxe, iii. p. 615.

represented—personal rule and the Church of Rome. Only a strong man could have prevented this. The Hanoverian dynasty was introduced by the Whigs, and though George I. had not the strength to hold the Tories down the work was done for him by his Minister Sir Robert Walpole, who saw the country through that critical time. Of him Pownall professes great admiration.

> He warded off the hostile designs of foreign powers, he settled the peace of the nation, he established the government by fixing the House of Hanover on the throne under such conditions as restored, perfected, and secured the constitution of his country. . . . He never suffered the foreign views of a stranger King, the pride of the nation, the presumption of military men, or the cowardice of merchants, to involve this kingdom in the foolish interprises of war.

But to do all this he had to make use, as others did, of the methods of his age; he knew the men he had to deal with and how little dependence could be placed upon them unless their interests were appealed to. He treated them as they were, and not as they might be or ought to be. He gave them credit for very little principle, for he was well aware how they would behave "where the spirit of party ceased, and how ready many of them were to betray one another or to forsake their leaders if any offer could make it worth while to enlist with others." This sharp censure of party politics comes, it will be remembered, from a man who, for most of the twenty years before he expressed it, had from his own place in Parliament watched the actions of the "King's Friends," among whom corruption and bribery by the Court had been more rampant than even in the days of Walpole.[1] Having that experience Pownall thought that the attitude of Walpole was sound; if he did not buy the

[1] Before we leave this subject, rejoicing that we have changed all that, may we ask ourselves a few simple questions?—

Did not the man of the old days either own or openly buy the seat which conferred the vote he sold?

Which is the more dishonest—to sell your own property in power or to obtain that power by resorting to what you admit to be terminological inexactitude?

Are no seats ever bought now, by manuring in advance the ground on which they stand, and by subscriptions, etc., while they are occupied?

Does the House of Commons consist of men equal in education, standing, and knowledge of the world to their predecessors?

What is the percentage of disloyal men and of faddists in the House now as compared with what it was 150 years ago?

Are we, or are we not, entitled to flatter ourselves that in these matters we can compare with our forefathers to their disadvantage?

votes of members somebody else would; he therefore bought them himself and thereby secured the safety of the country. It was cynical, no doubt, but it was business.

Pownall observed that while Walpole bought others he did not sell himself, men saw how little his gains and those of his family were in comparison with those of the country. His cynicism was justified, many of those who had been his friends when his power had been at the highest deserted him as it waned. A committee was appointed to investigate charges of corruption extending over the many years of his rule, but they could find no proof of anything wrong. "He retired not with a fortune greater than his fame."

The last statement is confirmed in a letter written by his son Horace Walpole, who declares his father left office no richer than he entered it. This letter[1] is dated from Strawberry Hill on October 27, 1783. It thanks Pownall for the vindication of the character of Sir Robert, with which Horace Walpole was much pleased. He says it placed the matter on sound and new grounds, "a great deal too deep for that mountebank Hume to go." He notices that Pownall had followed the sequence of events back to their origin, whereas Hume had studied and known nothing of what happened before the time of Queen Elizabeth. Horace Walpole objected, however, to one or two minor points in the first draft Pownall had sent him, especially to the statement that the country had treated the Walpole family shabbily; he said that on the contrary they were perfectly satisfied with their Earldom and the places they had received. Pownall altered his draft, and on November 7 Horace Walpole wrote again to thank him for doing so. Speaking of Sir Robert he added, "Your essay, Sir, will, I hope, some time or another clear the way to his vindication. It points out the true way of examining his character, and is itself, so far as it goes, unanswerable."

[1] *Letters of Horace Walpole*, 1857, viii. p. 420.

1784

In this year the *Three Memorials* already mentioned, —that to the Sovereigns of Europe, 1780,[1] that to the King, 1782, and that to the Sovereigns of America, 1783—were republished in one volume to which Pownall now added a new preface of 127 octavo pages, nearly enough to make a small book in itself. There is no copy of this in the British Museum, and it is very difficult to obtain. All that is new in it is a General Preface of twenty pages, some part of which has been already referred to. It alludes to the part which the author had himself played in the long struggle which was then drawing to a close, and may be divided into three stages, each of about ten years:—

1754–1765. Congress at Albany to the Stamp Act.
1765–1775. Struggle between Parliament and the Colonies.
1775–1783. War of Independence.

In the first two of these periods Pownall had taken an active part, during the last one he had been less prominent, but he had intervened on occasion. He says that through the whole course of events he had endeavoured to maintain his duty to his country and his good-will to the British nation "as well in America as in Great Britain." He says that from their very commencement the original settlements should have been formed as a system of provinces, governed and managed by a provincial and detached Government, instead of being left unsupported to expand from small settlements into great colonies. The whole inception had been left to individual effort instead of being organised and protected by the English Governments who, found out too late that the individuals had become too numerous and powerful for control from outside. Pownall recalls that as long ago as 1764 he had urged the formation of a separate organisation and a Secretary of State's office for dealing with American affairs. That might, he says, have

[1] This had passed already through three editions. It had also been translated and published in French, and the same had been done with the *Memorial* of 1783 (Rich, *Bibl. Amer.* i. pp. 310-317).

been able to deal with the whole trouble of taxation which arose afterwards.

As he could get no hearing from the Government he had published his views in the first edition of the *Administration*. Then he had tried what he could do in another direction.

> Whether the part which I afterwards took as a Member of Parliament be known or understood is of no consequence. Being such as answered not the purposes of any party of men, it rendered not only my conduct but myself of no consequence in my native land. . . . I have repeatedly gloried in this my state of insignificance. Upon the winding up of the late great revolution in the Empire I enjoy from hence a more real and solid happiness than all the emoluments and honours of Government could create in me.

Then he alludes to what passed in the autumn of 1774, when a petition to the King that he would adopt means for taking the sense of his subjects in America was to be proposed in Congress, and was brought to England by Governor Penn. Pownall says that his American friends had informed him of what was passing, and that there was a possibility then of war being averted if both parties

> would but agree *to look for grounds of agreement*. . . . I endeavoured *to open the way to those grounds*, and would have undertaken to find *my way* to them. I had communication with a Minister who had not the power of putting into execution measures which he approved. I was treated with by that man, who either deceived me or himself and became an unfortunate Minister, an instrument of a cruel, fruitless war and of ruin to his country in the event and effect of it.

When this passage is read in connection with the above-quoted letter by Franklin,[1] describing Pownall's conversation at that dinner at Richmond in the autumn of 1774, we see that Lord North himself was the Minister referred to. Pownall had then just lost his seat at Tregony, and was accepting one for Minehead from Lord North whom he thought he had won over to these grounds of agreement. The Government had not got hold of the private member, but on the contrary he had got hold of North,[2] and might have saved the situation if he could have kept his grip on the Premier. If North had been

[1] See p. 264, *ante*.

[2] See Lord North's renunciation of the coercive policy, mentioned on p. 271, as made on February 20, 1775, when Pownall immediately followed and endorsed him.

man enough to keep the promises he had made to Pownall (who speaks here of himself as deceived) all might have been well. But North was not one of those who obtain high station by being strong in their knees; he belonged to the other class of men who rise because they are so popular and agreeable that their being weak on their feet is ignored. On that occasion Lord North slipped through Pownall's fingers into the arms of the King, who held him fast and refused to let go of him, as had happened over and over again on other occasions when Lord North desired to resign office. It is curious to see how the weak Premier had just then a resolute man on each side of him pulling him in different directions. George III. was one of them, and the forgotten individual who has just been quoted as saying he "gloried in his insignificance" was the other. The King's position made his pull the decisive one, but the way in which Lord North spoke on the occasion referred to shews that the other pull had been a strong one and very nearly succeeded.

Pownall next refers to the other attempt he made in the autumn of 1777 to get the King to listen to Franklin's overtures from Paris at the time when it was doubtful whether France would join the United States. He says that the idea he then proposed of a federal treaty with America

> was novel, and so contrary to the wisdom of our Government that Ministers, though they dare not touch the argument in Parliament, called it in the Cabinet *a wild notion*. Not answering at that moment the purposes of party it was equally neglected by the Opposition, and I found myself alone.

He points out that France had been wiser; she took up the alliance which England had been offered and had refused. Then Europe generally became interested and took a part in the quarrel; this, Pownall said, caused the production of the first of his group of Memorials—that to the Sovereigns of Europe. As to the second Memorial of 1782, though rejected, it was not without effect. It made known that the Americans were ready to treat at the end of 1781. Pownall was then no longer in the House, but he says here "*the fact* which I authorised General Conway to announce to Parliament gave an immediate majority in Parliament to those who opposed the American War—and rendered it necessary for a

Ministry, who either would not, or could not, make peace, to retire and go out of office." Pownall appears to have felt that by prompting General Conway to the decisive stroke he had squared accounts with Lord North.

More than seven years had passed since the death of his first wife when Pownall, on August 2, 1784,[1] at the age of sixty-two, married Hannah, daughter of the Rev. Benjamin Kennett, Vicar of Bradford in Yorkshire, and widow of Richard Astell, Esq., Lieutenant-Colonel of the Huntingdon Militia, who had a property at Everton House in Bedfordshire. Mr. Astell had died in 1777, leaving no children. His widow had the use of Everton for life, and soon after her second marriage Pownall gave up his house at Richmond and made Everton his abode in the country, while still retaining his town house in Albemarle Street.

A long tour on the Continent followed the marriage; it appears to have lasted for a year or more. We shall see that in October Pownall was at Passy near Paris, and there met Franklin, probably for the last time.

1785

Mr. Cradock has left on record that on January 10, 1785, he was at Marseilles, where Governor Ellis, formerly of Georgia, came to supper with him, as did Governor Pownall.[2] He mentions that Ellis, though he was a rich man, wore very shabby clothes, and that Pownall was a great contrast to him, being "splendid and magnificent in his dress." Cradock describes them as men deeply learned in antiquities, and differing on that subject as they did in their attire. Each was inclined to lay down the law, and in these matters they both kept the uninitiated at a distance, but "our great dictators though totally unlike were always attentive to their countrymen."

From Marseilles Cradock went on to Montpelier, followed by the Pownalls, with whom he had become on friendly terms, they joining him on March 23 at a house he had taken for them opposite the King's garden. A flowering tree there caught Pownall's eye at once; he

[1] *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1784, p. 636.
[2] *Literary Memoirs*, 1828, J. Cradock, F.S.A., ii. p. 179.

asked Cradock what it was, saying that it seemed to be covered with lilac flowers. Forgetting for the moment to whom he was speaking, Cradock replied,

"It is commonly called the Judas-tree, and there is a very full account given of it in Governor Pownall's excellent *History of America*." The Governor seemed struck, and with a kind of smile said, "You are too hard upon me, for I never professed being much conversant with natural history, and as to the description of trees and shrubs that you have alluded to I freely confess that it was furnished by a friend." [1]

Another entry by Cradock speaks of the Pownalls being at Montpelier on April 1. Vienne, Lyons, Aix-les-Bains, Orange, Arles, Nimes were also included in this tour, which must have lasted some time, for at each place Pownall made a thorough investigation of the Roman antiquities to be seen, and he made notes from which he prepared a book published three years later. By July he was at Lausanne; on the 3rd of that month he wrote thence to Franklin. The letter begins by describing what Pownall was doing for the family of Evans of Philadelphia about the reproduction of the old map of America, and continues thus :—

I am told you are on the point of returning to your own country; a country which you have not only saved but formed into a State, independent and sovereign. You must excuse me when I say what I feel—that I envy you. God has not only made you an instrument of good to your country, but has given you the most supreme of all happiness in the world—that of seeing your country and all the world acknowledging your deeds.

Then follows a passage which has already been quoted,[2] in which Pownall describes with some bitterness how the corruption and ignorance which prevailed in England had rendered futile his own efforts on one side of the Atlantic, while those of Franklin had been successful on the other side. For nearly twenty years since they first met at Albany these two men had worked side by side to maintain the connection between England and her colonies. Franklin had then been publicly insulted by the King, through Wedderburn as his mouthpiece; he had been compelled to take another course, the building

[1] The book referred to is not the "History" but the "Topographical Description" of America, already noticed under the date of its publication, 1776. A note in it disclaims botanical knowledge by the author.

[2] Chap. xii. p. 373.

of a new Empire instead of the preservation of an old one. In so doing he had established a reputation, and a claim to remembrance by his countrymen, second only to that of Washington. While he was thus engaged he had of necessity been separated from his friend, who still continued to work for unity of the English race, and on occasions—especially in 1774 when he converted Lord North to his view of things—came very near attaining his object. That they had been separated by circumstances during the ten years 1773-1783, that the complete success of the one had meant the equally complete failure of the other, made no difference at the end to the perfect understanding between them. This letter goes on to say to Franklin :—

> Whatever my habitual love to my native country was I always had a feeling for the welfare of the English *nation* which superseded all local considerations. . . . Adieu, my dear friend. . . . You are going to a new world formed to exhibit a scene which the old world never yet saw. You leave me here in the old world which, like myself, begins to feel as Asia hath felt—that it is wearing out apace. We shall never meet again on this earth, but there is another world where we shall meet and where we shall be understood; and those of us who shall not have our reward here will have it in all fulness there.[1]

It may be agreed that the man who, misunderstood and unrewarded himself, could thus write what was intended only for the eye of his brilliantly successful friend knew how to bear adversity—and how we each of us do that is the test of our mettle. We hear no more of Pownall through the autumn of 1785; he was probably still abroad then and for most, if not all, of 1786. In that year only two small works of his appeared. They dealt with a scheme for University scholarships in art and with the Jutae or Viti, a tribe of the Teutons.

1787

In 1787 Pownall published

HYDRAULIC AND NAUTICAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE CURRENTS OF THE ATLANTIC.

This had some footnotes which the author says were added by Franklin when he looked it over with him at

[1] *Works of Franklin*, 1843, Jared Sparks, x. 342.

Passy on October 7, 1784. It has a chart of the Atlantic with the American and European coasts, and consists of seventeen large quarto pages published by R. Sayer. The contents are said to be based on information given by English naval officers in whose company Pownall had made several Atlantic voyages, and on what he had heard when in Boston as a young man from the masters of colonial merchantmen. Of all he had gathered in this way he had taken careful notes, of which this is the result, but it is of too technical a nature to be entered into here; and what hints it gives as to the use by sailing ships of Atlantic currents is out of date now that steamers have been introduced.

His other work of 1787 was on an entirely different subject—some Roman pottery at Sandy in Bedfordshire and at Lincoln; into that topic also we need not enter.

While on the Continent in 1785-1786 Pownall had shewn his usual industry in collecting facts on which to base conclusions, and those relating to the manufacture of woollen goods had received his particular attention. The result appeared in a book of 124 octavo pages published by Debrett in October 1787 with the title of

LIVE AND LET LIVE.

The Preface, dated April 12, says it is not the habit of the author to abstain from giving his name, but he does so when occasion requires. In this case he thinks it advisable not to give it, because he desires to discuss impartially the relations of the farmer or grazier who produced the wool with the manufacturer who worked it up. If he gave his name it would be recognised by the former class as that of one who had been at some pains to write from France giving information to the English manufacturers as to foreign methods. For this he had received many letters of thanks and addresses "which he never published in newspapers, as he is no candidate for that sort of fame." But as he had thus become known to men on one side of the question, he did not wish to be supposed to be holding a brief for them. He had sent to the English manufacturing firms samples of the wools grown and the cloth woven in France, the weight of the fleece as it left the sheep, and again after washing; what weight of cloth came from it, what the

rate of wages was in the mills, and what it cost the weaver to live.

But while he had done all this for the townsman who manufactured the wool, his own natural interests as a landowner were with the countryman who kept the sheep from which it came. He observed that there was something wrong in the condition of the trade, for wool had fallen enormously in value while the price of cloth had risen. This meant that the manufacturers were thriving at the expense of the farmer who had looked to his sheep to pay a large proportion of his rent at shearing time; now they ceased to do so, fewer sheep were kept, with the result that the price of mutton had doubled and was carrying that of other food up with it. This unseen distribution of profits had, he said, been described by Adam Smith as due to the fact that

> the manufacturer hath managed to get regulations established by which wool from other countries, from lands not taxed, shall be brought into competition in the English market against the English wool, locked up by a monopoly and lying under a load of taxes . . . to this oppressive rival is the English wool subjugated.

In the opinion that the English agriculturist had an equal right to the manufacturer and a superior right to the foreigner for the consideration of his Government to whom he paid heavy taxes, Pownall entirely agreed with Adam Smith. He compares the whole body, politic and economical, to a tree of which the "land-worker" is the root and the origin, and the trade and commerce the branches. Those branches Government might trim and prune by legislation, but there was an end to all that sprang from agriculture if that were damaged. The statesman's duty, he said, was to hold the balance even between producer and manufacturer in the first instance, and afterwards to secure advantages to our own manufacturers against those of other countries. To attend only to the second of those obligations while ignoring the first was fatal to the best interests of the community. It was favouring one part at the expense of another, and in the long run destructive to the whole, for the interests of each class were bound up with that of every other within the realm.[1] The foundation of the

[1] While Pownall in 1787 looked at both sides of the question Cobden looked only at the one in which he was interested.

wool trade is here ascribed to Edward III. who, by prohibiting the export to Flanders of the English raw material—the best to be had—brought the Flemings over to this country, where their art was learnt from them and practised by our own people. The Sovereigns who succeeded him had encouraged the industry by fixing a time limit so arranged that no wool could be sold abroad till some months after shearing time. During these months the English purchaser could obtain what he required; when he was supplied what remained was surplus which the foreign buyer was allowed to purchase. But this practice had been pushed too far. It had become the law that no wool at all should be exported, and thus the farmer was left with the surplus on his hands, entirely at the mercy of the manufacturer who could beat down price as much as he chose. This was the farmer's grievance, a very real one in the opinion of Pownall, who here argues at length for its removal by returning to the former system of giving the English buyer an advantage in the form of some months' start over his foreign rival in the market, but of admitting the latter also as a customer to the English farmer, who would thus be able to get a fair price from abroad if he could not get it at home.

Bound with the copy of this work in the Reading Room of the British Museum is a pamphlet of February 11, 1788, evidently by some Norfolk man for it was published at Norwich. He recognises, as it is easy to do from some passages it contains, who wrote the first work, and addresses this second one to Governor Pownall of whom he says:—

> The liberal conduct for which you are distinguished, the interest which the situation of some of your property gives you in the subject of the following sheets, and your well-known pursuit of such inquiries as are nearly connected with the good of the community which, in times of political danger, you have been forward to protect,

had caused him to study this subject.

CHAPTER XIV

LITERATURE—LAST YEARS—DEATH

1788–1805

During his long stay in France Pownall had not only studied the wool industry, but he had been busy investigating the relics of Roman rule in that country. In 1788 John Nichols of Red Lion Passage in Fleet Street published for him a book of 209 quarto pages—

NOTICES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PROVINCIA ROMANA OF GAUL[1]

In the preliminary remarks the provinces of Provence, Languedoc, and Dauphine are described as being at that time—just before the French Revolution—but the débris of what they had been under the Romans. With the exception of one or two great cities the country had gone to rack and ruin, the ancient sources of wealth had been neglected, but such was the fertility of the land that there was still a surplus of provisions and wines to export. Fowls and fish were difficult to obtain. "I must in this place observe that this circumstance always marks an inferiority of land culture." He speaks of the inhabitants as living in a country full of the stupendous and magnificent remains of ancient edifices, much above the level they could aspire to emulate or keep up. Some of these, the Basilica and the Mausoleum at Vienne, the Temple, the Amphitheatre, and the Pont de Garde at Nîmes, the Triumphal Arch at Orange, he had found in an almost

[1] The *Gentleman's Magazine* of 1808 mentions a great fire on February 2 of that year in Red Lion Passage, which destroyed Nichol's premises and a great quantity of valuable books, among them the unsold copies of this work and of the *Antiquarian Romance*, which Pownall wrote in 1795.

perfect state of preservation. Little had been done, however, to describe these works either in writing or by drawings, it was "a mine of Roman antiquities scarcely as yet opened." As for himself, he said that, as he was no worshipper of relics, he had only selected for notice such things as possessed historical interest or might serve to explain the customs and the arts of the Roman period. Before that he explained how the country had been occupied by Asiatic Greeks—Phoceans—who had made their headquarters at Marseilles, and established outposts along the coast.

Among other things they had built a Temple to Diana of Ephesus at Marseilles and another in the Pyrenees. They had also brought with them the olive, the vine, and the fig. As to the olive, he quotes Pliny to shew that it was cultivated in Gaul before it was known in the original Roman district of Italy. Cicero is quoted as authority for saying that this country had been a great granary to Rome, and had furnished vast quantities of corn to her armies in Spain. Marseilles had been in those days a great commercial state, the rival of, and an object of jealousy to Carthage. Lyons had been described by Seneca, in the time of Nero when it was burnt down, as a most opulent city, beautiful in a multitude of superb and elegant structures, any one of which would have rendered any other city illustrious. This country had been the residence not only of merchants but of Roman officials of the highest rank, including at times the Emperor. It was then more a component part of Italy than an outlying province. The Romans had known how to rule as well as how to conquer; the Pagani or colonists were occupied in agriculture while the soldiers and labourers were kept busy with the public works. The upper classes of the old inhabitants were provided with amusements and spectacles which so enervated them that they became incapable of resistance to their conquerors. Pownall described the difficulty he had experienced by being almost the first to explore this country when there was no book extant to guide him. He did not know what the objects of interest were at the places he visited, and though he did his best to discover them he often found afterwards that he had missed something he ought to have seen. He describes his book as only a manual intended to help others who

might follow him, and he begins with an account of Valence. At Paillaise, near that town, he found a Roman military column with an inscription which he transcribes. Thence he went to Orange where he spent two days; this town he believed to have been enlarged by Julius Caesar when his headquarters were at Vienne. At Orange Pownall found a well-preserved Triumphal Arch a quarter of a mile north of the town; various drawings of it are alluded to, but none of them seem to him satisfactory. He describes it as about 84 ft. long and 70 ft. high, with a central opening of 18 feet, and two side ones of 12 feet in width. He gives a sketch of the shields which ornamented it. These are divided into four quarters exactly as in the heraldry of later ages, and have a stork in the first and fourth, and what may be described as a pair of keys, warded at each end, in the second and third quarters. To distinguish these badges by colours as well as lines, as is done here, is mentioned as having been the custom of the Gauls and Germans, not only for nations but for families.



Aix is the next town described. The most noticeable antiquarian relics there had been three towers, one of which, the Tour de l'Horologe, had been demolished in 1779. Of this a sketch is given, and another shews the funeral urn within it.

To Marseilles five-and-twenty pages of this book are devoted. Tacitus[1] is quoted to shew that the Phocean Greeks who founded the city were no luxurious race, but one which enforced strict sumptuary laws. It is mentioned that emigration from Asia Minor had been forced on them by distress, and that their religion was that of Ephesus, and they had a consecrated image of Diana.

They brought with them an opinion common to their ancestors that such was the perfect purity and infinite justice of the Deity (their gods) that divine justice must be destroyed if the death and blood of the sinner did not expiate and make atonement for it. That, however, their priests could so compromise the matter that some one

[1] 56 B.C.

man, for the whole, might become a representative sinner, making, by his sacrifice, atonement and expiation for the whole people.

Arles contained the shipyards of Marseilles; it is mentioned that these were used by Caesar to construct twelve ships of war with which he defeated the fleet of Marseilles when joined by that of Pompey. Though Marseilles contained no Roman theatres there had been many public edifices such as temples, baths, and an academy, but of all these hardly any vestiges remained. This Pownall accounted for by the many sieges which the city had undergone, not only in the civil wars of Rome but from the barbarians afterwards.

He found that the materials of the old buildings then destroyed had been worked into new ones, and the sea had contributed to the destruction by submerging nearly half of what had been the lower part of the city. One column of Greek design Pownall did find near the Cathedral, which stood on the site of the old Temple of Diana. Fragments of other columns he discovered in the cloisters of the Abbey of St. Victor. Despite the interference on their behalf of Pope Gregory in a letter to Severus, Bishop of Marseilles, the early Christians had broken up all the old statues, so that none of them remained except some small figures of household gods, lamps, and sacrificial utensils preserved in collections. Of an Egyptian gem at Marseilles cut in sardonyx, said by tradition (which Pownall believed to be correct) to be the head of Cleopatra, a drawing is given.

Arles yielded more relics than Marseilles, and Nîmes, the Nemausus[1] of Roman days, was especially rich in them. Particulars are given of a bridge mentioned by Strabo which crossed the river Vidourte with four arches of thirty-feet span. At Nîmes there remained in perfect preservation the temple of the first of the Caesars, dating from 757 B.C.; the Colisseum, which is the most perfect amphitheatre in Europe, is externally if not inwardly in good repair. The temple usually assigned to Diana had, in Pownall's belief, been really erected to Isis and Serapis.

From Arles the explorer proceeded to Vienne on the Rhone, a head-quarters of the Romans in the time of Caesar, one of the most famous and favoured colonies in

[1] "The Metropolitan Pagus of the Aricomiscoi, natives of this part of Gaul. This Pagus was the head of twenty-four Pagi of the same nation" (p. 117).

Gaul, but only covering one-tenth of its former extent. The Roman remains were buried in their ruins. The sites of the Capitol, the Circus, the Theatre and the Baths had been traced by local antiquaries. Lyons is said to have been founded by the people who were expelled from Vienne by the Alleboroughs; the origin of the name had been ascribed to the Latin "Lugdunum"; but Pownall believed this to be a later term and that the first one was Celtic from "Llug-dun" the "White City," so called from the white rock on which it stood and of which it was built. Mention is made of the altar erected by the sixty nations of Gaul to Augustus in the time of Drusus. The columns which surrounded it are said to have been cut down to a quarter of their original height in order to form supports for the dome of the Church afterwards built on the same site. Except these mutilated columns and the aqueducts no ancient edifices survived.

At Lyons, as at Marseilles, the remains of the old world had been overlaid by the works of later generations, and only small objects could be found to illustrate the lives of the ancient inhabitants.

From Lyons Pownall turned eastwards to Pod-Weiler, which took the name of Baden-Weiler from its baths exactly as did Bath in England, to which town he compares it. Here Roman remains were found in 1784, and opened out exactly as was done at Bath a few years later; of these a ground-plan is given which is accompanied by a full description of the various chambers and the purposes for which they were used.

This discovery of Roman baths in Germany appears to have drawn Pownall's attention to those in England.

From this time onwards he was a frequent visitor to Bath and its neighbourhood, and he went there soon after he returned from the continent. We find him writing to Franklin from Bristol on April 8, 1788, to say that on hearing a false report of his friend's death he had been

struck with a damp upon my heart. Not for you but for myself, as having lost the last friend whom I could communicate on some points of the utmost importance to the liberty of man. I believe that I am the only one now left on this stage of life of those Commissioners who met at that Congress in Albany in 1754 . . . How long I am to continue after these is of very little consequence to myself or to the world, as I now stand unconnected with it and its affairs.

He proceeds to say what he had done, at Franklin's request, in studying the republican Constitution of Switzerland while he had been there. He then expresses some dislike of the "orbit of four years period" which Franklin had prescribed for the Presidency of the United States in their Constitution. He asked what would happen if a man well adapted to hold that office in quiet times had been elected while peace prevailed and had to guide the country in time of war. Another kind of Chief of the State was wanted then, but he could not be appointed unless the actual holder of the office resigned to make way for him. Such self-negation was much to ask for, but otherwise disaster might befall the country, because it was in the hands of one unsuited to the work to be done.[1]

1789-1793

We now come to a period of five years during which it appears at first sight that Pownall had ceased to occupy himself with writing for publication. This had been his occupation — coupled with Parliamentary work during the fourteen years he was in the House of Commons— ever since the appearance of the first edition of the *Administration* in 1764, with the sole and notable exception of the time during which Junius was doing the same thing. It is evident however that though after the publication of the *Provincia Romana* in 1788 it was long before anything else of importance appeared he was not idle; on the contrary he was busy during these five years in revising and expanding some of his former writings on the subjects which most interested him— Topography, Political Economy, and the early History of the human race. Books about them appeared almost simultaneously at the expiration of these years which he had obviously spent in their preparation. Being now seventy years of age he was going through his old papers and putting his views in final shape before it was too late to do so. During that interval he occasionally allowed some fresh topics to divert his attention from the

[1] *Works of Benjamin Franklin*, 1840, Jared Sparks, x. p. 342.

revision of the old ones. Thus in 1789 he wrote two papers, one on the origin of Gothic Architecture, the other on Ancient Painting in England.[1]

The storming of the Bastille in July of that year had not only convulsed France but disturbed all international relations; no one knew what it might lead to. It has been mentioned that seven years previously Pownall had predicted that the war in America would be the forerunner of others in Europe, and had then put his finger on France as the country in which they would probably begin. This forecast had proved correct. Though he had turned his back on politics the welfare of England was ever present to his mind, and of the importance to her of a good understanding with her former colonies he was convinced. He wrote from Bath on May 7, 1790, to Mr. Pitt, then at the height of his power, to urge the advisability of losing no time in forming an alliance with the United States in order to strengthen England in advance, so that she might have that to fall back upon when drawn into the European complications which the disturbances in France were sure to entail. That agreement, Pownall said, had better be made quietly. If Mr. Pitt wished it to be undertaken, the gentleman whom Pownall introduced to him in this letter was mentioned as one well qualified for the purpose, who could be trusted not to commit the Government in any way.

On August 6 he wrote another letter to Mr. Pitt warning him against the revolutionary Tom Paine, who had written the pamphlet called "Common Sense." Paine is spoken of as having made trouble in America and afterwards in Paris; he is said to have lately come over to England, a country which he hated, probably for the same purpose. Mr. Pitt is here put on his guard, not only against this man but against Spain, a country described as having supported England's enemies in the last war and likely to do so in the next one. A M. Miranda is mentioned as able to inform Mr. Pitt that before Spain joined France in supporting the Americans by arms she had given them financial assistance before she declared war with England. Of his own knowledge Pownall could tell Mr. Pitt that in 1781 the Spanish

[1] *Archæologia*, ix. pp. 109 and 141.

Governor of the Havannah had not only urged Count de Grasse to sail from the West Indies to assist in the capture of Cornwallis, but had presented the French Admiral with £350,000 to enable him to do so.[1] Of Pownall's work in 1791 no record remains; in 1792 he published an account of some sepulchral antiquities at Lincoln.[2] 1793 was a blank year.

1794

In 1794 he produced two large maps, each in four sheets, which, when put together, measure 48 by 41 inches. One of them gives the whole of America, both North and South, the other only gives North America, but on a larger scale, and includes the Isthmus of Panama and the West India Islands. This may be regarded as an extension of the map by Evans, to the reproduction of which Pownall had contributed in 1776. While Evans's map had shewn nothing north of the St. Lawrence, this includes Canada with James Bay and Labrador. On the West Evans had included the Ohio country, but had stopped short of the Mississippi. Pownall gives that and the country beyond it as far as the Rocky Mountains in the north-west and the Gulf of California in the south-west. Since the Evans map of 1776 was made the United States had become independent, their boundary with Canada is shewn as determined by the Treaty of 1783. We also see the Mississippi coloured as the boundary in the west between the United States and the great French province of Louisiana which, with New Mexico, the property of Spain, covered all the western prairies. From the sources of the Rio del Norte, that is from the present States of Utah and Colorado, everything to the southward is coloured as Spanish territory. The northern portion of it formed a barrier between the United States and the Pacific coast. In the reproductions of small-scale contemporary maps which have been given in preceding chapters of this book it will be observed how North American territories were described by the names of the Red

[1] Both these letters to Mr. Pitt are in the R.O., *C.C.* vol. clxviii.
[2] *Archæologia*, x. p. 345.

Indian tribes to which they belonged. In this large map of the whole area the original condition of things is even more apparent. Not much more than a century has passed since the words Iroquois, Twigh Twees, Chiktacheeks and Mascoutens were written across what are now the States of Michigan, Indiana and Illinois (which includes the great city of Chicago), as the only possible description of those territories. The map is dated May 12, 1794, and was published by Laurie and Whittle of Fleet Street.

1795

At the end of this period of apparent inaction no less than four books came from Pownall in this year. One of them,

INTELLECTUAL PHYSICS,

is a large volume of 255 quarto pages, printed by R. Cruttwell of Bath in 1795. An advertisement subsequently written says that some copies were then submitted to personal friends, who advised that publication should be deferred. They thought men's minds were so occupied with the problems raised by the French Revolution that it would be better to postpone the raising of additional speculation and theories till things had quieted down. It was therefore not till 1801 that this book was made public. A *Treatise on Old Age* was then added to it, which will be noticed when we come to that year. These *Intellectual Physics*, comprising as they do a philosophical investigation of self-consciousness, another on the power of human perception, a third on the unity of human existence and its future continuity in space, a fourth on the unity of the infinite Eternal, and more essays of the same nature, are subjects too abstruse to enter into here. It will be as much as we can do to follow him in

AN ANTIQUARIAN ROMANCE,

an octavo book of 193 pages, published by John Nichols of London. A preface, signed by Pownall at Everton

House on November 1, 1793, explains that though it seemed odd that he (who took antiquarian research very seriously because it threw so much light on current events) should use the word "Romance" in connection with it, there was in all ancient history an element of romance. The facts were few and scattered like the fragments of some old piece of architecture which might be put together by a really skilled hand, but even then needed something to keep them in place. In history the romance was the bead-roll on which the disjointed facts were strung. "As of architecture so in history, for the nature of man has its proportions and orders. I believe that the fact coincides in this position in most histories, Grecian, Roman, and Barbarian. They are a patchwork of scattered fragments of facts put together according to those proportions and orders." He further explains that this book is intended to supplement his *Study of Antiquities* published in 1782 which had dealt only with a part of the question, though the preface had described and given a syllabus [1] of the remainder as it now appeared.

In order to deal with what Pownall wrote on this subject as a whole, this preface of 1782, and a still earlier treatise of 1770,[2] will be included in the following précis. Any one learned in such matters who may read it is asked to dismiss from his mind all that he knows of the great discoveries made during the last century in Crete, Egypt, and Asia Minor, and to regard what follows merely as an attempt to explain the views held long ago by a man who put them on paper in the first half of the reign of King George III. Pownall's *Study of Antiquities* had taken its reader back to the beginning of European civilisation. He had traced this to the settlement in Phrygia, and the subsequent expansion westward, of a wandering tribe of unknown origin which possessed higher attainments than the people among whom it had established itself. In this book and the above-mentioned treatise he goes still further, and in more detail, into the past. He attempts to get at the back of civilisation by describing the very

[1] P. xvii, Table of Contents.

[2] "On a Sepulchral Monument at New Grange near Drogheda," 1770, published in the *Archæologia* of 1773, ii. pp. 236-275.

earliest development of mankind into separate races, and by shewing what kind of people they were and how they differed in their customs and manner of life from each other. Such men as Dean Buckland, the creators of the modern science of geology, were still unborn when Pownall wrote in 1776 that the Bible narrative was confirmed by the evidence of nature. He thus expressed himself:—

> Viewing this earth as it is, not as learned theorists suppose it should have been or was when first made. . . . I can, as I persuade myself, trace it through every progress of its changing existence. From the manner in which the land hath been continually increasing upon the waters of the globe from its first appearance I traced back my ideas to the viewing it in the first stage of its existence as a mere globe of mud . . . this globe, then an aqueous planet, was the proper habitation for the inhabitants of that element only. That in time as the planet, in the natural and ordinary operations of the power of nature, directed by the Great Creator, dried the land appeared.

Then follows a comparison of this natural sequence with the account in Genesis of the origin of the firmament. That is said to precisely coincide with the workings of nature which produced vegetation first and animal life after, marine in the first instance and culminating when

> the human race was brought into being, at first a mere sylvan animal of the woods. . . . He dwelt in a paradise and did not work the land nor gain his food by the sweat of his brow. That was (as we are taught) a curse which he afterwards entailed upon himself, through an ambition of being wise above what was ordained for him. Thus say the Indians that we landworkers take a deal of pains to spoil a good world.[1]

In his more recent works now under notice Pownall speaks of the Red Indian type, men who lived the forest life and did not cultivate the soil, as the original inhabitants of the earth. He had watched the gradual expulsion of the Red Indians by the European settlers who cultivated the ground and built houses, and he believed that this was exactly what had happened to their prototypes in Western Asia in the earliest ages. There also what he calls the "landworker" had established himself and driven out the man of the forests. In this connection he quotes Isaiah as to "the land of

[1] *Topographical Description of North America*, 1776, T. Pownall, p. 31.

the Chaldeans. This people was not till the Assyrians founded it for them that dwell in the wilderness."[1] There he finds the distinction between the civilised, earth-tilling, settlement-founding Assyrian and the Chaldees of the wilderness who were the forest men.[2] This primeval race difference he believed had become hereditary, had passed through countless generations affecting the whole course of history and was clearly traceable up to the time in which he wrote. He traced its course partly from the most ancient writers, those who compiled the book of Genesis and the earliest Greek authors, partly from the relics of antiquity and the customs of burial.

He said that the landworkers of Phrygia were led by the development of their agriculture to learn the art of navigation in order to export their produce and to found fresh colonies. Thus they, who were known at different periods as Titans, Teyts, Teuts and Teutons, became masters of the Mediterranean and founded a great empire. That broke up: Thrace and Phrygia remained united as one nation and fought the Trojan war against the other portion, which included Greece and the Islands, with Southern Europe as far as it was settled. Meanwhile the aboriginal hunters, Kalts, Celts or Cymri, driven out by the Teuts or Teutons from western Asia, the original abode of the human race, had not been extirpated but were ejected from that part of the world. Like the Red Indians they had retired from the advent of a superior civilisation, into the unknown wilderness of swamps and forest. From Asia Minor they had radiated to different points of the compass, north-west, north, and north-east.

Herodotus[3] is referred to as saying that the Scythians —who were originally Teyts or Teutons—drove the Cymri from them and that the latter became dwellers in islands. The same outcasts are said to be mentioned in Genesis; they were the sons of Javan, among whom the isles of the Gentiles were divided.[4] The classical authors spoke of them vaguely as wild people, dwelling in fabulous spaces outside the limits of geographical knowledge, somewhere

[1] Chap. xxii. 13, date 712 B.C.

[2] Their name, he says, came from Chalt or Keldt, a primitive word meaning a wild country, and still to be found in that of the Celts who, like them, come from the aboriginal race.

[3] 484 B.C.

[4] Genesis x. 4.

beyond the edge of the earth, and therefore below its surface. "They called this region however Tartarus, by the name of a people and country which really existed." A passage from Hesiod[1] is quoted which describes others of them as Cimmerians living in darkness; this is compared with a passage from Strabo,[2] who said these people lived where there are but seventeen hours in the longest day.

That statement enabled Pownall to fix the locality; he gives it as 54° 27′ north latitude, a figure precisely corresponding with the Baltic Islands in which the Cymri had made their abode. Thence they spread to the west of Europe, to Great Britain especially. They were followed through the Mediterranean to the west by the Druids who were missionaries of the Magi, the Wise Men of the East, despatched by the Phoenicians who were an offshoot of the Phrygians. Pownall says that the Druids taught these wild men the doctrine of the Supreme Good, that the life of this world was an intermediate and not a final existence. They taught also that atonement could be obtained by vicarious sacrifice, and this in the course of ages became degraded to the slaughter of human victims on their altars.[3] The theocratic rule of the Cymri or Celts by the Druids began in extreme antiquity and lasted till the time of Julius Caesar. While the stronger race thus imposed upon the weaker, even after its flight, an authority which was first spiritual and then temporal, there arose commercial intercourse between the two different peoples, for the Phoenician merchants followed the Druids to engage in mining in Cornwall.

While the Phoenicians and some Carthaginians approached the extreme west from the south, some branches of the Teuts or Teutons of Phrygia made their way overland in a north-westerly direction to the Baltic, following the route previously taken by the Cymri. Wave after wave of the Teuts followed on the track of the Cymri, who had made their dwellings on the Baltic Islands, and these Teuts settled on the north coast of what is now Germany and in Scandinavia. Both races became seamen and sea-rovers; pressed in the rear by the advance of the Teuts some of the Cymri had become the first inhabitants of Britain, where they were met, as before described, by the Druids. To arrive at the British Islands these early

[1] 950 B.C. [2] Died A.D. 25. [3] See *ante*, p. 436.

navigators had to sail for many days out of sight of land, and were unable to follow the coast as was possible in the Mediterranean. Pownall inquires how they shaped their courses, and answers the question by saying that they did this first by watching the flight of migratory birds and afterwards by taking birds with them to let loose as required. For this purpose they sometimes used hawks, but usually ravens, three of which it is said that Flocco, an Orcadian, took with him, and thus discovered Iceland. This use of the raven caused it to be adopted as the emblem on the standard of the Baltic rovers, and is compared to the experiment of Noah when he let a raven and two doves fly from the Ark in order to ascertain where land was to be found.

When the seamen of the Teuts had followed those of the Celts to Ireland they had reached a limit beyond which the Atlantic barred further progress, and that ultimate refuge of the Celt became a country of special interest to Pownall on account of the relics to be found there. When he visited the Pyramid at New Grange near Drogheda in 1769, he measured the ground it covered and found it exceeded the base of the third Pyramid of Egypt; he estimated the remaining height at 70 ft., but observed that it was being rapidly demolished by the country people, who were removing the stones for house-building and the repair of roads. Like the great Pyramid of Egypt it had a passage which led to a burial chamber in the interior. In the treatise above referred to Pownall gives a sketch of this pyramid as he saw it,[1] and also a drawing of an adjoining Druid circle[2] which was being so much encroached upon by a stone quarry that it seemed probable this circle would soon disappear.

The habits of burial shewn by this and other ancient British pyramids and tumuli[3] are compared with the

[1] *Archæologia,* ii. Plate XX. p. 253. [2] *Ibid.* Plate XIX. p. 239.

[3] At the opposite extremity of the European and Asiatic continent there can be seen, in the island of Yesso, a contrast between the Aino, the forest hunter of the earliest type and the Japanese land-worker. The latter has pushed the former before him till the Ocean blocked further retreat just as the Teut pushed the Celt in our part of the world. The difference between Aino and Japanese is as marked as that between Galway and Londonderry. The word "Aino" closely resembles "Anjou," which Pownall says was used by the Red Indians to denote a human being as distinguished from an animal.

discoveries of like nature by other antiquaries, and are described as similar and the work of the same race, as one retraces its course eastward, through Denmark and Poland to Russia and Tartary. Nor was the evidence confined to these monuments; he gathered it also from Runic inscriptions and legends, which shewed an eastern origin, and he found characters on Druid relics which corresponded with those in use as far to the East as China. In the Baltic both races were strong, the Celts on the islands, the Teuts on the North German coast, there they eventually joined forces and were the barbarians who moved south to overwhelm the Roman Empire. Before that they had fought perpetually with each other. The Vics or Vikings of the Teuts were the Picts who settled in Scotland, the Saxons were of the same stock as the tribes which settled on the lands in the extreme west of the area covered by the movement. Both the Saxons and the Normans Pownall regarded as branches of the Scythians. Another tribe of the Teuts were the Belgae who lived on the south of the Baltic; they traced their origin to the "Got-teus," and were hence called Cotti or Goths; they advanced to Britain on the southern flank of the Cymri or Celts and were the first of their race to enter these islands in which, as elsewhere, the distinction between them, the men who cultivated the ground and the Celts, the hunters of the woods, was always maintained. The prefix "Es" is stated by Pownall to have indicated remoteness, this when added to Cotti made the Es-Cotti or Scotti, who were thus a branch of the Cotti who had made their way to the north of Britain. Tacitus[1] is quoted as saying that the Æstui, one of the Teutonic tribes, spoke the same language as their offshoots in Britain, whose red hair and frame of body gave further evidence that they were of the same race. While the Teuts were subdivided into many tribes, some of which became nations, the fundamental distinction between them and the Cymri continued. As settled land could support a larger population in proportion to its area than that which remained forest, the Teuts increased more rapidly than the Cymri, whose defeat in the long struggle was partly due to the greater number of their adversaries. Pownall says that he had observed the same thing in America where the

[1] 56 B.C.

Red Indians were much less prolific than the European settlers.

Exactly as the American Indians have been superseded in their habitancy and driven off their hunts by the European expanding his settlements, so do those sylvan aborigines, as they are called, seem to have been driven back by the foreign eastern colonists and adventurers who came and settled first on their coasts and thence expanded, by their land-working powers and the operation of organised government, their settlements up into the interior of the country. There is, however, this essential difference between the fate of the Indian of America and the Celt of Gaul. The one has never yet, in any one instance, become a settler and land-worker, but has worn away in a languid decline to annihilation. The other, when there was no farther afield to go in search of unoccupied forests and undisturbed hunts became populous, took the forms and orders of organised government.[1] These Celts became, although retaining the spirit and form of foresters, a powerful civilised people who recoiled on those who had before pressed on them. This, according to the principles of human nature and the course of facts, in the actual history of these people, hath been the fate of the sylvan hunters of Europe.

This quotation shews how Pownall considered that what he had himself seen of the conflict of races in America gave a clue to the same thing in the most ancient times of Asia; with it our notice of this group of his works must cease. The limits of space prevent mention of much curious information which they give about the early history of mankind, but those who are interested in such studies may find it worth while to turn to the originals from which this necessarily brief summary is made.

Another book of this year, 1795, is called

DESCRIPTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF SOME REMAINS OF ROMAN ANTIQUITIES DUG UP IN THE CITY OF BATH.

Cruttwell of Bath was the publisher; bound with it are

[1] These remarks on the Celts of Gaul are hardly applicable to those of Connaught, a region into which Pownall does not appear to have penetrated. They abhor what he calls "settled government," and are as much sportsmen in their nature now as their most remote sylvan ancestors could have been. In his own person Pownall illustrated this theory of the difference between the man of the fields and the man of the forests. His blood had no ingredient of the primitive hunters of the sylvan race which he speaks of. To this may perhaps be attributed the fact that among his many interests in life a taste for field sports was not included.

other treatises by Pownall on "Gothic Architecture," written in 1788; on "Vases found on the Mosquito shore of South America," written in 1778; and on "Some Irish Antiquities."

As it fills in some details in the outline of early Celtic history which has just been described, the last of these will be dealt with first in order to preserve continuity. It was read before the Society of Antiquaries on February 10, 1774, and gives particulars of ancient objects disinterred between 1731 and 1773 in Ireland, chiefly in a small bog near Cullen in Tipperary.

Among them were two swords twenty-seven inches in length, the metal of which was proved by analysis to be chiefly copper with some particles of iron intermixed. At other times between 1748 and 1753 fifteen others were found, many of them a good deal hacked by use. As Pownall had no knowledge of the Romans having ever penetrated Ireland he believed these weapons to have been "articles of Carthaginian sale, as we of this day sell arms to the Indians and Africans." There was a fragment, as large as a gate post, of an image in black wood entirely covered and plated with thin gold. A portion of this, one of the breasts of the figure, is illustrated and here reproduced; it shews that the draughtsman's hand and eye were in perfect condition. This, Pownall thought, had also come from the Carthaginians or Phoenicians, who had a colony at Gades which was known to have communication with Ireland. Several small plates and cups of gold are described, one of them six inches long, nearly five inches wide and beautifully chased and engraved. The most remarkable thing was the gold "Iodhan Morain"[1] or breast-plate of judgment of the Irish Druids. Colonel Vallancey, a noted antiquary of that time, sent a drawing to Pownall,[2] with a letter in which he says that full inquiry had satisfied him that "Iodhan Morain" was the Chaldee name of the Urim and Thummim of the Old Testament. By a learned Rabbi in London Vallancey had been informed that none but Jews or Chaldees could have

[1] This is mentioned in Sir W. Wild's *Catalogue of Gold Ornaments*, Royal Irish Academy, as having belonged to the Earl of Charleville in 1819.

[2] From the reproduction in the work under notice it appears to have been a horseshoe-shaped piece of fluted gold $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide, 11 inches outside measurement, both in width and length, with circular bosses 4 inches in diameter as terminals.

Antient Swords found in the Bog of Cullen in the County of Tipperary in Ireland.

This Sword had been broken & Soder'd at this *

2 feet 2 Inches & ½



2 feet 3 Inches

A Gold Ornament found in the same Bog.



4 Inches ½

Profile of the same.



1 Inches ½

Drawn from the Originals by Gov.r Pownal.

brought the name and the thing to Ireland. With this drawing Vallancey sent Pownall another of the Druidical "Liath Meisicith," the "Ebn Masheith" forbidden by Moses to the Jews,[1] and known to the early Syrians and Egyptians as "Maschith." This is described as a large oblong crystal set in silver, one of several which had been found in Ireland. Another curiosity forwarded by Vallancey, was a copy of a brass coin found in 1783 in a bog at Allenstown in County Meath. This bore characters which the Colonel believed to be Syriac, but Pownall compared them with, and found them the same as, those on the Chinese copper cash, which this coin further resembled in having a central hole on which it could be strung with others.

These discoveries of special articles of Eastern origin confirmed Pownall in the opinion that the early races of Asia had direct communication through Gibraltar with the extreme West, where they had settlements in exactly the same way that the East India Company had its factories in Bengal. He thought also that the Magi, the priests of the old East, had sent their Druid missionaries westward, just as the Jesuits of Europe were in his day sending their missionaries eastward. He sums up his conclusions thus:—

> The native, or original habitants of Ireland in the first generations, took the name of Cymri, Cimbri, or Cimmerians; and in the second that of Cotti or Gothi, called also Es-Cotti or "Scotti," as being the *furthest* or *remote* Cotti. Upon these first the *Vics* or *Ficts* (in later ages called by the Romans *Picts*), who were pirates and sea-rovers, made incursions. In the second instance the *Thanes* (pronounced, and in after times written, *Danes*) made, under a different form, not only incursions but permanent conquests.

The above-mentioned paper on Roman Antiquities at Bath, which gives the title to the volume under notice, is not an important one. The preface is dated January 1795, and a note says that it was begun at the end of

[1] Leviticus xxvi. 1. Excavations made in 1901 at Stonehenge gave its date as about 1700 B.C. This corresponds in the Bible narrative with the end of the Book of Genesis and the beginning of Exodus. If this relic of the Druids was, as may be assumed, of the same age as Stonehenge, the dates go to confirm the above idea that it was one of the things the use of which Moses prohibited. The breastplate here mentioned is probably contemporary with it. Of the Liath Meisicith Pownall also gives a drawing, which shews the length to be 6 inches. A similar crystal is in the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin, Catalogue No. 111.

1790, when Roman antiquities were first dug up in that city. Above those now assembled in the public baths there is an inscription on the wall saying that a Roman frieze—one of the most noticeable things—was reconstructed by Governor Pownall. His paper is chiefly occupied in describing how he carried out this piece of work; it notices also a human head among those fragments which is identified as that of the Sun Deity, and a short account of the origin of solar worship is given.

Some vases found on the Mosquito shore of Honduras form the topic of the next paper, which was read at the Society of Antiquaries on February 5, 1778. These early utensils of the Indian tribes were made of granite. We need not follow what is said about them, but incidentally it appears that Pownall had a good digestion. Speaking of cooking vessels of any kind being an invention not known to primitive man, he says, "The ancient Scythians used to dress the flesh and entrails of the animal which they ate in the paunch. The modern Scythians retain the same custom to this day. The *Haggies* is that very dish (if I may so call it), and a very good dish it is." This chapter is of necessity discursive as it has to follow our versatile author in the subjects he wrote about, but it need not be made more so by discussing the Roman Pottery from the mouth of the Thames, or his views on the Origin of Gothic Architecture which are bound with the above. The next of his previous topics to which Pownall reverted was Political Economy, in the form of

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SCARCITY AND HIGH PRICES OF BREAD.

The 58 octavo pages which this book contains are said by the Preface to have appeared anonymously in the *Cambridge Chronicle* between July 28 and September 29, 1795. The public are here reminded that before 1770 England had grown so much more corn than she could use that she was exporting the surplus at a profit of £650,000 a year. Then had come a scarcity, which Pownall's Act of 1773 had met by arranging a sliding scale so adjusted that it gave the people their food at a price they could afford to pay while it secured a reasonable profit to the landowner and the farmer, and prevented their letting land go out of cultivation. Though it was not quite what its promoter

had desired it had worked fairly well up to the beginning of the great war with France in 1793, but since then prices had risen. Small farms had been thrown into large ones which could be worked at less cost; increase of population had absorbed the former surplus of corn, and the farmer had become master of the situation. The Preface says that every one could see "the state and port in which these families now live, and the mode in which their sons and daughters are educated at boarding schools for ladies and gentlemen." It is added that in 1794 the farmer must have made six rents at least.[1] This meant that one class in the community prospered at the expense of the others; it was the reverse of what Pownall believed in—fair treatment all round. It altered his views very considerably. He appealed to the people not to lose their heads and riotously attack the dealers, whom they accused of withholding stocks so as to raise prices, but to press for an amendment of the law which would prohibit export when prices were high. In the meanwhile either wages must be raised or a cheaper bread must be made by the mixture of less expensive flour which would save one-sixth of the cost. How that was to be done he explained, and he added, "of this we have our bread made, of so good a sort that we gentry hereabouts propose to use it in our own families and at our own tables. I myself do this." The conversion of pasture into arable land would increase the corn-growing area,[2] which might be further enlarged by the cultivation of waste and the draining of drowned lands such as those of Cambridgeshire. But he added that if "presumptuous men, who entitle themselves engineers,"[3] are employed, they would bar up the outfalls instead of improving them, and this he had recently seen done at the Eau Brink Cut. When prices were low he thought that the farmer should continue to receive a bounty from the State to encourage him in his outlay on such works. While he would thus increase the supply, he wished to prevent any export taking place unless there were really more corn than the

[1] Three rents were the old standard for the gross produce of a farm. One to be paid to the landlord, another to remunerate the tenant for his labour and give him interest on capital invested, the third to be spent on the land and maintain its fertility.

[2] Since Cobden's time the exact opposite has happened, a great part of the arable land has been converted into pasture.

[3] Of the engineering profession he does not appear to have had a high opinion.

country itself needed. He alluded to one way in which the food supply was then diminished by the use of hair powder, and says that he remembers on one occasion it being mentioned in the House of Commons that "every member had at least the flour of a half-penny roll on his head. Sir Fletcher Norton, the then Speaker, sitting in the chair, said aside, 'If that be the case I must have a peck loaf in this bushel of wig which I wear.'"

He goes on to say that great cities, such as London, Exeter, and Bristol, might establish depôts as reservoirs of food to prevent prices being raised to the detriment of the public in times of scarcity by private individuals, such as the large farmers and dealers. He added that if neither this nor his other proposals sufficed to meet the case, "Government must go into a total change of our corn trade and corn laws . . . and this must be done by the regulations of importation, as to the entries and duties and the warehousing of foreign corn, so as to render our market a free mart." It will be observed that he looked forward to duty being still levied on imported food, "which comes loaded with the charges of commission, with the expenses of long carriage and freight," and also that he was quite in favour of giving a bounty to the English farmer. But if, while receiving this, he could no longer supply the people with their food at a reasonable price, or if he took advantage of the war to raise the price to them, their being properly fed became the chief duty of the Government, and it ought, in Pownall's opinion, to be their first care. Half a century after this pronouncement of 1795 Cobden was advocating the same action, but with this important difference that he left the agriculture of England entirely out of his calculations, and thereby went far to destroy it.

1801

Except for a letter which he addressed to Mr. Pitt on November 28, 1799,[1] again urging the alliance with America which he had suggested in 1790 both in writing and verbally, we have no trace of Pownall's occupations from 1795 to 1801, when his above-mentioned book on *Intellectual Physics* was at last published. In some copies of it were included his

[1] R.O., *C.C.*, vol. clxviii.

TREATISE ON OLD AGE.

This is in the form of a letter of 45 quarto pages, addressed to Fawkener,[1] the son of his first wife by her first marriage. As the writer was now in his eightieth year, he was qualified to discuss the subject. He compares human life to a voyage; and says of himself, "I have now at length finished my passage and made land, and although I am not yet got into port I am anchored in harbour." He owns that though men ought to look back from that refuge on the conflicts of life as matters with which they had no further concern, the theory was sometimes difficult to reduce to practice. Sometimes he did not feel worn out at all; the bitterness of his failure to achieve success in his Parliamentary life had by now been dulled by time.

> I can venture to say it to you who know me and the course of my life, I was no more tired of the world at the time of my retreat than in any other period of my life. I enjoyed it as much as any one, and had as much activity in it as any of my neighbours. I had no quarrel with it, I had no complaints to make of my fate and fortune in it. If I did not obtain every object which ambition, avarice or vanity set out in pursuit of, yet I had more success than in any reason I could have expected.

But as he counted the years which had gone he had been compelled when he was sixty to realise that he was an old man from whom no more work was expected or desired. So he then "took his private station with a decided choice which no regret has for a moment disturbed. I have long maintained it with unabated spirits and unclouded mind." The way in which he had filled up his time during those twenty years had, he said, been often envied by Fawkener himself, a much younger man who had prospered in life. As to means, he had enough for his wants; "enough and a little more" was what most people sought for and he had wished for himself in his day. But he found "enough and a little less" answered every purpose, for when a man quitted active life he left many expenses, servants and carriages, for instance, behind him. He did want to feel that what he had was safe, and in that revolutionary period he had his doubts about this. "If these horrid times reduce us to a poverty which

[1] Mentioned as Captain Fawkener by Pownall in his letter of May 9, 1769, to Dr. Cooper of Boston.

deprives us of those comforts which, though perhaps not necessary, have been engrafted in the habits of our life, we must learn, at least we must try, to wean ourselves from such objects as our circumstances no longer allow." Having said so much of the physical condition of old age, he turned to the state of the mind. Some support for that also was necessary. If a man while in his strength had taken up some interests which he could still pursue as he got older, he would find them of great value. They would keep him from ennui, which he called "the ache of growing vacuity." But as the brain, like the body, became less active as time passed, it was too much for a man to expect of himself that he should be able to begin new interests after his work in life was done. To read about politics he found but tame after the active part he had taken in them; gardening helped some old men, but he himself had never studied this and could not now begin to do so. Travels and voyages it still interested him to read, but what suited him best were the problems of human existence and the study of them in the remote past, especially in their connection with antiquarian objects.

As to the round of so-called amusements he was tired of them. "Instead of feeling any pain of deprivation in the loss of the world's society any one who has lived in what is called the world will have acquired a full surfeit of company and of common visiting. He will have had his fill of the common conviviality of table society." Dinner parties, and what are called entertainments, being set aside he could still enjoy himself among the intimates he cared for. Though with most people jokes and laughter palled as time passed, "I may hazard this assertion with you, who knew me in my younger years and know me now in my old age, that I can still play the fool, out of time, I am afraid, as well as in time." A well-preserved, cheery old gentleman he was quite content with his lot; he denied that old age was to him "that oppressive evil, that state of deprivation," which most people considered it. As for himself he was quite comfortable and happy in his circumstances.

1803

His next and last book, published exactly fifty years after his first one, is called

A MEMORIAL TO THE SOVEREIGNS OF EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC.

Published by Debrett and consisting of 148 octavo pages, it reviews the history which the author had seen made in his day. Like all old men his thoughts turned backwards, like many of them he had become prosy. His sentences are no longer clear and sharp, they wander on interminably, one finds whole pages unbroken by a full stop. But while his style had become tedious his mind and memory were clear. Writing in the interval between the battles of Copenhagen and Trafalgar, when the hopes raised by the Peace of Amiens had proved futile and England was again driven by Napoleon to war, Pownall traced the whole sequence of events back to its origin in his youth. He considered that the lack of recognition by England of the claims of her colonies, first formulated at the Albany Congress in 1754, had been the beginning of all the trouble which had come since then. He said that if at any time within the twenty years which followed that Congress and preceded the War of Independence the mother country would have met her colonies fairly, they would not have been driven into the alliance with France. "This was not only the source, but in fact the beginning, of the revolutionary events which took place in Europe." The doctrines of the new philosophers, such as Voltaire, had before that been latent, these events had popularised them and brought them into practice with disastrous results. It is pointed out that when the revolutionary spirit first broke out in France, all the European monarchs took alarm and tried to put it down lest their own countries should be affected. This interference with the affairs of another country was an infringement of the right of each nation to settle its own affairs. If France had been left alone to settle hers she might have quieted down, following undisturbed the example of the United States in establishing a republic.

France, at the very period when these coalesced Powers commenced their operations, was divided within its own government and people into various factions . . . was weakened within and incapable of making any external effort. But upon the attack of the coalesced Powers she became immediately united in the first of all principles, self-defence. The circumstances to which she was reduced by this attack rendered a military power, as a national establishment, necessary. France became formed into a military government whose constituents were soldiers, whose constitution was that of an army, and whose system was war.

Thus the weapon had been forged which Napoleon was then using with tremendous effect. Whether the object of the United Sovereigns had been to preserve their brother of France, to check the spirit of revolution, or to maintain the old balance of power, no policy could have failed more than theirs, and therefore any other would have been better. France had by that time formed what was described as a Consular Republic; that this could only be a temporary phase and would become a definite sovereignty Pownall was sure.[1] There would however, he foretold, come a time when the force of his favourite motto "Live and let Live" would reassert itself; meanwhile all the old balance of power was shattered. When the European Powers recovered themselves they would probably form three groups as they had done before—it did not much matter to England how they did this. But the new state of nations and the new forces at work would have to be recognised.

Great Britain must now commence a new system in a new era, and that system must be founded on the nature of her being, *as a great marine Atlantic State*, advanced and prominent in the front of all those Atlantic Powers which have a natural interest to form positive and permanent connections of alliance in that Atlantic system.

Portugal is recognised as another Power strongly posted on the Atlantic; she had formerly played a great part in affairs though then reduced to impotence. But her possession of Brazil opened to her a great market; in conjunction with England and with the support of the English navy she might rise again if she had the spirit to do so. Until she shewed that, she had to be omitted from these calculations. There remained the United

[1] In the winter of this year Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor.

States, whose interest it was to avoid political ties but to make commercial connections by which they might be "a free port to all Europe at large, and in reciprocity claim a free market in Europe." Such commercial treaties England had it in her power to form; she had refused to do so on several occasions, and would now do well to reconsider her action. Great Britain on the east, and the United States on the west of the Atlantic were two Sovereign States

> both of the same family and tongue, and by nature the same hearts, except where the perversions of wretched politics may embitter that sweet blood of one common source which flows in them. . . . They are by nature formed to become constituents of a family compact . . ., more natural between two nations of the same family than any artificial family compact between two courts who govern two nations discordant to each other.

This Pownall said he had stated, and been ready to negotiate, many years before, but he was now too old to take an active part. Perhaps the opportunity had passed for ever, but it was possible that improvements in navigation might link the two countries more closely together; as commerce increased these maritime nations would find their interests in dealing with it were identical. "By this alliance these two Atlantic Powers will not only command the commerce of the Atlantic but have an ascendency in that of the whole world." The terms on which they were to act should be arranged beforehand and, provided that England did not cripple her own trade with her remaining possessions or disturb her relations with other Powers, she and the United States "must be to each other a free market and a free port."

Nothing could conduce more to a mutual understanding than joint action to emancipate the inhabitants of the Spanish provinces in South America, and to open those rich regions to free intercourse with the world. As to those South American regions, "they are at the crisis of an explosion to independency, which the government of old Spain hath not the power to prevent or to resist." He counts five revolutions which had already taken place in the Caracas, Quito, Mexico, Peru, and Santa Fe between 1750 and 1790, and mentions that in consequence of the way in which he had attempted to defend the liberties of North America he had been consulted, and had drawn up a plan for

securing them against despotism on the one hand and democracy on the other. This he had submitted to the British Government in 1790-91.[1] It had been on the point of execution, but the Spanish Government got wind of the scheme and staved it off. France had almost taken it up in 1792, wishing to make it a stepping-stone to the possession of Mexico.[2] At the time this was written Spain was in the grasp of France, who might use her power to obtain the cession by Spain of those South American provinces, and their transfer to France neither England nor the United States could tolerate. If New Spain were to leave old Spain as New England had left old England, it must be on the same system of independence, and to the establishment of this it would be justifiable to contribute, provided it were done disinterestedly. France, if she acted, would do so for her own interest, and therefore it was the common interest of England and the United States to block her action and prevent her obtaining such power on the Atlantic, by the possession of South America, as she already had on the continent of Europe.[3]

There was another thing, Pownall said, which would some day or other give trouble. "The negro people who, *serius aut citius*, will be masters of all the West India Islands." They already vastly outnumbered their masters, and as more and more of them were taken across from Africa their local preponderance increased. He therefore advocated a gradual system of emancipation framed to meet their capacity.

As to all these matters he wanted the English Government to act, to abandon "the mere cunning of the moment, the craft of shifting off the danger of the day." He says that ever since 1767, when he first entered Parliament, the Executive Power had feared nothing so much as the advice of experts, and had rejected nothing more decidedly. The new Government of France was wiser; it was acting

[1] It was probably about this question that he wrote his letter to Mr. Pitt in 1790. See p. 440, *ante*.

[2] Which, curiously enough, was attempted by Napoleon III.

[3] *The Life of Canning*, 1831, Stapleton, pp. 23, 47, describes how Mr. Canning in March 1823 told France she could not touch South America without war with England. It also says that in the following August Mr. Canning suggested to Mr. Rush, U.S. Minister in London, joint action between England and the United States as to South America, exactly such as Pownall had proposed in this book twenty years previously. Canning's idea was taken up by President Monroe, and led to the "doctrine" called after him.

on a regular progressive system by which it was benefiting that country.

The third portion of this work deals with the dangers which were to be expected from the revolutionary or democratic spirit of the day being carried too far. France had been mocked and cheated out of the kind of liberty she had sought. Other countries had to consider whether liberty might not degenerate into licence and cause the dissolution of the community affected. The fate of France had shewn that the lowest and worst members of the population might attain and misuse power. While pretending to work in the cause of liberty, it was possible for such men to "introduce a new arrangement of inequality of the most oppressive and despotic efficiency founded on force."

It behoved England to watch her agitators, for men's minds were unsettled. There was a restless, unsatisfied temper in every class; new habits of thought were being formed.

> A great change is taking place and coming forward; as in the spirit and temper of men so in the principles by which the system of political establishments move and act. . . . The lower, even the lowest classes of people have been for some time rising above the sphere in which they have hitherto acted or been acted upon.

The old idea of the mutual relations between employer and employed, the one finding work and the other doing it, would disappear. He saw the Trades' Union coming, far distant as it was; he said that in the future

> they will find the labourer and working manufacturer and mechanic, making claims on his employer, on his own terms and his own side of the question, with a spirit and conduct of conspiring revolt organised into a secret imperium of command and obedience, of maintenance and correspondence, by which, when they think it necessary to enforce these claims, they are always able to do it.

People above the mechanic in station, the tradesman and perhaps the farmer, might also combine to enhance prices and obtain wealth more rapidly than they had done. Thereby they would inflict great loss on the country. To apply a remedy to these coming evils seemed to him beyond human power. Those who strove only for their own interests, regardless of their duties to the community

of which they were members, would reduce society "to a mob, and putting it under the direction of mob leaders can create nothing but a mobocracy, founded on the chance of opinion, on arbitrary suggestion of will." Such a prospect alarmed him; he wanted to see each individual in his station share equally in the general progress of the country. If the government of a nation passed into the hands of a democracy which deprived an upper class of power, it would only end at the other extreme by falling into the hand of some one individual. That had happened to England when the Commonwealth broke down, and Charles II. was recalled; it had happened to the French Republic shortly before this treatise was written. To escape from the anarchy of the revolutionary period, when ideas of liberty had been pushed too far, the French had been thankful to accept any government which could command with effect. Democracy run mad was to Pownall, sound Liberal as he was, the worst form of government possible. Of the French Revolution he said, "May all nations learn from this great example, which cannot deceive, the fact as well as truth of this doctrine." Great Britain was fortunate in having a fixed constitution; it was the duty of Government

steadily and firmly to resist all artificial theories, provisional or revolutionary, operating from any unnatural centre. Maintaining on one hand its constitutional efficiency and on the other the personal and social rights of its constituents combined in the political freedom of the community. To this government thus organised, thus actuated, thus conservative, every true patriot will, *ex voto*, say—*Esto Perpetua.*

This sentence ends the long series of his published thoughts. He died of heart complaint at Bath on February 25, 1805, and a tablet to his memory in the Abbey Church records his career. By his own directions he was buried at old Walcot Church in the eastern part of Bath. His funeral was as unostentatious as possible; no one was to follow him to the grave but his housekeeper and his manservant. A childless man, he left by his will, dated March 27, 1804,[1] a life-interest on his property to his widow, who died two years later and was buried at Everton. His estate then passed to his nephew Sir George Pownall.

[1] It describes him as of Marshland in Norfolk, with estates at North Lynn, and a leasehold in Albemarle Street, resident at Everton House in Bedfordshire.

In closing this account of one long dead and forgotten, whose ruling passion was the future *Grand Marine Dominion* of his country, and who devoted his best years to endeavouring to maintain the ties between the motherland and her old colonies, it may be appropriate to quote from the poet of the new Australian Colonies:

> We tarry yet, we are toiling still,
> He is gone and he fares the best,
> He fought against odds, he struggled uphill,
> He has fairly earned his season of rest.[1]

[1] Lindsay Gordon, "Gone."

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SUPPLEMENT

SUPPLEMENT

The Colonies Under Kings George III. and Edward VII.

In the Preface the contents of this volume have been described as consisting of two portions; the first an account of the career of a forgotten individual who failed to achieve distinction, the second a comparison of the respective positions of England and her Colonies in the reigns of the above-mentioned Sovereigns.

When he arrives at this page the reader has finished with the bulk of this volume; he will have formed his own opinion as to whether the authorship of the *Junius Letters* is rightly attributed to Thomas Pownall or should still be credited to Philip Francis. But what has been written on that subject is no more than an attempt to solve an old literary conundrum which cropped up as an incident in the course of this work but was not contemplated when it was undertaken. The biographical portion is more important. If that has been properly treated the reader should by this time have a distinct idea of what kind of man Thomas Pownall was, what value attached to his opinions, and how far reliance could be placed in the forecasts of the future which he made from the causes he saw in operation when he wrote.

It has been shewn that years before the events happened he foretold several things, among them :—

The French Revolution, which he said would arise from the condition of the peasantry.

The Napoleonic Wars, which followed the Revolution.

The separation of South America from Spain, and the Monroe doctrine.

The difficulty in the United States caused by the slavery question.

The other difficulty there due to the insistence on their separate rights by individual States.

The future prominence among the nations of the United States, then in their infancy.

The necessity of Colonial possessions being free from interference by Parliament though subject to the King.

The origin and growth of labour combinations and trade unionism in England.

The coming of a commercial era in which business would dominate politics and international relations.

The future development of the English beyond the Atlantic till they outnumbered the English in England.

The marine dominion of England, and that her destiny lay on the seas and depended on the linking up of her separate component parts.

Though he died in the beginning of the year in which Trafalgar was fought, the result of that battle—the naval supremacy of England, which was unchallenged till recently—was quite clear to him. In his day he who made the "long plans" (such as those with which modern Japanese statesmen are credited, and to which they owe their marvellous success) was derided as a visionary, but consideration of the above list will shew that all those visions of his became realities. We now come to the most important question of all, the consideration of England's relations to the present colonies [1] as compared with what her relations were in his day to the thirteen provinces of North America. In doing this we may be able to some extent to recall him from that "wilderness" [2] to which he was relegated in his lifetime,

[1] An apology must here be offered to those who dwell in what were till last year called the colonies for retaining that word instead of the new and preferable one of dominions. It will, it is hoped, be recognised that this is unavoidable, because confusion would arise if distant portions of the Empire were spoken of by different names when the only difference that exists is in dates and when the meaning to be conveyed is the same.

[2] See *ante*, p. 306.

so that a hundred years and more after his death he may aid us in arriving at a better understanding with our colonial fellow-subjects. No tribute to his memory would have gratified him more than this.[1] We may ask ourselves whether the limits of political foresight by this man who struggled so hard for the Empire have even yet been reached; whether he who spoke so accurately from the point of view of his own generation may not still be found able to do the same from our standpoint? It may be possible for us to draw some lessons from the writings and speeches of this early and fervent Imperialist which will be found coinciding in a remarkable degree with those of the statesmen of England and the colonies who speak and work for the Empire to-day. The attempt to do this is the underlying purpose not only of what follows but of everything between the covers of this book. The relations between Englishmen abroad and at home are usually discussed from the financial aspect, but there are other points of view, perhaps equally important, and among them the argument from history to which it is here proposed to direct attention. It may be observed that between the two periods we have to compare there is a very strong resemblance. Given the same causes the same effects may be expected, no matter at what date. Though the outer conditions of life are very different from what they were four or five generations ago we, who are subjects of King Edward, are face to face with a colonial problem which will be seen to be almost identically the same as that which was treated in so narrow-minded, and therefore so disastrous a way by King George III. and his Ministers.

In the preceding chapters the account of how that King dealt with the original colonies was led up to by a brief sketch of their history, and in this final chapter uniformity of treatment may be preserved by approaching the present colonies in the same manner. With the exception of Canada none of the present great self-governing communities of Englishmen overseas had any existence till long after the old colonies had established

[1] "When Kings and Ministers are forgotten, when the force and direction of personal satire is no longer understood, and when measures are only felt in their remotest consequences, this book will, I believe, be found to contain principles worthy to be transmitted to posterity" (*Junius*, Dedication to the English Nation).

their independence in 1783. Before that time England had sent to North America those of her population whom she transported under the terrible old penal laws, in many cases for offences which modern justice would visit with but a few days' imprisonment. When that outlet was closed another had to be found, and then began the system of transportation to Australia which continued, to the western part of that country, till 1864. In the first half of the last century these convicts were followed by pioneer Englishmen, some of whom went to Australia to take up land and become squatters, while others, as traders and merchants, ministered to the wants of those squatters and exported their produce. There was, however, no considerable emigration of Englishmen to that country till 1851 when gold was discovered in New South Wales. Partly by the larger emigration from England which this caused, partly by the appearance on the scene of the "native-born," sons of the blood while children of the soil, the population of Australia increased rapidly from that time.

The settlement of New Zealand dates only from 1839; that it was made by the English and not by the French depended more on fortune than on policy, especially as regards the Northern Island where a party of French emigrants was about to land and take possession in 1840. Captain Owen Stanley, H.M.S. *Britomart*, happened however to be there, and he forestalled the French by running up the English flag on shore a few hours before they landed.

In South Africa the Cape Colony was not recognised as a permanent possession of England till 1814, nor did Natal occupy that position till thirty years later. Vastly outnumbered by the native races and at variance with each other, neither the English nor the Dutch had much hold on the soil till about the time when that was obtained in Australia and New Zealand.

Meanwhile Canada had been slowly developing from the small area it had originally comprised. The boundaries of the original Canada which was taken over from the French are marked on the map opposite from one of North America which Governor Pownall published in 1794.

The inhabitants were originally the descendants of the old French emigrants who lived scattered on the shores of

the St. Lawrence and gathered together in the cities of Quebec and Montreal. When Australasia and South Africa assumed a definite form in the middle of the last century Canada did the same; till then it had been a region with a possible future but of little practical value.

In the nineteenth as in the eighteenth century it was found that in the new lands white men could live and work, make homes and bring up families as well if not better than in the old land.

THE CANADA OF 1794 SHEWN IN SHADED LINES.

In each of these three great and widely separated areas little material progress was made till Queen Victoria had been for some years on the throne.

Meanwhile England had been growing fast both in population and in industries. At the time of the great Queen's accession her country had an enormous start over all others, both in manufacturing power and in commerce. The former was due to priority of invention on the part of Englishmen, the latter to several causes. It cannot be too often repeated that this country owes the supremacy in commerce—which was confirmed by the naval ascendancy by Nelson established—to the Navi-

gation Laws passed by Cromwell to wrest the seaborne trade of the world from the Dutch. Those laws were in the highest degree protective, so much so that they were rigorously applied to our own early colonies. The policy of England was one of distinct protection from the earliest times up to sixty years ago. Our forefathers made such good use of the weapon we have now dropped, and which other countries have picked up, that they appeared to have placed our grandfathers in an unassailable position. In it they felt so secure that soon after the Reform Bill of 1832 had transferred political power from the counties to the towns a cry for Free Trade arose. It came from the manufacturers who wanted cheap food for their workmen and cheap raw material for themselves. Given those things, and an unchallenged pre-eminence in manufactures such as they then had, and which they fondly imagined would last for ever, the Manchester school of that day thought they saw their way to a colossal and perpetual monopoly in buying cheap and selling dear such as is the highest ambition of those who live to make and accumulate money. If only that object could be attained anything else might go to the wall. In their eagerness to snatch advantage for their own portion of the population which consumed food, they ignored the other portion which produced it. Sixty years earlier Adam Smith, the pioneer of Free Trade, had exposed this fallacy. He wrote that one of the causes of the depressed condition of France at the end of the reign of Louis XIV. "appeared to be the preference given by the institution of M. Colbert to the industry of the towns above that of the country."[1]

It has been shewn that three years before Adam Smith's book appeared the welfare of the producer as well as of the consumer had received attention in Governor Pownall's Bill of 1773[2] which, like that promoted by Cobden, was passed to cheapen the cost of food, and how the consistent object of the originator of that measure was to ensure the welfare of the whole community and not of a section only. But to Cobden, narrow-minded though clever as he was, the fate of British agriculture and British colonies weighed nothing in the balance; indeed

[1] *Wealth of Nations*, 1776, Adam Smith, book iv. ch. ix.
[2] See *ante*, p. 247.

he regarded the latter as encumbrances which he would gladly be rid of.[1] Nor was he alone in that view. During the years which preceded the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 there was in this country a general indifference to the colonial question which did not cease till long afterwards. The harvest of old colonies had been lost under George III., the crop of new ones was still sprouting but had not risen high enough to catch the eye.[2] Soon after the discovery of gold in Australia England began to realise that she had still some distant possessions which needed attention and supervision, and the Colonial Office, which had been absorbed in the War Office for many years, was re-established in 1854. Far more important than any departmental change was the substitution of steamers for sailing vessels which began a few years later, and has drawn the ends of the earth nearer together, placing the distant colonies in closer touch with the centre of the Empire. One of the many things Thomas Pownall foretold was that the voyage to America, which in his day was one of six or eight weeks would require less time than it did then. It now takes not so many days as it then did weeks. We have become so accustomed to the new conditions that it is hard to realise the mental effort required of any one who lived under the old ones in predicting their disappearance.

In the thirties and the early forties of the last century, while Cobden was working to obtain cheap food for Great Britain by legislation, other men, whose names are less remembered, were working equally hard to perfect the marine engine and the locomotive. On the mistaken principle of *post hoc propter hoc* the progress which this country has since made is by many people attributed solely to the adoption of Cobden's doctrine. This was, however, but one of the contributing factors, and it is to the marine and railway engineers of his date much more than to him that the working classes of our cities owe the cheap food which free importers now claim as Cobden's gift to the nation. Without steamers and

[1] *Life of Cobden,* by Right Hon. John Morley, p. 32. "The Colonial system with all its dazzling appeals to the passions of the people, can never be got rid of except by the indirect process of Free Trade which will gradually and imperceptibly loose the bands which unite our colonies to us by a mistaken notion of self-interest" (Cobden's letter to Henry Ashworth, April 12, 1842).

[2] There can be no third crop if the present one be lost, for no ground remains on which it can grow.

railways Free Trade would have had but little effect; without Free Trade steamers and railways would have done much to alter the circumstances in which we live. After the Cobden era came that of Mr. Gladstone who was in his zenith in the sixties and as purely insular and deficient in the power of Imperial thought as Cobden had been in the forties. One who had less mere cleverness than Gladstone, but was as superior to him in ability as in straightforwardness, a lifelong Liberal to boot, thus described his attitude :—

> He has nothing in him of the Imperial instinct. He sees no advantage to humanity in the existence of the British Empire. He would have been glad if the Civil War in the United States had ended in the separation of the South from the North . . . He does not feel with us when we talk of our Empire as a gift from God to be used for the good of mankind . . . A Statesman who goes wrong in this hopeless way is of necessity dismissed, and I fear the Liberal Party will long suffer damage from his action.[1]

Between 1850 and 1876 responsible self-government was granted to South Africa, Canada and Australasia, but by an oversight on the part of the Colonial Office no provision was then made for reciprocal trade on preferential terms with the mother country. This omission on the part of his opponents in politics was alluded to with regret by Mr. Disraeli at the Crystal Palace in 1872. One of the earliest leaders of opinion to "suspect free imports of the murder of our industries" was Lord Randolph Churchill, who used those words at Blackpool in January 1884. By this time England was waking up to the value of her colonies, and in 1886 she was assisted in so doing by the opening of the Canadian Pacific Railway, which threw open the prairies of the Great West to settlement, and gave the Premier Colony a frontage to the Pacific as well as to the Atlantic. In the following year the first Jubilee of Queen Victoria was celebrated in London, and the occasion was utilised to hold a Conference at which Sir Samuel Griffith of Queensland moved a resolution in favour of mutual preference under the British Crown. He asked whether it should not be recognised as part of the duty of the governing bodies of the Empire to see that their own subjects have a prefer-

[1] *Life of Frederick Temple*, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1906; Archdeacon Sinclair, ii. p. 640. Dr. Temple's Letter of August 16, 1886.

ence over foreign subjects in matters of trade. Mr. Hofmeyr of the Cape went further; he definitely proposed a general tariff of 2 per cent levied on all foreign goods entering any port of the Empire, the proceeds to be devoted to Imperial defence. In 1890 a resolution favouring preferential trade was unanimously carried by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce—a sign that the old head-quarters of the Cobdenite and anti-Colonial school was becoming alive to the situation. At Dublin in 1891 another unanimous resolution to the same effect was passed by the Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain and Ireland, and in 1894 the Ottawa Colonial Conference took the same line. On that occasion Mr. Hofmeyr renewed his suggestion of 1887 and

expressed his deliberate judgment to the effect that it was highly necessary for the stability of the Empire and almost for its existence that a customs alliance of some kind should be established; that if it were not established the self-governing Dominions might be expected to turn to other Powers and possibly to enter into treaties with them which he thought would have an injurious effect.

The year 1895 will be remembered in colonial history as that in which Mr. Chamberlain took charge of the Colonial Office, which he administered for seven years as none of his predecessors had done. Some of them had been incompetent, many of them had been indifferent to colonial thought and aspirations. He, however, was full of sympathy, and the colonists soon found that in him they had a man whom they could understand and who understood them. Under his presidency the Conference of 1897 assembled in London at the time of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee. Judging from what has happened since, and the hands into which the country has now fallen, it is to be feared that on that memorable occasion we saw the high-water mark of England's prosperity. Both by the President and by the members of this Conference it was recognised that the great obstacle to mutual action lay in the divergent fiscal arrangements which had been allowed to grow up between the colonies themselves, as well as between all of them and England. Another difficulty lay in the Treaties of 1862 and 1865 with Belgium and Germany which gave those countries—and others under the most favoured nation clause—opportunities in colonial markets

equal to those of England herself. Notice was now given of the termination of those treaties, and when a year had expired they ceased to operate. Canada then gave a substantial preference, which by 1904 had almost doubled the consumption of British goods in her territory. The other Colonial Premiers who were present at this Conference undertook to ascertain whether their people would be willing to do the same in order to improve their relations with the mother country.

Two years later Paul Kruger declared that war against England which he had meditated and prepared for ever since 1881, when the diplomatic surrender of Mr. Gladstone to him had followed the military surrender of Majuba. The colonies at once shewed their appreciation of the treatment they had received from Mr. Chamberlain, and of the importance of the issue which was being decided, by sending fifty thousand of their best men to the aid of the mother country in her need.

And that need was great. Splendid as the British soldiers shewed themselves to be, there were not enough of them to cover the enormous area of the campaign. The man in the ranks differed from the raw recruits who formed the bulk of the Waterloo army in that he was, as a rule, town-bred while they were hardy country men. He resembled the regulars who were cut up under Braddock at Pittsburg in 1755, for like them he knew nothing of the conditions of the country in which he had to fight, and his training had not prepared him for doing so in open order. How greatly England was indebted to her colonies is expressed in some well-known lines addressed to her at the time :—

Sons of the sheltered city, unmade, unhandled, unmeet,
Ye pushed them raw to the battle as ye picked them raw from the street
And what did ye look they should compass? Warcraft learned in a breath
Knowledge unto occasion at the first far view of death.

. . . . .

And ye flaunted your fathomless power and ye flaunted your iron pride
Ere—ye fawned on the Younger Nations for the men who could shoot and ride.[1]

Between this modern South African War and the

[1] "The Islanders," part of *The Five Nations*, 1903, Rudyard Kipling.

Seven Years' War of 1756-63 there were other marked resemblances which may have escaped notice and be worth recalling in connection with what has been written about the last named in preceding chapters. Both were due to colonial questions. Though the modern war in South Africa was localised, as the old war in North America was not, there were occasions on which it was quite possible that it might have become only the prelude to a much wider range of hostilities. There can be no doubt that but for the overawing force of the British Navy something of that kind would have happened. It has been pointed out how loyal Natal stood in the forefront of the battle in 1899 as loyal Massachusetts had done, under Shirley and Pownall, in the old days. Both wars were fought by British regulars supported by colonial levies whom, in each case, it was the object of the enemy, working from the interior lines of an inland position, to sweep to the sea. On both occasions the war began in the last years of an aged Sovereign and ended at the beginning of a new reign. How England, after the peace of 1902, followed her old precedent of 1763 by treating the Colonists who had supported her with neglect, and plunged herself into the petty strife of party politics, scarcely needs to be stated. But it may be said here that during the South African campaigns the weakness which our system of party government causes in times of war stood out in strong relief. When it became apparent that an attack on our Natal frontier was imminent and that the continuance of peace was thereby imperilled, the leader of the Opposition in Parliament was appealed to by the Government to sink party differences and co-operate for the national welfare.

Not only did he refuse to do this but during the war every possible party advantage which could be obtained, often by distortion or misrepresentation of facts, was made use of by the Opposition. An amount of disloyalty was displayed in the Commons which would have been impossible in earlier days when Government would have at once impeached the perpetrators and Parliament would have sent them to the Tower, perhaps to Tower Hill. The Opposition openly sympathised with the enemy of the country, furnished him with information, and tied the hands of Government to such an extent that the war was

prolonged for two years after the capture of Pretoria. If the proclamations then issued had been enforced and acted on hostilities must have come to an end almost immediately. It is not too much to say that the unpatriotic attitude of the men who were then out of office, and are now in it, is responsible for the millions of money, and for the still more valuable thousands of lives, expended during those two years. So fully was this recognised at the time—though a too easy-going people appears to have forgotten it—that they were generally spoken of as Pro-Boers[1] and regarded as almost as dangerous to the country as the open enemy then in arms against it. No one was more strongly of this opinion than the Conservative member elected for Oldham in October 1900 who, as a newspaper correspondent in South Africa, had enjoyed special opportunities of watching the mischief caused there by the Radical dissentients from the Imperial policy. There was no more fervent admirer of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner. His personal obligations to the former were recognised by him in his maiden speech of February 18, 1901. He deprecated any undue haste in dealing with South Africa after the war.

> Above all things let us not be in a hurry. . . . The removal of Sir A. Milner from his control of South African affairs at the present time would be a greater blow to Imperial interests than the defeats of Magersfontein, Stormberg, Colenso, and Spion Kop put together.[2]

A few days after this expression of opinion he urged the country "to keep the present Government in power and have continuity of policy in South Africa."[3] He said of the war :—

> It has cost us a great deal of money and some of the noblest men who ever left these shores, and we must take care that the experience we have bought at such a terrible price is not thrown away.[4]

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[1] Any one disposed to think it unkind to refer to these matters is asked to remember that on the action of the group who form the Government depend not only the present but the future of the country, which is so all-important that a man trying to express the anxiety widely felt about it may be pardoned if he both claims and uses the right to speak freely.

[2] Speech at Birmingham reported in the *Times*, July 26, 1900.
[3] Speech at Chippenham reported in the *Times*, August 2, 1900.
[4] Speech at Plymouth reported in the *Morning Post*, August 18, 1900.

In the reports of these and other speeches, which appeared in that portion of the Press which does not tone down the sensational element, are to be found most violent denunciations of the Radical party which he described as containing rebels and slanderers, men untrustworthy and impossible to consort with.

In January 1901, Queen Victoria died, but it was not till the end of May in the next year that peace was restored in South Africa.

The presence of the Colonial Premiers in London for the Coronation of King Edward in 1902 gave opportunity for another Colonial Conference, over which Mr. Chamberlain again presided. Resolutions were passed to the effect that, though an untaxed exchange of goods was impossible, it was desirable that those self-governing colonies who had not up to that time given a preference to the products and manufactures of the United Kingdom should now do so. It was agreed that trade within the Empire, on preferential terms, would tend to strengthen and solidify it. In return for this the Home Government was asked by the Colonial Premiers to give preferential treatment to the products of their colonies. Upon this, Cape Colony, Natal, and New Zealand gave to British goods a lighter scale of taxation than to those which came from other countries, and Canada increased the advantage already in force. England then revived the old registration duty of one shilling a quarter on all seaborne wheat, and thus added two millions to the revenue without increasing the cost of bread.[1] This duty the colonies hoped might be relaxed in their favour, thereby giving some advantage to corn grown under the flag. That opportunity was lost in the Budget of 1903, when this import was entirely repealed, and the colonist continued to receive no better treatment than the foreigner. This may have been accounted for by the fact that Lord Salisbury, the great servant of the great Queen, had ceased to be Prime Minister in July 1902.

As early as 1879 he had described what he called "a

[1] When it was put to Mr. Lloyd George at the conference that this cost had not been raised by the duty, he replied, "I should not be surprised if it were the fact. At any rate I have not gone into the matter. I will accept this from Sir William Lyne" (*Blue Book*, Cd. 3523, p. 376).

set of doctrines that are called Free Trade but are not Free Trade" as a fetish worship, and on several subsequent occasions up to 1901 he had spoken in the same sense. For instance at Hastings in 1892 he had said, "If you intend in this conflict of commercial treaties to hold your own you must be prepared, if need be, to inflict upon the nations which injure you the penalty which is in your hands—that of refusing them access to your markets." Had the opinion of the public matured as quickly as his own, or had his life and powers been prolonged, he would no doubt have been found strong enough, when the time came, to practise the doctrine which he preached.

On Lord Salisbury's retirement it was soon apparent that his mantle had fallen on weak shoulders, the team he had driven got hopelessly out of hand; some kicked over the traces, some broke away from the harness. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was permitted to reverse the decision of the previous year as to the registration duty on corn.[1] That was arranged while Mr. Chamberlain was in South Africa. When he returned in March 1903, he found what had been going on in his absence, and in the middle of May he spoke his mind in Birmingham. He expressed his appreciation of the steps taken by the colonies to shew their solidarity with the old country, and of the fact that they were doing their best to promote closer union. The preferential tariffs of South Africa and New Zealand, as also the extension of the existing preference in Canada, received due recognition. He added that when the Premiers had been in England in the previous year they had made to him a distinct offer to concede more if they could receive in return a drawback on the shilling registration of corn. His speech demanded an inquiry into the whole subject of our Fiscal Policy, and contained the significant warning: "It is an issue much greater in its consequences than any of our local disputes. Make a mistake in legislation—it can be

[1] If the Prime Minister had refused his assent to this retrograde measure, the split among his followers which weakened them so much at the General Election of 1906 might have been avoided. It was never said, but is quite obvious, that Mr. Chamberlain left the Cabinet because he found his intentions frustrated by this action of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which the Prime Minister had endorsed. This blunder has cost the Empire dear.

corrected. Make a mistake in your Imperial policy—it is irretrievable."

Those men—and there were many of them—who had seen something of the outside world, had long understood that this country had never had the Free Trade which Cobden promised, but had only opened its ports freely to other countries whose sole reply was to continue to levy duties in their ports on what we exported to them. They responded at once to the appeal which they rejoiced to see made by one whose high position enforced attention to the views they had long held. Startled as other men were at finding that doctrine questioned in which they had grown up to believe, and therefore accepted as an article of faith, they were led to think for themselves by this speech and others which followed. Unprepared as the country then was to reconsider its fiscal system it is possible that if it had been asked to give its verdict at a General Election that autumn, the Unionists would have obtained a majority. They could not have had less than a powerful minority, and no policy could have been less successful than that which was followed under the guidance of their leader, who pleaded that he was responsible for the welfare of his party, and therefore could not endanger its prospects.

In September 1903 Mr. Chamberlain backed his opinions by resigning the charge of the Colonial Office which, under him, had attained an importance unknown before. Cutting himself free from the trammels of party, and from the necessity of consultation with colleagues before action, he took his own line and became a private individual free to act as a missionary of Empire. To that work he devoted himself for the next three years with such zeal that his health broke down under the strain, as had done that of his prototype Lord Chatham, the other great Minister who knew how to deal with and administer colonies, in the time of George III. It is to be hoped that those two names may hereafter be remembered together. Then followed two years of vacillation as to the fiscal question; it was soon evident that the Unionist Government must collapse because it had worn out its welcome and had nothing to offer to the country. When it resigned office at the end of 1905, many who had previously supported that party were so tired of its

inaction that they either withheld their votes or gave them to the other side. The great and almost unprecedented victory which the Radicals obtained at the General Election of January 1906 was partly due to this cause, partly to the fact that their leaders, who had suffered much personally for their behaviour during the South African War, had laid to their hearts the ingeniously garbled maxim that "a lie is an abomination to the Lord, but a very present help in trouble." Their trouble had been very considerable during the many years they had been out of office, which, at all costs, they were resolved to obtain. Disregarding the first part of this saying, they engineered their election campaign on the basis of the second, and appealed to an uninformed electorate with two lies. That which related to South Africa was "Chinese Slavery."[1] The other, which was used to decry Fiscal Reform, was "Your food will cost you more."[2] It will be seen that the first barrel of this cleverly constructed weapon of fraud was aimed at the credulity, the second at the frugality of the British voters, many of whom lacked the defensive armour of power to think for themselves on such subjects. In justice to the multitudes who were thus misled, it should be added that the appeal to the breeches' pocket in the second statement was less effective than that to the Englishman's love of fair play which was outraged by the pictures of imaginary Chinamen in imaginary chains.[3] From the point of view of those who descended to such electioneering methods the result was magnificent. From that of others who are free from the reproach—"What should they know of

[1] When they were taxed with this in the House of Commons the spokesman put up to reply could only take refuge in expanding the simple word used, both there and here to express it, into "terminological inexactitude." A man is hard put to it who has to invent a quibble of that kind in order to raise a laugh under the cover of which he may make his escape.

[2] No increase of the existing taxation was ever proposed by Mr. Chamberlain in any of his speeches. At St. Helens on June 3, 1905, he denied that he had done so, and said that his object was something else, "a transfer of taxation from one kind of food to another kind of food. It is not much of a sacrifice, but it is capable of the grossest kind of misrepresentation" were his words, and they proved true six months later.

[3] Of this election, which turned to a great extent on South African affairs, he who best understands them has said that "he had seen the people of this country talked into a policy with regard to South Africa, at once so injurious to their own interest and so base towards those who had thrown in their lot with us and trusted us, that if the British nation had only known what that policy really meant they would have spat it out of their mouths" (Lord Milner at Rugby, November 19, 1907).

England who only England know"—it was deplorable. The Parliamentary majority of 355 which was thus obtained, included an unusually large number of men[1] whose struggle to rise in life has been so severe that it cannot have allowed them the leisure and opportunity to study such complicated problems as are involved in the foreign and colonial affairs of this country. And the solution of those problems in the supreme court of the nation may depend at any moment on their votes which are far more than enough to turn a critical division. For, all told, there are forty-seven such members in the present House of Commons. Besides them there is the Irish Party who, whatever their feuds among themselves, may be relied on to vote solid against the Empire which continues to give them a numerical power far beyond that to which they are entitled by the amount of the population they speak for and misrepresent.[2] Of the 153 Unionists returned to this Parliament, more than two-thirds were pledged to follow the policy of Mr. Chamberlain, which thus became predominant in the counsels of the party. It was observed that candidates who accepted Mr. Chamberlain's lead succeeded much better than those who hesitated, and as to such as opposed him they had hardly a chance. At Greenwich most of the previous supporters of the sitting member, who had all the prestige due to a son of Lord Salisbury, broke away from him on this ground and on it only; he had but two-thirds the votes of the Tariff Reform candidate. With a huge majority behind them, the new Ministry could disregard their feeble opponents and do what they chose in colonial as in other matters.

Since the end of the war, more than three years earlier, the new South African territories had been under the control of the Colonial Office; the two white races there were pulling well together under the impartial rule of Lord Milner as High Commissioner, and the memories of the war were being effaced. Experience had shewn

[1] A list published in the *Times* after that election shews that the present House of Commons includes seven members who began life as factory lads, thirteen as pit boys and miners, three as grocers, four as carpenters, two as stone-masons, a boot laster, an agricultural labourer, a barge builder, a railway guard, a blacksmith, a cooper, and a newsboy.

[2] If that happens, which is alluded to as possible at the end of this chapter, these men will bitterly regret their separatist policy.

the strength of England, which had been doubted since Majuba. It had shewn also that after victory she could display extreme generosity; large sums were expended by her to re-establish her former opponents on the farms they had quitted to take up arms. There is no record in previous history of anything of the kind being done by the conquerors for the conquered. It was understood that when sufficient time had elapsed they would be treated as the French Canadians had been after 1760, when Canada was taken over, and would be entrusted with the management of their own affairs. South Africa was settling down. But the exigencies of English party politics required that the seed sown by the Unionists should be pulled up by the roots as soon as the Radicals came into office. The instrument chosen for the purpose was the ex-Conservative member for Oldham who has been quoted as expressing so strongly his opinion that above all things it behoved us to be in no hurry. During the years of Unionist indecision and decadence which followed the death of Lord Salisbury and the resignation of office by Mr. Chamberlain, this whole-hearted Imperialist had happened to change his mind. As Radical member for north-west Manchester he was requited for his singularly opportune conversion to views which he had held in abhorrence by becoming Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. He was not only welcomed to the ranks of that heterogeneous army which he had described as "a squabbling disorganised rabble,"[1] but immediately promoted to high command, and that in the place of all others in which he could do most harm. One wonders what sort of a letter *Junius* would have added to his famous series if he had been with us to witness this transaction; no pen but his could do justice to it.

Despite the solemn and emphatic warnings delivered in the Upper House by Lord Milner—of all men best qualified to speak—that it was a hazardous experiment to grant virtual independence to the Transvaal and the Orange River before the war had faded from memory, this retrograde policy was persisted in by those who had now the executive power. That it involved the second betrayal of loyal South African colonists by a Liberal

[1] Speech at Warkworth, the *Times*, August 13, 1900.

Government after a war in which they had risked their all for their country; that in other colonies there were now men who had recently fought alongside them as their comrades, and who would be disgusted and alienated by the treatment they received, mattered no more than what Lord Milner thought and said. The members of the new Government were too deeply committed by their rash utterances during the election to pause, the thing had to be done at once. Whatever might be the eventual result either to the country or her colonies it was essential that the party should neither be disappointed nor kept waiting, During the glamour of the Gladstonian régime twenty years earlier, Mr. Froude, who saw what it was leading to when others did not, had written in his *History of the West Indies*, "Either England will make an end of Party Government or Party Government will make an end of England." Is that prediction to be verified, and if so in which way?

In December 1906 the autonomy of the Transvaal came into force, and it was followed six months later by that of the Orange River Colony. In the case of the former the Liberals of England had been so illiberal to their countrymen abroad that the electoral districts were carefully arranged in order to secure a preponderance in the Assembly to those whose authority had been taken from them in the war. In the Orange River that precaution was unnecessary. All smooth speeches to the contrary notwithstanding, it becomes apparent as time passes that the powers thus conferred will be used by the grantees for their own purposes, which may or may not coincide with those of the Empire at large. Indeed there remains nothing to prevent them, on some future occasion when England has her hands full, from hauling down the Union Jack and hoisting the Vierkleur, or perhaps the flag of another country to which they are by race more allied than to England, and which could finance them and protect their coasts by the new Navy now in process of construction. Any people with a settled and consistent policy would either have abstained from draining their resources by the expenditure of 250 millions, and the lives of 20,000 brave men, on the war or, having fought such a war at such cost, would have retained what had

been won. To those who, like him whom this book has described, are Imperialists and not party men, the inconsistent and contradictory party politics of England appear at fault whichever way the matter is looked at. Before leaving this subject it may be observed that it never occurred to the Radical Government to invite the opinions of the other colonies as to the reversal of policy in South Africa, to the retention of which region under the flag they had so greatly contributed.[1] They had been partners in the business, and it would have been but courtesy, to say nothing of justice, to have given them a voice in the disposal of the proceeds. Had this been done time might have been gained for England to reconsider the rash decision of her people when they were carried off their feet by the cry of Chinese slavery. When communities so powerful and so helpful in war as Canada and Australia have been thus ignored, after they have helped England through one emergency, they must be credited with excessive enthusiasm if they are expected to repeat their action on another occasion.

In colonial history the year 1907 is of special importance on account of the Conference which assembled during April in London. The members who left their distant homes to attend it, with the object of continuing the work done here in 1902 to further the cause of Imperial Preference, were well aware that their errand was in vain. On March 12, 1906, three weeks after it first met, the new House of Commons had passed a resolution

> that this House, recognising the people of the United Kingdom have demonstrated their unqualified fidelity to the principles and practice of Free Trade, deems it right to record its determination to resist any proposal, whether by way of taxation upon foreign corn or the creation of a general tariff upon foreign goods to create in this country a system of protection.

This was carried next day by 445 votes to 118, a majority of 327. By this action England was committed, during the life of this Parliament, to continue that fiscal system which the colonies desired to amend. Our visitors were to be received at the Colonial Office,

[1] As the original policy had met with their hearty support it was unnecessary to refer to them at each stage of its execution.

where Lord Elgin had, from his first appointment, tamely allowed himself to be thrust into the background by his subordinate, the Under-Secretary, whom the colonies regarded as chiefly responsible for upsetting the original settlement of South Africa. Of him Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, M.P., the Labour[1] leader had thus expressed his opinion a year before :—

> I am bound to say that unless the Cabinet muzzles Mr. Winston Churchill they will bring themselves into a disastrous conflict with the Colonies. Mr. Churchill speaks like an irresponsible person. . . . I foresee grave discord between the Colonies and the Mother Country if Mr. Churchill is allowed to go on as he is doing.[2]

England being in that mood, and thus represented officially in Downing Street, doubts were expressed whether some of the Premiers would think it worth while to come so far for so little as they could expect to receive. But though they knew England would not meet their views they came. The spirit in which they did so is shewn by what Sir Wilfrid Laurier said at Ottawa just before he started : "We are turning our hopes towards the old Mother Land. We have introduced the doctrine and policy of preference to Great Britain and towards all the British Empire, and this is the policy by which we stand at the present time."

Those last words are noticeable ; they may be read as implying that the policy referred to cannot be expected to continue indefinitely if it fails to meet with recognition and requital.

From Canada came Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Prime Minister, with two of his colleagues Sir F. Borden and Mr. Brodeur ; from Australia there were two representatives, Mr. Deakin, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth and Sir William Lyne. New Zealand and Newfoundland sent their Prime Ministers, Sir Joseph Ward and Sir Robert Bond. South Africa contributed the Prime Ministers of Natal and the Transvaal, Mr.

[1] This term seems open to amendment. As used it implies the leadership of *all* labour in the country. But what is meant is the leadership of the hand workers with the exclusion of the head workers, who have an equal, if not greater, claim to be considered labouring men, for the work they do is far more arduous than that of the hand worker.

[2] The *Times*, March 21, 1906, p. 8.

Moor and General Botha, together with Dr. Jameson Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and Dr. Smartt. In accordance with former precedents the Colonial Secretary presided over the Conference but he did nothing except arrange and supervise the procedure ; when he might have been expected to speak he asked the Under-Secretary to do so.[1] By him therefore, and by Mr. Asquith, now Prime Minister, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and also by his successor in the latter office, Mr. Lloyd George, then President of the Board of Trade, the English case was presented on the question of Preference, by far the most important one, and that with which we are here concerned. Preoccupied with domestic legislation as the Ministry were, it went against their grain that the Conference should be held and public attention thereby turned to the Colonial question ; but it had been arranged for in 1902, and could not be avoided. The elaborate series of banquets arranged for the visitors did not, as may have been hoped, distract their minds from the business they had in hand,[2] but on the contrary enabled them, in their speeches on these occasions, to make their views more fully known to the public than the very brief and colourless official summaries supplied by Government to the Press permitted. The *Blue Book*, of more than 600 foolscap pages, which was published some time afterwards, shewed how long the discussions had been and how extreme had been the condensation in those summaries. On the English side Mr. Asquith followed Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Mr. Deakin, Sir Joseph Ward, Dr. Jameson and Mr. Moor, who had spoken for the colonies. The limits of space make it impossible to do more here than allude to their weighty arguments, which will be quoted from later. But they, one and all, expressed the entire accordance of their widely separated communities in the belief that the best hope of consolidating the Empire lay in the policy of Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Asquith's speech was a frank and uncompromising refusal of the appeals made by those

[1] His speech is not worth notice. The insults he addressed from Edinburgh to the departing Premiers are best left unnoticed. One hopes they may not be unforgiven to men for whom his position then enabled him to speak and who would gladly apologise for them. What has been quoted above shews that Mr. Ramsay Macdonald knew his man.

[2] Mr. Deakin expressed his regret that this assembly of business men "should have been so gracefully, but so absolutely, smothered in courtesy."

who preceded him. He alluded to what had happened in the time of King George by saying that "we tried to impose our fiscal system, or at any rate to impose taxation which was dictated from here and not from there, on our self-governing colonies on the other side of the Atlantic and we all know the result."[1] Mr. Asquith complained that while Australia was asking for a preference in the home market she was giving none on her part to British goods over those of any other power.[2] He further complained that the colonies did not propose to admit anybody to compete on even terms with their own industries.[3] As to the admission of the principle of Preference, even on a small scale such as Dr. Jameson had suggested, Mr. Asquith pointed out that if he, or any one else, went to the present House of Commons to make that proposal in any shape or form it would be rejected by a majority of two or three to one.[4]

Mr. Asquith's argument was thus summed up by the *Times* newspaper: "Preference will make things dearer because we, His Majesty's Government say so, and we have a large majority. *Ego sum rex at supra logicam.* This is not a question of reason but of faith. Begone." Before Mr. Lloyd George spoke he was strongly urged by Dr. Jameson to modify the uncompromising attitude

[1] *Blue Book*, Cd. 6523, p. 306. Those who have in mind what has been recorded of these events will hardly accept this as a correct version, they will remember that what first caused trouble was the omission of Parliament to consult and act through the Colonial legislatures as to internal taxation. It was not the tax but the method that was complained of. It was only after no redress could be obtained as to this side of the question that the other one arose—the objection to the Customs dues, which had always previously been paid without hesitation.

[2] She had not then followed the example of Canada and some South African colonies, but has since done so.

[3] That had never been contemplated; the offer from her colonies to Great Britain has been one not of *even* but of *preferential* terms. The latter are effectual in determining the source from which goods are imported, because in the ordinary course of business the colonial buyer will order that which he can lay down at the least cost. The even terms Mr. Asquith spoke of would do more than that, and more than could be asked,—they would expose the budding industries of the colonies to being undersold by the competition of rivals already firmly established elsewhere.

[4] This, though unquestionable, is of only temporary importance.

which Mr. Asquith had taken up. Officially he could not do so; he too had the House of Commons to think of, but he shewed that his mind was far more open to argument—and to conviction if it came—than that of the colleague who had preceded him. He began by saying that to anything short of a tariff on food stuffs or raw materials he might see his way.[1] He recognised the German Customs Union, or Zollverein, as having led up to political union between the originally separate sovereignties into which Germany had for centuries been split up and "as an illustration of a case where Imperial federation was effected and an Empire consolidated on the basis of a real Free Trade, within its own boundaries."[2] He went on to deny that he was "one of those who believe that the value of great ideals is to be measured by Board of Trade returns." Speaking of the raw material required for British industries he admitted that

> a very large proportion of this produce could very well be raised in the Colonies, and any reasonable and workable plan that would tend to increase the proportion of the produce which is brought by us from the Colonies, and by the Colonies from us and from each other, must necessarily enhance the resources of the Empire as a whole.

If this speech had stopped here it would have conceded everything asked for by the colonies or by the supporters in this country of Mr. Chamberlain, but, as the House of Commons had committed itself to the opposite course, it became necessary to change the subject. The cost of food and of living in different countries gave rise to a discussion in the course of which the speaker was rather severely handled by Mr. Deakin and Dr. Jameson. The next topic was the establishment of improved communications between various parts of the Empire. With an agreement to promote this object, the establishment of a special Secretariat attached to the Colonial Office for colonial affairs and the recognition of the right of individual colonies to make their own fiscal arrangements with each other, the Conference ended.

[1] Most of these our colonies could supply to the extent of our requirements without the cost being raised to us, the foreigner would pay the duty we imposed as a toll to enter our market. This has been constantly pointed out in Mr. Chamberlain's speeches.

[2] *Blue Book*, Cd. 3523, p. 361.

These three small mice were all that this mountain of talk had officially brought forth. The real object was finally frustrated by the refusal of Government to support a resolution that "the principle of preferential trade between the United Kingdom and His Majesty's dominions beyond the seas would stimulate and facilitate mutual commercial intercourse, and would, by promoting the development of the resources and industries of the several parts, strengthen the Empire."

Though the appeal by the statesmen of the Empire to the politicians of the United Kingdom had been made in vain, their presence and their speeches in public did much to further the object of their mission among the people of this country, to whom it had been brought home that this was not only a serious question, but the most serious of all questions, except perhaps that of national defence which is intimately connected with it. As a leader writer in the *Times* expressed himself, the Colonial Premiers had broken the back of Cobdenism in this country. Now that a twelvemonth has passed since their departure, rebuffed, and it is to be feared aggrieved, by the treatment they had officially received, sufficient time has been given to some people to consider, to others to forget, their visit, and we may review the position in which we stand in the summer of 1908 towards them and those whom they so ably represented.

We are now six years removed from the peace of Vereiniging which ended the South African war in 1902, and therefore in point of time where our forefathers were in 1769, when six years had elapsed since the treaty of Paris had ended the Seven Years' War in 1763. So far as her colonies were concerned England stood at the parting of the ways after the Seven Years' War, she had the choice then of listening to her own people and holding out a friendly hand or of refusing to do so. Unable to realise the truth of the saying that "the peas had outgrown the sticks" she chose the latter course. England stands at that same parting of the ways to-day, under the same conditions in all respects; it is for her to decide whether she will learn wisdom from the lesson taught of old, or whether in defiance of it she will persist in again banging and barring and bolting the door upon the desire of her colonies to have their wishes met. In 1769 the

colonists had waited six years to see what course the mother country would adopt, and Franklin was their agent to ascertain this. In 1907 the Premiers came to ascertain the same thing. Full of goodwill as Franklin was to England he could not divert her attention from the party questions with which she was occupied to the colonies. Equally full of the same goodwill the Colonial Premiers have had just the same experience, and they went away insulted by an official whose first duty, as the servant and instrument of the people, was to treat the guests of the nation with courtesy. An earlier chapter has described how Franklin also met with insult at the hands of the turncoat Wedderburn,[1] who was the instrument of the Court in inflicting it; and how when the Massachusetts Assembly demanded satisfaction for the treatment their representative had received the door was banged in their faces, which they then turned in another direction. Eleven years after the end of the war in 1763 they declared their independence.

If it should be fated that in this period of eleven years history should repeat itself as closely as we find it doing in all other details there are yet five years to run. Probably not more, for the colonies of to-day are guided by men quite as full of practical experience as those who were forced, sorely against their will, to separate from the England of King George III. Our visitors of last year will not wait indefinitely the good pleasure of the England of King Edward VII., if the door remains bolted and barred against them they too will turn their faces from it, they will not sit for ever on the doorstep. Their patience also will probably be exhausted in another five years, that is by 1913. By then the next General Election will have taken place, and on its result the whole future of the English race probably depends.

Before dealing with that question we may consider some coincidences in dates and opinions which will lead up to matters of fact.

It is a hundred and forty years this summer since Thomas Pownall wrote to Mr. George Grenville on July 11, 1768 the letter quoted on p. 344, and there described as betokening a resolve which took shape in the

[1] "As for Mr. Wedderburn there is something about him which even treachery cannot trust" (*Letters of Junius*, No. LXIX., Woodfall, 1814, ii. p. 244).

Junius campaign. With it he enclosed a draft of the Dedication to Mr. Grenville of the fourth edition of the *Administration of the Colonies*, which we may regard as also written in that month of July. It is five years this summer since Mr. Chamberlain opened his campaign at Birmingham on May 15, 1903.[1] It may be interesting to compare what was said by each of these men who worked for the same object—the retention of the colonies by the mother country.

THOMAS POWNALL, M.P., JULY 1768

There was a certain good temper and right spirit which, if observed on all sides, might bring these matters of dispute to such a settlement as truth and liberty are best established upon . . . I bear my testimony to the affection which the colonists ever bore to the mother country, to their zeal for its welfare, to their sense of government and their loyalty to

RIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., MAY 1903

I have read with care and interest all the speeches which have been made by leaders of the Liberal party, and in none of them do I find a frank acceptance of that National and Imperial policy which, I believe, is the first necessity of our time. . . . I confess I cannot look forward without dread to handing over the security and existence of this great Empire to the hands of those who have made common cause with its enemies, who have charged their own countrymen with methods of barbarism, and who apparently have been untouched by that pervading sentiment which I found everywhere where the British flag floats, and which has done so much in recent years to draw us together. Are we to sink back into the old policy of selfish isolation which went very far to try, and even to sap, the loyalty of our Colonial brethren. . . . I want you to look forward. I want you to con-

[1] These 140 years have witnessed the death of the old colonies and the birth of the new ones. Of the five years the first half had been wasted, so far as officialdom is concerned, by the supineness of the Unionist leaders, the second half has been thrown away by the hostility of the Radicals and their leaders. The waste of invaluable time is equally divided between each party.

THOMAS POWNALL, M.P., JULY 1768

their Sovereign. . . . The British Isles with our possessions in the Atlantic and in America are in

FACT UNITED INTO A GRAND MARINE DOMINION.

And therefore, by policy, ought to be united into a one Imperium in a one centre where the seat of Government is. And ought to be governed from thence by an administration founded on the basis of the whole and adequate and efficient to the whole. . . . How much they (the Colonists) have merited from this country, and how much they deserve to be considered by it, in order to put these matters of dispute on a footing of reconciliation. . . .[1]

RIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., MAY 1903

sider the infinite importance of all this, not only to yourselves but to your descendants. . . . Think what it means to your power and influence as a country; think what it means to your position among the nations of the world; think what it means to your trade and commerce. I put that last. . . . But the question of trade and commerce is one of the greatest importance. Unless that is satisfactorily settled, I, for one, do not believe in a continued union of the Empire. . . . So far as men are concerned and the personal sacrifice involved in risking life and encountering hardship the Colonies did their duty in the late War. . . . I believe in a British Empire, in an Empire which . . . should yet, even if alone, be self-sustaining and self-sufficient, able to maintain itself against the competition of all rivals.

It will be remembered that to both these statesmen had fallen special opportunity of obtaining at first hand access to colonial thought and insight into colonial problems, and in the case of each it lasted about seven years. Governor Pownall was in North America from 1753 to 1760. Mr. Chamberlain was at the Colonial Office, and afterwards on a visit to South Africa, from 1895 to 1903. The same portion of the life of each man had been devoted to obtaining the knowledge of the colonial question which both strove to impart to their fellow-countrymen for the country's good, not only without any personal object in so doing, but at the sacrifice of their official careers and incomes. Having seen how far the views of Mr. Chamberlain and Governor Pownall coincided, we will now put this ex-Governor of

[1] Some of the passages in this column are transposed in order.

Massachusetts alongside of the present Prime Ministers of Canada and Australia.

GOVERNOR THOMAS POWNALL, 1764

Administration of the Colonies, pp. 8 to 11.

I do repeat that there is a general commercial interest of Atlantic and American settlements. . . . This lead, I repeat it, is the foundation of a commercial dominion which, whether we attend to it or not, will be formed. . . . The forming, therefore, some general system of administration . . . uniformly and permanently pursued by measures founded on the actual state of things as they arise leading to this great end, *is at this crisis* the precise duty of government. . . .

. . . To enable the British nation to profit of these circumstances . . . it is necessary that the administration form itself at home into such establishments, for the direction of these interests and powers, as may lead them to their natural channel . . . to the utmost effect they are capable of producing towards this grand point. . . .

That part of Government which should administer this great and important branch of business, ought in the first place to be the centre of all information and application from all the interests and powers which form

SIR WILFRID LAURIER, APRIL 18, 1907

(Dinner with the Colonial Club —after emphasising the friendly relations between Canada and the United States.) But their neighbours were well aware that whenever it came to a matter of competition in Canadian markets between products of the United States and products of Great Britain, their choice was made—they stood by the old Mother-Country. That policy they had maintained and proclaimed to the face of the world. . . . Their policy of giving a preference to Great Britain only went back ten years, but it was years and years that they had endeavoured to direct their trade towards the channels of the great motherland.

MR. DEAKIN'S RESOLUTION AT IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, MAY 14, 1907

"That the Secretary of State for the Colonies be invited to frame a scheme which will create opportunities for members of the permanent staff of the Colonial Office to acquire more intimate knowledge of the circumstances and conditions of the Colonies with those whose business they have to deal, whether by appointments, temporary interchange, or periodical visits of officers or otherwise." In his speech he remarked that, "Although this new Secretariat is to remain under the Colonial Office, may I hope that it is to fulfil one of the functions of the Imperial

Governor Thomas Pownall, 1764	Mr. Deakin's Resolution at Imperial Conference, May 14, 1907
it. . . . All application, all communication should centre immediately and solely in this department.	Secretariat, that of being a free channel of the communication between the different Dominions and the United Kingdom. . . ." Copies of all these communications should be registered in this Secretariat, in order that we may be kept in touch with them.

Affection to what is called the "Motherland" by the present colonists was equally felt by their predecessors in Massachusetts, which was afterwards the prime mover in the separation in the old days. They used exactly the same term to denote this country, to which the devotion of many of them was so great that they abandoned all they had, and became refugees in Canada or in England, rather than take up arms in the War of Independence. It has been mentioned already that what is now the State of Vermont was a district at the back of New England, originally settled by such men. But their goodwill was not sufficient to counteract the disgust caused to the majority of those among whom they lived.

There are those in England now who point, not without excellent cause, to the way in which the present colonies have shewn, in deeds as well as in words, the sentiment with which the colonies regard the old country. It is then argued that there is no need to take action, the sentiment suffices. Sentiment is but cement, mutual interests form rivets of steel. When the modern architect is building a house with cement concrete he is not satisfied to rely on the adhesive power of that material; he binds his structure together by ribs and rivets of steel, and it is his example that those seek to follow who wish to bind the fabric of empire together by studying and meeting the interests of the colonies; for thus only will this fabric be made secure.

Attention may here be drawn to one force which has often shaken, and may at any time sever, that cement of sentiment which is now relied on to hold the blocks of empire together. So thoroughly had the ministers of King George learned the lesson taught by the revolt of

the North American colonies, in consequence of their domestic legislation being overruled by Parliament, that their successors in Downing Street were only too eager to hand over to the new colonies, as they arose, the management of their own affairs. But there still remains to the British Cabinet a power to interfere with the interests of the colonies by concluding treaties prejudicial to them with foreign countries. Colonial interests have often been, and still are, sacrificed or unduly subordinated, to those of Great Britain whose Ministers are apt to buy peace and comfort for themselves at the expense of the colonists. This was what happened in the old days when the restitution of Louisburg to the French in 1748 exposed the commerce of Massachusetts to the privateers of that nation. It has happened ever since; over and over again home officials, ignorant of local conditions, geographical or commercial, on which such matters turn, have arranged boundary disputes or proprietary rights over the head of the colony concerned, in order to placate the foreign Power with which difficulty had arisen. It goes without saying that it is impossible for England either to threaten or take up arms against some other country, whenever its people or authorities have a dispute with one of our colonies. That the welfare of a part must on occasion, and indeed usually, give way to the welfare of the whole, the colonists are well aware. But they also know that, if they were always consulted in negotiations which affect them, they would get much better terms than they obtain under the present system, which leaves them in the dark as to what is being done till the Foreign Office announces the conclusion of a treaty by which they are bound. At the Conference last year Sir Robert Bond drew attention to the way in which the *modus vivendi*, arranged by the Foreign Office in October 1906, had injured the interests of Newfoundland in those fisheries, to retain which Mr. Pitt had broken off negotiations with France in 1761. When he spoke at the Conference Sir Robert traced the history of this question from 1783, and shewed how often Newfoundland had suffered since then from the treaties made by England with France and the United States about these important fisheries. While this question was brought forward on behalf of Newfoundland, Mr. Deakin spoke at the

Pilgrims' dinner on April 19, 1907, of a similar grievance felt by Australia, where

> they had to-day some near neighbours, European neighbours, in the southern seas, and if His Majesty's Government, or Her Majesty's Government in the past, had listened to early warnings from Australia, they would have had no such neighbours within striking distance to-day.

What the fisheries are to Newfoundland, Samoa and the New Hebrides are to Australia—a thorn in the side. Of such the history of Canada during the last century is full, what are called rectifications of frontier there have been too numerous to mention here. Thorns in the side are apt to develop into open sores; any one of these may do so at any moment, and, unless the wishes of Colonial Statesmen to be admitted to a share in these negotiations be met, there may arise in the future as much trouble with the colonies from the diplomacy of Downing Street as there was in the past from the legislation of Westminster. The colonist, wherever he may be, has an idea that he knows more of his own affairs than people who have never studied them, and who live thousands of miles away, can know for him. He watches England more than England watches him. Almost all colonists read English newspapers, few colonial papers come here. Very many colonists visit England, some do so frequently, but not many Englishmen have personal knowledge even of the great colonies. It is rather a sore point to the colonist that more attention is not paid to him here, but he forgets that England has to look at many different points of the compass to see all her colonies, while the Englishman in each colony can fix an undistracted eye on England. As he does so, and concentrates his gaze on Whitehall, the sight of the Foreign Office is usually, and that of the Colonial Office frequently, full of disagreeable reminiscences. But he finds the adjoining buildings of the Admiralty more pleasant to look at. They stand for the Navy which now, as in the eighteenth century, is not only a connecting-link with the colonies but their chief support. Everything that the White Ensign meant to Massachusetts a hundred and fifty years ago it means to-day to Australia, whose people are keenly alive to the fact that future developments in the Pacific may make

naval power essential to their preservation from what is their nightmare—the being eaten out of house and home by Asiatic races. All these things the average colonist thinks of much more closely than the average Englishman; as a rule the former has a wider, if not keener, intelligence than the latter, and he is usually made of harder material. The South African war shewed the superiority of the colonial trooper to the second batch of what was called yeomanry, which was drawn from the population of the cities after the supply from the country-side was exhausted. Each was a sample of his kind.

The reason why the colonist then proved himself a better man than the Englishman may be found not only in the difference between the open-air life of the one and the town life of the other, but in the different stock from which they come. Either the colonist himself or his parents before him can claim to belong to the tougher kind who take their fortunes in their hands and seek them overseas, and not to the softer kind who stay at home. This distinction has been drawn in an earlier chapter as regards the Nonconformists of the seventeenth century, who went to America when driven out by religious persecution; of them it was said that the hard men probably left England while the soft ones remained.

Religious persecution has long been abandoned, but it has been replaced, as an expellent force on the population, by industrial starvation, and that, of the two, is the more effectual because it acts on more people. Each human being possesses a stomach more or less in working order, it is not everybody who has a conscience which can be described as in that condition. The pinch of starvation affects all the people thrown out of work in these times; in the old times the twinge of conscience only affected that portion of the community which was susceptible to it, and was made to suffer for so being. Every trade that is crippled by being undersold by cheap foreign labour producing dumped goods, every factory that is shut down from this cause, is a more powerful agent in driving the best of the English away from England, than any of the intolerant enactments of the Stuart kings about dogma. It will be admitted that every capable Englishman who has to leave his country from this cause is an asset lost to it, not only in himself but in his

descendants; if he goes to the colonies he remains under the flag, but he enriches the new lands at the expense of the old.

Though the recent enormous reduction in the staff at Woolwich arsenal was not due to the insistence on Free Imports, but to the excessive retrenchment promised at the General Election, what the employés of the nation had to suffer there may be quoted as an illustration on a large scale of what the workmen of private industries suffer when employment diminishes or ceases. In order to reduce the establishment to much less than it had previously been in times of peace, highly skilled artisans of long service and excellent character were discharged from the arsenal in droves. Many went to the colonies, some went to Germany where their expert knowledge of the production of war material is as useful to our neighbours as it may be dangerous to ourselves. We may assume that those who were thus driven to leave their homes were able to re-establish themselves elsewhere, because they were the men of most character who had laid by money and could use it to pay their passages. Those who could not do this—the obvious thing if possible—may be regarded as of a weaker type, men who had spent their wages week by week and so had nothing to fall back upon when they were turned out. For them there is no alternative but to sink from the grade of skilled mechanic, through the stage of looking for odd jobs, into the mass of the unemployed from which it is hard to rise again. They and their children are left to subsist on charity, and to look forward to Old-Age Pensions. On a smaller scale this is happening all over the country—except in the coal and steel trades, which have been helped by a wave of temporary prosperity during the last two or three years.

The upshot of it is that we are losing the cream of our industrial population, and being left with the skimmed milk—further adulterated by the dregs of eastern Europe, to whom access here has been made more easy by the present Home Secretary who has relaxed the Aliens Act of the last Government. Free import of these low-grade foreigners, who will work for a wage on which our own people cannot subsist, is not only damaging to our hand-workers, whom it reduces to competition with sweated

labour, but it does harm by lowering the average physical condition of the people.

> You seem bent on producing a nation of degenerate paupers. . . . Who could say that miserable West Ham with its population of stunted degenerates shewed up well against Chemnitz or Essen?[1]

So writes a German resident who says that he has lived many years among us, and who evidently knows us well. While the population is weakened at one end of the scale by these free imports of undesirables, it is being equally weakened at the other end by the compulsory export of the desirables, the best men for whom work might be found at home. As to this we may take another outside opinion, that of the late American statesman, the Hon. J. G. Blaine.

> As I look at it, your present fiscal system makes us a free gift of all the goods we import from Great Britain. True, we pay you a hundred million dollars yearly, but you present us yearly with more value than that in able-bodied humanity—in working men and women whom a sensible system of preferential tariffs would divert to your colonies, and retain in your own citizenship.

This process swells the figures of the emigration statistics on the one hand,[2] and those of the unemployed on the other hand. Mr. Lloyd George has been quoted as saying that the whole of this subject is not covered by Board of Trade returns. Those shew the fluctuation of value in exports and imports of commodities, but they give no indication of that in human brain and muscle, the most precious of all things to a nation, and one in which the value of our export largely exceeds that of our import under the present fiscal system. Of this particular and very special kind of export the benefit is lost to us when it passes under another flag—usually that of the United States. But the value to our flag and what it covers remains in the case of those who leave the British Islands to settle in the colonies. With foreigners our business in what we sell to them is reckoned in shillings, but that

[1] "Some Candid Impressions of England," by a German Resident, *National Review*, June 1905.

[2] In 1880 the number of emigrants from Germany was 117,000. Under a commercial system which fostered industries, that number was reduced to 27,000, out of a population of 61,000,000, by 1905. In that year the United Kingdom, whose population is 44,000,000, parted with 139,365 emigrants, a figure which rose to 194,671 in 1906, and to 237,204 in 1907.

with our colonists is done in pounds. It is here desired rather to avoid than to enter into figures and statistics which have been so often and so conclusively given by other writers and speakers on this subject. But in order to give some idea of the extent to which our own people abroad now purchase from our people at home, it may be mentioned that, deducting coal, we even now export to our colonies—undeveloped as they are—more than half as much as goes hence to the rest of the world.[1] If we compare the value of our exports to the colonies with that to the chief protected countries, we find the former in 1906 exceeded the latter, £119,000,000 sterling in one case, £113,000,000 in the other. In 1905 from each inhabitant of the United States we received for the goods he bought from us but five shillings and ninepence, from each German, Belgian, and Dutchman—taking the three together—the same receipt was thirteen shillings and fivepence. But each colonist of New Zealand was our customer to the extent of seven pounds five shillings, each Canadian for two guineas.[2] To such figures as these exception is sometimes taken on the ground that though the consumption of our goods is so much higher per head of the colonists, their number is relatively small compared to that of the inhabitants of all the foreign countries. Whether it will remain small in the same proportion that it is now, is either not considered or is ignored.

There are people who can only see things as they are; of them are the twenty-two Members of Parliament, part of the group of forty-seven above referred to, who published a manifesto twelve months ago,[3] in which they used this argument to belittle the Imperial Conference. They pointed out that the white population of New Zealand is no more than that of the Birmingham district, and that Australia contains only half as many people as London; but in making these comparisons those twenty-

[1] In 1906 the value was £119,000,000 to the former, £216,000,000 to the latter.

[2] *Administration*, 1774, i. p. 253. Thomas Pownall wrote that foreign commerce depended on "having many and sure customers. . . . Those whom we gain in foreign trade we possess under restrictions and difficulties. . . . Those that a trading nation can create within itself, it deals with under its own regulations, and makes its own and cannot lose.

[3] The *Times*, June 29, 1907.

two Members proved nothing so conclusively as the short sight which afflicts them. There are other people who can look at things as they can and will be; of them is the Bishop of London who said, when he returned last autumn from a visit to Canada, that there was room there for a hundred millions of people, and that the Colony ought eventually to be one of the greatest nations of the earth.[1] The Bishop's estimate of the extent to which the population of Canada will probably increase in the future may be confirmed by reference to what has already been quoted here as to the increase on the same continent to the south of the boundary between Canada and the United States. The British population of New England was estimated in 1731 at 120,000.[2] Governor Pownall was noted while in America for his careful investigation of such subjects. He continued to study them after his return to England, and has been quoted as saying that Congress estimated the population of the United States in September 1774 as three millions, but he himself thought this too high, and regarded it as not much over two millions.[3] If we take the mean of these figures as two and a half millions, and compare it with the seventy-six millions recorded on the census of 1900, we find that in about five generations the population of the United States has multiplied thirtyfold. At that rate of increase the five and three-quarter millions of people now in Canada will in another five generations, say in the year 2020, be nearly two hundred millions. Very probably it will be more, because improved means of communication make emigration more easy, while the increasing congestion of the Old World makes the necessity of leaving it more urgent. Set this against the other fact that in other colonies, Australia for instance, the increase will be much less and we may retain that thirtyfold ratio for the whole of the self-governing colonies. They now contain about eleven millions, so that when as much time has passed as separates us from the year 1774, in which the old colonies declared their independence, it is not only possible but probable that some three hundred millions

[1] The *Times*, November 1, 1907.

[2] See *ante*, p. 35.

[3] *Memorial to the Sovereigns of Europe*, 1780, T. Pownall, p. 63. The difference between these two figures is accounted for by their both being estimates, there was no such accuracy as a census gives till long afterwards.

of men of our race will be under the British flag abroad —unless the forty-four millions at home throw away in the present this magnificent prospect for the future.

Yet the sacrifice of the strength which consolidation of the Empire means to us now, when we sorely and urgently need it (and of all that it will mean if the colonies increase in population as the above figures lead us to expect), is demanded of us by those who call themselves Liberals and Radicals—but who really are Conservatives of the worst type, because they are intent on conserving a system which is worn out and obsolete. When the modern Radical is pushed in argument beyond his Conservative sentiment for a form of Cobdenism, so narrow-minded and one-sided that Cobden himself would have been ashamed to own it,[1] and asked why that doctrine should be maintained when it is as much out of date as the stage-coaches of the early Victorian period, he falls back on two things. He dilates on the enormous increase in our commerce during the last sixty years,[2] and

[1] Often as it has been said, there can be no harm in repeating that our present system of free imports was not at all what Cobden meant by free trade. The injustice of our paying duties in foreign ports on our manufactures while we levy no duty in our ports on foreign manufactures would have been as apparent to him as to any one. What he looked for, and was mistaken in, was that all the world would follow our lead and establish that most desirable thing a trade free in both directions, exports and imports. "I believe that if you abolish the Corn Law honestly and adopt Free Trade in its simplicity there will not be a tariff in Europe that will not be changed in less than five years to follow your example" (Speech in Manchester, January 15, 1846).

[2] The result of these years is that our people, who had been previously partly agricultural, partly industrial in their occupations, have to a large extent abandoned the former for the latter. It is estimated that agricultural capital has diminished in the last thirty years by nearly a thousand millions, a sum 25 per cent more than the National Debt. The farmers, the backbone of the nation, have been driven in crowds to the workhouses. Fifty years ago the agriculture of England and Wales employed two million persons, there are now less than a million on that land, to which legislation is making frantic endeavours to return some of the people who have crowded into the towns where the gulf between rich and poor is so wide. It is not visible in Denmark which has remained agricultural. In Copenhagen one sees neither the display of riches nor the extreme poverty which are so marked in London. Cobden's repeated assurances that Agriculture would not suffer from the adoption

he urges the paramount necessity of providing the employed with cheap food and the employer with cheap raw material.[1] As to the expansion of commerce, it may be reiterated that the simultaneous introduction of steamers, railways and improved factory machinery, would have caused this—though not to the same extent—if Cobden had never existed. As to cheap food, though Cobden is represented by his worshippers as the benefactor of the masses because he gave thought to this question there was nothing original in his doing so. The whole matter had been gone into very thoroughly by Adam Smith before he published the result of his studies in 1776 in the *Wealth of Nations*, from which mine of information Cobden dug out so much as suited his purpose. The rest he discarded. In describing Governor Pownall's Bill of 1773 mention has been made of many previous Acts of

of his proposals have proved as fallacious as his belief that if we adopted Free Trade other nations would do the same. They have done exactly the opposite, and in so doing have prospered far more in recent years than we have. From statistics in the *Labour Gazette*, it appears that in the second half of 1906 the percentage of unemployed skilled labour in Germany was 1.1 per cent. The percentage here from 1897 to 1906 averaged 4.1 per cent, and it is rising fast. The Board of Trade returns for April 1908 show that of the 638,237 members of the 268 Trade Unions 7.5 per cent were then unemployed. By June the figure was 8.2 per cent. Our streets are full of loafers and broken men, who form the often-quoted thirteen millions on the verge of starvation, otherwise described as the submerged tenth. One person in forty of the population of London is an actual pauper, many others are near that degradation. It may well be doubted whether all this loss and misery is compensated for by the great accession of wealth to the commercial and manufacturing classes to which Cobden belonged, and on whose behalf he worked.

[1] This was the pith of the argument for conserving the present fiscal system which fourteen Professors of Political Economy published in the *Times* on August 15, 1903. That such theories do not agree with the facts will be seen if we omit from consideration all the rest of the Empire and of Canada itself, except the province of Manitoba. Population increased there tenfold between 1880 and 1906, when it amounted to 800,000. In the same period the production of cereals increased not tenfold but a hundredfold, and in 1906 it reached the enormous figure of 240 million bushels, more by far than the 209 million bushels which was the whole import of wheat and flour to the United Kingdom in that year. In 1904 the Minister of Agriculture for Manitoba estimated that by 1912 the Province would produce 350 million bushels of wheat, more than half as much again as the quantity we now import.

Parliament which had regulated the price of corn and the trade in it. Before Parliament began this legislation the enactments of our Sovereigns had, from the beginning of our history, given equal attention to this food question. No rulers took more pains about it than Moses in the wilderness and Joseph in Egypt, who considerably anticipated the action of Cobden. To return from the distant past to the immediate present, our colonies are now able, as they were not sixty years ago, to provide us with all the food we need to import. With that great reservoir of supply behind us, on which under Preference no duty would be levied,[1] the people can be fed at a figure not exceeding that now paid. The price would be subject only to market fluctuations, such as those which have put up the price during the last year to the amazement of the British electors, who were led to believe that their votes in 1906 had secured the cost of the loaf against the operations and vicissitudes of nature. Turning from the question of cheap food to that of cheap raw material a passage already quoted from Mr. Lloyd George shews that the bulk of this can also be supplied by the colonies to the advantage of the Empire.

The argument of the opponent of fiscal reform may thus be stripped of its supports as to the increase of commerce being altogether due to, and the supply of cheap food and material entirely dependent on, the present system. Nothing then remains of it but a sentimental attachment to a dogma laid down sixty years ago by a school of men who were very one-sided, and far from infallible in their judgment and predictions. Surely that sentiment is not sufficient to outweigh the solid practical advantages of forming a closer union with the colonies in peace and for war;[2] the maintenance of our manufactures

[1] Opponents of Tariff Reform often miss the elementary fact that all the corn we import is not of foreign growth and no one proposes to tax the produce of our colonies any more than that of our counties. The House of Commons passed a resolution last March "*that any import duty* would tend to raise the price still higher and aggravate the suffering caused by dear bread." The words here placed in italics cover all duties whatsoever, including one which would only apply to the foreigner while it did not touch the colonial grower who alone is necessary to us.

[2] Our position during peace is sufficiently embarrassing under present conditions; as to what it may become in time of war Cobden himself may be quoted.

against foreign competition; the giving employment to the artisans; the securing them in the possession of their health and stamina.[1] Lookers-on sometimes see more than the parties concerned. The United States Consul at Manchester said, last January, that if England continued to be wounded in her export trade it was her own fault, and that she would keep on receiving wounds to her commerce till she recognised that it was not fair to let a country she was dealing with charge from 40 to 60 per cent on the English goods it imported, while it could send anything it chose into England free of duty. People in England are beginning to realise the anomaly of this kind of thing, which has long been visible to men abroad who do not study the question from armchairs, but have obtained in the course of their daily life a practical knowledge of how the present system works. The part played in our commerce by the pioneer men, who live in foreign and colonial ports distributing the manufactured exports of Great Britain, and collecting for shipment home the raw material required here, often escapes notice. They know what foreign competition is because they are always in touch with it; they know how far that real free trade within the Empire which the colonies desire would safeguard our interests. Go among them where you will, for choice not to Canada or to Australia, whose people are concerned in this question, and may be biassed or thought to be so; but talk to the men scattered on the South American coast, hear the views expressed in the clubs of Kingston and of Port-of-Spain, or turn the other way and listen to the talk in the clubs of Colombo, Singapore, Shanghai, and Yokohama. Speaking from knowledge it can be said that, living as they do in such different climates and conditions, the English overseas hold the same views everywhere, and that they who see this country from outside know the value to her of a sane imperialism far better than do the people in England. The former

"I doubt the wisdom, I certainly doubt the prudence of a great body of industrial people allowing themselves to continually live in dependence upon foreign Powers for the supply of food and raw material, knowing that a system of warfare exists by which at any moment, without notice, without any help on their part or means of prevention, they are liable to have the raw material and the food withdrawn from them—cut off from them suddenly—without any power to resist it or to hinder it" (Speech of October 29, 1862).

[1] How this is depreciating the hospital surgeons know, and sometimes speak of in public.

care nothing for those echoes of the turmoil of party politics which reach them in newspapers many weeks old, and have been described as sounding to their distant ears like "the scuffling of ghosts in a back attic." Which Right Honourable Gentleman scores off another on a platform or in the House is matter of indifference to them. They do not trouble to read long speeches in the English papers, but they do watch very closely—especially just now—the cablegrams which give them the main points in the policy of England on which their own fate depends.[1] Their way of looking at Imperial questions may be shewn in the following parallel passages taken from two men whose experience in the government of British colonies in the past and the present will be seen to have led them to express the same thoughts as to the necessity of imperial union for imperial strength.

THOMAS POWNALL, M.P.,
July 1768

Administration, 1768. Dedication to Mr. G. Grenville, p. xvi.

As I do from my best judgment sincerely believe that a general and entire unison of the British dominions is the only measure by which Great Britain can be continued in its political liberty and commercial prosperity, perhaps in its existence. So I make no scruple to aver that if this measure[2] be not adopted in policy, as it really exists in fact, it will soon become the duty of the several disunited parts to look narrowly to . . . and stand firm in the maintenance of their undoubted rights. . . . So have I suggested through every step how the American may fortify himself in his rights, consistent with his alliance.

VISCOUNT MILNER, G.C.B.,
December 17, 1906

Speech at Wolverhampton.

The conception which haunts me is the conception of the people of these Islands as a great family, bound by indissoluble ties to kindred families in other parts of the world, and, within its own borders, striving after all that makes for productive power, for social harmony, and, as a result of these and as the necessary complement and shield of these, for its strength as a nation among the nations of the earth.

[1] When the failure of that Under-Secretary of the Colonies to obtain re-election at North-West Manchester was telegraphed to these men a few weeks ago, their messages from the ends of the earth came back instantly, each expressing the same satisfaction.

[2] The consolidation of the colonies with the mother country.

Having compared these views of men who knew the outside world, we may contrast both of them with those of a Manchester man of high standing who knows the inside world and is described as a Conservative, though his speech was delivered at the Free Trade Hall, and was published by the Free Trade League. On January 21 of this year he began a defence of that policy by saying

I think we may assume that principles of business which are sound and good for our cotton trade are equally sound and good in our national trade. So let us look at the question as a matter of business from the cotton trade point of view. What have we to gain? What have we to lose? To gain? The total imports of all classes of cotton manufactures during last year, etc.

With all respect to the gentleman in question, when he thinks of his cotton trade first and the Empire last, he is inviting the destruction of what is so dear to him. An Empire without a cotton trade is conceivable, but lose the Empire and you lose the cotton trade. Business men have to attend to business, but those engaged in it abroad, holding responsible positions in different parts of the world, can see something in life beyond the ledgers which this last quotation shews may be the limit of the mental horizon. But on their part they fail to understand why England should grant free access to her home markets and refuse it to her own people. Why a toll of 90 per cent[1] should be levied on the British tea-planters of Ceylon and Assam who supply an article necessary to the people, while articles of luxury, such as the motor cars and pianos of Germany and France, come in free, is as much beyond colonial comprehension as comprehension of what the colonies and the Empire mean is beyond the Manchester gentleman above mentioned. A perfectly impartial person like the British merchant of Buenos Ayres or Hong-Kong may have as great an interest in the welfare of the

[1] This figure was given in Mr. Asquith's Budget speech of April 30, 1906. With regard to the article now so heavily taxed, without the consumers realising the fact, it is a curious coincidence between the past and the present, that it is the very one on which a tax of 3d. a pound caused the Massachusetts people to revolt. It has been already mentioned that they had previously paid a shilling a pound to defray the tax levied on their tea in England as it passed through. That shilling like our present 5d. was included in the price, and in both cases the existence of the tax was unseen and therefore escaped comment.

community as the merchant of Hull, and his opinion on these questions may be much better worth having, but he has not the same opportunity of giving effect to it as the latch-key voter of Dundee who has, in comparison, nothing to lose.

The cry on which the colonists of North America broke away from us in the days of King George was "No taxation without representation." Paradoxical people that we are, we have now in the days of King Edward arrived at the opposite extreme. If we have not quite got "representation without taxation," successive lowerings of the franchise have brought us very near to it. The old idea of our ancestors that only those should vote who, having a stake in the country, would lose appreciably if things went wrong, has been so completely whittled away that many of the electors who live from hand to mouth have no sense of responsibility. Moreover, though they are shrewd enough in the affairs of their daily life, they are mentally quite incapable of thinking out for themselves such complicated questions as are submitted to them, and so fall an easy prey to unscrupulous orators, who deceive them of set purpose for party objects. At a recent election in North St. Pancras an elector who was asked to which candidate he was going to give his vote replied that he would give it to neither; he had never had a vote before and he was going to keep it to himself. At Blackheath the same question was answered perfectly frankly, "I will vote for anybody that gives me two bob." When a Lincolnshire farm-labourer was asked to vote for Tariff Reform at the by-election last year, he objected to do so because he did not know what it was, and was afraid that if he so far committed himself, "the Squire would have him re-vaccinated."[1] At Felstead in Essex, at the last general election, a man of the same occupation to whom appeal had been made to vote for what was called the "Big Loaf,"[2] was heard saying, "As to that big loaf, I

[1] "The Squire" himself, that veteran opponent of Cobdenism, Mr. Chaplin, told this story soon afterwards at the election for Wimbledon, where he was returned to Parliament. The other cases are all guaranteed to be genuine, and can no doubt be capped by others known to those who have done much canvassing.

[2] As to this we may quote again from the German gentleman above referred to: "It is assumed by the greater part of your Press

am not so sure but there is some hole in it I cannot see." The man's wits were all there; he felt some fraud was being practised on him, but he was conscious of his own incapacity to find out where it was.

These things are mentioned partly to explain to people in the colonies what difficulties those who share their views here have to contend with, partly to shew how much the British elector needs guidance under the heavy responsibility now thrown on him instead of its being borne by the King and his Ministry as was the case in 1769. Though in 1906 the elector was very liable to be led astray by the false statements which were cruelly invented to mislead him, he has so retentive a memory that he neither forgets nor forgives those who have profited by his credulity. The price the Liberal party-leaders will probably have to pay for their conduct at the last election is their political extinction at the next one. Liberalism appears moribund, having like Samson pulled down the pillars on itself when in its strength; and the prevalent opinion is that at the next election the issue before the country—whatever attempts may be made to obscure it—will be between Socialism and Imperialism. Into the merits or demerits of the former this is no place to enter; it is sufficient to say that it is a policy of levelling down, it represents the disgust of the handworkers at Party politics, and it attempts to remedy the lack of employment by making the State the universal employer. Imperialism, on the other hand, is a policy of levelling up and endeavouring to obtain for the whole community a higher degree of prosperity. It fully shares the Socialist desire to diminish the number of the unemployed, but proposes to do so by the direct process of seeing that our manufactures have fair play and are able to keep on the men they have and engage more. On this branch of the question what it

and politicians that the worker will never pay an extra halfpenny a week of taxes on his food for the Empire. I am not concerned with protection; as a German it might be bad for me. I do not like Mr. Chamberlain or his works, but then I see that he is at least a strong man, and a man with some sense of duty, so that I respect him. But your talk and your arguing as to this extra halfpenny is working you a world of evil abroad, as it is more than ever convincing other nations that a people which shirks such an infinitesimal sacrifice is unworthy to rule, and can be induced with very little trouble to surrender certain of its pretensions."

says to the men who work for wages may be summarised thus. "Vote for free food from the colonies, they can give it you in plenty and as cheaply as any one else can. Spend your money with your own people, who in return will buy more of what you make. Thus you will maintain the industries which employ you, and secure a decent wage honourably earned." The Socialist appeal is of this kind. "Vote for free food from everywhere. Never mind the colonies. We will make the State the universal employer, and it shall give you such work as it can. Anyhow you shall have five shillings a week when you are seventy, if you live through thirty or forty years—which may or may not be spent in misery—to receive it." At by-elections the voter is already shewing that he thinks the work he may soon have in hand better for him than the pension in the distant bush. On some such lines as these the battle of the General Election will probably be fought in or about the year 1911.[1] It will decide a good many things, chief among them the two vital questions on which our future existence as a nation depends,—what our relations with our colonies are to be for the future,—and whether our defence is to be adequately provided for both on land and at sea. These two subjects are so intimately connected that they can hardly be considered separately. Our wealth is well known, our power to defend it is doubted. As to the colonial question we may recall what Mr. Chamberlain said in May 1903 :—

> Upon what you do in the next few years depends that enormous issue whether this great Empire of ours is to stand together—one free Empire if necessary against all the world—or whether it is to fall apart into separate states, each selfishly seeking its own interest alone, losing sight of the common weal and losing all the advantages which union alone can give.

Everything that has happened since has tended to confirm this opinion ; the "few years" there spoken of will have expired by 1911 when the British elector will have to assume the heavy responsibility which legislation has imposed upon him. What that amounts to may be realised by considering that each elector in the United Kingdom who then goes to the poll will be disposing not

[1] Which, to simplify comparisons of dates to follow, will here be assumed as the date of the next General Election

of his own destiny only but of that of eight of his neighbours here, of two of his fellow-subjects in the self-governing colonies, and also of one other English person in the Crown Colonies in India or in a foreign country.[1] At that General Election the issue has to be faced. It must be one of two things, there is no room for half measures, for the colonies will then have waited nine years since the end of the war in which they participated, and eight years since the question of how they were to be treated was raised by Mr. Chamberlain. In 1911 the electors will vote either for severance from the great colonies or for partnership with them; the grant of another lease of power to the present Administration means severance as surely as their being replaced by Unionists means partnership.

It may be well to attempt a comparison of what may be expected to follow the adoption of each of these two alternatives. We can form some estimate of what will result from a continuance of "banging and bolting the door" by considering certain known facts, filled in by the application of the proverbial truth that history repeats itself. If the British vote on the demand for preference goes against the colonists in 1911 it will take about two years for them to obtain it elsewhere. By 1913 they may have made commercial arrangements which will lead up to partnership with some other Power; it has been already pointed out that 1913 to them corresponds with 1774 in the case of their predecessors who then decided to break away from the Union. Two years later, in 1915, our treaty with Japan expires; that country which is now recovering under our wing from the strain of the war with Russia will then be free to make its own arrangements for the future. While our policy, as now conducted, is the subordination of business to sentiment, that of the

[1] 5,335,600 votes were given at the last election of 1906, and at the next one the even figure of five and a half millions will no doubt be reached. As the population of the United Kingdom is nearly forty-five millions, the electorate is about one-ninth of the whole population, and each elector may be said to act for eight people besides himself. The population of the self-governing colonies is eleven millions, just twice the number of the British voters, and that again is probably about equal to all the other English who are living abroad besides those in Canada, Australia, and South Africa.

Japanese statesmen is exactly the opposite, for they put business first and sentiment they ignore. Those who best know the inscrutable mind of that nation are agreed that they are as keen for their interests in peace as they are courageous in war, and also that their intense patriotism is not less developed than the efficiency of their intelligence department. In the last twenty years the latter has ascertained that, in the case of two great Empires, size did not imply strength. It was this discovery which led up to the success of Japan; first against China, afterwards against Russia. If we, who have so much to lose, continue to stint our navy and to reduce our army [1] those precedents may be applied to us. The attention with which the policy of this country is now watched by our colonists is probably surpassed by that which it receives from the very keen eyes of the Japanese. If, by 1915, they can obtain a more valuable European alliance than that which we have to offer them they can fairly, and will certainly, accept what best suits them. Nothing promises more to either Germany or Japan than an alliance, either overt or covert, directed against Great Britain and her outlying possessions. Suppose such a combination to be formed, with or without our knowledge, and that about 1919—six years after our greater colonies may have been definitely alienated [2]—a menace directed by Japan to Hong-Kong, India or Australia, causes the despatch of a British fleet superior to that of Japan to the East.[3]

[1] The present Minister for War has reduced the strength of the army by 22,618 men in addition to the 12,618 men whom his predecessor dispensed with. The *Pathway to Reality* down which the country is being led, with polite assurances that it is quite safe and that a skeleton army is just as good as a live one, may have a grimly real ending.

[2] The same period of six years elapsed between the final loss of the old colonies in 1783 and the outbreak of the French Revolution which led to the great wars of the next twenty-five years.

[3] Before the war with Russia Japan had six first-class battleships, she now has fifteen, and is building four more; of those nineteen there will be five superior to the *Dreadnought*. In addition she has twelve armoured cruisers, and will soon have sixteen. To meet such a force in distant waters would be a heavy strain on the British Navy at the two-power standard. Events in Corea and Manchuria are verifying a prediction similar to this, made in the *Nineteenth Century* of March 1904, as to the cause and the result of the war between Russia and Japan. How the latter may hereafter join forces with Germany has already been pointed out by Mr. P. A. Hislam in his *Admiralty of the Atlantic*.

We should then be left with the residue of our ships to guard the North Sea, already recognised by the Admiralty as a danger-zone, as is proved by the concentration there of our naval force withdrawn from the Mediterranean. The official programme of the new German navy, fixed by law and unalterable, shews that by 1920 Germany will possess thirty-eight battleships (twenty-three of them *Dreadnoughts*), and twenty armed cruisers, all of great armament and small coal capacity. This form of construction indicates the intention to use these specially designed vessels not far from home. We are told on the best authority that they are intended to compete with "the greatest Sea Power," and if there remained any doubt about the accuracy of that statement, it would be removed by the fact that neither the coasts nor the colonies of Germany require such a fleet for their protection. When such enormous expenditure[1] as this fleet represents cannot be explained on the ground of defence, the only justification for it is that it is intended for attack. Within twelve hours' steam of Essex and Lincolnshire is the port of Emden, recently adapted for the embarkation of large bodies of troops.[2] We have it on the supreme authority of Lord Roberts that our east coast is always open to an attack, and we cannot suppose that there would be any hesitation in delivering one if our defence had been weakened by the despatch of a great portion of our fleet, through the Suez Canal, a month or so before the time arranged for the blow at the centre of our Empire.[3]

[1] This expenditure is to a large extent met by the gains from the unrestricted imports of German manufactures to this country. If we put a check upon that system we not only prevent our own industries from being undersold, but we check the development of the German navy by cutting off the profits which go to pay for it. As things stand, we are actually contributing to the cost of a fleet built to rival our own.

[2] In face of such facts as these, diplomatic assurances of pacific intentions are of little value. Though any speaking or writing which increases tension between Germany and England is much to be deprecated, we have to look the facts in the face.

[3] There are those who say that we never could be treated in this way, but they forget that modern Germany owes its existence to carefully meditated aggression on Denmark, Austria, and France, and that it has far more to gain from success over us than it had on those occasions, and is perfectly aware of the fact.

The history of all our wars, that of the Seven Years, those of the Peninsula, the Crimea, the Indian Mutiny, and finally that of South Africa, shews that, though worsted at first, we can rally if time be given us. This being thoroughly understood by the other side, no time would be given. Far from having the six months postulated at its inception for training to war, the new Territorial Army would be called out in six hours to support the diminished force of regulars which could not suffice to meet columns advancing on different points from different landing-places. In six weeks, perhaps six days, all might be over with us. Great Britain would have to pay a heavy ransom, which would denude our industries of capital, and she would also have to surrender the mercantile marine and the remains of the navy in addition to such outposts as Malta, Singapore and Hong-Kong. To the victors belong the spoils, which could be shared between them. Ireland might be retained by Germany.[1] Large enough and fertile enough to support the force which held it, provided by nature with magnificent harbours, it is an ideal naval base enfilading the coast of France and overlooking that of North America. Held in the jaws of a vice between such an Ireland and the Continent, Great Britain would indeed be reduced to a "Little England" incapable of ever reasserting itself.

Many people may question whether such an irreparable disaster is probable, those who prefer to shut their eyes to the forces at work around them will do so. Few will, however, be found to assert that it is impossible or that it departs in any way from precedents already established. When once the possibility of successful invasion is admitted all the rest follows, and this country will be mad indeed if it tempts fortune by exposing itself to such calamity. But this, or something of the kind, is exactly what may be expected if, in 1911, the electors confirm in power a Government whose every action in Imperial matters is leading up to such a result. Nothing suits a burglar better than an isolated unguarded store of valuable

[1] If the Celt were thus finally in the grip of the Teuton, who drove him ages ago to the edge of the Atlantic, the early history of the two races would curiously repeat itself. Ground under the heel of a Prussian bureaucracy Sinn Fein would look back with regret on the mild rule of England.

property. If we do not set our house in order, connecting it with the outbuildings, and providing the whole premises with an efficient garrison, we simply invite attack, and in that case the accumulated wealth of the last sixty years becomes a source of danger instead of prosperity. Hemmed in as she is, Germany needs room to expand; if she can do so at our expense so much the better for her, so much the worse for us. We cannot complain if the Germans attend to their own interests, but we can attend to ours.

These views are the opposite of those held by either of the two groups above referred to, that of the twenty-two Trade Union Members of Parliament who decry the colonies, or that of the fourteen Professors of Political Economy who adhere to a blind faith that what Cobden taught sixty years ago must be absolutely true now—though events have shewn that it was only partly true then. Such men will regard the opinion that the country is being allowed to drift into a dangerous position, both as regards its defences and its colonies, as exaggerated, perhaps as alarmist.

If there be any such error here, it is shared by the highest authorities on these questions. Lord Roberts is devoting all his energies to rousing the country to the need of preparation for a war forced on us against our will. On November 15, 1907, Lord Milner declared at Edinburgh that we "could not afford such another fiasco as the late Colonial Conference." This he followed up by saying at Rugby a week later that "he trembled every day lest the pressure of ignorant idealists, of vote-catching demagogues, should cause this Government, or any Government, to curtail the provision, already none too ample, which made for the safety of our vast Empire."[1] Speaking in the House of Lords on July 20 last, Lord Cromer alluded to "the European conflict which may, not improbably, be forced on us before many years have elapsed." He added that he

> was aware that the mass of the people of this country, who do not follow foreign affairs with any very close attention, are not alive to

[1] In the opinion of an officer who has served long on the Headquarters Staff, both political parties know that compulsory training to arms is necessary, but each party seeks to throw on the other party the odium of enforcing it upon the electorate. At which rate our prospects of such a measure are remote indeed.

the possibility of any such conflict taking place. I say it is the duty of a Government, gifted with both patriotism and foresight, who have means of information at their disposal, which is not available to the general public, to provide betimes for that danger, a danger of which I, in common I believe with most people who can speak with real authority on foreign affairs, am very firmly convinced.[1]

In the same debate Lord Rosebery said, "I am beginning to think that this Empire may be at last destined to be wrecked by this finance . . . the first responsibility of every country and every nation is national defence." When men who have attained so much distinction by their military and administrative services are speaking thus there may be room for this attempt to shew how they are supported by precedents drawn from our own history at a time when the conditions were very similar to what they are now.

In 1803, when the Peace of Amiens made a lull between our struggle with Napoleon Buonaparte the Consul, and that with Napoleon the Emperor, Thomas Pownall wrote the retrospect already referred to[2] of what he had seen in the fifty years he had spent in acting, in speaking, and in writing for his country. He then attributed all the misery which had befallen England to the initial error of alienating the colonies nearly forty years previously. Unless the country be warned of its danger now, unless it will accept the warning and act accordingly, what happened in the days of King George may be expected to happen again in the days of King Edward. The loss of the present colonies means to his subjects as much disaster as the loss of the original colonies did a century ago to the home-staying subjects of his predecessor on the throne.

We may now turn to the other alternative which will be before the electors in 1911, and in considering how votes may then be given, we may remember that in 1906 they went as follows:—In London 37 per cent to the Unionists, 36 per cent to the Liberals, 20 per cent to the Labour Party; in Great Britain 36 per cent to the Unionists, 40 per cent to the Liberals, and 4 per cent to the Labour Party.[3] Neither on those figures nor from

[1] Since the above was sent to the press the Chairman of the Social Democratic Federation, Mr. H. M. Hyndman, has written still more forcibly to the same effect.

[2] See *ante*, p. 457.

[3] These figures come from the analysis of that Election which appeared in the *Times*.

the result of the last election to the London County Council can the Socialist be encouraged in the hope of obtaining in 1911 such a preponderance as would give him control of affairs, and enable him to dictate the terms on which those who accept his views can be sure of food at a reasonable price and of wages wherewith to buy it. But it may be brought home to the electors that those objects can be more surely obtained by adopting the Unionist programme than by supporting a visionary Socialism, the mere threat of which is now reducing employment by driving capital out of the country to employ foreign labour. If pressed too hard by rates and taxes, the capitalist can move elsewhere, as Messrs. Yarrow have moved from Poplar. If the whole country shares the fate of that district there will remain no money wherewith to pay wages.

In our Fiscal Policy there is far more at stake than bread-and-butter or whence our food comes. As in the case of Esau there is not only a mess of pottage but a birthright to consider—the right of remaining free men and of passing to our sons what our fathers won for us.[1] If by these arguments the Unionist vote can be reinforced from the Socialist ranks it will so outweigh that which the Liberals receive as to ensure a settled policy. It is necessary to disabuse the artisan of the idea which has been carefully instilled into him that the capitalist is his natural enemy.[2] He must be shewn that employment can be better secured by supporting the existing private factories than by replacing them with State-managed ones, which would be equally exposed to the foreign competition now so destructive to our industries, while a personal interest in fighting that competition would no longer inspire the management.

The Liberals in Parliament who voted for the Patents Bill of last year can fairly support other measures of like nature. It was then shewn that they, and those whom

[1] "We owe it to our ancestors to preserve entire those rights which they have delivered to our care; we owe it to our posterity not to suffer their dearest inheritance to be destroyed. But if it were possible for us to be insensible of those sacred claims there is yet an obligation binding upon ourselves from which nothing can acquit us—a personal interest which we cannot surrender" (*Junius*, Letter XX., August 8, 1769).

[2] It has been shrewdly observed that it is not the capitalist who succeeds, and consequently increases his works and pays more wages, but the capitalist who fails, and therefore has to discharge his men, who damages the mechanic and the operative.

they represent, desired quite as much as either Imperialists or Socialists to help the people to obtain work. It is said that twenty-five millions of foreign capital is being expended in this country in the establishment of factories in which the provisions of this Bill can be carried out.[1] These who approved of that piece of legislation can have no difficulty in agreeing with the Member for Northwich —himself a great pioneer of industry and a keen man of business—who last May startled a party meeting over which he was presiding in the Reform Club by "one piece of hard practical advice to the Government. That advice is to give up that part of the policy of the Manchester school which is called the *laissez faire* policy. . . . The Tory party have convinced the mercantile community that they mean to make a big effort for the benefit of trade." Not for trade only but for maintenance of freedom and of Empire. But to take it only as expressed in this speech, why should not every one who is interested—and who is not?—join in, regardless of party factions and their artificial lines of cleavage and demarcation? There is no time to lose, for but few years remain before we may, and probably shall, be confronted with a peril which the country does not realise.

Such a combination as is here suggested was made in 1886 when only the separation of Ireland was in question; that precedent may well be followed on a larger scale when the separation not only of Ireland but of all the far greater outlying possessions of this country is involved. If the verdict of the country at the next General Election is for Colonial Preference and the consolidation of the Empire, we may hope to retain for ourselves and to pass down to our successors the great heritage which has been won for us by our predecessors. To both we have a duty to perform; if we fail in it we shall be derided in all the history that has yet to be written as weaklings, unworthy of our forefathers. If we fulfil our duty we can preserve and continue the ideal conception of him from whom this volume takes its title,

OUR GRAND MARINE DOMINION.

[1] It requires that all foreign patents must be worked in this country to be valid here. British workmen thus draw wages which would otherwise go to foreign labour. This is exactly what Tariff Reformers are intent upon.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

THE WORKS PUBLISHED BY THOMAS POWNALL

POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

(Copies of those marked ✢ are in the Reading Room of the British Museum; their catalogue numbers are given in brackets.)

YEAR.

1752. ✢ Principles of Polity, being the Grounds and Reasons of Civil Liberty. (8006—d.) quarto.

1754. Pamphlet on the State of American Affairs. New York.[1]

1764. ✢ The Administration of the Colonies (published anonymously and afterwards acknowledged). (E.2056—(1).) 8vo.

1765. ✢ The Administration of the Colonies. Second Edition. (1061—d.20.) 8vo.

1766. ✢ The Administration of the Colonies. Third Edition. (1061—g.74.) 8vo.

1766. Considerations on the Points lately brought into Question as to the Parliament's Rights of Taxing the Colonies. 8vo.

1768. ✢ The Administration of the Colonies. Fourth Edition. (292—K.30.) 8vo.

1768. ✢ The Speech of Th-m-s P-wn-ll, Esqre., in the House of Commons in favour of America. Date December 16, 1768. (1324—C.)

NOTE.—In 1769-70-71 the 'LETTERS OF JUNIUS' were appearing. The appearance of the series with that signature coincides with this gap in Pownall's publications.

1770. The State of the Constitution of the Colonies. A printed letter of 4 pages.

1771. ✢ Two Speeches on the late Negotiation and Convention with Spain (8042—d.16.) 8vo.

1772. Considerations on the Indignity suffered by the Crown . . . by the Marriage of H.R.H. the Duke of Cumberland.[2]

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[1] Afterwards republished in the *Administration of the Colonies.*

[2] Mentioned in Watt's *Bibl. Brit.*

YEAR.

1773. The Right, Interest and Duty of Government as concerned in the Govt. of the E. Indies. (100.N.3.)

1774. ✢ The Administration of the Colonies. Fifth Edition. (1061—d.28.) 8vo.

1774. ✢ A Memoir on the Corn Trade (published as a supplement to the *Political Arithmetic* of Arthur Young. (288—C.13). 8vo.

1776. ✢ A Letter to Adam Smith, F.R.S. (115—h.43.) Quarto.

1780. A Memorial to the Sovereigns of Europe. 8vo.

1782. ✢ A Memorial in two Parts to King George III. on the American War. (103—d.62.) 8vo.

1783. The Character of Sir Robert Walpole (printed in Mr. Coxe's Memoirs of Lord Orford).

1783. ✢ A Memorial addressed to the Sovereigns of America. (103—d.69.) 8vo.

1784. Three Memorials—those of 1780-82-83 republished with a General Preface. 8vo.

1787. ✢ Live and Let Live—a treatise on the woollen trade. 8vo.

1795. ✢ Considerations on the Scarcity and High Price of Bread. (T.1466. (4).) 8vo.

1803. ✢ A Memorial to the Sovereigns of Europe and the Atlantic. (103—f.33.) 8vo.

TOPOGRAPHY, GEOGRAPHY, ETC.

1761. Six Remarkable Views in the Provinces of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.[1]

1775. ✢ A Memoir on Drainage and Navigation (291—e.35.) 8vo.

1776. ✢ Prospectus of a Map of the Middle British Colonies. (11,900—c.5.)

1776. ✢ Topographical Description of such Parts of North America as are contained in the annexed Map of the Middle British Colonies. (155—g.16.) folio.

1786. Proposals for founding University Scholarships for Architecture, etc.

1787. ✢ Hydraulic and Nautical Observations on the Currents of the Atlantic: notes by Benjamin Franklin. (B.470 (4).) quarto.

1794. Map of North America—in four sheets.

1795. Map of North and South America—in four sheets.

1795 and 1801. ✢ Intellectual Physics. (714.i.11) and (527.l.12.)

1801. A Treatise on Old Age—a supplement to the last named.

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[1] *Auction Prices*, 1905, by L. S. Livingston, mentions a copy of this sold in New York for $105.

ANTIQUITIES

YEAR.

1770. ✢ On a Sepulchral Monument at New Grange near Drogheda. Archæologia II. p. 236.

1774. ✢ An Account of the Boundary Stone of Croyland Abbey. Archæologia III. p. 96.

1774. ✢ Description of Coln Brach y Dinas on the summit of Penmaenmawr. Archæologia III. pp. 303-350.

1781. An Account of the Ship Temple at Dundalk.[1] 8vo.

1782. ✢ A Treatise on the Study of Antiquities as the Commentary of historical learning. Papers on the Elements of Speech. The Origin of Written Language. The Ships of the Ancients. The Chariots of the Ancients. (989—b.16.) 8vo.

1782. ✢ On Roman Earthenware and the Boundary Stone of Croyland Abbey. Archæologia V. p. 392.

1782. ✢ An Account of a Singular Stone among the Rocks at West Hoadley, Sussex. Archæologia V.

1785. ✢ On a Crystal Vase in the Possession of the Earl of Bessborough. Archæologia VII. p. 170.

1785. ✢ On the Ship Temples in Ireland. Archæologia VII. p. 269.

1786. Answer to a Letter on the Jutae or Viti.

1787. ✢ An Account of Roman Pottery at Sandy, Beds., and Lincoln. Archæologia VII. p. 110.

1788. ✢ Notes and Descriptions of Antiquities of the Provincia Romana of Gaul. (181—d.1.) quarto.

1789. ✢ The Origin of Gothic Architecture. Archæologia IX. p. 109.

1789. ✢ Observations on Ancient Painting in England. Archæologia IX. p. 141.

1792. ✢ Account of some Sepulchral Antiquities at Lincoln. Archæologia X. p. 345.

1795. ✢ A Description of some Roman Antiquities dug up at Bath. With this are bound papers on vases found on the Mosquito shore in South America, 1778; Roman Earthenware fished up within the mouth of the Thames, 1778; the origin of Gothic Architecture, 1788; an account of some Irish antiquities, 1774; further observations on the same.

1795. ✢ An Antiquarian Romance, endeavouring to mark a Line by which the most Ancient People and the Processions of the Earliest Inhabitants of Europe may be Investigated. (C.T.453.) 8vo.

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[1] Published 1786, in vol. iii., *Collectanea de Rebus Hibernicis.*

THOMAS POWNALL, SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1767-1780

DATE.	HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY.	SUBJECT.
1767		
May 15	xvi. 331	Bill suspending Assembly of New York
1769		
Jan. 1	,, 485	Affairs of North America
Feb. 8	,, 494	Affairs of North America on Report
Mar. 15	,, 605	Quartering troops in America
Apr. 12	,, 610	Repeal of American Revenue Act
1770		
Mar. 5	,, 854	Repeal of American Tea Duty
,, 21	,, 911	Trials of Controverted Elections
May 8	,, 980	Disturbances in America
Nov. 22	,, 1120	Spain and the Falkland Islands
,, 27	,, 1173	Press Prosecutions
Dec. 12	,, 1331	The Mutiny Bill
1771		
Feb. 13	,, 1368	Spain and the Falkland Islands
Mar. 22	xvii. 118	Press Prosecutions
1772		
Jan. 31	,, 245	Supply of Seamen
Feb. 12	,, 299, 301	The Mutiny Bill
Apr. 14	,, 476	The Corn Laws
June 3	,, 512	,, ,,
Dec. 3	,, 553	,, ,,
,, 15	,, 644	The Mutiny Bill
1773		
Feb. 2	,, 698	The Corn Laws
1774		
May 17	,, 1146	The Irish Linen Trade
Mar. 25	,, 1185	Boston Port Bill
Apr. 15	,, 1199	The Jury System in America
1774		
Apr. 22	xvii. 1282	Government of Massachusetts Bay
1775		
Feb. 20	xviii. 322	Bill on differences with America
May 8	,, 398	Bill restraining Colonial Commerce
Nov. 8	,, 890	Army Estimates
,, 16	,, 984	Mr. Burke's Bill for quieting America
,, 29	,, 1024	The Nova Scotia Petition
1777		
Apr. 18	xix. 157	Arrears of Civil List
Dec. 12	,, 525	Mr. Fox's Inquiry into State of the Nation
1778		
Feb. 6	,, 701	Employment of Red Indians in American War
Mar. 17	,, 930	Treaty between France and America
May 6	,, 1137	Commissioners sent to America
1779		
Mar. 10	xx. 248	Trade of Ireland
June 22	,, 955	Militia Bill
1780		
Mar. 13	xxi. 249	Abolition of Board of Trade and Plantations
,, 20	,, 302	Mr. Burke's Establishment Bill
Apr. 6	,, 365	The Influence of the Crown
May 5	,, 582	General Conway's Bill for quieting America
,, 24	,, 627	Introducing a Bill to enable H.M. to make peace with America

GOVERNOR POWNALL'S BILL TO ENABLE HIS MAJESTY TO MAKE PEACE WITH AMERICA

Hansard's *Parliamentary History*, xxi. p. 627, May 24, 1780.

In order to remove all doubts or disabilities which may prevent, obstruct or delay the happy work of peace, may it please your Majesty that it may be declared and enacted, etc., etc.

That His Majesty is empowered to make convention or truce, or to conclude a peace, with the inhabitants of New Hampshire, Massachusett's Bay, Rhode Island, and Providence Plantation, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the three Delaware counties, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, in North America, convened in Congress or in any other Assembly or Assemblies, or with any person or persons authorised to act for and in behalf of the same, in such form and manner as He, by virtue of the prerogative of His crown, hath power to do in all other cases, and on such terms and conditions as in the course of events shall become convenient and necessary for the honour and welfare of His Majesty and his people.

And in order thereto be it enacted by the authority aforesaid that from and after the passing of this Act it shall and may be lawful for His Majesty to appoint such person or persons (subjects of Great Britain) as His Majesty in his wisdom shall think fit, and fully to authorise the same to treat, consult, and agree with the said Americans or any part to the said purpose of convention, truce and peace.

And be it further enacted that from and after the passing of this Act it shall and may be lawful for His Majesty to grant safe conduct to any such person or persons whatsoever as His Majesty shall see cause and judge proper to receive on the ground of treaty for such convention, truce or peace, in like manner as he is by divers ancient statutes empowered to do in the cases therein specified.

Note.—General Conway's Bill of May 5, 1780, was much longer and went into details which the above avoids.

FACSIMILES OF TWO LETTERS OF GOVERNOR POWNALL, 1758

Boston July 3d 58.

Sir -

I am greatly obligd to you for ye good Ne
you sent me, & do most heartily congratulate wi
you on ye Successfull progress His Majesty's Forces ha
made in ye Service they are gon upon. I do not do
but in a short time we shall hear of an honnarab
& glorious Issue of ye final Event. I wish matte
to ye Westward cond be viewd in ye same hopes, but
think Genl Abercromby has a very hard (I had almost
saied) unequall task. The Enimy at Ticonderoga & Cr
Pt are very powerfull in their numbers & very strong
their Works & more so in ye Ground. They have eight Reg
there besides Canadiens & Indians. & ye Marine Provinc
It seems to me that ye General will want more Regu
However every thing is in great forwardness. on ye 21
of Last Month Lt How with ye Advanced Body 6,000
was gott to Lake George & had 300 whales Boats.

Batteaux &c afloat The General acquainted me he was to follow soon so that by this time he is I suppose there, with ye Main body if all ye Provincials have joined him.— Forbes affair is I hope in a fair way— He being at Fort du Quesne have but 500 in garrison & 300 Indians. & Forbes will have ten times that number & as many Indians as one. I will hope before next month begins to send you some good News from hence in return for ye agreable News you sent me. I am Sir

Your most Obed^t

& most humble

Servant

Howard—

P.S. to prevent idle accounts getting into ye News Papers I have given ye Printer ye Journal you sent me, to print as authentic.

Boston

Castle William July 27. 58.

Sir.

I am sorry I have no better account from the army at Lake George to send to you, than the Enclosed. The Inadequateness of the Troops to the Nature of the Service seemd to me what was always to be feard & proved unequall to it. I have not here by me the List of the Officers killd & wounded or I would send it. Lt Col Bruce & Majr Proby were only wounded & missing & the General was in hopes to hear of their being prisoners, but he hears since they were killd.

The General has strengthend the Mohawks River with 5600 Men under Brigr Stanwix, an advanced Post of which will be commanded by Col Bradstreet which may possibly act offensively but of this by himself only.

I find by the Halifax paper You are near to entering upon a New Department of Administration & making of a Legislature, I most heartily wish You Success & Honor — I am Sir

Your most Obed & most Humble Servt

The Honble Brigr Monckton
Commander in Chief of
Nova Scotia.

Jno Amherst

FACSIMILES OF TWO LETTERS OF JUNIUS TO MR. WOODFALL

They shew how the writer purposely varied his hand, which was identified by Mr. Chabot in 1871 as that of Philip Francis when disguised.

To Mr. David Garrick

I am very exactly informed of your impertinent inquiries & of the information you so busily sent to Richmond, & with what triumph & exultation it was received. I knew every particular of it the next day. — Now mark me, vagabond. — Keep to your pantomimes, or be assured you shall hear of it. Meddle no more, thou busy informer! — It is in my power to make you curse the hour, in which you dared to interfere with Junius.

I wd. send the above to Garrick directly, but that I wd. avoid having this hand too commonly seen. Oblige me then so much as to have it copied in any hand, & sent by the penny post, that is, if you dislike sending it in your own writing. — I must be more cautious than ever. I am sure I shd. not survive a discovery three days; or if I did, they wd. attaint me by bill. Change to the Somerset Coffee house, & let no mortal know the Alteration. I am persuaded you are too honest a man to contribute in any way to my destruction. ~~[illegible]~~ Act honourably by me, & at a proper time you shall know me.
I think the second page, with the widest lines, looks best. — What is your essential reason? — for the Change. I send You some more Sheets. — I think The paper is not so good as Wheble's — but I may be mistaken. — the type is good. The aspersions thrown upon my Letr to the Bill of Rts shd be refuted by publication. prevail upon Mr. Wilkes to let you have Extracts of my 2 & 3d. Letter to him. It will make the book still more new. — I wd. see them before they are printed, but keep this Last to Yrself.

To Mr. Woodfall.

Private & particular

Thursday Night.

I shall be glad to see the pacquet you speak of. It can not come from the Candishes. tho there be no End of the family. They would not be so silly as to put their arms on the Cover. As to me, be assured that it is not in the Nature of things that they, or You, or any body else should ever know me, unless I make myself known. All arts or Inquiries, or Rewards would be equally ineffectual.

As to you, it is clearly my Opinion, that You have nothing to fear from the D. of B— I reserve some thing expressly to awe him, in case he sh^d think of bringing you before the H^e of L— I am sure I can threaten him privately with such a Storm, as will make him tremble even his Grace. — You may send home to the same place without further Notice; if You have any thing of Your own to communicate, I shall be glad to hear it.

C

FACSIMILE OF ONE OF THE LETTERS OF PHILIP FRANCIS TO MACRABIE, JULY 30, 1769.

It was not from general resemblance, but by picking out from the text individual characters in detail that Mr. Chabot was able to prove that the same hand which wrote these letters to Macrabie was that of Junius as in the two foregoing examples. For full information as to how Mr. Chabot did this reference is necessary to pages 1-150 of his report in Mr. Twisleton's *The Handwriting of Junius.*

Complete comparison with what next follows, viz. two pages of one of the letters in the Cooper MSS. in the British Museum, is not possible from this one sheet, which is only a specimen, and does not contain a sufficient number of words for the purpose. But, by Mr. Chabot's method, it has been attempted to observe, and to make indicative marks below, a large number of the characters in this sheet which closely resemble those similarly marked in the two facsimiles which will be found after this one.

For details to notice see *ante*, pages 376, 377.

Ingrefs. 30. July. 1769.

My dear Brother.

Mr. L. Baker, who will deliver you this Letter, is a Person, for whom my good Friend Mr. Calcraft himself interests. He is by Trade a Ship Builder, and reckoned un: common Expert in his Profession. Particular Circum: stances oblige him to try his Fortune in Philadelphia. What I wish is that you would take up his Cause among your Friends, & endeavour to get him into Employment. I beg you will also make it a request in my Name to Teach Francis and all my Relations in that Quarter, to assist him with their Interest & Protection.

Believe me always most faithfully Yours

P. Francis.

FACSIMILES OF PART OF THE FIRST PAGE AND OF THE FOURTH PAGE OF ONE OF THE LETTERS FROM THOMAS POWNALL TO DR. COOPER OF BOSTON, FEBRUARY 13, 1769.

These, like that which is placed before them, are only specimens. They are reproduced from one of the two long letters referred to in the chapter on Junius. Characters which resemble those in the preceding letter of Francis are marked in the same way below the line of writing to facilitate comparison; this can only be done so far as the material in the Francis letter permits. If the result of comparison is that the characters are considered identical in each case, formed in the same way and written by the same person, we have in the body of these Cooper letters the natural handwriting of Francis, who did not here trouble to disguise it. The signature will be seen to be that of Pownall as in his holographs here reproduced. If Francis wrote the Cooper letters for Pownall to sign, it may be inferred that when he wrote the Junius series at the same period he did so from the dictation or drafts of Pownall, who was his employer on both occasions and the real author.

Albemarle Street, London
13th Feby 1769.

Dear Sir

In addition to what I wrote You in my last of the part wch I had taken in Yr affairs, lately before Parlt, I should here have troubled You with the remaining part of what I said upon the occas but as it is possible you may have other opportunit of being informd of it, I will not here enter into it —

I cannot as yet learn whether any other measure are likely to be taken in this affair — but I will atte to all Motions on this subject, with the watchfulney not only of a good subject of Gt Britn, but as a frien to the Colonies, & of the Massts bay in particular.

This Measure of the Crown's being advised, if it t proper, to act upon the 35th of Henry the 8th, altho I thi it is not meant to be, or ever will be carried into execution, yet deserves some very serious considera to guard agt the ill use that might be made of i as for instance — by this Measure any Servan of the Crown may be directed to inquire after & repo any matters of Treason or misprision of Treason upon wch Report the persons thus charged or infor against may be taken into Custody, brought prison to England &c &c —

if such Correspondence should fall into the hands of those who are either willing, or whose interest it is to misrepresent them — to prevent therefore beyond all doubt all such Letters as you may write to me, from falling into such hands, you may take care they never come in any other channel than thro' which they will be delivered directly into my own hands — I cannot by letter tell you why this Caution is necessary, but it is necessary. & you may suggest the same to any of our friends who may have occasion to write to me —

I hope this will find you & all our friends well, to whom I beg my best Respects —

I am with greatest Esteem, & most sincere regard

Dr Sir

Your affectionate friend & faithfull Servt

J Bowdoin

To The Revd. Dr. Cooper

I did mean by this conveyance to have sent you my Speach, Should the Ship not sail of two or three daies you shall have it —

GENEALOGY

GENEALOGY

King's *Vale Royal*, written in 1621, speaks of a "very ancient seat and Demean in the Township of Pownehall." That demesne, called Pownall Fee, comprises over 2000 acres, and with the similarly named Bolyn Fee, goes far to make up the area of the parish. It is believed that the original name was Paynells Feodry—or Fee—*i.e.* an estate held on feudal tenure by the Paynells, people of considerable importance in the very early days, who had estates called after them at Littleton Paynell and Knighton Paynell, Wilts; Boothby Paynell, Lincoln; Newport Paynell (or Pagnel), Bucks; and Hooton Paynell in Yorkshire. In the last-named county at Aynesty, or Ainsty, there was another place called by the same name of Paynell Fee.[1] Some of this family were brought into Cheshire by their connection with Randle II. Earl of Chester, whose first cousin, Avilia de Romelli,[2] was married in 1160 to William Paynell,[3] whose kinsmen had been companions in arms of the Earl twenty years before, fighting with him on behalf of the Empress Maud against King Stephen. Earl Randle led an army to Lincoln in 1141,[4] and took the castle and the whole of the country near it; meanwhile Ralph Paynell[5] was Governor of Nottingham, and Gervase Paynell, Baron of Dudley, uncle of the above-mentioned William, held Dudley Castle for the Empress. They were thus all acting together. Among the names peculiar to Cheshire this is mentioned by Mr. Guppy who says, "The Pownalls have long been gathered together in the Parish of Wilmslow, which contains Pownall Hall and its demesne whence the ancient family of Pownall of the thirteenth century derived its name."[6]

Eight years before the marriage of William, the name of Gervase appears on a deed,[7] whereby his lands in Cheshire, with those of the Bishop of Chester and others, were specially exempted from a grant

[1] Calendar of Inquisitions, R.O., ii. p. 190, "Karlton in Balne is held on socage of the fee of Paynel."

[2] Nichol's *History of Leicestershire*, ii. p. 158.

[3] Banks's *Ext. Baronage*, i. p. 154; Dugdale, iv. p. 2.

[4] Hanshall's *Cheshire*, 1823, p. 19.

[5] Hume, i. p. 483; Banks's *Ext. Baronage*, i. p. 154, Harl. MS. lii. p. 761.

[6] *Homes of Family Names*, 1890, H. B. Guppy, p. 97.

[7] Rymer's *Foedera*, 1152.

to Earl Randle by Henry, Duke of Normandy. All spelling in those days was variable and phonetic. Our ancestors were extremely inattentive to orthography, particularly in proper names, which they but seldom spelt themselves. The man *pronounced* his name, and the priest or scrivener, whoever he might be, wrote it as it sounded. If the local pronunciation had been acquired that appeared in what was written. "Personal names were written by the ear since the persons themselves did not attend to the accurate writing of their own names, which they changed, sometimes capriciously, sometimes with anxious nicety."[1]

The origin of Paynell is given by Gibbon.[2] The final consonant being dropped it elsewhere became Payne. In that form Sir Bernard Burke traces it,[3] basing his remarks on Gibbon. The broad speech of Cheshire makes "ride" into "roide," "fine" into "foine," "all" into "aw," "squire" into "squoir," and at Wilmslow has left "Fulshaw" Park to bear the name of Sir Matthew de Fulscha. So Paynell became Pownall, spelt in various ways. The same thing happened further north, where a hill on the Scotch border was called Pownell, either after some of the Paynells who went to the Scotch wars on several occasions, or, more probably, because Jordan Paynell held an estate in Northumberland.[4] The heading to Chapter XLV. of Sir Walter Scott's *Antiquary* runs:—

> Red gleamed the beacon on Pownell,
> On Skiddaw there were three.

Adam Paynell owned property in Westmoreland in the year 1200.[5] In Cheshire Paynell and Pownall were alternatively used, sometimes one, sometimes the other. An old Charter of the twelfth century speaks of the "whole fee of Pownale."[6] Spelt in the same way it appears, on another Charter, at Wilmslow in the year 1200.[7] Much later, in 1322, Johannes Paynell was "Subdiaconus" of the church of Rostherne,[8] and from 1330-35 he held that living,[9] seven miles from Wilmslow. In 1326-27-31-36 John Paynell[10] held the high office of Chamberlain of the County Palatine of Chester where, under its separate jurisdiction, the authority of a Chamberlain was that of a Chancellor.[11] All the elder lines ended with daughters who took the lands into other families when they married. To the

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[1] *Curiosities of Literature*, 1823, D'Israeli, v. p. 59.
[2] *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, note 2, Chapter XXI.
[3] *Rise of Great Families*, pp. 192-95.
[4] *Pipe Rolls of* 31. *Henry I.* (1131), p. 29.
[5] "Protecte oblatiset Finibus in Turri Londinensi," 2069, d., British Museum Catalogue.
[6] Earwaker's *East Cheshire*, i. p. 134.
[7] *Ibid.* i. p. 118.
[8] Ormerod's *Cheshire*, i. p. 55.
[9] *Reports of Deputy Keeper of the Public Records*, xxxvi. p. 410.
[10] *Ibid.* xxxi. p. 229.
[11] Hanshall's *Cheshire*, 1823, p. 12.

younger branches only the name remained. In his *History of East Cheshire*,[1] Earwaker writes of Pownall Hall:—"It was from an early period the seat of a family who bore the local name, and of whom there are still many descendants in various parts of the county. A Richard de Pownale occurs in the Trafford deeds in 1297, and again before 1300; and a Robert de Pownale in 1336 and 1343. The direct male line of the family terminated in the person of this Robert de Pownale who died about 1350, and whose daughter and heiress, Margery, married in 1328 Hugh Fitton, son of John Fitton, Lord of Boleyn."

Following on this passage are the deeds which passed between[2] the parties to this marriage. The Fittons of Gawsworth descended from it. So did the Fittons of Pownall; those of Boleyn died out



HAWTHORN HALL, WILMSLOW.[3]

about 1370. The Fittons at Pownall remained there till they were succeeded by the Newtons, one of whom married their heiress in 1490, and so obtained that property. Meanwhile, a younger line of the original owners of Pownall continued to hold the manor house, half a mile away, which was first called Hayethorn Hall, and is now sometimes spelt Hathorne, sometimes Hawthorne.[4] To quote again from Earwaker as to this place:—"It is probable that it was granted by the Fittons to a member of the Pownall family,[5] who continued the descent long after the main branch of the Pownalls at Pownall

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[1] Vol. i. p. 118.

[2] Lipton's *Magna Britannica*, *Cheshire*, 1810, ii. Part ii. p. 381.

[3] The above picture of Hawthorn (Hathorne) Hall is reproduced from Mr. Gallichen's *Guide to Cheshire*, by permission of Messrs. Methuen & Co.

[4] *East Cheshire*, i. p. 129.

[5] Their cousins by marriage.

Hall had become extinct. The Thomas Pownall who is mentioned in 1421, at the time of the divisions of the Manor of Bolyn between the Traffords and the Booths, was most probably of Hathorne. This family was still holding Hathorne early in the sixteenth century, for among the Trafford deeds there is mention of John Pownall of Hathorne in 1512, and of Edmund Pownall of Hathorne, probably his son, in 1532. . . . Edmund Pownall, who was buried at Wilmslow July 24, 1603, had a son Henry Pownall who, in 1606, sold the Hathorne estates to John Latham."

Under this heading Ormerod, in his *History of Cheshire*, has a similar passage.[1] As owners of Hathorne Hall, the Pownalls appear[2] in 1445 and 1579 on rolls of the "Knights, Gentlemen and Freeholders of Cheshire."

In 1460 "Hugh Pownall, late of Pownall," was on a list[3] containing many well-known Cheshire names—Fitton, Davenport, Maynwaring, Mascy—of those who received a general pardon for good service at the battle of Bloreheath.

Not at Hathorne only did the race survive. The ordnance map shews various places in the neighbourhood to which offshoots from Wilmslow gave their names. They were thick on the ground like a Scotch clan; like successive rooks in the same rookery they were all allied to each other, but the precise nature of the relationship then is as undiscoverable now as is that of the present rooks. There is a Pownall Brow, three miles south-west of Wilmslow; four miles to the north-east of that town, at Bramall, is another Pownall Hall, and also a Pownall Green; the latter name is found also at Tabley, eight miles west of Wilmslow; on the early registers of Rostherne, the parish Church of Tabley, is recorded the death on March 26, 1598, of a John Pownall who was a yeoman at Tabley. To Witton, four miles south of Tabley, another branch migrated, probably attracted there by the lucrative salt industry of Northwich. By 1581 this Witton branch had so prospered that they were then assessed[4] for a tax at three times the amount levied from those who still remained at Hathorne and whose fortunes were declining. By deeds of 1496,[5] and 1509,[6] John Pownall, then owner of Hathorne, had disposed of considerable quantities of land, thus reducing the estate. When that was sold in 1606, the direct line of succession to property at Wilmslow ceased after having lasted about four centuries.

There remained the above-mentioned offshoots in the district; they have been traced, as far as possible, and a folio[7] in the reading room of the British Museum gives their descent, a summary of it follows. From the sixteenth century, previous to the sale of

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[1] Edition of 1882, iii. p. 592.

[2] Earwaker's *East Cheshire*, i. pp. 17, 18.

[3] *Ibid.* ii. p. 2.

[4] Harleian MS. 1920, pp. 50, 56.

[5] *Reports of Deputy Keeper of the Public Records*, vol. xxvi. p. 27; vol. xxxvii. p. 596.

[6] Cheshire Plea Rolls, 1. Henry VIII. Quoted by Earwaker, i. p. 210.

[7] "1861. d. 24," on Catalogue.

Hathorne, the pedigree of the Witton branch which Governor Pownall came from is clear though it is uncertain at what precise date they moved from Wilmslow to Witton. On a pedigree at the Heralds' College, compiled in 1798 by Mr. J. C. Brook, Somerset Herald, the first name is that of Thomas Pownall of Morley, near Wilmslow, in 1422. Morley is part of Pownall Fee which includes Hathorne, so the person last mentioned is probably the Thomas Pownall of 1421, whose name appears in the second of the above quotations from Earwaker. Whom he married and what children he had the Heralds' College pedigree does not say. Unless those facts are fully given, as they seldom are, it is impossible to say, even of men bearing the same name in the same place, whether it was a son who succeeded his father or a nephew his uncle. One child born out of wedlock upsets everything that follows.[1] This Thomas of Morley is but a connecting link with Wilmslow, and the pedigree, as such, does not begin with him but with the next name, Humphrey, of whom it is there said that he removed to Witton. His son Ralph, born there in 1536, as the earliest registers of Witton Church shew, owned four "leads" or salt-making pans at Northwich in 1565. His grandson Thomas, born in 1584, married the heiress of William Lyttler of Barnton, a village on the north bank of the Weaver, where

[1] There is hardly a pedigree in existence on which every detail during the time before Henry VIII. could be sworn to and substantiated under cross-examination in a court of law. Very few heads of households could write their own records of who their wives were and what children were born to them. Later on, when education was more general, such entries were usually made in the family Bible, which became worn out and was discarded, with its memoranda, to be replaced by a new one. In the earlier days the domestic history of the very great houses, and of them only, is traceable from the part their members took in State affairs. Evidence comes also from their deeds as to land, or from their being able to afford to keep a chaplain who could act as scribe and recorder, but most of those houses went down in the Wars of the Roses. In 1485 there were only twenty-nine lay Peers left. Nor was there then any outside agency which officially took note of relationships. The Heralds' College was not founded till 1484, so the visitations to the counties of its officials cannot reach behind that date, and many of their entries are only based on hearsay evidence. In his book on the law of family names Mr. Fox Davies states that it is doubtful if there are fifty authentic male pedigrees which can be taken back to the Conquest, and that there are only about 300 families now holding the same land in male succession, even from the time of Henry VIII. When land went from a family the deeds went also, and relationships could no longer be traced from those papers when they were in other hands. Henry's minister, Thomas Cromwell, made the keeping of parish registers compulsory, and, with rare exceptions, it is only since those began that any pedigree, as such, is provable.

an old manor-house, probably that of the Lyttlers, still survives among the new streets inhabited by the employés of the adjacent salt works. Witton was then abandoned for Barnton by the issue of this marriage, and henceforth their names appear on the registers of Great Budworth parish church. The namesake and grandson of the Thomas who married Katherine Lyttler was born in 1650; he married another heiress, daughter of Richard Browne of Saltfleetby on the Lincolnshire coast, and left Barnton to live there.

His grandson was the Thomas Pownall with whom we are concerned, and whose nephew and heir Sir George Pownall died in 1834, leaving the Lincolnshire estate and that at King's Lynn in Norfolk, valued at £2400 a year, together with a personality of £60,000, sums much larger then than now, to a second cousin who married Dr. Beatty of Lincoln, whose descendants became Beatty-Pownalls.

The arms are recorded on the Heralds' visitation of Cheshire in 1613 as "*Arg. a Lion Rampant Sable.*"[1] They were confirmed by the Heralds' College to Governor Pownall in April 1790, with the crest of a lion's paw holding a key.[2] Those date back to and have been used since some time previous to 1328, when the Fittons of Pownall quartered them from the time of the marriage of Hugh of that name with the heiress of Pownall, and the Newtons who succeeded the Fittons there, on marrying their heiress, did the same. In this connection they are given in the Harleian MS.[3] and illustrated by Ormerod.[4] They are not the original arms of Paynell which Murray's Genealogist gives as *Or, two bars Azure with an orle of eight martlets Gules.*[5] Paynell of Dudley's seal, No. 12,432 in the British Museum, is *Two Lions contournes in pale between two Fleurs de Lys.* Before the edict of Henry V. in 1417, followed by the foundation of the Heralds' College in 1484, when Heraldry crystallised into definite and hereditary form, arms were variable even between father and son. Thus Hanshall[6] illustrates the arms of Randle I. and II., Earls of Chester, as a lion rampant, and those of Earl Hugh, son of the last named and his successor in 1153, as "*Azure*, 6 *garbs Or.*" Those garbs or wheatsheaves appear on the coat of Grosvenor and of Fitton and other Cheshire houses who claimed connection with him. John Paynell is recorded by Boutell[7] as having, about the year 1300, changed his arms from the bars and martlets which, with differences, had become usual in his house to adopt out of feudal alliance, *Vert a maunche Or.* It is probable that

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[1] Harleian MS. vol. 1535, p. 25.

[2] In his *General Armoury* Sir Bernard Burke quotes Mr. Brooke, Somerset Herald: "It appears that members of this family were Chamberlains to the Kings as Earls of Chester and on that account, in allusion to their office, they bore for crest a Lion's paw holding a golden key."

[3] Vol. xviii. p. 185.

[4] *Cheshire*, vol. iii. p. 593.

[5] Vol. viii. p. 216.

[6] *Cheshire*, 1823, p. 170.

[7] *English Heraldry*, 1904, p. 202.

for the same reason the branch of Paynell which was introduced into Cheshire by Earl Randle, and connected with him by marriage, did the same and dropped their bars and martlets to adapt that Earl's badge just as other families took that of Hugh his successor.

In the very early days they were people in high positions, thence they dropped in Cheshire to the plane of the local gentry as owners of Pownall and afterwards of Hathorne; from that again they became yeomen at Witton, Barnton and Tabley. From Barnton the Lincolnshire branch partly recovered its position again by Governor Pownall's time. Such a story is not an unusual one. Guppy quotes Bishop Stubbs as saying that the old yeomanry were "a body which in antiquity of possession and purity of extraction was probably superior to the classes that looked down on it as ignoble." He adds "the yeomanry in the past were the backbone of the nation. Men rose from their ranks and assumed the arms of the gentry, and from thence passed upward into the order of the nobility; or, as was naturally far more frequently the case, they descended in the scale . . . the ascending scale, or the rise from the state of the ignoble to the condition of the noble has been a frequent theme for the historian and biographer, but we are very apt to forget that this ascent involves a descent in the social ladder. The rise of some families into honour and fame implies the fall and gradual degradation of the others . . . thus we can perceive how when an ancient house becomes extinct it is only the honours which have passed away, the family remains though its ramifications are lost among the masses of the people."[1]

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[1] *Family Names*, 1890, pp. 1, 9, 10.

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THE GENERATIONS OF THE POWNALLS

So spoken in Cheshire since a.d. 1200. Previously Paynell or, in Latin Deeds, Paganel.

(This sheet is abridged from folio in British Museum, where it is 1861. d. 24 on Catalogue.)

1087. B. Ralph Paynell, Baron of Dudley, held 15 Lordships. Founded Priory of Holy Trinity, York. D., i. 153.
1101. B. Fulk P., Baron of Dudley. Founded Priory of Newport Pagnell, Bucks. D. i. 153.

1138. B. Gervase P., Baron of Dudley = Isabel, *d.* of the Earl of Lincoln.
1141. Held Dudley for the Empress Maud.
1152. Had lands in Cheshire.
1166. Held 50 Knights' Fees. C.P.

Hawise P. = (1) John de Somery. B¹. i. 154. (2) Roger de Berkeley.

B. William P. = Juliana, d. of Robert de Bampton.
1166. Held 15 Knights' Fees. Founded priory at Drax.

1180. B. Fulk P. = Auda.

B. William P. = Avicia de Romelli. D. iv. 2, B¹. *c.* of Raadle H., Earl of Chester.

1208. B. Hugh Paynell = ——. Lord of Drax. Held 6 Knights' Fees.

1209. B. William P. = ——. D.

William P. = Alice de Moyun.

B. Fulk P. = ——. B¹.

1221. B. William P. sued the Abbot of Canterbury for the Manors of Grenewich and Lowesham (Harwood's *Genealogist*, xv. 217).
1200. Pounale at Wilmslow mentioned on a Charter in the Trafford Deeds: and on a still earlier undated one. E. pp. 118, 134.
(As Paynell became Pownall in Cheshire speech, so did it become Pownell on the Scots border. By the same thickening of vowel sound Fulscha became Fulshaw at Wilmslow.)
1270. "Hee Punale" (High Pownall) the name of lands at Wilmslow. E. i. 142.
1272. Richard de Pownall appears on a deed at Wilmslow. O. iii. 592.
1276. Pounhale Fee, Wilmslow, on Inquis. Post-Mortem.
1290. Pownehale Fee, Wilmslow. O. (old edition), p. 290.
1294. Robertus P., "Le Chamberlain," held Drax Manor, Yorks., 60 miles from Wilmslow. Inq. Post-Mortem.
1297. Richard de Pounhale on Trafford deeds. Before 1300 he witnessed a deed at Wilmslow. E. i. 118.
1322. Johannes de Paynell, Subdisconus of Rostherne Church, 8 miles from Wilmslow (where his namesake, John Pownall, on March 24, 1598, was among the first entries of deaths in registers). O. i. 55.
1327-28-31-36. John Paynell, Chamberlain, *i.e.* Chancellor, to County Palatine of Chester. *D.K.R.* xxxvi. 410.
1328. Margery, *d.* and *h.* of Robert de Pownall, married Hugh Fitton. So Pownall Fee passed to him. Deeds quoted in full, E. i. 118. He, and the Newtons after him, quartered the Pownall arms. H.MS. xviii. 185.
1330-35. Johannes de Paynell held the living of Rostherne near Wilmslow. *D.K.R.* xxxvi. 410.
1340. Johannes Paynell, Dominus, Chamberlain of Chester. H.MS. p. 6111.
1349. Gilbert de Pounal, juror on Inq. P.-M. of Sir John Arderne. E. i. 339.
1370. Richard de Pownale witnesses a deed of the Fittons. E. i. 159.
1415. Thomas de Pownall, juror, Inq. P.-M. Robert de Legh. E. ii. 236.
1421. Thomas de Pownall on a deed at Wilmslow. E. i. 49.
1422. John, son of Hugh Pownall, on a deed at Wilmslow. E. i. 143.
1428. Thomas Pownall exempted from serving on juries. O. iii. 592.
1445. Edmund and John Pownall on a list of Knights, Esquires, Gentlemen, and freeholders of Cheshire. E. i. 77.
1460. Hugh Pownall, late of Pownall, pardoned for good service at the battle of Bloreheath. E. ii. 2.
1494. John Pownall exempted from serving on juries. O. iii. 592.
1496. John Pownall executed a deed disposing of property at Erdeswick, Wrenbury, and Church Minshull. *D.K.R.* xxxvi. 27.
1509. John Pownall of Hathorne party to a deed on Cheshire Plea Rolls, disposing of lands. E. i. 120.
1513. John Pownall of Hathorne executor to the will of Sir Edmund Trafford. E. i. 70.
1532. Edmund Pownall of Hathorne mentioned in the Trafford deeds.
1548. John Pownall a juror at Knutsford on the estate of Lady Trafford. E. i. 64.
1561. "Julye the 25th day was buried Edmund Pownall." Wilmslow Registers. E. i. 129.
1562. John Pownall of Hathorne on the Fulshaw deeds. E. i. 129.
*1565. Raffe Pownall of Witton held four "leads" for salt at Northwich. In 1581 assessed higher than Henry of Hathorne.
1579. Henry Pownall of Hathorne Hall on list of Knights, Esquires, Gentlemen, and Freeholders of Cheshire. E. i. 17.
1603. Edmund Pownall of Hathorne buried at Wilmslow, July 24. Wilmslow Registers.
1606. Henry Pownall sold Hathorne Hall and estate at Wilmslow to John Latham. E. i. 129.
1613. The Arms: Arg. a Lion Rampant Sable on Heralds visitation of Cheshire. H.MS. 1535, p. 25.
1663. Heralds visitation of Cheshire, pedigree of the Barnton branch registered.
†1666. William Pownall of Barnton, Charterer of Granthams lands at Mere by Tabley.

B. Sir John Paynell = heiress of Boothby, Lincoln. of Drax. Summoned as a Baron to Parliament. L. i. 27.

Sir John P. of Boothby, where this branch still was when Leland wrote in 1546.

Abbreviations

B. = Baron.
B¹. = Banks Extinct Baronage.
D. = Dugdale.
L. = Leland.
R.F. = Rymer's *Fœdera*.
O. = Ormerod's *Cheshire*.
E. = Earwaker's *East Cheshire*.
H.MS. = Harleian Manuscripts.
C. P. = Collins' *Peerage*.
D.K.R. = *Reports of the Deputy Keeper of the Records*.

TABLEY BRANCH

(Holding land there as yeomen, or on long leases for lives, for six generations from the time of Queen Elizabeth, or perhaps a still earlier period. Witton and Tabley are within 5 miles of each other.)

John Pownall of Tabley = Ellen Street. *d.* 1598.

Raffe Pownall of Tabley = ——. *d.* 1637.

John Pownall of Tabley = ——. 1603-78.

John Pownall of Tabley = Annie Tarvin. *b.* 1631.

John Pownall of Tabley = Hannah Eaton. Yeoman on Will at Chester, *d.* 1731.

John Pownall of Tabley = Catherine Wilkinson. 1687-1779.

William Pownall = M. Gerard. Mayor of Liverpool, 1718-68.

John Pownall = J. Crouchley. *b.* at Tabley, 1728-1814.

William Pownall = Eliz. Quilleo. of Liverpool, 1754-1814, *b.* at Tabley.

d. of J. Quillen, Attorney-General of the Isle of Man.

William Pownall. of Chester, 1765-1847. Ob. s.p.

John Pownall = A. Ricketts. of Staples Inn, 1766-

James Pownall = Maria A. Kewley, 1791-1854, sometime of Pownall Hall, Wilmslow.

g.-niece of William Assheton, the last of the Asshetons of Shepley.

Major Walter P., 1821-64, 3rd and 48th Regts.

Ven. Assheton P. = S. J. Whately, 1822-86. Archdeacon of Leicester.

niece of R. Whately, Abp. of Dublin.

John Fish P. = C. S. Harrison. 1817-98, of Russell Square.

Very Rev. C. H. P. = ——. Dean of Perth in Australia.

Assheton Pownall, 1877 Of Blackheath.

L.C.C. = F. H. Cowell, d. of Lieut.-Col. Clayton Cowell.

Henry Royds Pownall, R.F.A., 1887—

J. C. G. Pownall. 1891—

Percy M. Pownall. 1892—

Lionel Pownall.

WITTON AND BARNTON BRANCH

* Ralph Pownall of Witton = Margaret ——. 1536-1607.

Humphrey Pownall of Witton = Joan Tue. 1560-1614.

Thomas Pownall of Barnton = Katherine Lyttler. 1594-1664.

† William Pownall of Barnton = Mary Grantham. 1625-68.

Thomas Pownall of Barnton = Mary Browne of Saltfleetby. 1650-1706.

William Pownall of Saltfleetby = Sarah Burneston, 1681-1735. d. of John Barneston, Deputy-Governor of Bombay.

John Pownall, M.P. = Mary Lillingston. of Saltfleetby, 1720-95.

THOMAS POWNALL, GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS, M.P., F.R.S., 1722-1805. Ob. s.p.

Sir George Pownall, *b.* 1755. Ob. 1834, s.p.

J. Lillingston Pownall, of Saltfleetby, 1757-1821. Ob. s.p.

Edward Pownall = ——. *d.* 1869.

George Pownall = H. A. Pett.

Frederick P. = M. Hutton. *d.* 1889 Captain, R.A.

George H. P. = (1) L. Steinmetz. (2) E. Beckwith.

Frank P. = H. A. Stephenson. 1848— Royal Coll. of Music.

Frederick Pownall.

Guy Frank Pownall.

Capel George Pownall.

Lieut. G. H. Pownall, R.N.

Charles A. W. Pownall = D. B. Royds, 1848— 4 of In Japan 1882-96. Henry Royds Of Blackheath. of Wavertree.

H. Harrison Pownall = B. Glossop. 1853—

Rev. G. S. Pownall = G. L. Wakeford. Rector of Buxted, 1855—

WREXHAM BRANCH

Thomas Pownall of Wrexham = Martha Lowe. 1680-1718.

Thomas Pownall of Covent Garden = M. Catterall. 1712-82.

John Pownall = L. A. Durkin. 1759-1836.

J. O. Henry Pownall = A. S. Waterhouse. Chairman of the Middlesex Magistrates, 1792-1880.

NOTE. — Particulars of the Barnton and Tabley branches are to be seen in Sir Bernard Burke's *Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Commoners*, 1838, iv. p. 17.

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